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2Abstract
The Evolution of the New Federal Women’s Prisons in Canada
This thesis explores a unique experiment in penal reform; the final, successful 
attempt to close the sole federal Prison for Women in Canada and its replacement by 
five regional prisons. A government Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women, 
with representatives from the voluntary sector, produced a woman-centred document 
on penal reform. Wanting to create a plan reflecting the specific needs of Canadian 
women, they found that the country’s colonial history had an unanticipated impact 
upon their work, and that its Aboriginal (First Nations) members exerted a profound 
influence on the final report.
Focusing upon the first three prisons to open, this thesis traces the work of the Task 
Force itself, then shows how the voluntary sector was largely excluded from the 
project once the Correctional Service of Canada began to implement the plan. The 
exception was the new Aboriginal Healing Lodge, which relied heavily on 
Aboriginal input throughout the planning process. What this study reveals is the 
manner in which the language of penal reform is both incorporated and reinterpreted 
by correctional authorities. It shows how reformers from both the public and private 
sector may help to legitimise ventures, while the discipline of the prison 
simultaneously re-asserts itself in order to neutralise reform. The thesis assesses the 
way in which public and political opinion affected the entire project and analyses 
two major outcomes of the venture. Firstly, an enterprise intended to provide 
imprisoned women with greater autonomy has led to many more now living with 
disproportionate levels of security. Secondly, the possible consequences for 
Aboriginals of allowing their culture and spirituality to become part of the language 
of corrections. What the study demonstrates is that new forms of penal governance 
closely reflect those which have preceded them, irrespective of how the language 
and intentions might have changed.
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9Introduction
It was a curious conjunction of history. In April, 1990 prisoners and prison officials 
experienced a severe breakdown of order within the English and Welsh prison 
system. The disturbances, beginning with a 25-day siege at HMP Strangeways, 
spread to over 35 other male prisons and received wide media coverage throughout 
the country. The ensuing Inquiry into the events, headed by Lord Justice Woolf, 
produced a report in 1991 which was heralded as a blueprint for prison reform, even 
if much of what it contained was not new and had been foreshadowed by other 
criminological commentators. As was argued, what was new and radical was that the 
ideas should be united in a ‘unique package of reforms which Woolf insisted 
“need[ed] to be considered together and moved forward together” ’ (Player & 
Jenkins 1994: 11). The report was subsequently adopted by the Home Office and 
partially implemented across the entire men’s and women’s prison estate in England 
and Wales. Although women had played no part in the rioting and, with one 
exception, were not mentioned in the very lengthy report, it was assumed that their 
basic needs did not differ from men’s. To the Prison Service it seemed appropriate 
that the report’s recommendations should be applied equally to women and men.
At the same time as English and Welsh prisons were erupting, penal history was also 
being made in Canada. Responsibility for Canada’s correctional system is split 
between the provinces and the federal government, and those sentenced to 
imprisonment of two years or more are held in a penitentiary, rather than a prison. 
While there were a number of penitentiaries for men, the few women sentenced to 
federal terms had, since 1934, been confined in the physically inadequate Prison for 
Women in Kingston, Ontario. This meant that most federally sentenced women, 
unlike their male equivalents, were subject to immense geographic dislocation from 
their families and communities. Numerous attempts to close the prison failed, yet
i.L
on the 20 April 1990 Creating Choices, the Report o f the Task Force on Federally 
Sentenced Women, was published and hailed as the document which might finally 
succeed. The crux of the plan was that the Prison for Women should be closed and 
replaced by six new regional prisons, including an Aboriginal Healing Lodge. It 
was a groundbreaking report in that it focused entirely upon the needs of women 
prisoners, and there was no suggestion by the Correctional Service of Canada
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(CSC), once the report was adopted some eight months later, that it might apply 
equally to the male penitentiaries. Anticipating Woolf, the Report asked that the 
plan should be ‘seen, assessed and implemented in its entirety’ (TFFSW 1990: 114).
Superficially, the two events in Britain and Canada are only linked by the common 
thread of imprisonment, and the Woolf Report was immeasurably larger and, 
arguably, the more influential of the two reports. Yet Creating Choices has a 
significance beyond Canada simply because of its focus solely on women. The 
grand project of prison reform has frequently centred on overtly improving physical 
conditions (which covertly reinforce the prison’s inherent discipline), rather than 
question the prison’s rationale and utility. All too often, women have been ignored 
in the ensuing plans because they are seen to be peripheral to the larger problem of 
controlling men; women are added on, rather than included from the outset. An 
exception to this was the reformatory movement which sprang up in the United 
States, building on work begun in England by Elizabeth Fry. The American 
reformatories played a significant role in the regulation of offending women and 
their influence was also felt in Canada (Freedman 1981; Rafter 1985; Strange 1985; 
Hannah-Moffat 2001). Using the language of ‘matemalism’, women’s 
reformatories relied on the assumption that other women (matrons) could, through 
example, assist in the reform of their fallen sisters. Creating Choices, as a woman- 
centred report, used the more recent language of second-wave feminism to explain 
its vision of a re-formed prison -  and also suggested that other women (guards) 
could be role models for imprisoned women.
• This study notes the parallels to be drawn between the incorporation of both the 
‘maternal’ and feminist discourse into the correctional agenda and the way in 
which the intentions of the original ‘maternal’ reformers reappeared in Canada at 
the end of the twentieth century.
While this is interesting, of itself, it does not sufficiently explain why we should be 
aware of penal developments in Canada and should specifically consider the 
significance of Creating Choices. Canada is a vast country, but one which is often 
ignored because of the overpowering influence of the country which shares its 5,000 
mile border, the United States of America. In the United Kingdom we hear little of
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Canada, unless a British politician or member of the royal family pays a brief visit or 
something monstrous happens, such as the 1989 murder of 14 young women at the 
University of Montreal. Canada is too often assumed to be a bland country, lacking 
the excitement and verve of its southern neighbour, yet it embraces three very 
distinct cultures which coexist within a somewhat uneasy confederation of 
provinces. Canada is a country whose history we continue to share, thanks to our 
colonial past, and it retains many of the institutions set up when Great Britain seized 
control of the nascent state from the French in 1763. Yet the French were not the 
original peoples of that country; they simply began the process of divesting the First 
Nations of Canada (the Aboriginals) of their authority over the land which had been 
theirs from time immemorial.
The way in which the Aboriginals, the English and the Quebecois (francophones) 
worked together on the Task Force is important to the story I recount, because their 
individual perspectives intersected with the history of Canada and heavily 
influenced the report’s outcome. Task Force members were confronted by their 
colonial history in a most unexpected way and found their work greatly influenced 
by an articulate and impassioned group of Aboriginal women, who had themselves 
only been invited to join the Task Force as afterthoughts. The Aboriginals captured 
the agenda, politicising the discussion to an extraordinary degree and finally 
managing to have their ‘language’ integrated throughout the final report. By 
contrast the Quebecois, with significant issues of their own, exerted very little 
influence because they also had been largely excluded from the venture and were 
not subsequently included.
• These issues of inclusion and exclusion are a significant aspect of the story I 
relate.
Additionally, all Task Force members had to confront their individual differences in 
terms of how they viewed imprisonment as a sanction and, in this regard, the Task 
Force was indeed unique, because it brought together the voluntary sector, 
correctional civil servants and imprisoned women, in an unprecedented manner. A 
number from the voluntary sector were prison abolitionists, both by instinct and 
conviction. This perspective caused struggles with their consciences and principles
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were often painfully compromised because of the larger enterprise of trying to 
provide a less damaging prison for federally sentenced women.
• This aspect of the Task Force’s work has been a largely untold story, yet throws 
an important light on the process by which reforms are proposed and refined.
As has been suggested, individual Task Force members suspended their scepticism 
about the wisdom of the joint enterprise because they feared the price of failure 
would be paid by the federally sentenced women themselves. They allowed their 
conscience and empathy to over-rule their natural caution, because they could see no 
option, and contributed to producing a plan which allowed for the building of new 
prisons. The report was claimed by the civil servants once implementation began 
and the voluntary sector, with the exception of the Aboriginals, was eventually 
frozen out of the process. It might be thought, then, that the voluntary sector’s 
‘conscience’ was used by corrections to legitimate the joint enterprise and that their 
participation was for the ultimate convenience of the officials. But this could 
conceivably be too simplistic a reading of what initially happened, because many of 
the civil servants were as concerned as those from the voluntary sector about 
conditions in the Prison for Women. The effect of working together -  and 
particularly the impact of hearing the Aboriginal members’ views -  bound them all 
in an unanticipated manner, which suggests that such reforming schemes are at their 
most vulnerable once the partnership dissolves and the scheme is left subject to 
political and public pressures. That has been the universal pattern of prison reform, 
with good intentions captured and then distorted by the bureaucratic enterprise.
• Rothman’s (1980) thesis that benevolent intentions should be distrusted because 
of their unintended consequences will be examined in the light of what 
eventually transpired in Canada.
The initial point of my research was to ask if differential treatment of men and 
women might be justified in terms of its cost effectiveness, particularly in the area 
o f security. The complexity of this Canadian story, and particularly its historical 
context, altered the thrust of my examination and I chose to dwell on the Task Force
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and the issues which influenced it more than I could ever have first imagined. But 
that question remains valid, even if there is little consideration of the needs of men 
in this study, despite their having shaped ‘the prison’ as we largely know it. Part of 
Creating Choices' importance lies in the way in which it characterised federally 
sentenced women as being ‘high needs’ but ‘low risk’, a characterisation heavily 
influenced by the Task Force’s reluctance to label women as potentially violent, for 
complex reasons which I shall explore. Federally sentenced women were seen to be 
victims, as much as victimisers, and this led to the Task Force’s failure to be 
prescriptive about the type of accommodation which should be provided for the five 
percent of women they unwillingly decided might need higher levels of security.
We must see if this left Creating Choices with a potentially fatal flaw at its heart 
because the absence of such discussions subsequently allowed the Correctional 
Service of Canada (CSC), rather than the Task Force, to decide what should be 
provided.
• As the report’s explicit assumption had been than the great majority of federally 
sentenced women could live with relatively low levels of security, and that this 
should be ‘dynamic’ rather than ‘static’, provision for the ‘high risk’ women is a 
particularly important part of this study and something to which I shall return at 
various points.
I chose to examine the first three of the new prisons to open: Edmonton Institution 
for Women; Nova Institution for Women; and the Okimaw Ohci Healing Lodge. 
This was not because Etablissement Joliette and Grand Valley Institution for 
Women were any the less important, but solely determined by the scale of this 
thesis. Indeed, in the light of my focus on the impact of Canada’s colonial past on 
the Task Force itself, a very good case could have been made for considering the 
Quebec prison, as well. However, events at the first two prisons I mention so 
profoundly affected all the others, that they were almost self-selecting. The concept 
of the Healing Lodge was a complete departure from any other Canadian 
correctional norm and CSC allowed the Aboriginals a considerable input into its 
planning, in complete contrast to the other prisons. Its significance as a national 
venture should not be underestimated because it conveyed a message to the wider 
Canadian public that Aboriginals should have their voices heard, after centuries of
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neglect and indifference, an outcome attributable almost solely to the political skills 
of some of the Aboriginal Task Force members. Whether the Healing Lodge was 
indeed the right arena for such a political intervention is a contentious issue, 
particularly as prisons are not an Aboriginal construct. The building of the Healing 
Lodge itself raises the possibility that Aboriginals might have found themselves 
incorporated into a state structure which they have never formally acknowledged. 
This is also something I explore, with the immediate caveat that Aboriginals 
correctly question a non-Aboriginal’s understanding of their issues. In the context 
of what Creating Choices attempted to do I simply could not ignore the Healing 
Lodge; to do so would have been to marginalise the importance of the Aboriginals’ 
contribution to the Task Force.
• In addressing the issues of culture and spirituality in the context of imprisonment 
I explore the possibility that colonialism is not necessarily relegated to the pages 
of history. However, there is the related question, which I also address, of 
whether the Aboriginals themselves might have lost the moral high ground in 
agreeing to work with those previously seen as their oppressors.
What cannot be avoided is that all the members of the voluntary sector -  and this 
includes the Aboriginals -  deliberately participated in the Task Force, so share 
responsibility for the final outcome of their plan with the civil servants, irrespective 
of whether they individually participated in the implementation. The voices of 
prison reformers are frequently heard, yet are rather less frequently acted upon. The 
dilemma for reformers is the extent to which they should press for change to the 
existing system, rather than its reduction or even abolition. In asking if their failure 
to participate in reforming ventures might lead to a worse outcome for those whom 
they most wish to help, the question of whether punishment may be justified does 
not arise. There is simply the need to act and conscience appears to prevail in most 
circumstances because reformers find that they cannot stand by, on a point of 
principle, and watch as more people are damaged by the discipline and inherent 
limitations of the prison.
My sidestepping of the initial question regarding differential treatment has, in some 
senses, left me without a neatly defined central subject. The whole Canadian
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enterprise is ‘the subject’ because of what it shows us of the complexities of reform 
projects. The scale of what the Canadians undertook means that aspects of their 
work could well be examined in far greater depth.
• This study, by focusing on the endeavour as a whole, adds to our knowledge of 
the wider enterprise of prison reform and does so within the context of a plan 
which hoped to provide a distinctly Canadian solution to the problems of 
imprisoned women. Whether the Task Force was successful in achieving this is 
the point I now pursue.
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Method
Research subjects do not always emerge neatly from a long-considered topic. I first 
heard of the Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women when researching the 
subject of shared-site detention for a comparative paper I was completing. I had 
been given a copy of the proceedings of a 1992 conference on woman prisoners held 
in the Netherlands and one of the speakers came from the Correctional Service of 
Canada. The brief details of the Task Force and Creating Choices contained in her 
presentation appeared relevant to my work and, fortuitously, the published papers 
included telephone numbers for the individual participants. I rang the given 
Canadian number and found myself talking not to the presenter, but to a woman 
deeply involved with implementing Creating Choices. We talked for some time 
and, at the end of our conversation I said that I would very much like to see just 
what they were doing. Her response was to say ‘put a proposal together’ and at that 
moment my research topic presented itself, despite the fact that I had no idea how I 
could possibly undertake it. The civil servant then sent me a copy of Creating 
Choices and the fuse was lit.
My first visit to Canada took place in 1996. It lasted seven weeks and entailed visits 
to all of the new prisons, two of which had had their openings delayed, yet had staff 
in place eagerly awaiting the arrival of the first women. I had also arranged to visit 
the Prison for Women, the Burnaby Correctional Centre in British Columbia, which 
held both federal and provincial women prisoners, and the Minnesota Correctional 
Facility - Shakopee, which had influenced the style of the new prisons. The size of 
Canada, and the cost of travel, meant that I could not afford, in any sense of the 
word, to do anything other than start on one side of the country and make my way to 
the other coast. This was not as straightforward as it might sound, because I was 
also intent on meeting the (mostly) women who had participated in the Task Force; 
civil servants, members of the voluntary sector working with federally sentenced 
women and academics who had been following the venture from the outset. Many 
of these people lived considerable distances from the new prisons. The prisons 
themselves were not always close to reliable sources of public transport, so a 
combination of cheap airfares (which meant waiting until each flight had been 
boarded before I knew if there would be an available seat and, on one day, doing this 
six times in order to reach my final destination), buses and the occasional hired car
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enabled me to travel. At one particularly isolated prison which I visited during my 
second field trip, the local taxis -  essential for the final ride from the bus depot -  had 
all been suspended because their drivers had been caught bootlegging. These details 
are relevant, because it shows that I was subject to something of the geographic 
dislocation which many federally sentenced women and their families experienced 
in the move from home provinces, or as they attempted to visit, and that I also knew 
both the human and financial cost. I quickly realised that the scale of Canada would 
not necessarily be diminished for federal prisoners simply through the building of 
regional prisons.
Inevitably, the main focus of my journey was the prisons. The three whose stories I 
explore in this study had been open for little more than ten months when I first 
visited them. I was yet another who had come to see ‘their’ prison yet, as it turned 
out, I eventually became one of the very few who had seen them all and this became 
an important point in my subsequent journeys to Canada. My understanding of each 
prison changed each time I visited because of what staff and women had 
individually experienced and survived. My first point of reference was the staff and 
it was their interpretation of ‘their’ prison which immediately introduced me to some 
of the dynamics of each prison’s organisation. Yet the interpretations differed, 
depending upon the individual’s place in the staffing hierarchy. I was always given 
considerable freedom to make my own way around each prison and allowed to mix 
freely with the women, to the extent of being able to visit their houses, have coffee 
with them and occasionally share a meal which they had prepared. I carried no 
interview schedule with me, relying on both the women’s and the staffs willingness 
to talk to me informally and making comprehensive daily notes. During that first 
visit I was simply finding my way. I did not have the luxury of being able to return 
to my ‘research sites’ whenever I wished and this inevitably meant that I was 
sometimes asking the wrong questions, because I predictably lacked the overall 
perspective and knowledge which might have guided me to the right ones. This was 
particularly apparent in the more formal, taped interviews I first conducted with key 
members of the project, who had an infinitely greater understanding of the subject 
than I. But the outcome of those interviews was that they led to others, because 
individuals generously suggested areas that I should explore and who the best people
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to approach might be. I gradually began to know of a network of informed 
commentators -  and my horizons expanded.
The great difficulty of prison research is that one enters an arena constructed on 
relations of power. I had been granted access to the prisons by civil servants who 
worked at CSC headquarters and within each prison I was dependent upon the staff 
to facilitate my access to the women. I also had to carry a dyster1, which meant that 
my position vis-a-vis the women was very clearly marked out as being similar to 
that of a staff member. While I wanted to follow feminist practice and 
acknowledge the women’s expertise as much as anyone else’s, in a prison such aims 
are immediately circumscribed because of the fundamental inequality of relative 
positions between staff and prisoners and the researcher’s relationship with the 
authorities. I was free and the women were not; we were never on an equal footing. 
Too often these women had seen researchers enter a prison to further their own aims 
and in that I was little different, because I was carrying out my research for the 
purposes of a thesis and the women had no guarantee that it would ever be of benefit 
to them. Some were politely sceptical, yet still keen to discuss what they had 
experienced since their transfer from Kingston. During my first visit many of the 
women showed a considerable amount of goodwill towards the new venture because 
they envisaged being able to work on the issues which had brought them to prison in 
a less restricted environment. They found the inconsistency of staff hard to tolerate, 
but many were also aware that the staff themselves were finding the changed style of 
prison challenging. When I returned to Canada and saw some of the women again, 
it was a complicated feeling doing so because it again highlighted the gulf between 
us and the fact that they had been unable to move beyond the confines of the prison. 
It was particularly hard to see women who had previously been optimistic, if 
realistic, about the new prisons so diminished by their growing belief that they did 
not greatly differ from the Prison for Women. It was as though the shutters had 
again come down and one woman encapsulated it during my third visit when she 
declined to talk, saying ‘the vision has withered and to talk about it would be 
flogging a dead horse’.2
1 An alarm to be activated in emergencies.
2 Personal notes 2000
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It was not only the women who were dismayed; many of the staff were desperately 
concerned about what was happening and took the opportunity of my visit, even as 
early as 1996, to unload some of their concerns, often in great distress. This meant 
that at the end of some days I found it very hard being on my own, in an anonymous 
lodging, with no-one to whom I could speak and share concerns of my own. There 
were times when I was grateful for the distraction and bustle provided by the late 
closing of the local shopping malls. Yet at other times the day could be illuminated 
by my being unexpectedly invited to share meals with the women, which they had 
cooked in their own houses. Only the new prisons could have made such gestures 
possible and the sharing of food seemed to be a way for the women to place 
themselves on a more even footing with visitors.
Having taken the early decision that my time with the women would not be based on 
formal interviews and that, where possible, I would respond to their questions about 
what I was doing before attempting to engage too deeply with them, there were 
periods when I was uncertain about how each day would be shaped. I was a 
potential interviewer but not always an actual one and the design of the new prisons 
made any inactivity on my part highly visible. Their design also made it obvious 
that I was talking to both sides of the prison divide, the women and the staff, which 
led to comments and advice from both constituencies. I might be warned about the 
reliability of a particular woman, or could be told that a certain member of staff was 
problematic. In attempting to straddle the divide I at times became anxious about 
how both groups viewed me, rather than concerned about how to further the research 
project. In other words, I found it impossible to divorce myself from the broader 
picture. I was relying on qualitative, personal responses, yet at times wanted the 
distance made possible by quantitative analysis of data. One of the dilemmas faced 
by a researcher trying to elicit information from people, is how much of the self 
should be extended in return. I found that I had certain points of reference which 
made casual talk easier: I was a mother, so had some idea of what interested young 
women; being a mother was also a link to those missing and worried about their own 
children; even being middle-aged seemed to be useful. I found that I unconsciously 
started referring to my husband as ‘my partner’ and realised that that this was 
because I felt awkward about having a home of my own to which I could return.
Yet I made a decision that, with hindsight, I feel I cannot justify and now regret.
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Although occasionally asked by certain women if I would keep in touch I generally 
replied that I could not, saying -  and believing -  that I needed to be seen as 
independent by CSC. Yet I maintained close and continuous contact with officials, 
academics and members of the voluntary sector throughout the period of research.
In effect, I was favouring the knowledge and authority of one group over another 
and contributing to the unequal relations of power which I instinctively deplored, yet 
tacitly accepted.
The Healing Lodge presented particular difficulties. I was yet another ‘Euro’, if  not 
a Euro-Canadian, venturing into Aboriginal territory and, as will become apparent, 
there has been a long and dishonourable history of non-Aboriginals doing just that. 
Coming from another colonised country myself I had grown up amongst Maori and 
was familiar with their traditions, many of which are not dissimilar from those of the 
Aboriginals. This did not mean that I could easily make the transition. During my 
first visit to the Healing Lodge I was told that I must attend the morning Spiritual 
Circle. I had taken advice and knew that I should bring an offering for the Elders 
with me, but felt uncertain about participating in the ceremony. My understanding 
of it was entirely superficial and I felt that, with no belief of my own, I should not be 
taking part. Yet the first Spiritual Circle was a very powerful experience, and one I 
willingly repeated, so on each of my two subsequent visits to the Lodge I made sure 
that I arrived early enough each morning to take part. I declined the first invitation 
to take part in a sweatlodge for the same reasons, but accepted a later opportunity 
and was again grateful that I had. This combination of culture and spirituality 
within the confines of a prison which did not look like a prison, was a perplexing 
and worrying one. The ‘rules’, both disciplinary and cultural, were not always clear 
and to ask what they were was to highlight my outsider status even more. The 
security was not always apparent, either, so it was a shock during my second visit to 
be told to wear a dyster when one of the women offered to take me down to the 
beaver dams while she was exercising the Lodge’s dog. It should not have been 
surprising, as scanning of visitors had by then been instituted, yet I painfully recall 
the clear message then conveyed to the woman. The messages conveyed by all the 
prisons were altogether confusing, especially during my first visit. They did not
3 See chapter 8 for an explanation.
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look like prisons; they did not smell like prisons; the staff were not dressed like 
guards; there was an absence of noise. Yet at Edmonton the tannoy system routinely 
referred to the women as ‘offenders’ and the women were also searched whenever 
they moved between areas. The juxtaposition was bewildering.
The research was not always interview- or observation-based and one of the 
transforming moments was when I was given access to CSC’s records of the Task 
Force, and the work it undertook, a little over halfway through my time of research. 
Although I had searched CAEFS’ records for the period, they were relatively small 
and, for the first time, I truly became aware of the scale of what the Task Force had 
undertaken -  and knew that another set of questions needed to be asked. Inevitably, 
this meant another visit to Canada as I sought out more of the key participants for 
their views about why certain perspectives had triumphed over others.4 While this 
certainly illuminated my own dawning conclusions, it also made my study that much 
more difficult because I was, with some of the interviewees, raking up a past they 
had buried as their connection to the venture had ultimately been too painful. An 
added difficulty was the relatively small pool of people involved in the whole 
enterprise, which complicated the problem of confidentiality at the writing-up stage.
By the time my fieldwork ended I had seen two of the units within male prisons 
where maximum security women were held following the decision to remove them 
from the new prisons. I visited Maison Tanguay in Montreal, where many 
francophone federally sentenced women were confined, as well as the annexe for 
provincially sentenced women at the Halifax Correctional Centre, which was my 
introduction to caged cells. I saw the Prison for Women while it was still relatively 
fully functioning and once more, while it was just holding ‘difficult to manage’ 
women. The barred ‘ranges’ at the prison, and its even worse segregation unit, were 
deeply shocking and provided a context for what I saw in the new prisons. To begin 
with, the contrast dulled my critical reaction. I ‘heard’ the women telling me that 
they had less freedom in their attractively designed new prisons, but filed the 
information away as a problem of adjustment. I similarly ‘heard’ the staff, during
4 In total I conducted 32 taped interviews with people who had been involved in, commented on or 
were affected by the work o f the Task Force. Most o f the interviews were approximately an hour in 
length.
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my first visit, tell me that they found the dual role of counsellor and guard difficult 
to sustain and I wondered about the quality of the training, rather than about the 
fundamental irreconcilability of what they were expected to do. This leads me to a 
difficult point, which is the admission of my own naivety, coupled with the desire to 
remain a neutral observer. To begin with I was far from neutral. I had been entirely 
seduced by my uncritical reading of Creating Choices and by the enthusiasm of the 
implementers and some of those actually working in the new prisons. In academia 
there is sometimes a reluctance to admit that scepticism might be suspended by a 
researcher; that the ‘hard’ questions are not always asked. This occasionally 
happens because the researcher has a particular perspective, not publicly 
acknowledged, underpinning their argument. More often the researcher is relatively 
new in the field, as I was, anxious to do their best by all concerned, lacking 
‘distance’ from their subject and taking documents and comments at face value. In 
my own case, this also included being resistant to the idea that a Canadian penal 
plan should be viewed through the prism of history and that other accounts of 
similar ventures might be a valid means of assessing the outcome of events in 
Canada. Perhaps one of the unspoken advantages of taking a considerable time to 
complete and write up a major piece of research is that the researcher is allowed 
time to develop their ideas. The views tentatively formed at the beginning are 
subject to repeated examination and do not always survive. Moreover, the field of 
study evolves and changes as information is gathered. Had I not been able to view 
records at the half-way period this study would have had a different emphasis and 
my conclusions would also have been different.
As I have earlier mentioned, I was in the position of being one of the few people to 
have seen all of the new prisons and the extra time taken to complete my research 
had another effect. As I spent longer in the country (and, in total, I had about twenty 
weeks in Canada, spread over five years) it was obvious that staff at the various 
prisons were not always aware of what their colleagues were doing elsewhere.
There seemed to be a reluctance to pick up the phone and consult (which might have 
been because of financial restrictions) and there appeared to be no formal 
mechanism whereby people responsible for certain functions, apart from the 
Wardens, met with others in the same position. Despite central direction, staff were 
working in isolation from each other and felt excluded from the larger enterprise. I
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would be asked to comment on developments -  in effect, to compare and contrast -  
and this was something I was reluctant to do, but could not always avoid. It meant 
that I could not always be open in my response.
A researcher hopes to be able to blend into the scenery, to be somewhat forgotten so 
that observation can be less contrived. I simply had to speak for people to know that 
I was not a Canadian. I lacked a broad-based knowledge of the country and had 
hurriedly to inform myself. I could not always ‘read’ the nuances of actions and 
words and this was a particular difficulty in Quebec and within the Aboriginal 
community. But there are also advantages to being an outsider because you can ask 
the question ‘why?’ rather more often. Strategies and plans which perhaps seem 
logical in the local context might not seem quite so obvious to others. With the 
caveat that I absorbed some of the official rhetoric too unquestioningly at the start of 
my research, I think that my being a foreigner was mostly an advantage. Primarily, I 
generally had the requisite distance to be able to observe events a little more 
dispassionately. However, the longer I stayed with the project the more this 
objectivity was under strain and that was entirely due to the fact that I now knew the 
participants. I wanted them to succeed because I could imagine the bitter cost of 
their not doing so. I wanted the civil servants to improve the lot of federally 
sentenced women, because I had seen the Prison for Women. I wanted the members 
of the voluntary sector to feel that they had succeeded, as I knew the painful 
compromises they had made in order to join the Task Force. I did not want to see 
the dying hope in the women themselves. Because I accepted the integrity which 
had brought all these people together I did not want to be in the position where I 
would finally have to commit myself and examine their project critically and 
sceptically. This is a dilemma which many researchers face and I would suggest 
that it is too often swept aside in the rush to be seen as impartial and objective. 
Research is a fluid and flawed process, with no absolute ‘truth’ awaiting discovery. 
The ‘truth’ discovered by the qualitative researcher is always a mediated truth, 
relying on observation, discussion and instinct. I have finally had to commit myself 
and the following chapter provides the gateway to the process in which I have been 
involved.
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1. A very brief history; prelude to a task force
We are about to embark upon a journey which will unravel the story behind the 
closure of the infamous Prison for Women in Kingston, Canada. Why this prison 
should have been ‘infamous’, and why its shutting was thought necessary, provides 
the context for the next five chapters. It is not a story with a genesis in recent 
history; the Prison for Women was the focus of sustained criticism for many 
decades, yet it was not until 1989 that a plan was devised -  and quickly accepted by 
the Correctional Service of Canada -  which would allow for its replacement. To 
understand how this came about we must first look at the Prison for Women itself, 
and see where it fitted into, and reflected, the political history of a country which 
finally came to be a confederation of provinces. The prison itself was not 
completed until 1934. What preceded it, and successive attempts to replace it, 
could justifiably be the subject of a separate study, but for present purposes I offer 
no more than a brief sketch of that history. With that knowledge we might then be 
able to understand why the 1989 Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women, rather 
than any other, finally led to the closure of the Prison for Women.
Imprisoning women; suiting male interests
The city of Kingston stands on the edge of Lake Ontario. Its strategic position at 
the mouth of the St. Lawrence River ensured it an early importance amongst the 
first colonial towns of Ontario, and also led to its briefly being the capital of what 
was then Upper Canada. Today it is partly the presence of Queen’s University and 
the Royal Military College which ensures its continuing importance. Yet Kingston 
houses other institutions whose histories have also played a dominant role in the 
development of the social fabric of the city. Prominently sited on the shores of 
Lake Ontario, a mile to the west of the city centre, lies Kingston Penitentiary. Built 
between 1833 and 1835, its design was influenced by the ‘silent’ or ‘congregate’ 
system practised at New York’s Auburn Penitentiary. The building of the 
Provincial Penitentiary was a ‘decisive act of social control’, which recognised the 
importance of law to the larger social and political structures of Upper Canada 
(Oliver 1998: 134, 135). Yet the citizens of Kingston seemed unconcerned by the 
new building, apart from fearing that convict labour would depress local industries,
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as they were ‘watching with pride the early beginnings of a little school called 
Queen’s College, and had no concern in what went on behind the grim walls of the 
other institution at Portsmouth’ [which is part of Kingston] (Edmison, cited in 
Oliver 1998: 109). It was assumed that the new prison would be financially self- 
supporting, thanks to the labour of the inmates, but this argument was disputed, just 
before construction began, by the British Consul in New York, James Buchanan, 
who argued that ‘[Upper Canadians] are laying an egg which will produce a 
monster that will absorb the taxes that we ... must pay’ (Oliver 1998: 115).
Women were imprisoned in the penitentiary almost as soon as it opened and, as 
Cooper observed, ‘the historical record of corrections tells us that the small female 
population has always been housed wherever and in whatever manner best suited 
the interests of the larger male population’ (Cooper 1993: 35). In 1848, what 
became known as the Brown Commission1 was appointed by the Reform 
government to investigate the administration of Warden Henry Smith at Kingston 
Penitentiary. It has been suggested that ‘most Canadians who know anything of the 
penitentiary’s early years have learned of it, directly or indirectly, from this ... 
document’ (Oliver 1998: 140). Brown recommended that women should be kept 
entirely apart from the men and that a separate prison should be provided for them. 
Yet the women continued to be housed in various cramped locations within the 
prison, being moved as the needs of the men altered. They were well-nigh invisible 
within the infinitely larger male group, as was evident when E. C. Wines and T. W. 
Dwight of the New York Prison Association submitted their lengthy report on 
American and Canadian prisons and reformatories to the Speaker of the State 
Assembly of New York, in 1867. They praised the ‘beautiful and imposing 
structure’ of Kingston Penitentiary, severely criticised the actual location which 
‘prevented the architect giving the bottom of the sewers such a declivity which 
would insure (sic) the discharge of their contents’, and discussed at length the 
design and size of the 840 cells. The ‘female ward’, however, was simply 
mentioned in passing (Wines & Dwight 1867: 102-3).
1 Warden Smith was accused o f ‘financial maladministration and profligacy’ by Brown, who 
thought o f the penitentiary as an ‘enterprise that wasted public funds’ (Oliver 1998: 147). The 
prison could not earn enough from convict labour to finance it and the construction costs exceeded 
receipts from those sources and government.
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The British North America Act 1867, specifically Section 91, conferred authority 
over the criminal law and the ‘Establishment, Maintenance and Management of 
Penitentiaries’ upon the new Dominion (federal) government. At that stage, not 
only Kingston but smaller penitentiaries in Halifax (Nova Scotia) and Saint John 
(New Brunswick) came under the federal umbrella and, in the following decade, a 
further ten joined them. The provinces became responsible for ‘Public and 
Reformatory Prisons’. Oliver wrote: ‘This division of authority excited much later 
comment... it led, together with the 1868 statute [the Penitentiary Act] that defined 
a gaol term as two years less a day ... to a division of authority in correctional 
matters which would be condemned by every twentieth century commission on 
correctional practices, from Archambault in 1938, through Fauteux in 1956, to 
Ouimet in 1969, and frequently thereafter’ (Oliver 1998: 303).
Oliver took this point further. The Penitentiary Act 1868 was the first penal statute 
of the new Dominion and had largely been drafted by E. A. Meredith, Chair of the 
Board of Inspectors of Prisons, Asylums and Public Charities. Meredith was an 
ardent follower of the Croftonian2 system of imprisonment and in the Penitentiary 
Act 1868 he ‘push[ed] forward as much of his program as he dared’ (Oliver 1998: 
303). The acceptance of the two years plus a day provincial- federal divide was a 
recognition of the function of gaols as local institutions, whereas the penitentiaries 
became part of the social control network (as exemplified by the criminal law) of 
the Dominion. Oliver (1998: 303) believed that ‘both levels of government’ were 
in agreement with this decision. Ekstedt and Griffiths (1988: 46) contended that 
‘federal correctional policy was designed to establish the dominance of the federal 
government and to create a system of penitentiaries that would assist in the task of 
building a nation’, a perspective that arguably still applies to present-day Canada . 
They also cited a Task Force on Corrections’ report (1976: 8):
2 Sir Walter Crofton was an influential Irish penal reformer, whose model ‘deployed a 
sophisticated system of incentives and progressive development to encourage prisoners to work 
towards early release’ (Oliver 1998: 275). Canadian penal reformers believed that adherence to his 
system would sweep away ‘the cant o f the rival American systems [as practised at Auburn and 
Philadelphia]’ prevailing in Kingston Penitentiary (Oliver 1998: 296). For a fuller explanation see 
Oliver 1998: 297-299.
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The federal government may have been considered the only government 
with the resources available to establish long-term institutions, or there may 
have been insufficient numbers o f long-term offenders in some regions o f 
the country to justify an institution for them in each province. (Task Force 
on Corrections, 1976, cited in Ekstedt & Griffiths 1988, emphasis added)
This argument could easily have been used for the federally sentenced women’s 
population.
Brown’s wish for a separate women’s prison, based on his knowledge of 
‘inadequate living conditions, the extreme punitiveness, the absence of penitentiary 
discipline and the inability to occupy women with profitable labour’ (Hannah- 
Moffat 2001: 80), was not fulfilled until 1913, when such accommodation was 
provided for 34 women. However, the new quarters still remained within the walls 
of Kingston Penitentiary. The provision of this accommodation directly 
contributed to what some would later consider to be the missed opportunity 
provided by the recommendations of the Report o f the Royal Commission on 
Penitentiaries (Macdonnell Commission), in 1914. This suggested that female 
federal prisoners should be placed in the care of their home provinces, but the costs 
so recently incurred by the building of the new women’s quarters in Kingston were 
a powerful disincentive for change. The persuasiveness of the provincial- 
incarceration option for federal offenders continued (and continues) to be debated 
decades later.
The 1921 Nickle Commission, notable for being the first to consider federal women 
prisoners separately from men, emphasised what it considered to be the 
inappropriateness and vulnerability of the women’s situation within the Kingston 
Penitentiary. Nickle believed that there should be ‘adequate segregation of female 
convicts from male convicts and male staff, citing his concern that ‘the disclosures 
of the past year have shown how unscrupulous officers have taken unfair advantage 
of the opportunities for flirtations, improprieties and indecencies that presented 
themselves ...’ (Nickle 1921a: 4-5, cited in Hannah-Moffat 2001: 83). Nickle 
reflected on the inadequacies of the women’s quarters and the lack of work
3 Unless otherwise indicated, I have relied on Margaret Shaw’s The Federal Female Offender 
(1991a), Companion Vol. 3 to Creating Choices (TFFSW) for much o f the historical background.
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opportunities for them. The logic of his argument for closure led directly to the 
beginning of construction, in 1925, of what is now known as the Prison for Women. 
When this was finally completed in 1932 one hundred men, rather than women, 
were its first occupants. Rioting within nearby Kingston Penitentiary had damaged 
the men’s accommodation, causing the women to wait to move to their new prison 
(Hannah-Moffat 2001: 87). The rioting had been widespread, and not only 
confined to Kingston. Between 1932 and 1935 there were outbreaks at other 
penitentiaries across the Dominion and, for the first time, the public began to hear 
informed critical comment on penal affairs, with the riots providing ‘a sort of 
climax in the efforts of prison and penal reform bodies to obtain light upon 
conditions in the penitentiaries’ (Kidman 1947: 41).
An inadequate prison for women
The Prison for Women formally opened to women in 1934. Within the short space 
of four years the Archambault Commission (1938) had recommended that the 
prison should be closed and the women transferred to the provincial authorities, 
saying: ‘Your Commissioners are strongly of the opinion that the number of female 
prisoners confined in Kingston Penitentiary did not justify the erection of the new 
women’s prison and the further continuance is unjustified ...’ (40 were initially 
transferred to the prison). It was assumed that women held provincially would be 
detained, separately, within men’s prisons. The Archambault Commission was one 
of the first ‘to acknowledge the rights of women prisoners to equal treatment’ 
(Archambault, cited in Cooper 1993: 43). Archambault had been prompted by 
revelations during the trials of the men who had rioted in Kingston and elsewhere, 
and the subsequent fierce parliamentary debates led by the redoubtable 
parliamentarian, Agnes Macphail.4 Women were not permitted to visit the 
penitentiaries, but legislators -  irrespective of sex -  were, so Miss Macphail made 
it her business to inspect them ‘from dome to dungeon’, leading Kidman to observe 
further that ‘on visitation committees of prisons there should be a woman [as they]
4 Agnes Macphail was the first woman to be elected to the Canadian House o f Commons and is 
credited by Kidman (1947:48) with being instrumental in achieving the establishment o f the 
Archambault Commission. Hannah-Moffat (1997: 110) gives a fuller description o f Macphail’s 
developing interest in penal affairs, which changed from being primarily concerned with male 
prisoners, to her encouragiong the formation o f the Toronto branch o f the E. Fry Society, in the 
1950s.
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invariably see something that mere man overlooks’ (Kidman 1947: 48). 
Archambault’s implementation was derailed by the intervention of war, but Kidman 
still felt able to hail it ‘as the most challenging document that has been put forth on 
Canada’s penal problems. Some commissions deal with grain, harbours, fisheries, 
forestry and minerals, but this deals with human beings, not all of whom are 
inhuman because they are found in prisons’ (Kidman 1947: 51). Archambault’s 
closure recommendation could not withstand the fiscal reality of the recent building 
of the Prison for Women, but in 1938 the provinces were at last prepared to 
consider the idea of assuming responsibility for federally sentenced women. By 
1946, however, when the Commissioner of Penitentiaries and the Minister of 
Justice finally decided to ask the provinces if they would house federal women, it 
was made clear that, without heavy financial assistance, they would be unable to do 
so. Federal assistance was not forthcoming.
The question of what should be done with the Prison for Women continued to 
occupy various committees in successive years, with the Fauteux Committee (1956) 
recommending that a central facility should be retained, and the Ouimet Committee 
(1969) suggesting a unified prison service. The Royal Commission on the Status o f 
Women (1970) returned to the theme of equality and was the first such body to 
make specific ‘recommendations for the provision of appropriate and relevant 
services and programs for Aboriginal and Francophone women’ (Arbour 1996:
243). Throughout the sixties there had been a gradually increasing focus on 
women’s rights, building on work begun by the tiny American-inspired Women’s 
Bureau, which was established in 1954 as part of the Department of Labour.
The 1977 MacGuigan Report was a major government report and, like others, 
focused on male federal offenders, but also roundly damned conditions at the 
Prison for Women. It is now largely remembered for the aptness of one of its 
phrases, that the prison was ‘unfit for bears, much less women’ {MacGuigan 1977: 
135, cited in Shaw 1991a: 17; Cooper 1993: 45). The National Advisory 
Committee on the Female Offender {Clark Report, 1977), was ‘only the second 
major committee set up specifically to consider the future of the federal female 
offender’ (Shaw 1991a: 16). It took three years to produce its report, and also
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recommended the closure of the Prison for Women, citing the specific inequities 
experienced by female federal offenders, such as: geographic dislocation; the lack 
of adequate programmes and services; undue classification. Unusually for the time, 
this Committee included three members from the voluntary sector. The Clark 
Report prompted the formation of the National Planning Committee on the Female 
Offender, which was asked to respond to the points raised by Clark, particularly the 
two alternative plans Clark had formulated. These suggested that: the federal 
government should continue to be responsible for federal women, but should house 
them in small regional facilities; or the provinces should take charge of these 
women. The Needham Report (1978) was the result of the National Planning 
Committee’s deliberations and it opted for closure of the Prison for Women, and 
the building of two replacement facilities in the east and west of Canada, which 
would remain in federal control. As with the two previous Committees, Needham 
supported the idea of more community-based facilities and raised the possibility of 
a ‘co-correctional’ institution (Ekstedt & Griffiths 1988: 337). The Chinnery 
Committee had simultaneously been charged with assessing the viability of the 
regional facilities and, in its report, also rejected the notion of keeping open the 
Prison for Women. By 1981 the Canadian Association of E. Fry Societies 
(CAEFS) had presented a brief to the Solicitor-General advocating closure and 
suggesting that a Sixth Region, responsible for federal women, should be created 
within Corrections.5 This last was echoed by the Canadian Bar Association, which 
added its weight to the debate in 1988 by producing Justice Behind the Walls 
(Jackson). It bluntly said that legislation should be introduced to compel closure of 
the prison. This overwhelming pressure for change culminated in the Daubney 
Committee recommending that the Prison for Women should close within five 
years, and that a Task Force should be instituted to decide on the best way of 
facilitating it. The Task Force which finally emerged insisted that it ‘was not a 
government response to the Daubney Report ’ and was ‘not premised on the closure 
of the Prison for Women’ (TFFSW 1990: 70.) While it should be recognised that 
‘every major correctional inquiry in Canada [at least until 1988] has commented on
5 CAEFS is a ‘federation of autonomous societies which works with, and on behalf of, women 
involved with the justice system, particularly women in conflict with the law’. (Taken from the 
CAEFS’ Mission Statement). CAEFS is recognised within Canada as being the pre-eminent 
advocacy organisation for imprisoned women.
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the Prison for Women’ (Ekstedt & Griffiths 1988: 336), it should also be 
acknowledged that many did so in the context of discussing federal imprisonment 
as a whole, rather than focusing solely on women.
The unifying theme of these reports was the inequity of a system which: imprisoned 
most federally sentenced women far from their families and home communities; 
confined them in conditions of security disproportionate to their needs; allowed no 
possibility of transfer to a less secure environment during the course of their 
sentence; offered relatively few programme opportunities; operated within a 
building totally inadequate for its purpose. Some provincial inquiries, such as the 
Report o f the British Columbia Royal Commission on the Incarceration o f  Female 
Offenders (Proudfoot 1978), further echoed concerns about imprisoned women.
Yet, as each report was published, there was little political will to implement them.
In all of the foregoing I have made no mention of the reformatory movement and 
the legacy of the Andrew Mercer Reformatory in Toronto, which was the first 
separate prison for women in Canada (Strange 1995: 83). As Hannah-Moffat 
makes clear, it played a crucial, if largely unacknowledged, part in the history of 
the governance of imprisoned women in Canada, primarily through its use of 
‘maternal discipline [of the sort] most often associated with middle-class nuclear 
families’ (Hannah-Moffat 2001: 52). In North America it was in the United States, 
rather than in Canada, that ‘middle class women who had been abolitionists and 
health care workers during the Civil War’ in the late 1860s first began to take an 
interest in penal affairs and, specifically, in the situation of imprisoned women 
(Rafter 1985: xxi). They concluded that conventional, congregate prison design 
was inappropriate for women, ‘whose milder, more passive nature required a 
gentler environment’, and their preference was for ‘cottages’ in rural settings which 
would house relatively small groups of women (Rafter 1985: xxi). (As Rafter 
(1985: 33) made clear, these ‘cottages’ were not on the small scale associated with 
English usage of the word; rather, they duplicated the ‘cottages’ of wealthy 
Americans and were Targe, substantial houses’ wherein the women would live
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under the guidance of a matron.)6 The initial vision of these reformatories was 
predicated on the ideal of the ‘reformable’ woman and ‘common womanhood’, 
(Freedman 1981: 63) whereby ‘virtuous women could uplift their fallen sisters’ 
(Hannah-Moffat 2001: 56). But not all ‘fallen sisters’ were included, because the 
original reformatory ideal was selective in its range and excluded those most 
commonly confined in custodial prisons. The first American reformatories 
concentrated on a group not previously brought within reach of ‘state punishment -  
vagrants, unwed mothers, prostitutes and other “fallen” women who seemed more 
promising material for their attempts to uplift and train’ (Rafter 1985: xxi). 
Freedman contended that these first, visionary female reformers, while attempting 
to further the rights of women prisoners, believed in an ‘innate sexual difference’ 
which enabled women to ‘control women’s prisons’; the reformers were not 
attempting to press for ‘sexual equality’ (Freedman 1981: 47). Moreover, the 
reformers’ femininity enabled them to encourage similar feminine behaviour in 
imprisoned women, simultaneously projecting their own middle-class values onto 
women who had not previously experienced them (Freedman 1981: 54).
The Andrew Mercer Reformatory was the direct result of energetic lobbying by J. 
W. Langmuir, an Ontario Prison Inspector, who was also convinced of the need to 
imprison women separately from men. A timely legacy of $ 100,000 to the Ontario 
province secured the possibility of Langmuir’s dream being realised, and he 
encouraged the province’s Premier to allow construction by telling him that 
‘women’s prisons, both in construction and administration, were “of a far less 
costly character” than men’s prisons’ (Oliver 1998: 428). Canada differed from the 
first American reformatories in that the Mercer had to take ‘frequent offenders’ and 
had ‘very modest expectations as to rehabilitation’ (Oliver 1998: 459). Further, at 
Langmuir’s instigation the Mercer was based on the congregate system, yet its 
design allowed for ‘distinct and separate accommodation for four grades of
6 Freedman (1981: 68) expanded on their design. Writing of the Massachusetts Reformatory 
Prison for Women, she wrote: ‘Instead o f cells, the reformatory had “private rooms” which ranged 
from 50 to 90 square feet, slightly larger than most men’s prison quarters. Iron bedsteads and white 
linen, not the typical bare cot, adorned each room. Well behaved inmates could decorate their 
quarters, enjoy unbarred windows and have wood slats instead o f gratings on their doors. Room
size and location was determined by a merit system  ’ Similarly, the Hudson House in New
York state had ‘cottages fitted up as nearly as possible like an average family house’.
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prisoners’ (Oliver 1998: 429), a hoped-for system of classification which does not 
appear to have survived the Mercer’s opening in 1874. The logic and means of 
maternal governance applied at the Mercer outlasted its closure and, as has been 
contended by Hannah-Moffat (2001) and others, reappeared in the 1990s, as the 
discourse again moved towards ‘women-centred’ prisons. In a curious twist, the 
influence of the original American reformatory movement became manifest in 
Canada during the 1990s, when the Minnesota State Reformatory for Women, now 
known as the Minnesota Correctional Facility - Shakopee, emerged as the exemplar 
for Canadian planners.
Feminism
It was not only the various Commissions of Inquiry which suggested change at the 
Prison for Women. Legal challenges were mounted, one of the most important 
being that of sexual discrimination, filed in 1981 with the Canadian Human Rights’ 
Commission, against the federal government, by Women for Justice. The 
Commission found for Women for Justice in their allegations of ‘discrimination in 
the provision of goods, services and facilities’ (for federally sentenced women), 
upholding nine of their eleven complaints (see Berzins & Hayes 1993).7 The 
founding of Women for Justice was a ‘turning point in Canadian women’s prison 
reform [being] the first time that women outside the field of corrections came 
together to fight for the rights of federally sentenced women ... [seeking] to 
politicise and contextualise the discrimination faced by women’ (Hannah-Moffat 
2001: 135).
The patriation of the Constitution had united women across the country in their 
efforts to ensure that the equality provisions in the Charter, (which is Part 1, of the 
Constitution Act 1982) differed from those in the Canadian Bill o f  Rights. It is 
debatable whether the women’s efforts would have been quite so vociferous had the
7 Berzins and Hayes detailed their sacking, after being hired by the Ministry o f the Solicitor 
General to follow up the recommendations o f the Clark Committee (1977). They were the first to 
work ‘exclusively on the needs o f women’, and prepared a review o f programmes for women 
offenders which incurred the ‘wrath’ o f the then Commissioner o f Corrections. Shortly thereafter 
they were told that their contracts would be terminated. In a telling section, echoing Rothman 
(1980), they wrote: ‘it appears that a powerful system which did not hesitate to compromise the 
interests o f women in its charge for convenience’s sake, also dealt unscrupulously with women 
hired to correct those inequities’ (Berzins & Hayes 1987: 169).
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Government not urged the cancellation of a conference planned by the Canadian 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women (CACSW), scheduled for February 
1981, which was to be the culmination of CACSW’s campaign to ensure that 
women’s rights would be protected under the proposed Charter (Razack 1991: 33- 
34). The conference was to coincide with parliamentary debates about the Charter, 
a clash which the government wished to avoid (Geller-Schwartz 1995: 53). 
Members of CACSW were Government appointees and all, with the exception of 
their president, caved in to the Government, As Brodsky and Day noted, ‘men 
were negotiating a new Constitution, which would be very difficult to amend. It 
contained entrenched rights clauses that would affect women in Canada for decades 
to come. ... Though outsiders to the process, women injected themselves 
forcefully into the constitutional debates, arguing with one voice for ... guarantees 
that could bring real change to the lives of women in Canada’ (Brodsky & Day 
1989: 17). The CACSW conference would have highlighted those sections of the 
proposed Charter which the government wished to deal with in its own way, and 
this heavy-handed approach inspired women from across the country to attend an 
alternative conference in Ottawa, and continue campaigning until their message had 
been heard and reflected in the Charter (Geller-Schwartz 1995).
Section 15 of the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms covers equality, thus:
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, 
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as 
its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or 
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, ... [as 
above]
Section 28 continued:
Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred 
to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.8
8 As later becomes evident, when we move to discussing the role played by Aboriginal women in 
the Task Force, the debates centred on the patriation o f the Constitution and the Canadian Charter 
o f  Rights and Freedoms were of fundamental importance to culturally-distinct groups as well. A  
meeting o f First Ministers in 1981 agreed (without the assent o f the Premier o f Quebec) to the
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These powerful Sections were to have been the basis of a class action by LEAF 
under the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms (1982).9 LEAF intended to 
challenge CSC to prove that federal women were not actively discriminated against 
by the location of the Prison for Women. They intended to show that having just 
one federal facility for women precluded their moving to less secure 
accommodation as their security classification changed, and that the women were 
disadvantaged by the programmes offered to them. This action was not pursued 
when the government committed itself to the closure of the Prison for Women in 
1990. Earlier, it had been argued, in Horii v. Canada Commissioner o f  Corrections 
(1987) 17 F.T.R. 190, that women were discriminated against by being forced to 
serve a federal sentence in Kingston, rather than in their home province. Although 
‘Horii was unsuccessful in the first stage of her challenge to sex discrimination in 
the federal penitentiary system’ (Brodsky and Day, 1989),10 her case helped 
underpin the on-going construction of an argument which forced CSC to rethink the 
policy for federally sentenced women.
All of these latter actions had been taking place against a backdrop of increasing 
feminist interventions in the criminal justice arena and, as Shaw (1996b: 179) 
suggested, ‘nowhere else had feminism made such marked inroads into official
insertion o f Section 33 in the Charter, which gave any provincial government the right to ignore 
sections o f the Charter (including those deemed so important by women, Sections 15 and 28) if  they 
were thought to be in conflict with provincial interests. Additionally, Section 27 protected 
multiculturalism within Canada. Interpretations of the meaning o f ‘culture’ had been used within 
Canada (and elsewhere) as a means o f defining and restricting the freedom and autonomy of 
women. Some Aboriginal women believed that some Aboriginal men might claim that cultural 
practices and traditions required that women should be treated differently from men. Aboriginal 
women needed the reassurance that Section 28 would be applied equally to themselves, and other 
culturally-distinct groups, because they had been signally failed by the law when seeking redress 
under the Canadian Bill o f  Rights. The ‘notwithstanding’ clause, Section 33, caused women to 
protest vehemently, because it was feared that it could adversely be applied to Section 28, which 
guaranteed rights and freedoms equally to men and women. This was finally acknowledged when 
Section 28 was specifically made exempt from the ‘notwithstanding’ clause of Section 33. See 
Krosenbrink-Gelissen 1993; Brodsky and Day, 1989; Razack, 1991.
9 The Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) was founded in 1984, by ‘a small group 
of influential Canadian women, almost all lawyers ...’ (Hannah-Moffat 2001:136). LEAF had been 
‘impressed by the record o f the ... National Association for the Advancement o f Coloured People 
(NAACP), in particular their strategy o f pursuing incremental gains in specific areas [and had] 
concluded that Canadian women could best secure their legal rights in a similar way’ (Razack,
1991: 52). For a fuller discussion o f the importance o f LEAF see Razack, 1991.
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discourse than Canada’. Whilst imprisonment was not at the top of the agenda, 
considerable progress had been made in recognising the prevalence of violence 
against women. The victims’ movement was becoming entrenched and changing 
attitudes to sexual mores had led to the wider definition of sexual assault replacing 
rape on the statute book in 1983. Within government, there had been a Women’s 
Bureau established since 1954, but it took a larger ‘coalition of 32 women’s 
organisations, calling themselves the Committee for the Equality of Women in 
Canada (CEWC)’ (Geller-Schwartz 1995: 43), to persuade the Canadian 
government to follow President Kennedy’s lead, in appointing a Commission of the 
Status of Women, and appoint its own Royal Commission on the Status of Women. 
The resultant Commission led directly to the appointment of an eponymous 
minister in 197. In this case, though, there was no specific department for which 
the minister was responsible, and the position continues to be that of a junior 
minister within the Cabinet, A further coalition of women’s groups, the National 
Advisory Committee (NAC), campaigned specifically for the full implementation 
of the Royal Commission recommendations, and the Canadian Advisory Council 
for the Status of Women (CACSW) finally emerged in 1973. While this was 
mandated to highlight the interests of women, it was not independent of the 
executive, as the Royal Commission had recommended, and women’s groups 
eventually shunned it (Geller-Schwartz, 1995). Encouraged by the United Nations’ 
International Women’s Year, the government established Status of Women Canada 
in 1976, which had specific responsibilities for scrutinising legislation and policies 
for their impact on women. As Geller-Schwartz (1995: 48) observes, ‘once 
established, women’s policy agencies in Canada do not fade away. Successive 
Governments may reorganise structures ... but the institutions themselves seldom 
disappear’. This institutionalisation of women’s influence paralleled the growing 
influence of a number of non-state women’s organisations, many of whom were 
represented in the NAC, which was at the height of its influence in the mid 1980s.
This by no means exhaustive examination of the Inquiries, Commissions, 
submissions and legal challenges provides some explanation of why CSC was
10 The challenge remained dormant until 2002, when it was finally settled. Details remain 
confidential.
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under such pressure to do something about the Prison for Women. But it would be 
wrong to suggest that much importance was attached to the Prison for Women by 
other government departments, let alone the public at large, for whom it had little 
or no significance. Employment, education and adequate health care were of far 
greater public concern than the welfare of a tiny group of women incarcerated in 
Kingston. So what made this prison such an icon for campaigning groups? And 
why did campaigners think it so particularly unsuitable for imprisoned women? To 
be, in MacGuigan’s phrase, ‘unfit for bears, much less women’? The answer to this 
lies in its design and location, as we shall later see. But there was also an 
increasingly feminist questioning of the subordinate role of women within 
Canadian society, which became centred on the fight to amend the wording of the 
Charter o f Rights and Freedoms. The Prison for Women represented many of the 
larger inequities against which women were campaigning; on every score the 
prison failed the equality-with-men test. It was a microcosm of the wider 
discrimination women faced within Canadian society, as had been made so 
abundantly clear during the 1970s, with the wide publicity accorded both the Lavell 
and Bedard case (see chapter 2) and the Bliss case (see Krosenbrink-Gelissen 1993; 
Brodsky and Day, 1989; Razack, 1991). These legal challenges had separately 
highlighted the ways in which the law discriminated against women on the basis of 
their gender. CAEFS, as the national advocacy organisation for imprisoned 
women, had women within its own membership who were actively agitating for 
change in the legal arena. As I later make clear, women’s expertise was co-opted 
for a variety of purposes by individual groups and there was a nation-wide network 
of women, familiar with each other’s interests and prepared to campaign on specific 
issues. The power of that informal network was apparent in the consistent way in 
which CAEFS continued to highlight the necessity for change at the Prison for 
Women, and press for a Royal Commission. Together, these women were able to 
reach key civil service personnel and focus on the inequities faced by federally 
sentenced women.
However, upon reading this list of Inquiries and Commissions it might be tempting 
to assume that the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) relied on successive 
conflicting reports as a means of avoiding action. Such assumptions would be to
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ignore the scale of the problems to be surmounted in a country the size of Canada, 
with its complex federal-provincial relationships, the difficulties of which have 
been well documented. With regard to the criminal justice arena Rock had 
pertinent comments to make regarding the Ministry of the Solicitor General, which 
are entirely relevant here: ‘on occasion it is as if... dealings with the provinces map 
out a Balkans of the Canadian criminal justice system: one maladroit move always 
promising to lead to a much wider disturbance’ (Rock 1986: 169). Indeed one 
senior official interviewed during the course of my research, upon being asked 
whether there had been any consideration of the federal-provincial responsibilities 
being merged for imprisoned women, responded:... the task was onerous enough, 
so to start the Third World War by discussing provincial-federal jurisdiction just 
wasn ’t an option.n As Rock continued: ‘in every (official) paper will be found a 
routine reference to the preservation of amicable federal-provincial relations’ (Rock 
1986: 169) and this delicate partnership frequently leads both to increased numbers 
and membership of committees. It is of paramount importance that the provinces 
should feel fully consulted about initiatives affecting them.
In a wider sense, dealing with the Prison for Women was also ‘do-able’ for the civil 
service. In much the same way that Her Majesty’s Prison Service was able to set 
about replacing Holloway Prison in London because imprisoned women were a 
‘safer’, less contentious group than imprisoned men (see Rock, 1996), CSC 
believed that it could tackle the Prison for Women without attracting huge public 
debate. As a senior civil servant noted: I f  you looked at treating men and women 
equally, this was not equal... How long can you continue such unequal treatment 
o f people before the public becomes sympathetic and begins to demand action?n
MacGuigan’s ‘unfit’ prison
How should we envisage the Prison for Women? The following description 
reflects what prevailed until at least the mid-nineties.
The Prison for Women provided puzzling and confusing images. If a bystander 
were to ignore the massive walls to which the prison was attached, the four-storey
11 Interview 18
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stone building, crowned by a copper-wrapped cupola, looked as though it could be 
a civic building. At first glance the Prison’s neatly manicured, colourful front 
garden suggested a place of order and structure. The reality, however, was that the 
prison was a confusing mixture of narrow passages, myriad stairs and inadequate 
communal spaces; for many it engendered a feeling of claustrophobia, heightened 
by the inadequacy of its living accommodation. The Prison for Women became 
infamous for its double-tiered A and B ‘ranges’, which consisted of small cells 
fronted by bars stretching from floor to ceiling, which afforded the women little 
privacy, and even less quiet. The cells looked like -  and were -  cages. A Range 
contained fifty cells, half at floor level with the rest arranged above at mezzanine 
level. B Range, while identical, was split in two, with half used for protective 
custody and dissociation, and the remainder accommodating women whose 
institutional (mis)behaviour had led to their being assigned to this range. Some 
women remained on these ranges for years, never qualifying for the next step, 
which was the ‘wing’. This provided accommodation for the rest of the women and 
contained fifty unbarred, largely single, cells which offered the women a modicum 
of privacy and the possibility of creating a space which was more distinctly ‘theirs’. 
As Arbour (1996: 9) was to comment, the prison was ‘inadequate for living, 
working, eating, programming, recreation and administration’. The prison was 
enclosed by a huge wall, ‘half a mile long ... bolted into solid bedrock’, erected at a 
cost of $1.4 million in 1980 when the previous wall was replaced (Johnson, cited in 
Cooper 1987: 140; TFFSW 1990: 63). This wall was the hallmark of a maximum 
security prison, although the prison was actually a multi-level one. The only 
respite from this level of security was provided by Isabel McNeil House, directly 
across the road from the prison, which provided minimum security accommodation 
for eleven women.
12 Interview 27
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The Prison for Women, Kingston, Ontario.
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In 1932, for reasons of economy, the authorities had built a ‘congregate-style 
prison, as opposed to a cottage-style [prison] (more associated with maternal 
discipline)’ (Hannah-Moffat 2001: 86). But even so, in an uncanny replication of 
what happened in England when Holloway Prison was being redeveloped (see 
Rock, 1996), the building of the Prison for Women was delayed by architectural 
changes which added considerably to its cost. The prison contained neither an 
exercise yard nor educational facilities. Although there was a ‘supervising matron’, 
the prison was administered by both Kingston Penitentiary and the Collins Bay 
Penitentiary and it was not until 1960 that this link was severed and a separate 
warden, Isabel McNeil, appointed (Hannah-Moffat 2001: 99). The Prison for 
Women was administered by the Correctional Service of Canada, which is part of 
the Ministry of the Solicitor General. It was a federal facility, which meant that it 
received women sentenced to two years or more in custody. The prison took 
federally sentenced women from across Canada, but the development of Exchange 
of Service Agreements (ESAs) meant that by December 1988, forty percent of 
federal women remained in their own provinces, although largely in Quebec and 
British Columbia (Shaw 1991a: 4).13 While provincial incarceration allowed these 
women to remain closer to their home communities, it also meant that they were 
disadvantaged in other ways, particularly in the paucity of available programmes. 
Provincially sentenced women could be transferred to the Prison for Women when 
their behaviour became, in provincial corrections’ eyes, difficult to manage. 
Because the prison was the only federal facility for women, those who were sent 
there could be, quite literally, thousands of miles from their homes. A woman from 
Edmonton, for example, would be 1,800 miles from her home, and a woman from 
Vancouver, 2,200 miles from hers. To put that last figure in a more immediately 
accessible English context, it would be akin to sending a woman from London 
almost twice the distance to Moscow to serve her sentence. This geographic 
dislocation generally only applied to women. The far larger number of federally 
sentenced men had a greater number of penitentiaries to which they could be sent,
13 Exchange o f Service Agreements (ESAs) were first negotiated in 1973, and enabled provinces to 
assume responsibility for some federally sentenced women, especially Francophones. By this 
means, some women were able to be imprisoned closer to their homes, but there were significant 
penalties. ‘An offender transferred to another Canadian jurisdiction is subject to all the statutes, 
regulations and rules applicable in the receiving jurisdiction. In other words, a federal inmate 
transferred to a provincial jurisdiction becomes a “provincial prisoner” ’ (TFFSW 1991: 63).
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and these were not all at the same security level. Men had the possibility of 
‘cascading’ through the system, whereas federal women had no such choice and 
could spend their entire sentence in conditions of security entirely disproportionate 
to the risk they posed.
Conclusion and looking ahead
As has been shown, the Prison for Women attracted adverse attention and criticism 
from the moment of its opening. Yet, although the prison’s design was considered 
inadequate and unsuitable, this was not seen as the major issue. Even during the 
decades when ‘equality’ of treatment for men and women was rarely part of public 
discourse, the Prison for Women was seen to be unfair. To confine women so far 
from their home communities was to compound their punishment in a way that 
became increasingly difficult to justify, especially by the 1980s, when the country 
had observed women fighting to achieve the legal changes thought so essential to 
the efficacy of the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms. Even so, the Prison for 
Women was not subject to large-scale campaigning, and criticism generally came 
from well-informed sources, rather than from the wider public. It was the 
accumulation of these criticisms, against a backdrop of increasing feminist 
engagement both within and against state agencies, that finally encouraged CSC to 
grapple with the problem once more. By the late 1980s, CSC hoped for the 
successful resolution of one of its most intractable, yet increasingly ‘do-able’, 
problems.
Yet the history of penal reform tells us that change is often achieved at a cost. As 
Cohen (1983: 115) warns us, ‘we must be wary of good intentions [as] benevolence 
might do more harm than good’. A closer examination of the history of women’s 
reformatories in America demonstrates that, once women were engaged in the 
management of separate female prisons, ‘power triumphed over sisterhood not 
because these were single-sex institutions, but because they were prisons’ 
(Freedman 1981: 105, emphasis added). The innate discipline attached to any 
prison ensured that the initial benevolence was absorbed and subverted, simply 
because the prison could never be anything other than a place of involuntary 
confinement; prisoners could not see their imprisonment as a benevolent act,
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executed by a benevolent state. Similar good intentions failed spectacularly and 
tragically in the rebuilt HMP Holloway (see Rock, 1996). The Prison for Women 
itself had originally been built as an act of benevolence towards women who were, 
rightly, seen to be disadvantaged compared to male federal prisoners. Yet it, too, 
had failed. However, it can equally be said that history should not be the reason for 
refusing to contemplate change; rather, that we should learn its lessons, act upon 
them and accept that benevolence can play a crucial role in effecting change. The 
Canadians were faced with a uniquely Canadian problem, occasioned by the 
federal-provincial split in jurisdiction and the vast scale of the country itself. While 
they were also aware of the lessons of history, they felt that their circumstances 
impelled them towards doing something distinctively Canadian, rather than a 
simple replication of other jurisdictions’ solutions. They needed a catalyst, and the 
appointment of a new Commissioner of Corrections proved to be just that, as the 
next chapter will begin by illustrating.
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2. A journey begins; creating a task force
Throughout its colonial history, Canada relied on imported skills to develop its vast 
hinterland, pursuing expansionist policies despite the initial presence of large 
numbers of Aboriginals. Varying migratory patterns are evident in the very diverse 
nature of its present population, reflecting the results of social and economic 
upheavals throughout the world. Canada has also resorted to soliciting the help of 
specific individuals as needs have arisen both within and outside government. The 
appointment in 1988 of a new Commissioner of Corrections, Ole Ingstrup, proved 
crucial to the continuing endeavour of closing the Prison for Women. While much of 
his correctional background lay in his native Denmark, he came to Canada in 1983 as 
Special Adviser to the then Commissioner of Corrections. Following that 
appointment he was briefly Chairman of the National Parole Board, so was not 
unknown to Corrections, nor seen as a complete outsider, by the time he assumed the 
role of Commissioner himself. He brought with him a Scandinavian perspective on 
prisons and punishment and was known as someone with a specific interest in 
programming (for which we should read ‘regimes’), wanting to focus on the 
prisoners themselves, rather than strictly their security management as had more 
generally prevailed. He wanted change throughout CSC and within a very short time 
had established a number of Task Forces and brought in a new Mission Statement for 
the Service. As Adelburgh and Currie observed, when reflecting upon his rethinking 
of the Mission Statement: ‘for those of us who had worked with women in the 
federal correctional system before Ingstrup’s appointment, this sort of commitment 
from the Commissioner represented a radical departure from that of his predecessors 
-  who generally dismissed female offenders as insignificant or beyond rehabilitation’ 
(Adelburgh and Currie 1993: 19).
Involving the voluntary sector; a partnership with CAEFS
On the 1st September 1988 Mr. Ingstrup distributed to the members of Corrections - 
Senior Policy Advisory Committee (C-SPAC) an outline proposal for the creation of 
a Task Force on Female Offenders. This proposal had already been discussed 
informally with the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies (CAEFS) during 
an August meeting and both the Commissioner and CAEFS had acknowledged their
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similar goals regarding the need ‘co-operatively [to] design a new plan to provide an 
integrated system of programs and services for federally sentenced women’.1 At 
their meeting on the 16th September C-SPAC agreed that a Task Force should 
proceed and soon afterwards a formal approach was made to CAEFS, inviting their 
participation. CAEFS’ Executive Director, Bonnie Diamond, told CAEFS’ members 
in November that she had already met with the Deputy Commissioner of Corrections, 
James Phelps, and the Director of Native and Female Offender Programs, Jane 
Miller-Ashton, to discuss the proposals.2 It is perhaps indicative of the importance 
then accorded women and Aboriginals that in 1989 these two constituencies did not 
have separate Directors. Both were seen as ‘minorities’, despite Aboriginal 
incarceration rates for males, and particularly females, being entirely 
disproportionate to their numbers in the larger Canadian population. Even at that 
early stage it was clear that a partnership approach was envisaged for the Task Force, 
with representatives of CAEFS and the Correctional Services of Canada (CSC) being 
proposed as joint chairs of the Steering Committee and, by October, as joint chairs of 
the Working Group as well. Ms Diamond wrote:
I really want us to work quickly in having the task force up and moving.
Time goes so quickly and I do think that Ole Ingstrup is very open to
alternative ideas. The average term for a Commissioner of Corrections is
three years and he has already been in the position for six months.4
(Ms Diamond was correct; Mr. Ingstrup was to move to another federal position in 
1992).
This willingness to accept a Task Force represented a compromise on the part of 
CAEFS, because for some time it had been pushing for a Royal Commission on 
female offenders. As has been noted, ‘a favourite way in Canada to induce
1 Letter from Bonnie Diamond to Joseph Stanford, Dep. Solicitor General, 13th February, 1989
2 October / November, 1988 CAEFS’ Executive Director’s Report
3 The closest comparison is derived from figures for ‘on register’ prisoners (federal prisoners in 
provincial or federal prisons, and provincial prisoners in federal prisons, including those on day 
parole) in 1990/1991. Aboriginal men comprised nearly 13 percent o f ‘on register’ male prisoners. 
Figures presented in the same table showed women to be 2 percent o f the total ‘on register’ prisoners, 
but do not give a breakdown for Aboriginal women (Boe 1992: 14). We know from Shaw et al 
(1991b) that Aboriginal women comprised 23 percent of the federally sentenced women’s population, 
but there is not an exact correlation because those figures do not include all ‘on register’ Aboriginal 
women or provincial women serving sentences in federal prisons.
4 October / November, 1988 CAEFS’ Executive Director’s Report
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legislative change is through a more elaborate form of research and education, 
namely the public commission of enquiry. Governments find commissions a handy 
response to pressure from women’s groups to do something’ (Geller-Schwartz 1995: 
51). Or, as Bruckert (1993: 4) wrote, ‘establishing a Task Force or special 
committee to examine an issue that has successfully been defined in the public forum 
as a social problem has historically been a common strategy by the state to quiet the 
voices of opposition’. Perhaps something of the truth straddles these two views. The 
Task Force concept was imported into Canada following the Kennedy 
administration’s successful use of them in the United States. They are seen ‘as an 
instrument of policy making, combining intellectuals, aware of the practical 
constraints of government, with civil servants and other knowledgeable private 
citizens’ and are used to ‘facilitate both long-range planning and the control of 
government by the political executive’ (Wilson 1971: 122, 123). Royal 
Commissions are struck under the Inquiries Act 1985 and are established by the 
‘Governor [General] in Council’. Such Commissions ‘have the power of summoning 
before them any witnesses, and of requiring them to: (a) give evidence, orally or in 
writing ... and (b) produce such documents ... as Commissioners deem requisite’ 
(Section 4). Royal Commissions are independent of government, with members 
being appointed from outside the sphere to be investigated. Task forces, by contrast, 
are ‘informal administrative aids to the executive’ (Wilson 1971: 124) and for Mr. 
Ingstrup’s purposes it was important that civil servants from CSC should be 
included, as they would enable him to maintain more control of the time-frame and 
personnel involved. He could also incorporate others from the various criminal 
justice departments, such as the Office of the Solicitor General and the National 
Parole Board, whose support would be needed should a workable solution be 
provided by the Task Force. CAEFS recognised that Mr. Ingstrup’s preferred way 
of focusing on various issues was through such task forces, and pragmatically 
accepted that this was the only route for change available. In her December report 
their Executive Director, Bonnie Diamond, was to write:
It looks like the Task Force will be a go but CSC is quite nervous entering 
into such an undertaking with us. If we can pull it off it will be a new model 
in co-operation.
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The means of ‘pulling it o ff required protracted negotiations between CSC and 
CAEFS. The CAEFS’ Executive Committee met at the beginning of December to 
discuss the basis of a partnership with CSC and on the 6th December formally sent 
their proposals to James Phelps, who was then to negotiate the various points 
personally with Bonnie Diamond. CAEFS’ view of the purpose of the Task Force 
was that it should ‘comprehensively study the circumstances of federally sentenced 
women and ... recommend an integrated national system of services that is based on 
meeting the needs of these women. The task force will produce a blueprint for action 
complete with an implementation schedule ’ (emphasis added). CAEFS outlined 
nineteen ‘important elements’ and at that meeting Bonnie Diamond was able to 
obtain agreement on all but three: the financing of CAEFS’ Task Force 
representatives; co-chairmanship; financing of the regional consultations. The gist of 
these discussions was conveyed to Mr. Ingstrup, who expressed reservations about 
some of the conclusions reached. Co-chairmanship was an essential prerequisite to 
CAEFS’ participation and Mr. Phelps was able to point out to the Commissioner that 
there had been a precedent set, when the Secretariat worked jointly with the private 
sector during the Women in Conflict with the Law initiative. There were concerns 
that the ‘co-chairmanship would make accountability for the Task Force unclear and 
would be inconsistent with the development of a policy framework for the 
Correctional Service of Canada’5, but CSC still wanted to involve the voluntary 
sector.
Canada was adopting an unusual approach. At that time most jurisdictions jealously 
guarded the right to produce their own reports and, while they might have consulted 
outside agencies, did not share the writing of the final report with them, nor 
necessarily disclose the consultations, as exemplified by HM Prison Service’s 
Regimes for Women (1992). A rare European exception was the Dutch initiative, 
Women in Detention (Ministry of Justice, 1992), which involved external specialists 
in the Working Group. Stem, commenting on the role of the voluntary sector and 
pressure groups working in the criminal justice arena in the United Kingdom, cites 
their importance in being ‘free to argue for a better and more humane [penal] system’ 
in that ‘they do not have the dual and sometimes conflicting, responsibilities of many
5 Memorandum 1st February, 1989
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of the statutory bodies’. She then highlights the difficulties such groups face when 
dependent upon government for some of their funding and the fact that ‘grants are 
given ... on condition they are used to meet needs as defined by the Government or 
by statutory bodies. The effect of this is to erode the independence of voluntary 
organisations ...’ (Stem 1994: 244; see also Ryan, 1983). When there is a financial 
relationship between an organisation and government, such as with NACRO in the 
United Kingdom, there is an inevitable dulling of the critical edge, with ‘consensual 
limits and both sides know[ing] the boundaries’ (Ryan 1983: 109). Independence is 
an ever-present worry for most campaigning groups and in Britain, for example, 
there has been little inclination for government departments and voluntary 
organisations to view each other as partners until relatively recently. Indeed, the 
voluntary sector has cherished its independence, largely (in the penal sphere) 
because of fears of incorporation and being used to legitimate government policies.
The Canadian decision to opt for joint participation in such an important policy 
venture had wide ramifications because the involvement of a national umbrella 
organisation, CAEFS, and eventually the Native Women’s Association of Canada 
(NWAC), signalled to the provinces that women’s imprisonment was firmly on the 
national correctional agenda. What was being undertaken by the federal authorities 
could not fail to have an impact upon the provinces, which in turn might conceivably 
find it harder to ignore the regional branches of the national voluntary organisations. 
But there was also an underlying pragmatism in CSC’s approach, as acknowledged 
by a senior civil servant: It was better that they [voluntary sector groups] participate 
because then you have a solution that satisfied them as well as the government -  
and, ideally, they would stop criticising the Minister at every turn!6 Such 
pragmatism, if indeed it was that, could also be viewed as a means of neutralising 
and incorporating the voluntary sector. To have both CAEFS and NWAC involved 
made it harder for each organisation to exercise its more usual function of informed -  
and often critical -  observer. CAEFS, in particular, was such a consistent and vocal 
critic of CSC that some officials thought the organisation compromised its
6 Interview 27
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effectiveness because of its ubiquity, while outside observers of the organisation
n
thought that its prime function was ‘to be the burr in the government saddle’.
To begin with, the larger unresolved question was that of funding. CAEFS received 
sustaining funding from the Secretariat ‘to ensure the maintenance of the 
Association’s national structure and to cover the core operating expenses necessary 
to fulfil their objectives’,8 but it was insufficient to cover the additional cost of 
participating in the Task Force. CAEFS relied heavily on volunteers to pursue its 
work and it was felt that those asked to join the Task Force could not be expected to 
do so without recompense for the time involved, particularly as the civil servants 
would continue to be paid by their individual departments. Pressure to conclude the 
negotiations was compounded by the need to satisfy the Treasury Board which, 
during the negotiations to finalise the Burnaby Agreement9, had made it clear that it 
thought the ad hoc agreements for federally sentenced women unsatisfactory and was 
not prepared to finance more of them. Throughout the month of January James 
Phelps continued to press Ole Ingstrup for a decision, and it was finally agreed that 
the Commissioner would meet with Bonnie Diamond and Felicity Hawthorne, the 
President of CAEFS, in February. The meeting was an uncomfortable one (‘in 
retrospect, we find the tenor of the meeting was disturbing’10) and the CAEFS’ 
representatives failed to resolve the three outstanding matters. An angry CAEFS’ 
Board, upon hearing that the Commissioner considered the proposed Task Force an 
‘internal operational review’ passed the following resolution:
Whereas CAEFS is a member of the voluntary sector it has no part to play in 
an internal CSC review of the Federal Female Offender except in an advisory 
capacity as consultants.11
7 Personal notes 1996
g
The fact that sustaining grants are funded by the Secretariat means that there is a degree of 
independence between CSC and the Secretariat. Even if  CSC were to cancel service contracts with 
organisations such as CAEFS, the sustaining grants would not be affected. CAEFS currently receives 
a grant o f approximately $500,000 annually.
9 An Exchange o f Service Agreement, concluded in 1988, covering federally sentenced women in 
British Columbia.
10 Letter from Bonnie Diamond to Joseph Stanford, 13th February, 1989
11 Ibid
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A few days later Bonnie Diamond, together with the Executive Director of the 
Ottawa E. Fry Society, once again met with Mr. Ingstrup. This meeting and a 
subsequent one resulted in agreement being reached on all substantive matters. The 
financial questions were settled, with per diems being accepted for CAEFS’ Working 
Group members and extra money provided for CAEFS to organise regional 
consultations with interested groups and individuals. Co-chairmanship was also 
agreed, with the proviso that Commissioner Ingstrup would retain certain 
‘accountabilities’ because of the ‘government structure within which the Task Force 
will operate’. Mr. Ingstrup’s retention of financial accountability was an indication 
to Task Force members -  if they considered it -  of the structural reality of the
19enterprise they were joining.
A Task Force, comprising a Working Group and a Steering Committee, was agreed 
and both of these committees were to be co-chaired by CAEFS’ and CSC 
representatives. The Working Group would carry out the bulk of the work, while the 
Steering Committee would ‘monitor, review and approve the activities and output of 
the Working Group’13 and offer a ‘broad context for the work of the Task Force’.14 
CAEFS formally agreed to participate in the Task Force on the 14th March and at the 
same time nominated their members of the Working Group. CAEFS’ March 
Executive Report commented on recent developments, and the Board’s action in 
reversing their earlier decision, saying: ‘Most of us approach such a joint venture 
with healthy awareness but also with optimism that any system reform will be better 
for our participation. We will however have to remain very alert’.
CSC’s wish to have CAEFS on board as a partner was recognition of its pre­
eminence as an advocacy organisation for imprisoned women, as well as the fact that 
CAEFS had long been pressing for a Royal Commission. This partially explains 
why the Service went to such lengths to accommodate the Association’s various 
demands. CSC’s tactic was a particularly Canadian approach, rather than one which 
might be replicated within other correctional services. A possible explanation can be
12 All government departments are subject to the Financial Administration Act 1985 and Mr.
Ingstrup would have been unable to delegate any authority for financial matters.
13 Memorandum 23rd March, 1989
14 Proposal for a Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women (unamended version)
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found in the complex relationship between provincial and federal sensibilities, the 
curious dance each side engages in whilst delineating the boundaries which each may 
not exceed. The consequence of this sometimes fraught relationship is the need to 
consult widely before decisions are reached. Every avenue must be explored and in 
Canada these avenues frequently lead to the voluntary sector, where alternative 
voices are most likely to be heard and add legitimacy to the public debate. With 
respect to CAEFS such a joint initiative also had the effect, as I have earlier 
suggested, of neutralising them for the period of the Task Force and beyond, because 
CAEFS would be intimately linked to and sharing responsibility for the eventual 
report. The risk of incorporation by government is a constant one for voluntary- 
sector organisations and CAEFS understood the twin possibilities of both 
compromising their reputation as an independent organisation and alienating their 
own membership. As a CAEFS’ representative, looking back, said: We had to 
accept one really difficult thing, which was that we had to operate within the law as 
it was then, because we thought it [the situation at the Prison for Women] was urgent 
enough to have to do that, so we knew that whatever we recommended would be 
prison o f some sort... and we had to know that we could live with that bottom line.15
The urgency of the need to do something about the Prison for Women underpinned 
CAEFS’ decision to enter into partnership with CSC, but the relationship with CSC 
had never been clear-cut. As well as the sustaining funding received by CAEFS, 
which enabled it to carry out its advocacy work, CAEFS also received Government 
funding for the many community programmes it managed across the country under 
the auspices of its various branches. CAEFS was involved in supervising women in 
the community on behalf of Corrections16 and this reliance on government money led 
to an uneasy tension between its independence as an advocacy organisation and its 
status as a paid agent of the state. As Rock wrote: ‘Private bodies cherish their 
privacy. A paradoxical consequence has been that the private sector periodically 
petitions federal departments for money to support its independence’ (Rock 1996:
23). This paradox lay at the heart of CAEFS’ relationship with government. At the 
time of the Task Force CAEFS would have been astonished had CSC considered any
15 Interview 19
16 Some o f this work, such as parole supervision, has now been reclaimed by CSC.
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organisation other than theirs as the major partner. When the Corrections and 
Conditional Release Act (CCRA) was subsequently passed in 1992, they interpreted 
Section 11:... the Service shall ...(b) consult regularly about programs fo r  female 
offenders with (i) appropriate women's groups ... as applying particularly to them. It 
also tends to be forgotten that CAEFS, whilst then displaying many of the 
sensibilities of prison abolitionists, did not formally adopt an abolitionist stance until 
June, 1993.17 Consequently, many of its members questioned the wisdom of being 
involved in a government project which might conceivably lead to the building of 
new prisons.
In many voluntary groups, there is often a considerable overlapping of key personnel 
and, although Canada is a vast country, the need for provincial branches of national 
organisations frequently means that those operating in specific spheres are in close 
contact with representatives many thousands of miles away. The pool in which they 
are operating is often quite small. As Shaw later wrote, in connection with groups 
operating in Nova Scotia, women frequently ‘sat on each other’s boards, made 
representations to authorities in support of member organisations in trouble ...’
(Shaw 1998: 108). There was a thread uniting women’s groups with other women’s 
groups; violence, victimisation and inequality before the law. It was unsurprising 
that the boundaries should have been permeable and that a woman’s expertise in a 
specific area was valuable to more than one group. CAEFS was no exception, in that 
members often had broad connections. As their Mission Statement notes, they are 
‘community based agencies dedicated to offering services and programs to 
marginalised women, advocating for legislative and administrative reform’, with 
‘volunteerism ... an essential part of [their] work’. As an umbrella group for local 
societies, CAEFS’ Board of Directors includes a representative from each and the 
national agenda is determined following intensive consultations with all members.
Helping each other campaign, often against government agencies, was not 
uncommon amongst these various organisations, but there was a fundamental
17 Ryan (1983) details similar dilemmas faced by a British abolitionist group, Radical Alternatives to 
Prison (RAP), whose very outspoken view that prisons ‘could not rehabilitate’ antagonised the Home 
Office, leaving RAP unable to influence official policy in the way that more pragmatic organisations,
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dilemma as to how far women in the voluntary sector should co-operate with 
government in order to achieve change. There was a history of government 
involvement with women’s umbrella groups and their subsequent neutralisation or 
marginalisation. For example, the high profile of the government-funded National 
Action Committee (NAC) during the 1970s diminished following the election of a 
Conservative government and individual women’s groups were ignored because they 
did not reflect the prevailing political ideology. Some women’s groups were no 
longer always national in their scope, as in Quebec, where the women’s movement 
became identified with the independence movement and was reluctant to be publicly 
linked to pan-Canada women’s organisations (see Geller-Schwartz, 1995). CAEFS 
knew of this collective history -  because some of its members were personally 
involved -  and a number within the organisation feared similar incorporation by 
government, remaining sceptical of any requests to advance specific causes 
collectively. Then there were those whose pragmatism about the means was largely 
occasioned by the worsening situation within the Prison for Women. Carlen, with 
respect to prisons, has long advocated that ‘campaigners [should] continue to engage 
in democratic discussion and co-operative enterprise with prisoners, prison staff, 
prison administrators and opinion leaders ... [because] it is essential to keep open to 
public view the inner workings of the whole carceral machinery so that its endemic 
secrecy can be held in check’ (Carlen 1998: 167). How far this co-operation should 
be extended was the crux of the problem for many within CAEFS. Its members were 
aware of the historic failure of many benevolent penal enterprises, the record being 
characterised as one of ‘not just good intentions going wrong now and then, but of 
continued and disastrous failure’ (Cohen 1985: 19). However, the worsening 
situation at the Prison for Women convinced the Board of the need to risk the 
possibility of further failure.
Their ambivalence would have been shared by some of the civil servants because 
they, privately, would also have thought of themselves as feminists. This was an 
uncomfortable label to wear while employed by the state. Some were already 
ghettoised by virtue of working in fields focused on women and their future careers
such as the Howard League and NACRO, did. CAEFS had always taken a less confrontational path, 
partly, it might be suggested, because o f its financial relationship with government.
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were dependent upon not being seen as devoted to one particular area. Geller- 
Schwartz (1995) noted that as ‘femocrats’18 they were ‘suspect’ in the wider 
bureaucracy. Increasingly, the term feminism came to be used derogatively and 
supposedly neutral civil servants would have been wary of being too closely 
identified with women’s issues.
This emphasis on the role of CAEFS is necessary because the Association, mainly 
through its Executive Director, Bonnie Diamond, played a fundamental role in 
shaping the Task Force and in suggesting who the various non-government members 
might be. CAEFS’ success in securing voluntary sector parity with CSC 
representatives ensured that neither faction was publicly paramount during the life of 
the Task Force (although there were undoubted power differentials between 
individuals behind the scenes). The composition of the Working Group, which was 
to undertake the bulk of the work, illustrates the balance achieved, even though a 
look at the names published in the Task Force’s report, where there are four 
government appointees alongside six voluntary sector ones, would indicate an 
imbalance in favour of the voluntary sector. (There were actually five civil servants, 
but one withheld her name from the final report, a circumstance discussed in chapter 
5). Initially, the Working Group was to have equal government and CAEFS’ 
representation. During preliminary discussions within Corrections, at the time when 
C-SPAC approved the launch of a Task Force, it was suggested by the Chairman of 
the Parole Board, Mr. Gibson, that a ‘native [Aboriginal] person should be on the 
Task Force as well as ‘two provincial representatives * (emphasis added). That 
decision was made in September 1988 and the wording of the minutes suggests that 
both these constituencies, possibly through oversight, had been omitted from Mr. 
Ingstrup’s original proposal. By the end of September it was already clear that the 
preferred format of the Task Force was for it to consist of a Working Group and a 
Steering Committee and, following Mr. Gibson’s suggestion, it was then assumed 
that an Aboriginal representative would sit on the (arguably less influential) Steering 
Committee. Even CAEFS, when suggesting in its December letter to James Phelps
18 A term coined by Australian feminists to cover feminists working in a government bureaucracy 
(see Stetson, 1995)
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that the ‘particular needs of native women must be highlighted’, only requested 
Aboriginal representation on the Steering Committee.
What significance did Mr. Gibson’s suggestion have? And what was its importance 
to the Task Force? The answers lie in the history of Canada as a colonised country, a 
country which eventually came to be a confederation of provinces. The provincial 
aspect of this story is also important and will shortly be explored more fully. For the 
moment, we need to reflect on the history of the First Nations of Canada, those 
Aboriginal nations which were displaced and dispossessed by waves of European 
immigration. We need this knowledge in order to understand why Aboriginals came 
to be so disproportionately represented in Canadian prisons -  and why their 
participation in the Task Force came to be so important.
Dispossession and attempted assimilation; the First Nations of Canada
The first peoples of Canada were the Aboriginals. They were there, in their many 
nations, at the time of Canada’s ‘discovery’ by Europeans. The nations were self- 
governing and had no concept of the European principles of ‘ownership’. This is 
best summarised by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP):
In general, the European understanding -  or at least the one that was 
committed to paper -  was that the monarch had, or acquired through treaty 
or alliance, sovereignty over the land and the people on it. The Aboriginal 
understanding, however, recognised neither European title to the land nor 
Aboriginal submission to a European monarch. ... the Aboriginal concept of 
land and its relationship with human beings was based on the concept of 
communal ownership of land and ... while people could control and exercise 
stewardship over a territory, ultimately the land belonged to the Creator. 
(RCAP 1996 Vol. 1:5).
The term Aboriginal is often used loosely. In Canada there are three distinct groups 
which can accurately claim to be part of this larger group: those known as First 
Nations; those known as Metis and those now known as Inuit (but formerly known as 
Eskimo). In reality, the groups are distinct, even if it has sometimes been politically 
expedient for them to be seen as homogeneous. The groups were further divided by 
whether or not they were considered to be ‘status’ (registered) or ‘non-status’
Indians; the legislative aegis of the original British North America Act 1867 only 
included registered Indians. The relatively recent Constitution Act 1982 defined
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Aboriginal peoples, in Section 35(2), as including ‘the Indian, Inuit and Metis people 
of Canada’, which was the first time that the Metis had been officially recognised as 
a distinct group (see Frideres, 1993)19. The Metis emerged as a separate entity 
following the first contact with Europeans and are of ‘mixed heritage, [being] First 
Nations, or Inuit in the case of the Labrador Metis, and European’ (RCAP 1996, Vol. 
1). Following the example of the constitution, and that of RCAP itself, the term 
Aboriginal will generally be used in this work and the word ‘Indian’ will only be 
used when it is being quoted from another source. In correctional terms, however, 
Aboriginals are not treated as three separate groups, but as a single entity.
The very first contact between Aboriginals and Europeans was mutually beneficial; 
trading links were established and there was little encroachment on the land. Indeed, 
without Aboriginal assistance, the first European settlers would have found it 
difficult to survive. However, as Europeans arrived in increasing numbers, believing 
that they had found a land to which they could freely lay claim, the situation quickly 
changed -  and it was not just the question of land occupation which was to have an 
impact. A devastating consequence of contact with Europeans was the exposure of 
Aboriginals to foreign diseases and illnesses which they could not withstand. 
Consequently, during the first 300 years of European immigration the Aboriginal
t lipopulation declined by 50 percent and towards the end of the 18 century it was 
estimated that the numbers of Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals had become, in an 
astonishingly short period, approximately equal (RCAP 1996, Vol. 1: 5). Another 
consequence of contact with Europeans was the proselytising of missionaries, which 
undermined the belief systems underpinning the social organisation of Aboriginal 
nations, caused divisions amongst Aboriginals and encouraged them to adopt a way 
of life far removed from their traditional ones. Those missionaries also became 
highly involved in the education of Aboriginals.
Loss of land and sovereignty is the continuous thread of Aboriginal history. As we 
shall see the Royal Proclamation of 1763 had a particular application to Quebec, but 
it was also a statement of intent towards Aboriginal nations living within the newly
19 The Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women chose to adopt the word Aboriginal for their report 
because it was the term used in the Constitution Act 1982.
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conquered land. Those nations were seen to be autonomous and ones with whom 
treaties could be concluded but, as RCAP earlier indicated, the Aboriginals’ 
understanding of what these treaties meant was fundamentally different from the 
Europeans’ (also, see Miller 2000). As European immigration increased and, with it, 
the illegal occupation of Aboriginal land and its clearing for European-style 
agriculture, the Aboriginals were further displaced and left without a traditional 
means of supporting themselves. They then became increasingly reliant on the state 
for treaty payments as a means of survival.20 The notion of Aboriginals as 
autonomous nations abated as immigration increased and the treaties became Tittle 
more than real estate transactions designed to free Aboriginal lands for settlement 
and resource development’ (RCAP 1996, Vol. 1: 6). Moreover, there was a 
concerted effort to increase the conversion of Aboriginals and thus ‘civilise’ them 
through the added benefits of European-style education, whilst ceremonies such as 
the potlatch and Sun Dance, which were of spiritual significance to various nations, 
were proscribed. Such proscriptions were ‘analogous to passing a Catholic Act to 
regulate the lives of Canadian Catholics that prohibits them from attending mass ... ’ 
(Morrison and Wilson, 1995: 608).
The Gradual Civilisation Act 1857 first introduced the idea of voluntary
enfranchisement as a means of assimilating Aboriginals into European Canada, but
9 1the consequence of enfranchisement was the loss of legal Indian ‘status’.
Providing that Aboriginals could prove they ‘were debt-free and of good moral 
character’ they could apply for enfranchisement and become a citizen of the country 
that was already theirs. The bait used was land. Any Aboriginal accepted for
20 Treaties were originally made through the Crown but, post-Confederation, were made through the 
Canadian Government. The treaties, in taking control o f Aboriginal-held land to facilitate European 
immigration, created reserves and provided small annuities for individual Aboriginals. At the time 
these treaties were signed by the Aboriginals various verbal assurances (such as assistance with 
agriculture) were given by those negotiating on behalf o f the government. Aboriginals, being 
accustomed to oral transactions, assumed that the Government would honour them and the failure to 
do so, and to clarify entitlement to land, has led to protracted claims from individual Bands. (See 
Frideres, 1983: RCAP, 1996)
21 ‘Status’, in this context, refers to those who were legally entitled to call themselves Indian. ‘The 
terms ‘legal’, ‘registered’ and ‘status’ are generally used interchangeably to denote an Indian who is 
o f federal concern ... “Indian” refers to a person who, pursuant to the Indian Act, is registered as an 
Indian, or is entitled to be registered as an Indian’ (Frideres, 1993: 28). At no time were Aboriginals 
permitted to self-identify as Indians. For a fuller discussion o f the many ways in which the Indian Act 
determined who might be classified as a ‘status’ Indian -  and those whom the Act excluded -  see 
RCAP, 1996 and Frideres, 1993.
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enfranchisement would receive 20 hectares of land -  and this would be taken by the 
colonial government from reserve lands which, under the Royal Proclamation, the 
government had no power to touch. Land that had previously been held in common 
ownership by nations could, by this means, be sub-divided and held in private 
ownership by a man who was no longer legally Aboriginal (Miller, 2000). By this 
means the Aboriginals’ claim to land would be weakened. (It was only in 1960 that 
unqualified enfranchisement was extended to all Aboriginals (RCAP, Vol. 1: 9.12).
The policy initially failed -  only one Indian asked to be enfranchised -  but the idea 
re-emerged in the Gradual Enfranchisement Act 1869 and women were singularly 
targeted by many of its provisions. Those who married non-Aboriginal men lost 
their Indian status, as did their children. Conversely, if a woman married an 
Aboriginal man who elected to be franchised she also lost status as a consequence of 
his decision. The main means of regulating Aboriginals was, however, the Indian 
Act 1876 and, although amended at regular intervals, this continued to be the pre­
eminent legislation concerning Aboriginals until the Constitution Act 1982. Under 
the 1876 Act Aboriginals were seen as being in a state of ‘wardship’ in relation to 
the state, no longer competent to administer their own affairs. Federal control over 
Aboriginals’ governance, land, resources and education completed the means of 
assimilation of once-independent nations.
Land loss did not only occur as a result of failure to honour treaties. In the 20th 
century there were enforced relocations of whole Aboriginal communities. Some, 
such as the Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia, were moved because it was administratively 
easier to have them in one area, rather than scattered across various reserves and 
others were moved because their land was needed for development purposes. Many 
of the relocations were undertaken without adequate consultation and informed 
consent did not appear to have been obtained from those moved. Removal was often 
to areas with which they had no previous links and the host communities had not 
been consulted to see if they agreed to an influx of newcomers. The new 
accommodation was usually inadequate -  and sometimes non-existent -  and there 
were insufficient jobs to provide an income for all families. RCAP details the case 
of the Gwa’Sala and ’Nakwaxda’xw, two fishing communities on Vancouver island,
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who were forced to move in 1964 when the government threatened to withdraw all 
funding for housing, school and services if they refused. Promised moorings for 
their boats never materialised and new houses were not ready:
When boats were used for homes because the promised houses were not built, 
fishing licences were revoked because the boats were no longer defined as 
fishing vessels. Most of these boats, as well as others used for fishing, had to 
be moored in the river or on the beach, where they were eventually destroyed 
by high winds, waves and rain. This deprived the bands of access to marine 
resources, formerly a mainstay of their economy. (1996 Vol. 1,11: 4.2)
Aboriginals’ living conditions were sometimes so scandalous that many developed 
tuberculosis and the mortality rate of these relocated communities accelerated. Their 
old homes were often burned to discourage any possibility of return and the 
consequence was a drift to the cities so that they had more chance of paid 
employment. In turn, this drift led to more social and economic problems and an 
increasing dependency on state welfare. The end result of these enforced relocations 
was the further destruction of the Aboriginals’ relationship with the land and their
99cultural identity.
While Aboriginals were being displaced from their communities, whether through 
losing the right to live on a reserve, through enforced relocation or the need to move 
elsewhere in order to obtain work, yet another piece of the grand project to ‘civilise 
and assimilate’ them was undermining their communities. Education was the means. 
Early on it had been recognised that, through education, the colonial government 
would be able to reach the most easily influenced group of Aboriginals, the children. 
Their parents were believed to be beyond reach because they had already been 
exposed to the traditions and beliefs which were so inimical to the tenets of 
Christianity. Although some Aboriginals had requested that education should be 
provided for their children, it was in the belief that they needed the skills of the 
dominant culture, such as literacy and numeracy, in order to be able to compete with 
Europeans in the workplace. At no stage in those early years of colonisation did the 
majority of Aboriginals wish this new knowledge to be a replacement for traditional
22 Chapter 11 o f RCAP, Volume 1, provides an extensive review o f many o f these relocations and 
the consequences for the communities involved. These relocations continued until well into the 
1960s.
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skills; rather, it was to be complementary. The state thought otherwise and, in 
collaboration with the four main churches -  Anglican, Catholic, Methodist and 
Presbyterian -  established, in the 19th century, a mix of industrial and boarding 
schools. As RCAP shows, the system was driven by ‘missionary efforts’ and the 
‘considerable force of the churches’ political influence in Ottawa by which they 
secured funds to operate the schools’ (1996 Vol. 1: 10). Over time the schools came 
to be known simply as residential schools but, whatever their original name, the 
intention behind each was identical; the obliteration of all that made the children 
self-identify as Aboriginals and the creation of new Canadians. In this scheme, 
parents had no part to play because they were part of the perceived problem. As 
RCAP said, ‘while they [parents] could not learn, they could, as parents, teach their 
children. Through them to their children and on through successive generations ran 
the influence of the “wigwam”.23 If the children’s potential was to be realised, it 
could only be outside the family. ... A wedge had to be driven not only physically 
between parent and child but also culturally and spiritually’ (RCAP 1996 Vol. 1: 10). 
As the system developed it was hoped that the children would act as civilising forces 
in their own right and would return to the reserves to influence others. The reality 
was that most ‘graduates’, thanks to innate racism within Euro-Canadian 
communities, could not gain employment after leaving the schools, yet no longer 
fitted into the reserves and way of life they had been forced to abandon.
The schools -  where the children were forbidden to speak their own languages -  
were under-resourced, with poorly paid and often ill-trained teachers. The children 
were used as unpaid labour to offset the cost of their care and they worked long 
hours with, until the end of the Second World War, no more than half of each day 
actually being spent doing school work. The emphasis was on their acquiring 
practical skills, which would enable them to find employment in manual 
occupations. They were inadequately clothed and fed and the physical conditions in 
which they lived were particularly bad, with the insanitary conditions leading to high 
incidences of disease, particularly tuberculosis. This was well-known to the 
Department of Indian Affairs and the churches. Indeed, in the early 1900s the
23 This is a reference to an 1879 report compiled by Nicholas Flood Davin, MP, who had been asked 
to report on the industrial schools.
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Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, Duncan Campbell Scott, freely 
admitted that ‘it is quite within the mark to say that fifty percent of the children who 
passed though these schools did not live to benefit from the education which they 
had received therein’ (Miller 1996: 133). Children ran away from the schools and 
some were to die while attempting to find their way home in the depths of winter.
The horrors of the schools did not end there, but it was only in the 1980s that public 
attention was focused on the physical and sexual abuse to which children had 
systematically been subjected. The relationship between churches and state, and the 
governance of these schools, ended in 1969 and government policy was eventually 
pushed in the direction of ‘Indian control of Indian Education’ by the National Indian 
Brotherhood, which led to some of the original schools being transferred to the 
control of Aboriginal organisations (Miller 1996: 405).
Although Miller (1996) estimates that no more than one third of Aboriginal children 
attended such schools, RCAP suggests that any figures should be treated cautiously. 
RCAP contends that the full ‘impact of the system was felt not only by the children 
who attended schools but by the families and communities that were deprived of 
their children and had to deal subsequently with children who returned damaged ...
In that sense, communities, parents and, indeed, children later bom to former 
students of the residential schools were all “enroled” (sic) (1996 Vol. 1: 10).24 
Although the policy ceased, it was replaced by the ‘Sixties’ Scoop’25, whereby 
children avoided residential school, but were instead taken into care and fostered (see 
Fournier and Crey, 1998).
24 There is a growing literature on the history o f the residential schools. RCAP (1996) received 
extensive testimony in both written and oral form, some o f which found its way into the final report. 
Miller (1996) gives a particularly broad view o f the history and the consequences o f the residential 
school experiment. As well as singling out the various churches for their roles in running the schools, 
Miller also makes it clear that the federal government had -  and continues to have -  responsibility for 
what happened. Chrisjohn and Young take issue with what they term the ‘standard account’ o f the 
rationale for residential schools and offer an alternative ‘irregular account’, which begins “residential 
schools were one o f many attempts at the genocide o f the Aboriginal people” (Chrisjohn & Young 
1997: 3).
25 A phrase coined by Patrick Johnston to cover the period, which began in 1959, when large 
numbers o f Aboriginal children were removed from their homes and placed in (frequently non- 
Aboriginal) foster care on the grounds o f ‘child protection’. The phrase is cited in Fournier and 
Crey’s Stolen from our Embrace, wherein they describe the period as being ‘damage done to the 
generations o f people who narrowly escaped residential schools only to wind up in foster homes’.
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As our focus is on Aboriginal women, irrespective of the fact that Aboriginal men 
were also highly discriminated against and regulated, at this point we must briefly 
return to the legislative arena. It should be remembered that women were 
particularly disadvantaged by the Indian Act 1876, specifically by sections 12 (1) (a) 
and 12(1) (b), as amended in 1951. Any Aboriginal woman who ‘married out’:
lost any claim to Indian status ... [and] was not entitled to registration. Like 
generations of women ... who had married out, loss of status meant loss of the 
right under Canadian law to hold land on the reserve and loss of status for 
any children of the marriage. With the loss of status and membership came 
the forced sale or disposal of any reserve lands she may have held ... [and] 
she was also struck off the band list and was no longer entitled to 
distributions of band moneys’ (RCAP 1996, Vol. IV: 2).
This inability to return to reserves should a marriage fail, and to protect the status of 
their children, contributed to the growing number of Aboriginal women in the urban 
Diaspora where, despite having marginally better education than male Aboriginals, 
they found it harder to gain work. They were disadvantaged relative both to 
Aboriginal men and other Canadian women. In 1970 the Royal Commission on the 
Status o f  Women recommended that ‘the [Indian] act be amended “to allow an Indian 
woman upon marriage to a non-Indian to (a) retain her Indian status and (b) transmit 
her status to her children” ’ (RCAP 1996, Vol. IV: 1.5). The 1985 Bill C-31 
partially restored women’s rights in this regard, but anomalies remained and are a 
continuing source of concern and grievance.
Aboriginal history cannot be covered in a few short paragraphs and the foregoing has 
given the barest glimpse of a colonial process which began with the intention of 
offering protection and ended with coercion. The results of Euro-Canadian policies 
of assimilation can be found within Canada’s prisons in the disproportionate 
numbers of imprisoned Aboriginals. While the residential schools may have ended 
thirty years ago, the generations of lost parenting are evident in those who failed to 
find a way back to a heritage which had been removed from them -  and which had 
also been displaced from the reserves to which they returned. The Aboriginal 
‘graduates’ of the residential schools emerged stripped of their cultural identities into 
a society which did not recognise them as ‘proper Canadians’ and failed to offer 
them work. Their own families had often been destroyed by the removal of the
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children and the ravaging effects of alcohol and violence on the reserves (see 
Maracle, 1993). More recently, drug addiction has added to the difficulties of 
Aboriginal communities. When attempting to create their own family units, 
Aboriginals resorted to what they experienced in the schools, having seen no other 
models. Consequently, the physical and sexual abuse which many had experienced 
was often meted out to their own children. While enforced relocations for purposes 
of economic development may now largely have ceased, the consequences of those 
policies remain manifest. Some communities have found it impossible to recover 
their previous independence and their children have been obliged to leave in order to 
obtain work. Canada’s prisons are disproportionately filled with Aboriginals, as a 
direct consequence of colonial policies which, although amended, continue to affect 
all First Nations’ peoples. In chapter 8 this particular strand will be pursued in 
much greater detail.
The provincial dimension; Quebec
The Aboriginals, however, were not the only culturally-distinct group deserving of 
inclusion in -  or at least consideration by -  the Task Force and it is at this point that 
we need to reflect on the first colonisers of Canada, the Quebecois.
The original C-SPAC recommendation that two provincial representatives should be 
on the Task Force was reconfirmed on the 6th February 1989, but the decision 
created problems. There were ‘difficulties involved in selecting two individuals to 
represent all provincial and territorial governments’ (emphasis added). Eventually, 
there were to be representatives from all five correctional regions on the Steering 
Committee27. However, the decision to opt for the correctional regions -  as a means 
of avoiding offending provinces which might otherwise have been omitted -  has 
subsequently been cited by CSC as the original reason for being unable to include 
Quebec on the Working Group, as it would have been impolitic to include one 
province, ahead of others, on the most important of the Task Force’s two
26 Memorandum 14th March 1989
27 For administrative convenience CSC has five correctional regions: Atlantic, covering the 
Maritimes and Newfoundland; Quebec; Ontario; Prairies, covering Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta 
and the Northern Territories; Pacific, covering British Columbia. As has been discussed in chapter 1, 
the federal government is responsible for those sentenced to terms o f  more than two years’ 
imprisonment.
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committees. Yet during those first discussions about forming a Task Force that 
concern did not appear to be an issue.
As has already been shown, assembling the Task Force was no easy matter. CSC 
had taken great pains to ensure that CAEFS was highly involved in the project and 
had made considerable concessions, such as joint chairmanship, in order to ensure 
their participation. On that point alone, the Task Force was already breaking new 
ground, but Corrections had gone further when it belatedly invited NWAC to join the 
deliberations, to speak for Aboriginal women. Federally sentenced women, as 
personified by their ‘representatives’ on the Task Force, immediately became two 
distinct groups; Euro-Canadians and Aboriginals. The addition of the Aboriginals 
also meant that the composition of the most influential part of the Task Force, the 
Working Group, was then balanced in favour of the voluntary sector. As we already 
know, the Commissioner preferred a Task Force because this allowed him to 
exercise some control over its direction, precisely because civil servants could be 
appointed to it. The addition of NWAC meant that the civil servants ended up as an 
unexpected minority on the very Group they were unofficially expected to guide 
through force of administrative expertise. In Canada, however, there are other 
considerations when creating representative bodies and the reasons for these are 
firmly bedded in the political structure of the country itself. The federal government 
is constantly aware of provincial sensibilities whenever it plans new ventures. It can 
never be assumed that provinces will share the same perspectives; they are as much 
formed by their individual histories as is the single entity of Canada. Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in the French-founded province of Quebec, where the question of 
political and cultural identity has been of profound importance since it was 
‘conquered’ by the English and incorporated into an anglophone Canada in 1763.
Why should this be important in the context of a Task Force on federally sentenced 
women? If we look at the composition of the Working Group we already know that 
six of the members were non-civil servants. What has not been made clear is that all 
of these lived and worked outside Ottawa, coming from as far as British Columbia 
and the Maritimes, whereas the five civil servants were all then based in the capital 
city. Of course it is scarcely surprising that civil servants, working largely at
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Corrections’ headquarters should be selected for a Task Force which was focused on 
their areas of expertise, but there is a further dimension to all of this. CSC had 
recognised the need to involve the voluntary sector and saw that its primary partner, 
in the context of federally sentenced women, could realistically only be CAEFS.
CSC then had to accept the need to involve Aboriginals as a separate group and, as 
we will see, eventually involved many more than first anticipated. In doing so a 
distinction between federally sentenced women, based on ethnicity and culture, was 
made. Aboriginals were only 2.5 percent of the total Canadian population yet were, 
disproportionately, 23 percent of the federally sentenced women’s population. At 
the time of the 1991 census French-speaking Canadians formed roughly 25 percent 
of the country’s population and the majority of these lived in Quebec (Bothwell 
1998: 234). Federally sentenced women from Quebec comprised 21 percent of the 
sentenced population at the time of the Task Force and those Quebecois could 
correctly have claimed to be a distinct ethnic and cultural group in their own right. 
Yet they were not represented separately on the most influential of the groups 
comprising the Task Force. We now need to look at what had been happening in 
Quebec prior to the forming of the Task Force to see if it might be justifiable to ask 
why the Quebecois were not recognised as constituting an equally important group of 
their own on the Task Force.
Returning to history
It is not necessary to delve too far back into Quebec history to establish that the 
province had experienced immense political and social change during the two 
decades prior to the Task Force, but we also need to understand something of how 
the province of Quebec came into being. As far as Europeans were concerned, 
Jacques Cartier ‘discovered’ Canada in 1534 (although there is evidence of much 
earlier European contact on the eastern seaboard) and the French were the first 
colonisers of Canada, or New France as it became known. In turn, they were 
colonised by the British in 1760 -  a time known as the Conquest -  and New France 
was ceded to Britain. This was made formal by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
through which Quebec became a British province, English law was imposed, the 
Church of England became the established church, English became the official 
language in any representative assembly and any Quebecois wishing to sit in such an
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assembly had to renounce their (Catholic) faith. Such a strategy proved impossible 
to implement and the Quebec Act 1774 re-imposed French civil law, leaving the 
Catholic church again ascendant (McRoberts, 1993: 44-45). In 1791 Quebec was 
divided into two separate areas known as Lower Canada and Upper Canada, with the 
French-speaking former Quebecois comprising the majority in Lower Canada. It 
was always an uneasy division, exacerbated by increasing numbers of English- 
speaking immigrants into Lower Canada and in 1837 the francophone nationalists, 
led by Louis-Joseph Papineau, rebelled. They were defeated and in 1838 the newly 
arrived Governor-General, Lord Durham, was charged with recommending ‘how 
further disturbances might be avoided’ (Bothwell 1998: 34). His solution was the 
proposal that both Upper and Lower Canada should be united into one Province of 
Canada, with a legislature that would entrench the hegemony of the anglophones.
An associate of Papineau’s, Louis-Hippolyte LaFontaine, pragmatically recognised 
that, irrespective of Durham’s dismissal of the francophones as a ‘a people with 
neither history nor literature’, the French-speaking majority could use parliament to 
their advantage (McRoberts, 1993: 51). That pragmatism and astuteness was to 
translate into adept political manoeuvring by various francophone politicians in the 
following decades but, by the 1860s, the political structures were once again at 
breaking point. A solution was found in the concept of Confederation and with the 
British North American Act 1867, the Dominion of Canada emerged. Quebec was 
once again a separate province, with the francophones overwhelmingly in the 
majority. While French-speaking Canadians at last had a political structure which 
enabled them to dominate provincial matters, a more powerful federal government 
was at the same time created -  and in this the Quebecois would be a minority 
(Bothwell 1998: 39).
Quebec was a largely Catholic province, as distinct from the Protestant-dominated 
provinces in the rest of the Confederation, and the church had played a considerable 
role in encouraging Quebecois to believe that they were an agrarian society, a society 
‘with a special mission’ and ‘a society where the government did not play a 
significant role, thereby leaving the leadership of the society to the church’ (Cook, 
cited in Bothwell, 1998: 42. Also see Cook, 1995). Although it is simplistic to 
characterise Quebec as a nationalist province defined by its history, language and
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religion -  together with the implicit underlying issue of ethnicity -  the twin questions 
of faith and language have resonated throughout the province’s history. Moreover, 
they have been viewed by other Canadians with a great deal of distrust and have 
sometimes been seen as an excuse for Quebec’s having remained aloof from the rest 
of Canada while continuing to reap the benefits of being within the Confederation. 
The view that Quebec benefited from being part of the larger Canada was not shared 
by many Quebecois. As the major means of Quebec employment moved from 
agriculture to industry, with the consequent drift towards the conurbations, the 
bedrock of the francophone society also changed and the old certainties began to be 
questioned. More Quebecois began to be educated outside the province and those 
that returned saw their society with new -  and frequently non-religious -  eyes. As 
the sixties progressed what became known as the ‘Quiet Revolution’ unfolded, with 
the province assuming responsibility for functions that had previously been very 
much the domain of the church, particularly those of education and social welfare 
(see Cook, 1995). In doing so Quebec frequently opted out of federal programmes, 
choosing to implement its own plans, thus emphasising its difference. Meanwhile, 
the 1965 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism had declared that 
‘Canada, without recognising it, was passing through the greatest crisis in its history’ 
and this became evident at the same time as the country was celebrating its centenary 
as a Confederation. The President of France, Charles de Gaulle, came to Montreal, 
declaimed ‘vive le Quebec libre’ and was promptly asked to leave the country; and 
Rene Levesque founded the Mouvement Souverainete-association, which was to 
become the Parti Quebecois in 1968 (Bothwell, 1998: 117).
Just two years earlier Pierre Elliott Trudeau had been elected to the federal 
parliament as a Liberal representing a Montreal riding and within less than three 
years he was to be Prime Minister of Canada. Although the Liberal Party within 
Quebec had become identified with nationalism and nationalists, Trudeau himself 
was not and he and a group of like-minded friends believed that the previous federal 
government, led by then Prime Minister Lester Pearson, had done insufficient to 
promote the case for a united Canada. Within weeks of becoming Prime Minister, 
Trudeau had laid the groundwork for the Official Languages Act 1969, which
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declared that both English and French were the official languages of Canada, much 
to the dismay of many Canadians living far from Quebec.
Despite Trudeau’s premiership, nationalism continued to flourish within Quebec. 
Even as the ‘Quiet Revolution’ had been unfolding a small group of nationalists 
resorted to bombing in and around Montreal and in October 1970 the Front de 
Liberation du Quebec kidnapped the British Trade Commissioner, James Cross.
Five days after that they kidnapped, and later murdered, the Quebec Minister of 
Labour, Pierre Laporte. Trudeau’s response was to proclaim the War Measures Act 
1970, which suspended all civil liberties and allowed for government by decree. 
While most Canadians supported his actions, many in Quebec never forgave him for 
supposedly crushing part of the separatist movement (remarkably small, as this 
branch of it turned out to be). The move towards separatism had not, however, died.
Language continued to be a potent issue in Quebec, partly because the changing 
patterns of immigration meant that new ethnic groups were asking to be educated in 
English, rather than French. The declining birth rate within the francophone 
community suggested that the supremacy of French would relatively soon be 
seriously challenged and eventually Premier Bourassa of Quebec brought in Bill 22 
in 1974, which gave priority to the use of French in both education and business. 
(Bill 101 further strengthened the position of French three years later, making it the 
official language of the province). By 1976 Rene Levesque had led the Parti 
Quebecois to victory in the Quebec elections and in 1980 he sought a mandate from 
the Quebecois, by means of a referendum, simply to start talking to the federal
• 90government about sovereignty-association. Trudeau, who was again Prime 
Minister after a brief period out of office, was appalled by the possibility of a ‘yes’ 
vote to the proposition and actively campaigned against it. In the event, the 
referendum was lost, but Trudeau wasted no time in setting out his own 
constitutional stall; he would seek the patriation of the Constitution from Great 
Britain and this would be supported by a Charter o f Rights and Freedoms. After
28 Sovereignty-Association was part o f the political discourse o f the Parti Quebecois prior to its 
election win in 1976 but its official position on the matter was not outlined until 1979 in the White 
Paper Quebec -  Canada: A New Deal. It was proposed that Quebec would become a sovereign state,
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hard bargaining with the provincial premiers Trudeau achieved his objective in 1982 
but Rene Levesque, still premier of Quebec, refused to sign the newly patriated 
Constitution.
Similar aspirations?
While the foregoing has done little but skim the surface of very complex issues, we 
have a clear idea that Quebec was not a province which any federal government 
could afford to ignore. Many of the major federal initiatives had been designed 
either to placate or thwart Quebec’s wish to be recognised as an historically, 
linguistically and culturally distinct society within the larger Confederation of 
Canada. The reason, here, for examining the situation in Quebec prior to the creation 
of the Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women is to demonstrate that Quebec was 
rarely out of the headlines. The patriation of the Constitution did not end that 
situation. Indeed, it increased Quebec’s high profile and the federal government then 
attempted, through the Meech Lake Accord, to entice the province back into the 
constitutional fold. At this point, however, the interests of both women and 
Aboriginals -  ignored during the constitutional debate -  need to be thought about, as 
they were both absent from the provincial -  federal negotiating table. We saw in 
chapter 1 how women from across the country were united in their opposition to the 
inadequate equality clauses in the Charter. What we need to look at now are the 
remarkable parallels between Aboriginal and Quebecois’ reactions to those events in 
the 1980s. All of these should be viewed in the knowledge that Aboriginals have 
always been the First Nations of Canada, notwithstanding the fact that the French 
were the original colonisers of those Nations and that the French were themselves 
conquered by the British. The British North American Act 1867 had made formal 
this colonisation, characterising both the French and the British as ‘founding nations’ 
of Canada, while ignoring the Aboriginals. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples (RCAP) put it succinctly:
... equating Aboriginal peoples with racial and cultural minorities is a 
fundamentally flawed conception. People came to Canada from other 
countries in large numbers, over a period of several hundred years, and they 
came as immigrants -  that is, for the most part they chose to leave their
but that there would be a very high degree o f economic continuity and co-operation with the rest o f 
Canada. See Bothwell, 1998; McRoberts, 1993.
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homelands as individuals and families and to settle in an already established 
country. Aboriginal people are not immigrants. They are the original 
inhabitants of the land and have lived here from time immemorial. (RCAP 
1996: Vol. II: 13)
While we know that Aboriginals had generally been excluded from the negotiating 
table on all major constitutional matters, it was Trudeau’s decision to introduce the 
1969 White Paper Statement o f the Government o f Canada on Indian Policy, 
proposing the ending of the Indian Act and the assimilation of Aboriginals into the 
‘dominant’ culture of the larger European Canadian society, which proved to be a 
catalyst for Aboriginal protest and activism. ‘They were to be allowed to keep their 
cultures, much as other Canadians do in a multi-cultural society, but they were to 
give up the other features that make them distinct -  elements such as treaties, 
Aboriginal rights, exclusive federal responsibility and the department of Indian 
affairs’ (RCAP 1996: 191). An immediate consequence of the Paper was the 
founding of the first pan-Canada political Indian (Aboriginal) organisation, the 
National Indian Brotherhood. Although the Indian Act had been responsible for 
many of the ills visited upon Aboriginals, it also represented a link to the promises 
made when the First Nations were afforded the protection of the Crown in 1763, 
irrespective of how these promises might have subsequently been interpreted by the 
dominant culture. When Trudeau later decided that the Constitution should be 
patriated Aboriginals responded by actively lobbying the British government, 
because they feared that patriation would lead to a loss of their Treaty rights, as 
guaranteed by the Crown. The three major Aboriginal men’s organisations were 
only permitted to be observers at the first of the constitutional conferences preceding 
patriation and, as chapter 1 has shown, the Native Women’s Association of Canada 
was totally excluded. The original draft legislation included three sections 
specifically providing for Aboriginals’ rights but, by the time the actual November 
Accord was published in 1982 these had been removed, directly as a consequence of 
horse-trading indulged in by some of the provincial Premiers. The outcry was 
vociferous and, at this point, Aboriginals had added support from Canadian women’s 
organisations which were protesting about threats to sexual equality posed by the 
Charter o f Rights and Freedoms, which accompanied the Constitution Act 1982. An 
amended reference to Aboriginal rights was eventually inserted in the legislation 
together with the promise of a subsequent First Ministers’ (provincial premiers’)
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conference which would focus on Aboriginal affairs. The issues of Aboriginal
• • • 29sovereignty and self-government were finally to be discussed at First Minister level 
(Chodos et al, 1991: Cook, 1995). In the event, four First Ministers’ conferences 
took place between March 1983 and March 1987, but they eventually failed because 
of an inability to agree on ‘whether the right of Aboriginal self-government flowed 
from inherent and unextinguished Aboriginal sovereignty ... or whether it was to be 
delegated from provincial and federal governments’ (RCAP 1996, Vol. 1: 7). (The 
1983 Penner Report also looked at questions of Aboriginal self-government).
There was therefore outrage amongst Aboriginals when the Meech Lake Accord was 
announced only one month after the ending of the last of these First Ministers’ 
conferences. Meech Lake was intended to persuade Quebec to accede to the 
Constitution and offered the province recognition as a ‘distinct society’. Zachary 
wrote: ‘from the federal point of view, spending the political capital required for a 
native agreement would have left little in the bank for the constitutional negotiations 
that really mattered electorally -  the talks that took place in April on Quebec’s status 
within Confederation’ (Zachary, cited in Chodos et al, 1991). As Hall (1989: 434) 
described it, ‘Aboriginal leaders had faced consistent resistance to the assertion that 
there must be constitutional reform to enable Aboriginal governments to preserve 
and promote the distinct identity of Aboriginal peoples. Within a few weeks of the 
termination of this process Native people learned that the kind of recognition denied 
to them was to be extended to the provincial citizens of Quebec’. (See also Monture 
1995: 158, for further comment). Ovide Mercredi, former Grand Chief of the 
Assembly of First Nations, dealt with Meech Lake trenchantly, observing that ‘many 
people think Quebec has the market cornered, so to speak, on the phrase ‘distinct 
society’ and that even using the expression ‘distinct peoples’ in reference to the First 
Nations is unacceptable’. He continued, ‘the concept of ‘distinct society’ is as real 
for us as it is for you [Quebecois] (1994: 167 & 175). Another Aboriginal leader, 
Louis Bruyere, said that ‘Aboriginal people’s views of the Accord can be 
summarised in four words: It abandons Aboriginal peoples. It does this by being 
silent about the uniqueness and distinctiveness of Aboriginal peoples’ (cited in
29 The First Minister (Premier) o f each province.
72
RCAP 1996, Vol. 1: 7). (See Mercredi and Turpel, 1994; Frideres, 1993; RCAP, 
1996; Krosenbrink, 1993 for a fuller discussion of these issues).
Although the Meech Lake Accord was later to fail, when Aboriginal parliamentarian,
*5A
Elijah Harper, stood up in the Manitoba Assembly in June 1990 and said ‘no’ , the 
whole issue of Quebec and its place within Canada was much debated during the 
1980s. The collapse of the Meech Lake Accord was as much to do with the federal 
government’s failure to allow for ‘the highly volatile nature of provincial politics’ as 
with anything else and, during the 1980s, Quebec was believed by many to be acting 
against the best interests of confederal Canada (Behiels, 1989: 475). As we have 
also seen, many of the issues seemingly exclusively linked to Quebec were also 
Aboriginal issues; for example, sovereignty, culture, distinctiveness as separate 
nations. As RCAP itself summarised:
Meech was meant to heal the wounds created by the patriation and 
amendment of the Constitution in 1982 over Quebec’s objection. For years, 
Quebecois were seeking recognition of their historical rights -  the reality of 
deux [two] nations -  in the Constitution. Aboriginal peoples were unable to 
have their nation-to-nation relationship recognised, and Quebec was unable 
to have its distinctiveness as a society recognised. The fate of these two 
Canadian dilemmas had become inexorably linked. (RCAP 1996, Vol. 1: 
7.1)
The Quebecois had the overwhelming advantage of being entrenched within their 
own province -  and of being recognised as an ethnic group reflecting the traditions 
and European sensibilities so familiar to their Anglophone counterparts, even while 
these same traditions appeared to divide them. Aboriginals had no specific 
homeland and, therefore, no bargaining position. They were vastly outnumbered -  
thanks to the ravages of colonisation -  and their traditions were not readily 
understood by the dominant culture. Aboriginals were very easy to ignore and, if 
they chose to organise themselves into protest groups, it was easy to label them 
militant rather than see them as a people responding to injustice. Yet Aboriginal
30 Elijah Harper daily sat in the Manitoba legislature, holding an eagle feather, and saying ‘no’ 
whenever the Speaker asked if  the Meech Lake Accord could be considered. The Accord eventually 
failed because it was not ratified within the necessary time limit. Harper was later to say: ‘We 
blocked the accord because it posed a threat to aboriginal people. Aboriginal people have no quarrel 
with Quebec. But we’re a distinct society too, and w e’ve fought for many years for the basic rights 
that Quebec takes for granted, such as participating in constitutional talks’ (Cited in Miller 2000: 
377).
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concerns were also never far from the public gaze during the 1980s: there were
clashes at Kahnawake over proposed tax laws; the carrying of the Olympic flame
across the country was politicised by Aboriginals; a number of Inquiries highlighted
•  ^1the grossly inequitable treatment of Aboriginals by the justice system. And, we 
should not forget, the 1985 amendment of the Indian Act, Bill C-31, had specifically 
focused attention on Aboriginal women.
It was Quebec, however, that continued to be of major concern to the federal 
government and, as we have seen, every effort was made during that decade to tempt 
the province into a closer federal embrace, while Aboriginal aspirations appeared to 
be expendable in pursuit of that goal. Quebecois nationalism had not died with the 
failure of the Referendum and the place of the province within Confederation was an 
issue of concern to the Canadian public, as well as the federal government. It is 
therefore right to ask why astute civil servants, charged with putting together a Task 
Force, failed to include a representative from Quebec on the Working Group, while 
eventually accommodating another distinct ethnic group, the Aboriginals. It is also 
right to ask why Aboriginals were initially not included in the Task Force at all, 
bearing in mind the high public profile they had recently enjoyed. Both these 
questions will be considered in chapter 5, where their importance should be apparent.
For the moment we must consider the relative impact of both these distinct groups on 
the work of the Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women and begin by focusing on 
the role of NWAC.
NWAC joins the Task Force
Although Aboriginal participation in the Task Force had been suggested in 
September 1989, it took until early January 1989 for NWAC to be asked if they 
would nominate a representative. NWAC was already the national voice for
31 See, for example, Hamilton, A.C. and Sinclair, C.M. (1991) Report o f  the Aboriginal Justice 
Inquiry o f  Manitoba: The Justice System and Aboriginal People; Nova Scotia (1989) Royal 
Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution.
32 NWAC ‘represents Aboriginal women who base their identity on self-identifying criteria and 
includes non-status and status Indian women’ (Krosenbrink 1993:344). Its constitution dates from 
1973 and its activities cover most areas impinging on the welfare o f Aboriginal women. Like 
CAEFS, it has an Executive Board composed o f representatives from regional /  provincial 
associations across Canada. Although not predicated on the issue o f sexual equality, NWAC was
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Aboriginal women. Although well aware of the disproportionate number of federally 
sentenced Aboriginal women (23 percent, set against 2.5 percent Aboriginal women 
within the general population)33, NWAC was involved in other grassroots issues; 
there were simply too many areas demanding their attention at the time. The heavy 
rates of Aboriginal offending were not necessarily felt to be shameful. Rather, they 
caused anger and this was directed at the dominant culture responsible, so it was felt, 
for the socio-economic inequities contributing to Aboriginals’ disproportionate rate 
of offending.34 NWAC also had the recent memory of the failure of the 1984 
Women in Conflict with the Law (WICL) initiative, when NWAC had been excluded 
from the ‘ministerial committee ... which possessed the authority for final approval 
on proposals ...’ (AWC Submission, 29.8. - 2.9.1989). NWAC eventually withdrew 
its support for WICL. Even more recent had been the publication of the report of the 
Task Force on Aboriginal Peoples in Federal Corrections, which had devoted two 
and a half out of 109 pages to women. This report was viewed by most Aboriginals 
as a government report and great offence had been caused by the Task Force’s 
original title, Task Force on the Reintegration o f Aboriginal Offenders as Law- 
Abiding Citizens. It raised questions such as ‘Whose laws?’ and ‘If a group have 
never been integrated, how can they be re-integrated?’
NWAC was amongst those Aboriginal groups campaigning for legislative, social and 
economic change. It also had to fight its own battle to establish its right to represent 
Aboriginal women independently of other, male-dominated Aboriginal organisations 
such as the National Indian Brotherhood and the Native Council of Canada. Unlike 
NWAC, these last two groups determined their membership ‘in accordance with the 
status regulations of the Indian Act’ and were fearful that any attempt to achieve 
sexual equality for Aboriginal women might lead to the repeal of the Indian Act and
heavily involved in campaigning for ‘Indian rights for Indian women’ following the initial failure of  
the Lavell and Bedard cases, which challenged the discrimination Indian women experienced under 
the Indian Act when they married non-status males, or Aboriginals from other bands. See also 
Razack, 1991 for further discussion o f the Lavell case. See Behiels, 2000 for a comprehensive 
overview o f the role o f NWAC in challenging both the government and male Aboriginal 
organisations over their treatment o f Aboriginal women.
33 In 1989 Aboriginal women comprised 45 percent o f all female admissions to provincial 
institutions (La Prairie 1992)
34 La Prairie (1992) explores Braithwaite’s theory o f reintegrative shaming in the context o f  
Canada’s Aboriginal population, showing that shaming was ‘a standard response to deviance in
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the loss of Indian rights (Krosenbrink 1993: 341). In essence, Aboriginal women 
were being ‘requested to subordinate their goal -  Indian rights for Indian women -  to 
that of Indian men; they were used as a political vehicle to pursue an Indian Act 
revision the way status Indian males saw fit’ (Krosenbrink 1993: 342).
The process of patriating the constitution also involved NWAC but, strikingly, not as 
formal participants sitting at the conference table. Attempts to achieve parity (with, 
amongst others, male Aboriginal organisations) were to occupy NWAC in the late 
eighties and early nineties, which partially explains why NWAC did not immediately 
accede to CSC’s invitation to join the Task Force. But there were also other reasons. 
Like CAEFS, NWAC is an organisation based on volunteers and no-one on the 
Executive Committee felt able to commit herself to the amount of time which the 
Task Force would require. Additionally, Aboriginal women’s voluntary 
organisations operated under greater constraints than did many other women’s 
groups, not least of which was their relative financial positions and the level of 
education many members had achieved. Although its membership was large,
NWAC did not have a big pool of women it could call upon to participate in 
government initiatives. Nevertheless, the request that they should be on the Task 
Force was discussed by the Executive Council, supported by the Elders, and it was 
felt important that an Aboriginal voice should be heard during the Task Force’s 
deliberations. They knew that they were after-thoughts to the original proposals, but 
for them this was not an uncommon experience. Eventually, Sharon Mclvor, an 
Aboriginal lawyer from British Columbia, agreed to be nominated, but the question 
of how many Aboriginals should be on the Task Force remained. CSC’s assumption 
that one would be sufficient was: totally, flatly unacceptable to us because when you 
put one Aboriginal woman on a committee like that you ’re just so alone and so
-1 c
marginalised and you ’ve got no support.
The question took some time to resolve. The Ontario branch of NWAC suggested 
that Patricia Monture, another Aboriginal lawyer and academic, should also be on 
the Working Group and this request was relayed to Corrections and eventually
traditional, communal aboriginal communities’ [in Canada] but that its impact had been lessened by 
the ‘rupturing o f traditional institutions o f social control’.
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accepted. At the same time, NWAC wanted Aboriginal women who had served
federal time to be on the Task Force and two names were put forward for
• » ^  consideration by the Prison for Women’s Aboriginal Sisterhood.
Thanks to persistent lobbying, by the time of the first Steering Committee meeting its 
Aboriginal representation had been increased to two. The Aboriginal representatives 
then persuaded the Steering Committee that two federally sentenced women should 
be included in its already large list of representatives, as well as two other members 
of the Aboriginal Women’s Caucus. The balance of the Working Group was altered 
and voluntary sector representatives outnumbered the civil servants. Thus the 
eleven-strong Working Group -  five civil servants, four CAEFS’ and two NWAC 
representatives -  ended up looking rather more like the tri-partite group it later 
proclaimed itself to be. The 31-member Steering Committee had representatives 
from a much wider field and the civil service members were again outnumbered by 
one voluntary sector member. Whether this lack of absolute balance might possibly 
undermine the Commissioner’s grasp on the Task Force remained to be seen. That 
NWAC managed to have Aboriginal federally sentenced women included on the 
Task Force raises interesting questions about CAEFS’ failure to press for federally 
sentenced women, of whatever ethnic identity, to be included. Perhaps more 
importantly, it raises questions about why NWAC’s proposals were so readily 
acceded to and that is something to which I will return. The striking fact is that 
federally sentenced women were considered to be legitimate members of such an 
enterprise and what this means is open to interpretation. It could have been a simple 
recognition of their inherent expertise -  and certainly it was for that reason that 
NWAC insisted that they should be included. But their inclusion also added further 
legitimacy to CSC’s venture, in the manner of both CAEFS and NWACs’ 
participation, and the civil servants would have been well aware of that.
35 Interview 20
36 CAEFS, in their written proposals submitted to James Phelps in December 1988, had asked that 
the Task Force ‘actively seek out and incorporate the views and ideas o f federally incarcerated 
women’ but had not suggested they actually be on the Task Force. In March 1989 a meeting took 
place between Bonnie Diamond and a CSC representative, during which the composition o f both the 
Steering Committee and the Working Group was reviewed, and it was then that Ms Diamond 
suggested that an Aboriginal should be on each.
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The Terms o f Reference for the Task Force had already been worked out between 
CSC and CAEFS, with no contribution from NWAC. Amongst other issues, the 
Terms documented some of the ‘unresolved, longstanding issues pertaining to the 
management of federally sentenced women’, including those of geographic 
dislocation, the inflexibility of the Prison for Women regarding classification and 
security levels, and the difficulty in providing programmes comparable to the range 
available in male institutions. It recommended ‘that a policy paper be prepared to set 
strategic direction for the future sentence management of federally sentenced 
women’. The Terms outlined the Mandate governing these objectives:
The mandate of the Task Force will be to examine the correctional 
management of federally sentenced women from the commencement of 
sentence to the date of warrant expiry, and to develop a policy and plan 
which will guide and direct this process in a manner that is responsive to the 
unique and special needs of this group.
The Terms o f Reference were later presented to the Working Group at their first 
meeting and Patricia Monture pointed out that ‘it contained no mention of the
<7*7
particular oppression experienced by First Nations Women in prison’. It was 
agreed that Prof. Monture would draft an amendment (which was eventually ratified 
by both the Working Group and the Steering Committee at subsequent meetings) and 
she added to the list of ‘unresolved problems’:
... the over-representation of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice 
systems of Canada. This over-representation is also evidenced among 
federally sentenced women. The unique and valued cultural, historic, and 
spiritual aspects of the experience of Aboriginal women has an additional 
significant impact on the ... areas of concern [centred on accommodation, 
programming and community release services which left federally sentenced 
women disadvantaged, compared to men].
But the ‘unique ... cultural, historic and spiritual aspects of... Aboriginal women’ 
had largely not been valued by other Canadians. The replacement of the core of the 
Aboriginals’ heritage by an alien culture, with its different historical perspectives 
and understanding, can be linked to Aboriginals’ becoming increasingly 
marginalised within a society which both rejected and, as many Aboriginals saw it,
37 Working Group Minutes 13th April, 1989. The ‘particular oppression’ can best be explained as 
the extra burden carried into prison by Aboriginal women who, having experienced both socio­
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criminalised them through its unaccepted laws. (Aboriginal nations have never 
formally accepted the authority of the Canadian justice system). Prof. Monture’s 
amendment could be seen as a political one as much as anything else, and prefigured 
subsequent attempts to broaden the Task Force’s agenda when considering 
Aboriginal issues. (It also marked the beginning of the characterisation of 
Aboriginal women as victims by the Task Force). For the Aboriginal members of the 
Task Force the narrowness of the Mandate meant that they could only focus on 
issues arising from the passing of a sentence. It left them unable to examine the 
sentence itself and its legitimacy for Aboriginals. This initial failure of both CSC 
and CAEFS to be aware of the broader Aboriginal perspective was to be a continuing 
thread throughout the deliberations of the Task Force.
Both sections of the Task Force would be working to a set of nine Working 
Principles previously agreed by CSC and CAEFS, as well as the Mandate, and one of 
these stipulated that the Task Force would not be ‘premised on the closure of the 
Prison for Women’.38 Nevertheless, a senior civil servant, when looking back, said: /  
thought the most important thing would be to find an alternative to that one national 
institution in Kingston -  and certainly to that particular national institution. I  
thought that a national institution in any event was a bad idea. These women were 
so far away from their relatives and their support communities, and I  thought that 
no-one around that table would suggest that we keep the Prison fo r  Women and that
' i Q
nobody would suggest that we replace it by another national institution.
Conclusions and looking ahead
We have seen that the appointment of the new Commissioner of Corrections proved 
to be the necessary catalyst for change and how, at his instigation, a Task Force was 
struck so that the question of the Prison for Women could once again be considered. 
Mr. Ingstrup ensured that the work was collaboratively undertaken with a pre­
eminent member of the penal voluntary sector, CAEFS, in partnership with his civil 
servants. We have also seen that, although initially unplanned for, another
economic and racial discrimination on the outside, often found themselves exposed to racism on the 
inside.
38 Minutes o f Working Group 13th-  14th April, 1989. Appendix B
39 Interview 18
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campaigning group, NWAC, subsequently joined the Task Force. Through sheer 
force of argument NWAC then managed to persuade those responsible for the Task 
Force that Aboriginal representation should be significantly increased on both the 
Working Group and the Steering Committee -  and that Aboriginal federally 
sentenced women should also be members of the Task Force. Because of NWAC’s 
inclusion the unanticipated question of ethnicity and culture, although circumscribed 
by the Mandate, was acknowledged as being within the remit of the Task Force. Yet 
those who had been accustomed to thinking of themselves as the ‘distinct’ society in 
Canada -  the francophones of Quebec -  were not included separately on the most 
influential of the Task Force’s two working parties, the Working Group, leaving 
Quebec once again on the margins of anglo-Canadian planning. Although I have not 
clarified at this stage why questions of inclusion and exclusion are important, we can 
already see that these two distinct ethnic communities and cultures shared some 
common aspirations and can begin to see that these questions might, conceivably, 
affect the deliberations of the Task Force.
Of equal importance -  even though the historic cultural dimensions of this Canadian 
story have dominated this chapter -  is the relationship of the voluntary sector with 
CSC. The participation of CAEFS and NWAC in the Task Force represented a 
compromise: for CAEFS, in that the Association was accepting the possibility of 
jointly planning new prisons; and for NWAC, in that it was tacitly accepting the need 
to work within ‘illegitimate’ Euro-Canadian law in order to facilitate change for 
Aboriginal women prisoners. Both groups faced considerable risks in being allied 
with corrections, not least because ‘when reforms reach the existing system, they 
confront a series of powerful, managerial and organisational imperatives’ (Cohen 
1985: 92). Aboriginals’ history had taught them that the dominant culture did not 
easily cede control to the first peoples of Canada (see RCAP, 1996; Miller, 2000). 
The history of penal initiatives taught CAEFS that bureaucracies are adept at 
incorporating and subverting the language of reform (see Rothman, 1971, 1980; 
Rafter, 1985; Freedman, 1981; Cohen, 1983, 1985; Hannah-Moffat, 2001). Their 
shared concerns were set aside on behalf of a small group of imprisoned women.
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The various members of the Task Force are now assembled and we are about to look 
at what unfolded when they undertook their work. As a member of the Task Force 
was later to remark: ...so  much o f what happened is like a magical period o f time, 
with a constellation ofpeople and a series o f events that created a very unique 
opportunity or problem, depending on how you wanted to look at it.40 All were 
about to discover the extent of their individual contributions -  and what the 
opportunities or problems might be.
40 Interview 17
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3. Struggling for consensus 
Beginning the deliberations
The first meeting of the Steering Committee was held on the 3rd April 1989, under 
the co-chairmanship of CSC Deputy-Commissioner James Phelps and the Executive 
Director of CAEFS, Bonnie Diamond. Commissioner Ingstrup made his only formal 
appearance before them and challenged them to ‘think broadly’, stressing that there 
were ‘no limits or conditions on the Task Force work within the confines of the 
Mandate’. Yet there were limits and possible impediments to change, already 
explicit in the Commissioner’s retention of financial accountability and the 
‘government structure’ within which the Task Force would operate. The Task Force 
was expected to present its completed report to the Commissioner by the 15th 
December, 1989 and the Steering Committee’s prime function was to provide 
direction for the whole of the Task Force, with this being achieved through the four 
co-chairs liaising with each other.
The Working Group, co-chaired by CSC’s Director of Native and Female Offender 
Programmes, Jane Miller-Ashton, and CAEFS’ Past President, Felicity Hawthorn, 
met for the first time ten days later. Unlike the Steering Committee, which included 
four men, the Working Group had none. This was something of an exploratory 
meeting, where individuals assessed each other and decided the operating model for 
the Group. They spoke of their ‘hopes and fears’, including the possibility that their 
work would be shelved, as had been the fate of so many previous commissions and 
inquiries. They were particularly concerned that any failure to detail their 
recommendations with sufficient precision in the final report would make it difficult 
for those outside the Task Force to ‘appreciate’ and ‘implement' the plan (emphasis 
added). Another fear was that their ‘goodwill [would] be turned into oppression’. 
They worried that federally sentenced women might eventually be left in a worse 
position because of the Task Force’s work and their individual contributions, as they 
had been following other reforming ventures. They anticipated the possibility that 
they would need to be vigilant in acknowledging differences amongst themselves, 
because of the intensity and scale of the work they were undertaking, their diverse 
backgrounds and small numbers. One member of the Group remembered their
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introductory session, when each woman was ‘doing her “who I am” bit’. She was 
‘blown out of the water’ by the ferocity of one contribution and eventually returned 
to her room, asking what on earth she had got herself into and whether she would 
‘survive’ it? Moreover, did she want to?1 This, of course, was not a problem 
specific to the Working Group, as a member of the Steering Committee recalled:
Very much the same thing ... [applied to] the Steering Committee because you have 
to remember the makeup o f the Steering Committee was that there were [almost] 
equal numbers o f private sector and CSC reps, so you had these career CSC reps ... 
all o f whom had agendas that we knew nothing about, bringing them all in to the 
Steering Committee.
The Working Group realised that they would have to consult throughout Canada if 
they were to hear the voices of those most intimately involved with federally 
sentenced women. This strategy was useful to CSC, because provincial correctional 
officials who contributed to the regional debate, could not subsequently say that they 
had been ignored by those initially planning the Task Force. The scale of the work 
confronting them was immediately apparent and the Working Group formed a 
number of sub-committees from within its own ranks in an effort to cover ground in 
advance of future meetings. It was already clear to them that there needed to be a 
philosophical basis to the proposed report and they were determined to identify at an 
early stage those ‘items which seemed to look like principles on which the Task
•y
Force might premise its work’. While an initial text for the principles bore little 
resemblance to what finally appeared in the report, from the beginning the Group 
was grappling with the concept o f ‘difference’: how women differed from each 
other; how Aboriginal federally sentenced women differed from other federally 
sentenced women; how women differed from men; how difference in treatment of 
women and men might be justified if the end results were comparable.4 The Group 
also arranged to visit the Prison for Women to hold ‘a preliminary meeting with 
several representative inmate groups in order to facilitate the women’s input into the
1 Notes o f conversation November, 1999
2 Interview 28
3 Working Group Minutes 13th -  14th April, 1989. These principles should not be confused with 
the Working Principles, allied to the Mandate, which set out the ‘ground rules’ guiding the Task 
Force (see TFFSW 1990: 72).
4 Memorandum 2nd May, 1989
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formal consultation process’.5 Their greatest concern was that they might ‘be 
disrespectful to other people’s lives [as they were] not the ones serving [a] 
sentence’.6
Different perspectives; working together
The Working Group’s members inevitably brought varying perspectives to the 
deliberations, as well as different ways of working. They were also individually 
answerable to their own organisations and, as became apparent at various times, their 
dual responsibilities were not easily reconcilable. Participation in a government- 
sponsored Task Force raises questions as to whom members are ultimately 
responsible and about their ability to remain independent. It raises further questions 
about: participants understanding the possible limitations of their role, and the 
manner in which official policies are constructed; whether participants are creating 
joint policy, or are simply contributing to official policy. In this instance, the 
Commissioner’s injunction to the Steering Committee and, by extension, the 
Working Group, to ‘think broadly’ encouraged some non-civil servants to assume 
that a large degree of change was feasible. Yet, when dealing with documents that 
are expected to be turned into policy, there are certain processes which come into 
play. In relation to another policy initiative, Rock quoted an official in the Policy 
Branch of the Ministry of the Solicitor-General, who said: ‘you have to facilitate the 
production of the types of paper that make [policy] go through the system’ (1986:
31). At federal levels of government, especially, the processes of facilitation require 
a high degree of diplomacy. It was inevitable, but perhaps not always acknowledged 
by those from the voluntary sector, that the civil servants quite frequently felt 
constrained by the requirements of officialdom. While being quite capable of 
thinking imaginatively and laterally, they also knew that certain procedures had to be 
followed if there were to be any hope of their planning being officially accepted. 
Their training as civil servants encouraged a pragmatic acceptance of the necessity of 
working within existing legislative parameters, so for them the invitation to ‘think 
broadly’ was immediately hedged with (anticipated) constraints. Their restraint may, 
however, be otherwise interpreted. Young (1983) suggests that the penal system is
5 Working Group Minutes 10th -  12th May, 1989
6 Working Group Minutes 13th-1 4 th April, 1989
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adept at neutralising and diffusing change and it is, of course, those working for the 
system, rather than those confined within it, who exercise power. Cohen (1983) took 
this further, arguing that state-sponsored personnel had a vested interest in 
maintaining the system which employed them. The Canadian civil servants would 
have vehemently denied such self-interest -  and probably correctly, insofar as it was 
a conscious act -  but the bureaucratic instinct would have been deeply instilled, even 
if unconsciously so. They also brought another dimension to their work, being 
women who had experienced the rapid social change of the seventies and absorbed 
the language of feminism. While working as civil servants -  indeed, as ‘femocrats’ -  
within the complex bureaucracy of federal government, they would have said that 
they were advancing the feminist cause and ideals by means of the perspectives they 
brought to their work. Stetson and Mazur suggest that ‘femocrats’ have a vital role 
to play in providing access to resources and opportunities for feminist groups 
wishing ‘to participate autonomously in policy formulation and implementation’ 
(Stetson and Mazur 1995: 276). They also make the point that ‘femocrats’ should 
ensure that such groups are not co-opted or dominated by the state, but this is not 
always easily achieved because groups funded by the state inevitably have their 
independence constrained. Thus, in wishing to advance the feminist cause, state 
feminists sometimes manage to diminish the autonomy of such groups and this can 
lead to a painful compromise of their own principles.
The civil servants’ apparent acceptance of the status quo, and willingness to work 
under it, reflected to some degree a deference to the established order which others 
did not share. Unsurprisingly, their attitudes intensely angered some members of the 
Task Force, who were hoping for collective radicalism and courage. But, as a 
member said, reflecting on the role of her voluntary organisation: Really, we have an 
easier role. We ‘re on the side o f  light and bright. ... We don’t have to think about 
the cost because we ve exempted us from all responsibility there so we can just ask 
fo r  what we think we need. We may not get i t!7 Yet this was also a disingenuous 
response because it did not reflect the constraints under which she operated; she was 
in a position to ask things of CSC, but was ultimately answerable to her own 
organisation regarding which questions she asked -  or failed to ask. Not one
7 Interview 19
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member of the Working Group could say that she was truly independent and not one 
could say that her allegiance was solely to federally sentenced women, despite trying 
to effect change on their behalf. Inevitably, the challenge for all the Working Group 
was to achieve change through consensus, whereas ‘a benevolent dictatorship might 
have been easier’?  as one participant was later to observe.
The added dimension to their struggle for consensus was that of culture. Members 
were still becoming accustomed to working with each other, to the extent that it was 
necessary to minute:
• everyone who wishes gets to speak before any one else can speak again;
• no interruptions;
• members will be sensitive to the issue of reinterpreting another’s points.9
Although the Minutes do not specify which of the Group’s members suggested them, 
all of the preceding ‘rules of procedure’ are reflective of the Aboriginal Sacred 
Circle, wherein speakers are heard in turn and in silence (see Waldram 1997: 134-6). 
It is an Aboriginal custom which allows time for reflection, rather than an 
immediate, perhaps unconsidered riposte. Similarly, the consensus model -  based on 
consultation leading to consensus -  adopted by the Working Group reflected 
Aboriginal custom. Ross, writing from the perspective of a non-Aboriginal 
Canadian Crown Attorney, ‘coming into remote Native communities to conduct 
criminal courts’ discusses Aboriginal consensus in relation to judicial decision­
making. He describes the ‘ordering of relevant facts ... [the] sifting to shake out the 
truly significant facts’ which precede the eventual judicial decision. Although this is 
similar to a conventional court, the crucial difference lies in the fact that the decision 
was ‘communal’, that it is ‘arrived at without “losing”, without anyone having his or 
her opinion ignored’ (Ross, 1992: 21, 23). It is debatable whether the non- 
Aboriginal participants would initially have recognised ‘consensus’ as being an 
Aboriginal practice because of their own understanding of what ‘consensus’ meant, 
but the distinction between Aboriginal and European use of the strategy lay in the
8 Interview 19
9 Working Group Minutes 10th- 1 2 th May, 1989
86
way in which it was conducted. The device enabled the Working Group to reach 
decisions whilst acknowledging amongst themselves the varying shades of opinion.
Aboriginal influence was also beginning to be felt in other ways. In May the Group 
adopted the word ‘Aboriginal’, rather than ‘Indian’ or ‘native’, for their own usage, 
as it was ‘consistent with the terminology of the Constitution Act 1982, (although an 
amendment in the July minutes emphasised that this was the ‘simplest solution’ and 
might not be acceptable to ‘all Natives’). During the same meeting the draft 
Principles were reviewed and it was argued that ‘differences between and within 
Aboriginal groups had been ignored’ and that there was too frequent a comparison 
between men and women.10 A political note was being added to the debate in an 
effort to force the realisation that Aboriginal women came from backgrounds as 
diverse as their Euro-Canadian counterparts and that they could not be planned for 
on the assumption that all would have the same needs.
As the work of the Group progressed through the months, the pressure of the huge 
task -  and the individual histories and loyalties of the members -  led to intense 
disagreements. This forced many members repeatedly to refocus on the federally 
sentenced women as a means of justifying their own continuing participation. It was 
not easy. A Working Group member articulated some of the stress involved, when 
asked why she had decided to stay on, despite huge personal reservations: I  had 
thought quite a few  times during the process o f pulling out, but I  had a lot invested in 
it and the reasons fo r  going into it were still there, that I  wanted to influence the 
outcome. I  was distinctly unhappy about the Civil Service aspect o f  the Working 
Group and didn ’t want them to be the ones that wrote the report.11 While this might 
be seen as initial naivety regarding the final control of the enterprise she had 
wittingly joined, it may more accurately be regarded as pragmatism. She knew the 
propensity of a larger organisation -  in this case, CSC -  to retain control and was 
determined that the perspective of those whom she represented would be heard in the 
final report. She acknowledged this when elaborating on the structure of the Task 
Force and the fact that it was not an independent Royal Commission (whose
10 Ibid
11 Interview 19
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appointee is also carefully chosen, but ultimately has greater freedom to act should 
he or she wish to), saying that she felt she had ‘been co-opted by something that was 
a “done” deal’, implying that the civil servants had already decided the outcome, as 
they were accountable to those in more senior positions.
This question of who she was actually representing again leads to the larger point of
accountability. Bearing in mind the compromises members of the voluntary sector
had made in order to participate in the Task Force, particularly those inclined
towards the abolition of most prisons rather than the construction of new ones,
failure to deliver a workable proposal could have led to charges of betrayal of
principles from their own organisations. The civil servants, on the other hand,
insisted that they were neutral; that their function was to be a dispassionate force
concerned with getting the most practical solution to a seemingly intractable
problem. On this reading, it also left them able to claim that they had the best
interests of federally sentenced women at heart and were morally accountable to
them, if not answerable, whilst simultaneously accountable to the correctional
hierarchy. While this might, indeed, be the official version of a civil servant’s
responsibilities, political realities demand that they produce solutions which can be
implemented and not embarrass the governing party. For plans to be implemented it
is imperative that they should reflect the political sensibilities of the relevant
Minister. As one senior civil servant reflected on the ethos of civil service neutrality:
They may mean it, [that they are neutral] but they may not realise that they have a
powerful vested interest and a whole career o f culture and education in the political
environment o f working as a civil servant. You ’re always aware that the Minister
has to be protected, taken care of, that you can ’t put him in a political situation that 
1 ^
he can’t handle.
Research; identifying the federally sentenced woman
The Working Group knew that a research strategy had to be formulated quickly 
because of the extremely tight timetable for production of the final report and a 
discussion paper set out a rationale, saying there ‘has been a serious gap in previous 
work in this area, and [this] has contributed in some cases to the failure to implement
12 Interview 27
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recommendations of previous work groups and committees. In today’s environment, 
it is even more imperative that any recommendations of the Task Force, especially if 
they have resource implications, have a sound empirical basis'. This was amplified: 
‘while we on the Task Force might be in complete agreement on all major directions 
in this area, it will still be necessary to demonstrate objectively to others that the 
options we recommend are the best of all available options’ (emphasis added). 
Although it was recognised that a number of constituencies would need to be 
persuaded, including the Commissioner, the Minister and the public, arguably the 
most important was the Treasury Board Secretariat, which had ‘in recent years 
shown an increasing tendency to insist on a thorough analysis of all reasonable
13options before agreeing to consider a proposal to proceed with any one option’.
The Sub-Committee recommended that research should be commissioned on:
• women’s programme needs, involving all women serving a term of two or more 
years, not just those at the Prison for Women;
• exemplary programmes from other jurisdictions, as well as those available within 
Canada;
• women’s risk to themselves, as well as to others, and their security needs (to 
support accommodation recommendations);
• a comparative analysis of accommodation options (to satisfy possible Treasury 
Board demands);
• the home communities of the women.
It was assumed that basic data about the women (such as offence, education, 
children) could be extracted from files, as could statistics regarding population flows. 
In the event, not all of the recommended research was undertaken.
When the Task Force was first mooted the then Deputy Solicitor-General, John Tait, 
alerted the Commissioner to a study of the ‘needs and characteristics of female 
offenders’,14 which the Secretariat had already begun. This work had been 
undertaken by Margaret Shaw and was made available to the Task Force in June
13 Memorandum 28th April, 1989
14 Letter from John Edwards to Ole Ingstrup 22nd September, 1988
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1989. It gave a comprehensive account of the history of imprisoned women in 
Canada, set this in the context of international practice, asked questions about risks 
and needs and frankly said ‘we do not have much idea who [these] women are, why 
they are there or what are their needs for programs and support’ (Shaw 1991a: 2). A 
further piece of research, also involving Margaret Shaw, attempted to provide some 
answers, asking what were the experiences of women in the federal prison system, 
both of imprisonment, and prior to their involvement with the law; what were their 
circumstances; what did they see as their needs for programmes and services in and 
out of prison? This research was to be based on interviews with all federally 
sentenced women in the Prison for Women or provincial prisons. It was 
accomplished with some difficulty since the Corrections’ Research branch of the 
Ministry of the Solicitor General had already decided to undertake interviews with 
all women in Kingston and had drawn up a schedule. Their survey was to use the 
Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS), an American instrument developed in 
Wisconsin to measure the prevalence of mental health problems in general 
populations. It had not been devised for prison populations, yet Corrections’ 
Research had already completed a study using the instrument on a sample of male 
federal prisoners. In recognition of the Task Force’s interest, Corrections’ Research 
suggested that one or two additional questions might be added to their survey. This 
was totally unacceptable to the researcher and to those members of the Working 
Group involved in developing an interview survey. The DIS, a psychologically- 
based instrument, consisted of a series of specific, closed-scale questions. It made no 
concessions to gender or diversity and, since its concern was with measures of 
mental ill-health, contained little of the broader information the Task Force sought. 
The result was that all interviews for the Task Force had to wait until the DIS 
interviewer had completed her separate interview schedule.
Corrections Research, as a department within CSC, was firmly psychological in its 
discipline and had no interest in feminist research or thought, which it regarded with 
great scepticism as being subjective and unscientific. On another front, having 
persuaded CSC of the necessity for a separate survey for Aboriginal women, there 
was intense discussion within the Working Group of the inadequacy of using even an 
open-ended interview for gauging the Aboriginals’ concerns and experiences.
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Standard question and answer responses and linear questions would be inaccessible 
because of cultural differences and ways of talking. It was agreed, therefore, that 
Aboriginal women from outside the prison would undertake all interviews with 
Aboriginal women inside.15
The wider sphere
During the 1980s it could not be assumed that Canadian knowledge and experience 
of providing for imprisoned women would be widely disseminated amongst 
Canadian practitioners. As Adelburgh and Currie (1987: 13, 22) were to write in the 
introduction to their ground-breaking book on Canadian women ‘in conflict with the 
law’16, Too Few to Count, ‘during our years as students of criminology and social 
work and later while working in the criminal justice field, we scoured libraries and 
bookstores for literature that would inform and assist us. Little was to be found, at 
least about Canadian women’. In a footnote they wrote that ‘significant progress has 
been made in this field in Britain and the United States’, citing commentators such as 
Smart, Carlen and Klein. But even in England Heidensohn was writing: ‘I have 
already suggested that academic criminology has given some house room to the 
study of women and crime in recent years, but it tends too often to be the lumber 
room or attic rather than the visible and visited public rooms. What is still lacking is 
the integration of all this work into the mainstream’ (Heidensohn 1987: 26). Within 
Canada, Bertrand had asked questions about sexual equality and the law at a 
conference in 1967 and there had been pieces of unpublished research which could 
have added to the understanding of Canadian women and crime, had they been more 
widely available. Adelburgh and Currie (1987: 14,15,17) preceded Shaw in 
observing that there was a ‘lack of good statistical data on women in conflict with 
the law’, which left the contributors to their book ‘making tentative, as opposed to
15 I am grateful for Margaret Shaw’s assistance in clarifying the issues in these two paragraphs.
16 Faith relates how during the 1980s ‘women’s groups succeeded in persuading criminal justice 
agencies, including CSC, to refer to convicted female lawbreakers as “women in conflict with the 
law” [which] comes closer to a non-judgemental description in that it doesn’t denigrate or 
permanently label the woman in question. It doesn’t presume that she is a criminal “type” but rather 
that she is in an adversarial position vis-a-vis the law’. She continues: ‘The key problem with the 
phrase ... is that it denies the fundamental inequality o f the relationship ... one simply cannot be 
“in conflict” with power to which one is subordinate’ (Faith 1993: 58). In a personal letter Prof. Faith 
amplified her view, saying that ‘the change grew out o f the grassroots, initiated by prisoners objecting 
to “female offender” ’ (August, 2001).
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written-in-stone conclusions’ ... ‘relying on their own and others’ first hand 
impressions ...’. The data on Aboriginal women were described as ‘non-existent’.
So the Task Force -  and Shaw -  had little option but to look elsewhere for detailed 
information on imprisoned women and the review of international practice compiled 
by Shaw focused on England and Wales, Australia and the United States ‘because 
each has certain characteristics of relevance to Canada’ (Shaw, 1991a: 33). Axon 
(1987) had undertaken a comprehensive review of practice and legislation relating to 
imprisoned women from fifteen countries for the Secretariat of the Ministry of the 
Solicitor General, upon which Shaw was also able to draw. Australia, in many 
respects, was the one jurisdiction most closely resembling Canada, in so far as it had 
a federal system, a vast geography imposing severe limitations on what could be 
provided for imprisoned women, a disproportionate number of imprisoned 
Aboriginals and a system of justice heavily dependent upon British precedent. As 
with its neighbour, New Zealand, Australia was only just beginning to assess the 
problems encountered by Aboriginal prisoners and the report of the Task Force on 
Aboriginals and Criminal Justice was yet to be published. Te Ara Hou, the 
Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into the Prisons System in New Zealand was not 
published until 1989 and would not have been available as the (limited) resource it 
might have been. (It rejected the concept of differential treatment for women.) 
Jackson’s The Maori and the Criminal Justice System, the second of a two-part 
investigation into Maori offending, had been available since 1988 and its call for a 
parallel system of Maori justice would have resonated with some of the Aboriginal 
members of the Task Force; yet it did not deal with the prison service. Overall, there 
was a body of knowledge to be consulted from which many common strands 
emerged. But the bigger question is whether such knowledge is translatable between 
jurisdictions, and the question becomes particularly difficult to respond to when the 
‘knowledge’ is derived from cultural practices specific to indigenous groups.
The short timetable stipulated by Ingstrup for the production of a report meant that 
an enormous amount of research had to be undertaken within a very short period, and 
at the beginning of the Task Force there was little information readily available about 
the Canadian client group, as Shaw later emphasised. Members were faced with
92
creating solutions for an inadequately defined problem until the commissioned 
research was completed. In a sense, this left the Task Force initially free to construct 
its own vision of the federally sentenced woman. The Task Force has since been 
accused of portraying her largely as a victim of her economic and social 
environment, bereft of agency because of her victimisation, yet the initial 
construction emerged from Task Force members’ individual knowledge of such 
women. Many on the Task Force, but more specifically those from the voluntary 
sector on the Working Group, had worked closely with imprisoned women and knew 
their collective histories of poverty, abuse, racism, addiction and educational failure. 
The civil servants also had this understanding, but it was generally acquired at a 
remove. They rarely visited the Prison for Women and did not know the women as 
individuals. Rather, the women were the statistics informing the civil servants’ daily 
work. As the Task Force proceeded the image of the federally sentenced woman 
assumed some of the characteristics of those whom the Working Group began to 
meet via the consultations and prison visits; ‘the woman’ became more of a physical 
reality and, finally, an event occurred which partially metamorphosed this ‘woman’ 
into a particular, almost symbolic woman, as we will shortly see. Essentially, 
however, this ‘woman’ remained shrouded by the status of victim and federally 
sentenced women were ‘denied even the rhetorical status of survivors' (Bruckert, 
1993: 11). The consequence of this will be seen in later chapters.
Speaking for other women
Historically, men have always been involved in planning for, and speaking on behalf 
of, imprisoned women. The women’s reformatory movement challenged men’s right 
to do so, but, as chapter 1 outlined, it has been suggested that the reformers’ 
challenge was premised on their belief in an innate sexual difference, rather than an 
attempt to press for sexual equality (Freedman, 1981). (See also Rafter, 1985; 
Hannah-Moffat, 2001). In ‘crossing] the boundary between themselves and fallen 
women’ (Freedman 1981: 105) reformers were suggesting a commonality of 
women’s experience and assuming that women such as themselves had an 
instinctive, or collective, knowledge of other women which qualified them to 
participate in the governance of women’s prisons. Those early reformers 
accommodated imprisonment, rather than questioned it, and contributed to its
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continuing legitimacy as a means of controlling deviant women. In so doing, they 
developed a form of maternal governance which was no less controlling than the 
paternalism more commonly found in prisons (see Hannah-Moffat, 2001). While the 
majority of the members of the 1989 Task Force were not employed directly by 
correctional authorities (although CAEFS had a financial relationship with CSC), so 
were not in a position to exercise maternal authority in a physical sense, they were 
nevertheless involved in a project which required them to plan on behalf of 
imprisoned women. Once again, women were being asked to show a collective 
understanding of other women, yet only two on the Task Force had personal 
experience of actual imprisonment; for the remainder, their knowledge could be no 
more than conjecture and empathy. Additionally, these women exercised their 
power to plan for others from various positions of authority and, most obviously, all 
were free (Bruckert, 1993; Hannah-Moffat, 2001). In no sense could they be equal 
to imprisoned women.
Bruckert had pertinent things to say about the power differentials between ‘the 
discourse creators [members of the Task Force] and subjects [federally sentenced 
women]’, positing that class was a ‘central [unacknowledged] difference’ (Bruckert, 
1993: 19). Irrespective of how each member of the Working Group might have 
viewed their own background, the sheer disparity between their economic and social 
circumstances and those of the vast majority of imprisoned women immediately 
distanced them from those for whom they were planning. Harding et al (1985: 171) 
lamented the loss of prisoners’ voices from criminological literature, and then almost 
immediately discounted prisoners’ accounts of their own lives as ‘not to be greatly 
relied on for obvious reasons’. However, there is often a tendency to assume that it 
is those working with prisoners who have the greatest understanding of prisons. 
Indeed, many officers spend longer inside than do the prisoners (Faith, 1993), but 
that is not to experience the physical loss and pain occasioned by imprisonment. 
Dilulio (1991: 1) suggests that: ‘there are no experts on corrections. As near as we 
come to such experts are the men and women who have spent their adult lives 
working with criminals: wardens, correctional officers, probation and parole agents 
... ’. In this analysis the prisoner becomes merely the subject of others’ expertise. 
Within the Task Force, it might have been tempting for some Working Group
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members to assume that their somewhat increased contact with individual federally 
sentenced women, occasioned by visits to the Prison for Women, permitted a closer 
understanding of their needs. Yet ‘these [federally sentenced] women ... are one of 
the most over-studied and over-intervened populations ... As a consequence they are 
likely [to be] more conscious and articulate about their past experiences’ (Bruckert 
1993: 33). Many of the women would have been able to convey powerfully the pain 
of their incarceration, using the ‘sociological’ language of some of the professionals 
within the prison. This did not necessarily mean, however, that the truth as they 
experienced it was being fully expressed. Neither did it lessen the power 
differentials between the two groups. The imprisoned women had few means of 
expressing their inherent expertise, except through the mouths of intermediaries.
Hannah-Moffat traced the development of ‘maternal logics’ in the governance of 
imprisoned women and in doing so explored the question of ‘structural relations of 
power which are not mediated by gender sameness. Although women reformers, 
volunteers, matrons and prisoners are of the same sex, relations of power continue to 
exist between those socio-economically and culturally heterogeneous categories of 
women’ (Hannah-Moffat 2001: 43). In the context of the Task Force, and 
specifically within the Working Group, it can be argued that there were also 
‘relations of power’ between members. The civil servants had a power vested in 
them by virtue of the fact that they were government appointees, with (stratified) 
access to those who would make the final decision regarding implementation of the 
final report. With the exception of Mary Cassidy -  both a prison warden and a civil 
servant -  their expertise was as government administrators involved in the 
bureaucracy of corrections, rather than in the prisons themselves.17 The CAEFS’ 
representatives derived their expertise from the specific knowledge they had 
individually of the imprisoned women whom they represented. The Aboriginal 
members’ knowledge was grounded in their knowledge of the destruction of their 
communities and culture at the hands of Euro-Canada. Yet the power differentials 
were remarkably fluid, depending upon the area of expertise being discussed. The
17 This lack o f prison-based expertise on the Working Group did not indicate a disregard for the 
knowledge o f individual wardens; rather, it reflected the fact that there was only one federal prison 
for women, so the pool o f specific expertise was restricted. The Steering Committee included the
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civil servants were politically ascendant, while the voluntary sector often believed 
itself philosophically ascendant. The civil servants sometimes thought the voluntary 
sector unrealistic in their demands and were, in turn, seen to be intransigent and 
lacking in vision. Unsurprisingly, the pressures of working to a rigid timetable 
caused friction between members, exaggerating their differences to a degree which 
might not have occurred had they been under less pressure.
It could be assumed that the Aboriginal representatives were the least advantaged 
within the formal relationships of power, but this would be to discount the effect of 
their history on others in the Working Group. As the Minutes reveal, even while 
they were failing to document the true extent of Aboriginal contributions to 
discussions, there was little criticism of Aboriginal perspectives by others on the 
Task Force. At times there was a marked deference to the moral authority of the 
Aboriginal members indicated not so much by what was said by the rest of the 
Group, as by a failure to say anything at all. One Aboriginal member was later to 
characterise this as ‘internalised racism’, a view also presented by a non-Aboriginal 
interviewee.18 By this, they meant that the other Working Group members’ 
reluctance to criticise and challenge implied that the Aboriginals’ perspectives could 
not withstand critical discussion. Some of the non-Aboriginals would have refuted 
this, as explained by this commentator from the Steering Committee: I  would say 
that at least part o f it [the silence] is that the non-Aboriginal members never felt that 
they were experts on the Aboriginal issues or culture, so when the Aboriginals say 
they are suffering an injustice, the general attitude o f  all the people in the room was 
‘you ’re r i g h t N o  Canadian doubts that they have been treated unjustly. ... There is 
an element o f guilt, particularly within government, at having managed it so badly.19 
This might well be interpreted as another means of neutralising Aboriginals simply 
by refusing to engage in debate with them, but interview evidence suggests that there 
was a genuine acceptance of the strength of the Aboriginals’ case.
Directrice o f a Quebec provincial facility, but the needs o f a provincial prison, with its transient 
population, do not always translate into a federal model.
18 Interview 29
19 Interviews 27 and 31
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Politicising the agenda
Eight consultations across Canada were planned for the months of June and July and 
before that over 500 invitations were extended to groups and individuals across 
Canada. A very large number of organisations responded and 200 presentations 
were made to the Task Force. As with all the Task Force’s documentation, the need 
to translate documents delayed the distribution of information in Quebec, and 
organisations and individuals who might contribute to the consultations were not 
contacted as quickly as others across the country. In an effort to focus the 
presentations at the consultations, and to lessen the burden of collating the responses, 
a Sub-Committee drafted a set of Guideline Questions they wished to have answered. 
Patricia Monture’s views were subsequently sought ‘to ensure that [the] First Nations 
perspective was included’. She added two further questions: ‘who should have 
responsibility for women serving sentences of two years or more?, and ‘if First 
Nations had a self-determined justice system, what would it look like?’21 The 
Working Group’s co-chair, Jane Miller Ashton, provided a written brief on the 
matter for James Phelps, in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner, rather than as co­
chair of the Steering Committee and had forwarded the Consultation Guidelines, by 
then including Ms Monture’s questions. In his reply Mr. Phelps pointed out that the 
‘design of a “self-determined justice system” for the “First Nations” would be a 
Department of Justice issue, which is beyond the authority of the Solicitor-General. 
Similarly, the responsibility for women serving sentences of two years or more is 
federal under existing law ...’ He was concerned that the Task Force should not 
‘exceed its authority or interfere in the jurisdiction of other government departments 
or other governments’.22 The Working Group was informed at its July meeting that 
all the co-chairs had jointly decided to remove the sovereignty question from the 
Guideline Questions. Patricia Monture noted that ‘while the federal -  provincial 
aspect is the usual interpretation applied to jurisdiction, the question did provide an 
opportunity for Aboriginal presenters to address the issue of sovereignty’. Its 
deletion might limit ‘the potential scope of the consultation’.23 This attempt to 
broaden the brief and circumvent the Mandate would undoubtedly have been seen as
20 Minutes o f meeting o f Sub-Committee on Consultations 21st April, 1989
21 Guideline questions for consultations 21st April, 1989
22 Memorandum 17th May, 1989
23 Working Group Minutes 6th -  7th July, 1989
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an attempt to politicise their deliberations by some members of the Working Group 
and it is possible that a few might have thought such attempts capable of 
destabilising the joint project. Yet once again, Ole Ingstrup’s injunction to ‘think 
broadly’ was seen to be circumscribed and in this case the limitations were 
reinforced by a co-chair of the Steering Committee, in his capacity as a Corrections’ 
official and civil servant. James Phelps’ response highlighted the dual roles of some 
on the Task Force and raised further questions about their ultimate accountability. 
While members of the voluntary sector could, with some degree of accuracy, claim 
to be accountable to federally sentenced women, was this ever a real possibility for 
the civil servants on the Task Force? And, in attempting to add a political dimension 
to their deliberations, were some of the Aboriginal members showing that they had a 
wider constituency than just federally sentenced women?
In June it was the Steering Committee’s turn to meet and a Briefing Note was 
provided for both James Phelps and Bonnie Diamond beforehand. Three new 
Aboriginal members were to attend the meeting. The Chairs were forewarned that 
the women might wish to ‘put forward an agenda different from the course 
established’ and should be told that their colleagues on the Working Group had 
agreed to work within the Mandate.24 At the meeting itself the practicalities of 
commenting on ‘work in progress’ provided by the Working Group was again a 
dominant feature. There were fewer, shorter meetings of the Steering Committee 
than there were of the Working Group, which meant that the Working Group would 
be covering an immense amount of ground, but still required the approval and 
guidance of the Steering Committee before certain decisions could be made. During 
this June meeting a great deal of time was spent discussing the Draft Principles and, 
although still a distance from those which were finally published, certain words of 
great importance in the final Report made an appearance: respect; dignity; self­
esteem and empowerment. The Committee high-lighted the fact that the Principles 
seemed to focus on the ‘incarceration period’ and that there needed to be some 
emphasis on the ‘community and post-release aspects’. Co-chair Phelps found the 
suggested wording altogether ‘too soft’. He thought it important to make references 
to such things as assisting ‘offenders to become law-abiding citizens’ (a phrase sure
24 Briefing Notes 19th June, 1989
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to annoy the Aboriginal members), if the Task Force’s credibility were not to be 
undermined. The co-chairs of the Working Group were indeed ‘steered’ by the 
Committee to reconsider much of the draft.
History repeated; ignoring Quebec
Although Aboriginal perspectives were heard from the first, an entirely outnumbered 
francophone member of the Steering Committee had also been trying to raise 
Quebecois issues. At the first Steering Committee meeting in April she had 
expressed concern about the lack of a Quebec representative on the Working Group, 
but no response was minuted and we do not know the general reaction to her 
proposal. The question of francophone representation on the Group was also raised 
during the May Working Group meeting, ‘given the significant number of federally 
sentenced women from Quebec’, and it was agreed that all four co-chairs would 
consider the options of either appointing a francophone member to the Working 
Group, or allowing francophone members of the Steering Committee to take on a 
greater role.25
The Task Force’s four co-chairs then invited a francophone civil servant to join the 
Working Group, in recognition of the importance of the Quebecois’ perspective, but 
she was unavailable until August, which was felt to be too late. This is the clearest 
of indications that Quebec, from the Task Force’s inception, could have been 
represented on the Working Group -  by a civil servant -  without there being undue 
worries about offence being caused to other provinces. My supposition is supported 
by the fact that one of the Task Force’s four co-chairs was a Deputy Commissioner, 
itself a very senior rank, and he had acquiesced in the decision to co-opt a civil 
servant. Twenty-one percent of all federally sentenced women were French- 
speaking and, given the fraught history of relations between Quebec and the rest of 
Canada, it is remarkable that their needs had not assumed an earlier importance. 
Since 1982, with the signing of the Exchange of Services’ Agreement (ESA), the 
Tanguay Agreement, most Quebec women had been incarcerated provincially, at 
Maison Tanguay, which inevitably provided a francophone milieu. This ESA
25 Working Group Minutes 10th -  12th May, 1989
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implicitly accepted the rationale of the others; that acceptance of provincial 
imprisonment meant acceptance of provincial standards in programming and, as 
these were based on the infinitely more transient needs of the provincially sentenced 
woman, the requirements of the long-term prisoner were consistently overlooked. 
This was certainly the case at Maison Tanguay which, in its own way, was as bleak 
as the Prison for Women. The inescapable conclusion, sustained by the late 
invitation extended to the civil servant, is that those responsible for the initial 
composition of the Task Force did not, to begin with, see Quebec as a major 
component in what they were undertaking. They only came to see it as such during 
the life of the Task Force.
Listening to other voices; looking at existing provision
Although members of the Steering Committee assisted during the consultations, 
those most affected by the scale of the proceedings were on the Working Group.26 
Alongside the regional consultations, the Task Force found itself interviewing its 
own members, Bonnie Diamond and James Phelps, in their professional capacities.
97Ole Ingstrup was asked for his personal view ‘on the issues and possible solutions’. 
The unions were questioned. Extensive meetings took place with the provincial 
Heads of Corrections and their staff. The National Parole Board, both nationally and 
regionally, was consulted, as was the noted advocate of prisoner’s rights, Claire 
Culhane.28 Task Force members visited eleven provincial institutions housing 
federally sentenced women. They met with federally sentenced women in the Prison 
for Women and on parole in the community. The Task Force was determined to 
show that it had ‘heard’ the various voices and also needed to ensure that provincial 
sensibilities were not offended, as the Exchange of Services Agreements had made 
provincial Corrections key partners in the business of housing federal women. There
90were immediate provincial difficulties once the consultation process began. The 
francophones expected that French would be used during the Quebec consultations,
26 Working Group members were each assigned to a proportion o f the consultations. It would have 
been an impossibility, within the timescale, for all to attend every consultation meeting.
27 Progress Report on Consultations September 1989:3
28 Claire Culhane occupies a special place in the history o f Canadian penal reform, noted for 
(amongst many things) her resolute advocacy o f prisoners’ rights and the book(s) detailing removal o f  
her visiting rights at provincial and federal men’s prisons in British Columbia. (See Culhane, 1979, 
1985, 1991).
29 Minutes o f Consultations Sub-Group 6lh June, 1989
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simply because to do otherwise in a largely French-speaking province would be 
politically insensitive.
As indicated earlier, members of the Working Group were also visiting other 
institutions as part of their fact-finding mission, and a member was particularly 
alarmed by what she observed at one. We had a meeting with the sta ff who were 
going to be the staff at Burnaby [in British Columbia] when it opened and we asked 
them all sorts o f questions about how things would be different when the new 
institution opened and o f course the answer was ‘not at all ’ and that was when it 
really came to me most forcefully -  probably half-way through the Task Force -  that 
we may be on the wrong track. That you can’t fix  the present system. That you have 
to have a new system.30 Under an ESA (the Burnaby Agreement 1988) the new 
Burnaby Correctional Centre for Women (BCCW) was to hold both provincially- 
and federally-sentenced women. The prison was later described: ‘Technically, the 
institution is a medium security facility, but for all practical purposes, due to the 
architectural design and high-level technological security systems, and because 
women from every classification are locked up together, they must all abide by the 
maximum custody rules intended for the control of the few women who are 
perceived as security risks’ (Faith 1993: 146). It thus replicated what already
o  1
prevailed at the Prison for Women. The distinction, however, between this new 
ESA and all predecessors negotiated earlier, lay in the fact that federally sentenced 
women, who both qualified and elected to remain in British Columbia, would be 
under federal jurisdiction. Others making the same decision in other provinces at the 
same time, lost their ‘federal’ status and became provincial prisoners. This generally 
meant that women from other provinces received the benefit of being held closer to 
their homes, but had significantly fewer programmes available to them, unlike 
federally sentenced men, who did not face the same dilemma because of the greater 
number of penitentiaries.
30 Interview 19
31 As BCCW was newly built, the decision was later made that it would not be replaced by one of 
the institutions subsequently recommended by the Task Force. This was an uncanny echo o f  the 
reasons for not closing the Prison for Women in 1938 -  that it would be fiscally irresponsible to close 
a prison so recently built.
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The fourth Working Group meeting was held in August, 1989 in Ottawa. Although 
they were beginning to receive information and ideas from the community, 
provincial and institutional consultations, the Group knew they still had some time to 
wait until the bulk of the research material would be available. The Minutes stated: 
‘Given the Task Force timeframe, the Working Group would have to move forward 
using assumptions based on their personal expertise, that of the organizations 
consulted and the findings of previous studies. The research results, therefore, would 
be used to validate or modify these assumptions’. In assuming a collective 
expertise -  and, in this instance, having little choice -  the Working Group were 
straying into problematic territory. As we know, James Phelps had urged the Group 
to validate their work by means of empirical research, whereas the Commissioner 
had imposed an almost draconian timetable for completion. Both stances were 
determined by the demands of the Treasury Board and they left the Working Group 
in an untenable position. Without research evidence they could not accurately plan, 
yet if they failed to complete their report on time the Treasury Board would refuse 
funds essential for implementation. In relying on their own expertise and their 
shared experience of womanhood, if not imprisonment, the Working Group were 
replicating the strategies of the first women prison reformers and planning for an 
insufficiently identified group. It was a risky position to be in, and one with which 
they did not feel comfortable, yet they saw no other option. The benevolence of their 
intentions outweighed the inherent risks and, as we shall see, there were unintended 
consequences.
At this critical half-way stage the Working Group also needed to start planning the 
outline of the final report. There was a diverse public which had to be persuaded of 
the need for change but, above all, the final document had to open the Treasury 
Board’s purse. The report had to be logical, persuasive and defensible. In short, its 
appearance could not be too different from most other government reports, but this 
did not preclude its language from being radical. Where the Working Group was 
ground breaking, at that juncture, was in deciding that the voices of federally 
sentenced women would open the report; the women would have a chapter to 
themselves and be recognised as possessing a unique knowledge. As the Working
32 Working Group Minutes 15th -  16th August, 1989
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Group was constrained by a tight budget and contract hours were fast being used up 
by the non-government representatives, it was decided that the civil service members 
would undertake the writing of the first draft. The wisdom of allowing the civil 
servants to be the initial drafters of the report was apparently not questioned, but the 
minutes of all the meetings are at best an approximation of what was said, and we 
already know that some members had reservations. It was still proving difficult to 
move towards consensus on the Principles which were to underpin the report and the 
Group knew that, as the distillation of a new correctional philosophy, they had to be 
precisely defined. The Task Force attempted subsequently to safeguard their plan by 
including an implementation strategy in their report, but what the Task Force could 
not do was force the bureaucracy of CSC to co-operate.
Adding to the agenda; Aboriginal issues
During the Working Group’s July meeting concerns about the failure to consult with 
Aboriginal groups in the ‘more remote northern or rural native communities’ had 
resurfaced. Invitations to meet with the Working Group had been extended but the 
response had been discouraging. So in August the Working Group decided that the 
final report would document the failure and that the Aboriginal issues would not be 
confined to a sole Aboriginal chapter in the final report, but raised throughout. The 
Aboriginals’ success in pressing their issues continued with the question of 
Aboriginal sovereignty again being raised, in the context of a discussion on the 
‘artificiality of the federal-provincial split in jurisdiction’. Aboriginal self- 
determination was considered another ‘jurisdictional issue’. Despite James Phelps’ 
earlier-cited view that this question was outside the Mandate of the Task Force, the 
Working Group agreed to acknowledge the Aboriginals’ wish for self-determination 
in the report. By then the Working Group was largely persuaded of the moral 
strength of the Aboriginal case (and some had needed no persuading at all), but a 
minority also conceded certain arguments in order to keep the peace and ensure a 
completed task.
The commissioned research was already under way and the needs’ interviews (which 
provided the basis for Shaw et al’s Survey o f Federally Sentenced Women) had 
commenced at the Prison for Women. There were delays beginning the interviews in
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Quebec, but these were occasioned by a ‘nervousness’ on the part of some of the 
Task Force in approaching the province rather than by the inability of the researchers 
themselves to gain permission.33 This ‘nervousness’ reflected the dual reality that 
Quebec Corrections had negotiated a considerable amount of autonomy with the 
advent of the Tanguay Agreement and that the province itself was customarily treated 
with caution. A separate piece of research, the Security Needs Assessment, also 
involving Shaw in the preliminary discussions, was delayed. This was to be based 
on earlier work Berzins and Dunn carried out for the Chinnery Report in 1978 (see 
chapter 1) and was expected to demonstrate -  as it had some ten years earlier -  that 
women were frequently over-classified, with most capable of being accommodated 
in minimum security settings.
Finalising the schedules for the community interviews was problematic. In June the 
Steering Committee had minuted a request that Aboriginal women should be 
interviewed by an ‘Aboriginal person’ and a Memorandum to the co-chairs of the 
Working Group, written by another member, had outlined Patricia Monture’s 
unhappiness about the seeming failure to discuss the interview guide with an 
Aboriginal woman with ‘research/interview experience’. The pre-testing of this 
guide had been restricted to non-Aboriginal women, and Prof. Monture felt that the 
more logical step would have been to limit it to Aboriginal women, in an effort to 
test its efficacy in persuading them to speak. At this stage Patricia Monture also felt 
that her attempts to ‘communicate awareness/sensitivity to the Working Group [had] 
not been effective’.34 What she had been trying to convey to the Group was perhaps 
best expressed in the report eventually produced by Lana Fox and Fran Sugar, 
themselves one-time federally sentenced women and members of the Steering 
Committee, when they discussed other task forces which had requested meetings 
with the Native Sisterhood inside the Prison for Women:
We always agreed to meet, somehow believing that there was hope for 
change. ... We never said out loud that we were teaching them something 
about being a people. The circle of chairs we sat in represented the cycle of 
life from birth to death and that cycle did not exclude anyone. ... In our 
private conversations afterwards, we felt that even though those officials
33 Letter,January, 2000
34 Memorandum 2nd August, 1989
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were our enemies, our jailers, our keepers, the all-powerful representatives of 
white authority and the state, that they would have heard our truth (Sugar & 
Fox, 1990: 15, emphasis added).
We already know that Aboriginal claims to ‘truth’ or understanding had historically 
been swept aside by the dominant culture. That Aboriginals were allowed to 
participate in ceremonies in prison showed Corrections’ supposed tolerance, rather 
than a failure to understand that Aboriginal societies did not themselves resort to 
imprisonment. In an effort to understand Aboriginal issues more fully, and to show 
that Aboriginal women came from backgrounds as diverse as their Euro-Canadian 
counterparts, the August meeting concluded with a workshop conducted by an Elder, 
Joan Lavallee.35 She reflected on the impact of the residential schools on Aboriginal 
women and the consequent separation from traditional teachings, but warned that 
native spirituality was not a ‘quick fix’. The Working Group would soon be faced 
with decisions about the type of staff they wished to have working with federally 
sentenced women and she cautioned that ‘efforts to increase Aboriginal staff in 
institutions [might] be ... misdirected ... since Aboriginal persons object to guarding 
their sisters’.36 Again, this reflected the divide between the Euro-Canadian and 
Aboriginal cultures, because Aboriginal nations did not have comparable 
hierarchical structures. Where hierarchies did exist, they were generally based on 
respect accorded to wisdom, as with the Elders.
Some Euro-Canadian members of the Task Force were further exposed to Aboriginal 
concerns in August, when Jane Miller Ashton and Bonnie Diamond attended the 
Aboriginal Women’s Caucus conference. The opening lines of one of the papers, 
‘dedicated to the memory of all women who have died unnatural deaths as a result of 
their incarceration’, gave some indication of the mood of the meeting:
The relationship of the Aboriginal Women’s Caucus and the federal 
government is not a relationship that is based on trust. ... All Aboriginal,
First Nations citizens are in conflict with the law. We are First Peoples with 
an inherent right to exercise our own systems of justice and the values these 
systems represent. The issue of Aboriginal women and the criminal justice
35 For Aboriginals, Elders have the same function as priests and chaplains. They are valued for their 
wisdom, insight and knowledge and are considered to have special spiritual gifts. They are valued by 
their communities for their ability to guide others, both by example and through teachings.
36 Working Group Minutes 15th -  16th August, 1989
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system is merely the most blatant example of the oppression of First Nations
I T
people under a system of laws to which we have never consented.
In considering the Task Force itself, Caucus members expressed frustration at the 
failure of the Steering Committee to ‘take account’ of their views and questions and 
the equal failure of the minutes to record their contributions. This point was later 
made most strikingly by Sugar and Fox:
When our rage became uncontainable [during Task Force meetings] we spoke 
of prison conditions, of the actual experiences of being Aboriginal women in 
prison ... Yet our words were met with tense silences and appear nowhere in 
the minutes of meetings. Our descriptions of the reality are buried as our 
sisters are buried in prison (1990: 2).
Despite the clear concerns, the September Minutes followed much the same format 
as previous ones but, in this instance, it is possible to compare them with very 
detailed notes taken of the same meeting. In the Minutes there was one line saying: 
‘Karen Paul spoke of her vision for responding to the needs of Aboriginal women’. 
In the notes this ‘vision’ took half a page to explain. Whether these omissions were 
in support of ‘consensus’ or simply to avoid the appearance of dissent is a debatable 
point, but their effect was to heighten distrust at a time when the Task Force, and the 
Working Group in particular, needed to work cohesively in order to prepare for the 
final stage of their work.
The critical role played by the Minutes in passing information to both parts of the 
Task Force was also apparent at the September Working Group meeting, when 
Patricia Monture reported that ‘the Aboriginal Steering Committee members had 
[understood] from the [August] Minutes ... [that she and Sharon Mclvor] considered 
acceptable the fact that the consultations had failed to reach Aboriginal 
communities’.38 Had the Minutes been fuller this misunderstanding might not have 
occurred, but it also reflected the continuing anxiety on the part of the Aboriginal 
participants that they were listened to but not ‘heard’; that Euro-Canadians, while 
appearing to be more deferential in that they did not interrupt or criticise, were in 
effect ‘internalising’ their unacknowledged racism, as has earlier been discussed.
37 Paper presented at the Aboriginal Women’s Caucus 30th August, 1989
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For some of the Euro-Canadian members of the Task Force the emphasis on 
Aboriginal concerns, while understood, at times occasioned discomfort. Although 
theoretically familiar with Aboriginal history, a number had had very little contact 
with Aboriginal women, particularly those who were articulate and assertive in the 
company of Euro-Canadians, and some found the emotions expressed during 
meetings very difficult to deal with. One recalled: You sat there. You listened 
politely. It was also a period when you were extremely politically correct. There 
were scenes - I  remember waiting for an hour for the representatives to come to the 
table because they were late and no-one mentioned anything, no-one said ‘le t’s 
start’, we just waited. ... There could be all kinds of... personal histories sat around 
the table... with an awful lot o f emotion being shared and people just felt very
39uneasy.
Federally sentenced women; victims?
The language used by the AWC, in speaking of the ‘oppression of First Nations 
people’, is particularly interesting because it continues a theme which has previously 
emerged; the victimisation of Aboriginal women. Although used in the context of 
imprisoned Aboriginal women, it is not entirely about their victimisation by the 
criminal justice system. There is a larger political strand to the discourse 
encompassing the historic victimisation of Aboriginal women by the dominant 
culture, through the application of unjust laws to which their individual nations had 
never assented. Had these laws not been enforced, Aboriginal women would not 
have been dispossessed of their families, communities and cultures. Most would 
conceivably have remained living in secure communities, with supportive familial 
ties, and unaffected by the ravages of alcohol. Although imprisoned Aboriginals 
were undeniably offenders, insofar as Euro-Canadian law classified them as such, 
their disproportionate imprisonment was assumed to be almost entirely attributable to 
their historic victimisation and not necessarily a cause solely for shame, as chapter 2 
has explored. The AWC’s language reflected some Aboriginals’ belief that the only 
solution to their many problems lay in the adoption of separate strategies and, in this 
case, one focused on an Aboriginal justice system. To the Aboriginal members of
38 Working Group Minutes 21st -  22nd September, 1989
39 Interview 32
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the Task Force the apparent failure of other members to appreciate the scale of past 
injustices was difficult both to accept and work with and their continuing battle to 
educate individual members seemed fruitless.
However, it was not only Aboriginal women who were seen as victims. In the 
context of the Task Force the theme of victimisation had four strands: the 
victimisation of federally sentenced women by CSC’s failure to recognise that 
women have needs distinct from those of men; the victimisation experienced by 
many federally sentenced women, from all ethnic groups, as a consequence of their 
economic and social positions in Canada; the victimisation imposed by the 
correctional / justice system on federally sentenced women because only one federal 
facility was available to them (while to be held in a provincial prison meant 
foregoing federal rights, which compounded the injustice); the victimisation 
experienced specifically by Aboriginal women, exacerbated by racism, the roots of 
which lay in historic injustices. As we shall see, the Task Force was later accused of 
characterising all federally sentenced women as victims, rather than as women who 
had themselves created victims. I believe these various distinctions must be made, 
however, if only to avoid perpetuating what some commentators have interpreted as 
being the collective image of a group of women completely without agency. It is 
apparent that the traditional image of the ‘victim’ as being the innocent bystander to 
whom something unwarranted had happened was somehow lost. Yet that same 
description could equally apply to an Aboriginal woman, should her life be seen in a 
social context, so the terminology was necessarily imprecise. At this point we need 
to be aware of the evolving, undisputed image of the federally sentenced Aboriginal 
woman as ‘victim’, a view reinforced by Johnson and Rodgers (1993: 110), who 
characterised Aboriginal women as suffering from ‘racial discrimination, gender 
discrimination,... and legislated discrimination’. That image eventually affected 
how all other federally sentenced women were characterised by the Task Force, for 
reasons which I shall later discuss.
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Glimpsing the ‘difficult to manage’ woman
By September, 1989 progress with the research could be relayed to the Steering 
Committee. Lee Axon’s report on exemplary programmes for women in the United 
States would be available in October and the needs research interviews were 
proceeding, although a start still had to be made in Quebec. The fact that these 
interviews were solely with imprisoned women, rather than including those released 
into the community, continued to worry the Task Force. The 15th December 
deadline imposed by the Commissioner was cited as the reason for the research not 
being undertaken, as there simply was not enough time to commission and complete 
it. The Steering Committee, while recognising that the Working Group was already 
faced with an enormous work-load, still thought that funding and personnel for the 
research could be obtained from other sources. The option of asking for the deadline 
to be extended was much debated, but considered detrimental to the ‘credibility of 
the Task Force’ and forcefully opposed by James Phelps, who was also aware of the 
constraints imposed by the need to meet Treasury Board deadlines.40
Of all the research areas discussed by the Steering Committee in September, the area 
that was eventually to have the greatest impact appeared to receive the least debate, 
according to the Minutes, but this was belied by the very full discussion documented 
in the Detailed Notes.41 The Security Needs Assessment, to be undertaken at the 
Prison for Women, was deferred. The main reasons offered for the deferral were the 
lack of time and recent disturbances at the Prison. As the Minutes recorded, ‘while 
the exercise was not without merit, it was not considered of high priority, and 
therefore would not be completed as an integral part of Task Force work’.42 But the 
Notes revealed that Committee members were worried that the results would be 
‘skewed by recent events’ (disturbances and a lock-down at the prison) and that the 
women would be over-classified. Looking ahead to the possibility that there might 
be a facility other than the Prison for Women, the exercise provided an important 
opportunity to ask what kind of ‘static and dynamic security features [might be]
40 Steering Committee Minutes 19th September, 1989
41 Detailed Notes o f Steering Committee Meeting 19th September, 1989
42 Steering Committee Minutes 19th September, 1989
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required in alternate (sic) accommodation’ and was ‘critical for long-term 
accommodation planning’.43 But what seemed to sway the Committee towards 
deferment was the worry that the assessment might ‘falsely suggest the women have 
become tougher since the last exercise’ (carried out for the Chinnery Report, in 
1978) and, by implication, that this depiction would make it harder to justify a new 
style of facility. The cancellation of the Security Needs Assessment also worried the 
Working Group when it met separately two days later and the Group specifically 
minuted their ‘recommendation that the exercise should be implemented at the first 
possible moment’. One Group member noted that this would leave them unable to 
make ‘as precise a recommendation regarding maximum security type 
accommodation’, which eventually proved to be the case.44 The Task Force was 
thus deprived of information crucial to the planning of any new prisons as they had 
no specific information on the numbers of women requiring higher levels of security. 
This left the Working Group to rely heavily on its own knowledge of the women 
when proposing its plans.
The Task Force was right to be aware of and concerned about events at the Prison for 
Women. Some two weeks before the September meeting there had been a minor 
assault at the Prison, and by the next day the Prison had responded by locking the 
women on A and B ranges in their cells and heavily restricting all prisoner 
movement. Shortly afterwards three protective custody inmates were assaulted, 
which led to a lockdown of the institution for a day and a half. Restrictions were 
gradually eased, but the prisoners were very resentful of what they saw as an overly 
harsh response. The situation deteriorated and the Chair of the Inmate Committee 
called the press to protest at what was happening, but the ensuing publicity focused 
on the supposed violence of the women in the prison, rather than on the institutional 
policy. Tension continued to mount as the weeks passed.
At the Task Force’s first meeting Mr. Ingstrup had stressed that ‘no major decisions 
regarding federal women would be made during the life of the Task Force’45, but the
43 Detailed Notes o f Steering Committee Meeting 19th September, 1989
44 Working Group Minutes 21st -  22nd September, 1989
45 Steering Committee Minutes 3rd April, 1989
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administration of the institution of course remained firmly within the grasp of CSC. 
While Mr. Ingstrup was at that point referring to expanded Exchange of Service 
Agreements and matters of similar significance, the Task Force worried about its on­
going work being used as an excuse for allowing conditions to stagnate at the Prison. 
Although an undertaking had been given that any initiatives being considered would 
be ‘brought to the attention of the Task Force’ (TFFSW 1990: 75), this did not mean 
that it could influence day-to-day procedures. Neither did it mean that initiatives 
always were brought to the attention of the Task Force, as evident when the Working 
Group queried a proposal to establish a mental health unit at the Prison for Women. 
Mary Cassidy told them that she had not raised ‘this initiative at the previous 
meeting since the unit [was] intended to address an acknowledged long-term regional 
need, whether or not federally sentenced women remain[ed] at the Prison for 
Women’.46
This highlights the anomalous position of a member of the Working Group who was 
both Warden of the prison in question and a government employee. Decisions she 
needed to make, as a Warden accountable to CSC, would not always be ones that she 
could easily convey to her colleagues on the Working Group. It had been clear at the 
July Working Group meeting that the Task Force was being used as an excuse for 
inactivity at the prison, with individual members having been told that ‘the Task 
Force will address it’ whenever they tried to raise issues.47 Mary Cassidy’s position, 
on the relatively few occasions when she was able to attend Working Group 
meetings, was made even more difficult by the fact that she was the public face of 
the Prison. Irrespective of what she might be attempting to achieve within the Prison 
for Women, the escalating unrest ensured that she was continually subjected to 
public criticism and also had to face it during the Group’s meetings. One member 
recalled: We were all criticising her, while another remembered: There’s no doubt 
that they used the meeting as a chance to whip h er ... you could see from their 
criticisms that it was beyond their comprehension that she could have a view ... they 
were advocating changes to her management, so it wasn ’t a situation where she was
46 Working Group Minutes 6th -  7th July, 1989
47 Working Group Minutes 6th -  7th July, 1989
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looked upon as part o f  the team.4* The sense of being ‘apart’ must have greatly 
increased any difficulties Mary Cassidy experienced as a member of the Working 
Group, but this is conjecture on my part, as she felt unable to discuss this, or any 
other aspect of her work, with me.
Thanks to the consultation process it was already clear to members that the Task 
Force would not be recommending the continuation of the status quo and they were 
able to minute that the ‘Prison for Women, as it exists now, be closed and that the 
Exchange of Service Agreements cannot continue on the current terms’.49 A 
preliminary review of 118 of the consultations’ submissions revealed that only 
eighteen had suggested the Prison for Women should remain open. There was also 
little support for enhanced Exchange of Service Agreements (under which provinces 
accommodated federally sentenced women, in provincial standards of 
imprisonment). Emerging themes suggested that: women were over-classified as 
security risks; women should mostly be dealt with in the community; women’s 
groups should provide women’s services; programmes should be focused outside, 
rather than within, the prison. Some of the recommendations which emerged from 
the consultations would have required legislative changes, but it was felt that the 
Working Group should produce recommendations which could be implemented 
‘under the authority of the Commissioner’, further illustrating the restricted nature of 
his injunction to ‘think broadly’.
The Aboriginal representatives on the Task Force had met earlier to discuss the Task 
Force’s inability to make contact with Aboriginal groups during the consultations, as 
well as federally-sentenced Aboriginal women post-release. During the September 
Steering Committee meeting one of the Aboriginal members had highlighted the 
need to provide empirical information: ‘Government has historically not funded 
Native Organisations unless they were willing to provide traditional empirical data to 
back up their work. ... But the data collection must be appropriate for native 
people’.50 The Steering Committee emphasised that ‘the community needs personal 
interviews [were] a critical element in determining what programs/services [for
48 Interviews 28 and 27
49 Working Group Minutes 21st - 22nd September, 1989
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Aboriginal women were] required to support community-based intervention 
strategies’. The Committee again recognised the extreme workload being carried by 
the Working Group and decided that ‘consultation can be considered a type of 
research’, which meant that ‘traditional research instruments’ need not be used.
Thus the Committee provided Aboriginal women with a means of undertaking 
research appropriate to them, irrespective of whether ‘traditional’ researchers would 
accept the validity of the finished piece. This decision inspired the AWC members, 
at their separate meeting, to propose that Fran Sugar be sent to ‘eighteen cities to 
locate Aboriginal women through names obtained from the Native Sisterhood, CSC 
databases, word of mouth and consultation with street workers’ and their proposal 
was accepted by the Working Group. (Lana Fox was to join Fran Sugar in this 
endeavour).51
The report eventually produced by Sugar and Fox, both of whom were on the 
Steering Committee, was a powerful document, as we have already seen. Their own 
experience of serving federal time enabled them to provide a running commentary on 
what women individually told them, and they did so with a passion and articulacy 
which far exceeded the cool prose normally reserved for such research. They did, 
indeed, produce something which ‘challenge[d] traditional understandings of 
effective research methods’ (Monture, 1989-1990: 467). Monture continued: ‘This 
report is also important in academic circles and women’s circles because it carries a 
powerful message about research. Research methods to be effective must be 
culturally relevant. In this case, that meant respecting the traditional way of doing 
things of First Nations’ Peoples’. In large part this meant accepting the validity of 
qualitative information, listening to the voices of those directly affected and not 
attempting to put them in a quantified context. Voices were to be heard individually 
and respected for their individual truths. Yet the fact that Sugar and Fox’s report 
was considered acceptable, alongside the Task Force’s commitment to underpinning 
their work with rigorous (and, for this, read empirical) research, also said something 
about the dynamics of the Task Force and the general reluctance to impose its 
collective will on the Aboriginal members. In saying this I am not implying that
50 Detailed Notes o f Steering Committee Meeting 19th September, 1989
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Sugar and Fox’s report was less worthwhile. Rather, that it was different and 
achieved its purpose of giving a voice to the voiceless in a highly effective manner.
The untested question is whether the cultural difference to be found within the 
francophone community would have been respected had the Quebecois pressed for a 
similar report, irrespective of the fact that Quebecois culture shared a common 
European heritage with the anglophones. As it happened, Quebec’s federally 
sentenced women were interviewed by francophones, but were not subsequently 
viewed as a distinct faction within the Euro-Canadian group. It might be argued that, 
as they shared a history of reliance on the penitentiary as a means of social control, 
even before they had separately colonised Canada, few distinctions needed to be 
made. Furthermore, the Exchange of Services Agreement, the Tanguay Agreement, 
enabled most Quebecois federally sentenced women to be imprisoned in a 
francophone milieu, so they were seen to be less disadvantaged than many other 
imprisoned women. Yet, accepting these positions is to continue ignoring the 
importance of culture; those specific ways of knowing, indeed the ‘truth’ to which 
Sugar and Fox (1995) alluded. In assuming that the francophones were quite 
naturally part of the Euro-Canadian plan, the Task Force -  perhaps unwittingly -  
imposed anglophone ways of knowing upon a province familiar with such treatment 
since the Conquest. This left a Quebecois member of the Steering Committee 
appealing fruitlessly for ‘the interests and special interests of French women’ not to 
be overlooked. The Task imposed their knowledge in a larger sense (and were 
subsequently criticised for failing to consider black women separately), but I have 
been dealing with those three communities which historically have laid greatest 
claim to Canada. While we do not know what a truly Quebecois plan might have 
looked like, we can perhaps safely assume that it would have been somewhat 
different, precisely because Quebec itself is different.
With three months left until the deadline of the 15th December, the Working Group 
had reached the point where they needed to start the final planning process and 
acknowledge the importance of two strands; community interventions and prison
51 The community-needs interviews o f  non-Aboriginal women were also being carried out at the same 
time and both pieces of research were to become separate companion volumes to the final report.
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interventions. It was suggested that, as long-term federally sentenced women would 
spend the greatest period in whatever new prisons emerged, their needs should 
dictate what would be regarded as the ‘norm’ when designing accommodation. Lee 
Axon, who had been commissioned to look at exemplary programmes available 
outside Canada, had told the Group of the adverse effects of visible and intrusive 
security on inmate participation in programming. She stressed that the greater the 
security the more likely it was to promote a ‘them and us’ culture, adding that it 
would be difficult to have programmes requiring ‘openness and self-disclosure’ if 
security levels were too overt. The wish to provide an environment which would 
‘reduce institutionalisation and support autonomous living’ was seen as a short-term 
objective, with the longer-term objective being legislative change permitting greater 
‘flexibility in sentence management’ and ‘an Aboriginal Justice System’. Once 
again, the Mandate was being exceeded.
The community model was also becoming clearer, especially the need to have 
adequate liaison between the prisons and those supporting the released woman in the 
community. But the Working Group had set themselves a problem, which they 
recognised, in wanting to move towards a community rather than a prison-based 
solution for these women, and they called it ‘the central issue’:
If a capital investment is made in construction (or lease/buy) how will the 
strategy to replace prisons with community-based interventions be moved 
forward?54
They understood the risks inherent in providing better prisons and programmes. 
Sentencers would see them as being beneficial to the women, whereas the 
geographically dislocated Prison for Women had been a disincentive to sentence 
women to federal terms (see Bruckert, 1993). The Working Group’s interim 
compromise was to take shape in the next three months.
52 Steering Committee Minutes 19th September, 1989
53 Working Group Minutes 21st -  22nd September, 1989
54 Working Group Minutes 21st -  22nd September, 1989
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Conclusions and looking ahead
As this chapter has chronicled, the Task Force, but more specifically the Working 
Group, were experiencing geographic dislocation of their own. They needed to cross 
the country both for meetings and consultations. In between, they had formidable 
piles of papers to read and comment on and extra papers to prepare themselves. It is 
already clear that the francophones were on the periphery of decision making and 
that their omission, if not deliberate, was surprising in the context of events within 
Quebec. It is also clear that the initially disregarded Aboriginals were proving 
themselves unexpectedly eloquent and influential, while ignoring the limitations of 
the Mandate and pressing for political issues to be considered as part of the Task 
Force’s work. The constraints of the Commissioner’s injunction to ‘think broadly’ 
have been further highlighted by the Task Force’s inability to plan adequately for 
federally sentenced women from British Columbia. Those were to be imprisoned in 
the Bumaby Correctional Centre for Women, which was about to be built and 
therefore could not be replaced. The federally sentenced women themselves 
assumed a voice, yet those with the greatest experience of managing federally 
sentenced women, the staff of the Prison for Women, remained singularly absent 
from the debate. The tensions between the requirements and expectations of both the 
civil service and the voluntary sector have become apparent, with some of the 
conflict centred on their being involved in ‘re-forming’ prisons, rather than 
reforming, or changing, the old concept of imprisonment. Some members of the 
Task Force, having overcome initial concerns about their participation, were faced 
with the realisation that they might not be able to restructure imprisonment at a 
fundamental level (see Hannah-Moffat, 2000).
This and the previous chapter might have subliminally suggested that some members 
of the Working Group took a more dominant role than others. On the evidence of the 
available minutes there is undeniably some truth in this, but there is also another 
consideration, articulated by several of the Group in separate interviews. Certain 
members were extremely influential, if not always publicly so. In particular, Sharon 
Mclvor, was repeatedly cited for her skill in being able to refocus the Working 
Group on the reason for their sharing what at times seemed like an enforced, 
unwelcome co-existence, yet her name features infrequently in the minutes. The
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Minutes’ drafter, a civil servant, controlled the official record (and it is remarkable 
how silent some members appear to be), but it must be remembered that it is not the 
whole record, because the Minutes were continually refined before being sent out. 
(Minutes for the Steering Committee were much more forthcoming about names). 
Although my use and interpretation of the Minutes is necessarily selective and, in 
many respects, gives little idea of the sheer volume of work undertaken by the 
Working Group, it may be justified on the grounds that a new tale is emerging. One 
in which a minority group appears to be taking advantage of an unforeseen 
opportunity and is politicising the agenda of a government-sponsored initiative. 
Moreover, those who were unofficially charged with keeping the project on track -  
the civil servants -  appear to be reluctant, or possibly unable, to prevent the 
politicisation. (But it may also be conjectured that part of the civil servants’ failure 
to intervene was based on a pragmatism which suggested that, once the report was 
finalised and approved, they knew they would be in charge of deciding what changes 
ought to be made). Much has been written about the risk of benevolent ventures 
being incorporated by the state (for example, see Rothman, 1980; Cohen 1983, 1985; 
Freedman, 1981; Scull, 1983; Hannah-Moffat & Shaw, 2000; Hannah-Moffat, 2001). 
The Task Force appears to be demonstrating an alternative version of incorporation, 
wherein the seemingly less powerful Aboriginal participants have captured the moral 
high ground and are actively involving others in the dissemination of their views. 
Those whom they have not ‘captured’ appear, nevertheless, to have been neutralised 
by their own knowledge of Canada’s colonial history and the terrible consequences 
for Aboriginal nations.
Why this should be so is something we must explore, as parallel ventures appear to 
be emerging. One in which the replacement of a prison for federally sentenced 
women is being planned; and one in which the replacement of a prison for federally 
sentenced women appears to have been overlaid with considerations of women’s 
victimisation and, more specifically, Aboriginal women’s victimisation. This should 
be borne in mind during the next chapter, as I continue to chart the work of the Task 
Force as it determined the content of the report. I show how events at the Prison for 
Women influenced the Task Force, right up until the time -  and beyond -  when the 
completed report was handed to the Commissioner of Corrections.
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4. Facing the central conundrum
During the August meeting of the Working Group a submission from a prisoner at 
the Prison for Women had been tabled. It was written by Sandy Sayer and 
eloquently urged the Task Force to remember that, for prisoners, the real experts on 
imprisoned women were the women themselves. She was a reluctant contributor to 
the consultations, having seen many people attempt to provide solutions to the 
intractable problems of the prison, with few positive results. Despite her doubts 
about the outcome, she wanted to add her voice, in the hope that ‘something 
[would] work for our people’.1 Ms Sayer, the mother of two young children, was a 
twenty-five year old provincially-sentenced Aboriginal woman who had been 
involuntarily transferred to Kingston from Saskatchewan, and on the 7th October, 
1989 she committed suicide in the Prison for Women. Hers was the third suicide 
associated with the Prison for Women in less than ten months and there were to be 
another four by the end of February 1991.
Her death had a profound impact on all involved with the Task Force; women such 
as Ms Sayer were the ones for whom they were all working. There was immense 
pain and, for those who knew Ms Sayer personally, a feeling of incredulity. One 
member of the Task Force remembered being told and, in distress, conveying the 
news to a work colleague, who responded: Jesus, le a n ’t believe you don’t 
understand this one ye t Every suicide in Aboriginal country is painful fo r us 
because there isn’t an Aboriginal person alive on the planet who hasn ’t thought o f  
doing it themselves. (Aboriginal women between the ages of ‘fifteen to twenty- 
four have a suicide rate almost six times greater that of other Canadian women’ 
(Johnson & Rodgers 1993: 110). Another member thought that for those on the 
Task Force with the closest links to Kingston:... who worked intimately [with the 
imprisoned women] there was a level o f anger that this had to happen and here 
[they] were still talking about the same thing, the closure o f  the Prison for Women. 
She emphasised the growing sense of connection they were all beginning to have
1 22nd July, 1989
2 As Horii (2001) makes clear, the use o f the term ‘involuntarily transferred’ obscures the fact that 
prisoners are being forcibly transferred.
3 Interview 20
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with the confined women: We visited the prison, we listened to them speak, we had 
submissions from them - I  don’t think anyone could have heard the voices and not 
been touched in a personal way.4
But even for those on the Task Force who did not know Ms Sayer, her death felt 
intensely personal and akin to a rebuke for their failure to be further ahead in their 
work. In a sense Ms Sayer, despite her provincial status, represented all federally 
sentenced women living in what was thought to be the unsafe and inadequate 
environment of the Prison for Women. Of the seven suicides at the prison between 
December 1988 and February 1991, six were by Aboriginal women, and there were 
also high levels of self-harm amongst the women. It seemed that the prison 
imposed a form of state-sanctioned victimisation upon its inhabitants, and this 
perception counter-balanced the Task Force’s views of the offending and 
victimisation of individual women, as we shall later see.
Nine days after Ms Sayer’s death the Steering Committee met and was urged by co­
chair James Phelps to ‘proceed aggressively’ with their work. Later that morning 
Fran Sugar (an Aboriginal member, and one-time federally sentenced woman) 
spoke at some length about the death of her friend. She explained that she felt 
guilty, frustrated and powerless ‘as a member of the Steering Committee, in dealing 
with bureaucratic issues and long-term plans, while the living conditions for 
women at [the] Prison for Women become worse and the human suffering 
continue[d]’. She reminded the Committee that she had ‘raised the concern of 
[provincial] transfers in a previous meeting as an urgent matter, but no action 
followed’. (The provinces sometimes resorted to transferring ‘difficult-to-manage’ 
provincially-sentenced women to the Prison for Women and a disproportionate 
number were Aboriginal.) Ms Sugar asked ‘what [was] the purpose of the Task 
Force if it [was] not able to ensure operational change as necessary at the Prison for 
Women?’ Noting ‘the composition of the Steering Committee, the numerous 
government and non-government members who represented sufficient political 
power to affect (sic) change’, she ‘urg[ed] them to use their influence to produce
4 Interview 28
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changes needed in the immediate and short term’.5 The Committee responded by 
suggesting that their long-term contribution would be in the form of a completed 
report recommending an alternative to the Prison for Women. Their short-term 
response was to produce an immediate formal Motion to send to Commissioner 
Ingstrup, the Deputy Commissioner responsible for Ontario (wherein lies the Prison 
for Women) and the Warden of the Prison for Women (who was also on the 
Working Group). The Motion urged that ‘the existence of the Task Force [should] 
not preclude immediate action’ at the Prison and that ‘involuntary transfers of 
provincially sentenced women to Prison for Women [should] cease forthwith’.6
This decision to send the Motion was not easily reached, irrespective of how each 
member might individually have felt. Almost half the Steering Committee were 
civil servants, with eight working for either provincial or federal corrections and, 
for them, the Motion was a direct criticism of those to whom they were answerable 
in Corrections. Although drafted by the Steering Committee, the Motion was sent 
on behalf of the Task Force and the same difficulties were faced by the civil 
servants on the Working Group. They understood that, while a Task Force could 
be an expedient choice because of its relative speed compared with a Royal 
Commission, its expedience also rested on its ability to include members able to 
influence the decision-making process. Signing a Motion so critical of the 
Correctional Service of Canada appeared to some to be ‘improper’7; their role as 
civil servants was discreetly to further the work of government and, above all, to 
provide the public appearance of impartiality. But they also had to protect the 
Commissioner from adverse criticism, even when the criticism was relevant to what 
some knew he wanted achieved -  the closure of the Prison for Women. Civil 
servants operating at this level are always aware that their careers are less important 
than that of the relevant Minister and their work is carried out with considerable 
constraints attached to it because policy, especially within the bounds of a federal 
system of government, can never be seen as an isolated construct. It is always set 
in the context of other policies, which inevitably reflect the political bias of the
5 Steering Committee Minutes 16th October, 1989
6 16th October, 1989
7 Interview 31
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party in government -  and, in Canada, the political bias of the federal government 
is not necessarily reflected in each provincial government. This knowledge would 
have made the civil servants hesitate before signing, yet sign they did. Co-chair 
James Phelps was later to say that he felt he had to reflect the views of the Task 
Force, rather than his own: For the inclusive consultation process to be effective 
and to retain the respect and support o f the Task Force I  had to represent 
accurately the views o f the members o f the Task Force, even in the difficult 
situation where the views were critical o f operations o f the Correctional Service o f
O
Canada and /  or its administration.
How much attention would actually be paid to the Motion was beyond the control 
of the Steering Committee and it was sent more in hope than expectation. Fran 
Sugar’s view that some on the Task Force ‘represented sufficient political power’ 
to effect change was accurate, but not in the sense that change could be immediate 
or was indeed wanted.
Emerging from the shadows; profiling the federally sentenced women
The Working Group, meeting on the 25th - 27th October, were equally shocked by 
Ms Sayer’s death and their immediate concern was to do whatever they could to 
ameliorate the lockdown within the prison, which at least one member believed had 
had a direct bearing on Ms Sayer’s death. Peer-support9 was impossible and Elder 
Joan Lavallee was consequently allowed into the prison to work with the women.
The October meeting was, arguably, the most important of any undertaken by the 
Task Force as the Working Group were about to decide on how they would replace 
the Prison for Women. With events at the Prison for Women foremost in their 
minds, they still needed to be able to consider the results of the survey of federally 
sentenced women which Margaret Shaw was about to present to them. For the first 
time they were to have properly documented information about those for whom
8 Interview 2000
9 Heney (1990) noted that ‘a good deal o f the counselling/emotional support that takes place in ... 
prison is provided by the prisoners themselves’. She suggested that prisoners should be trained as 
‘support counsellors’ and her recommendation led to the first ‘peer-support’ team being formed at 
the Prison for Women in 1990. All o f the new regional prisons for federally sentenced women have 
similar teams o f trained prisoners able to offer help to fellow inmates during times o f personal crisis.
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they were planning and Shaw’s evidence was crucial in supporting any decisions 
they might make. A remarkable aspect of this was that such information had not 
been gathered before; CSC itself did not know its client group in the detail then 
made available. In common with imprisoned women across the world, imprisoned 
women in Canada were a tiny part of what was essentially a male phenomenon. 
With so few imprisonment options available for federally sentenced women, it had 
been easier for the Canadians to justify gathering information about larger groups 
of individual men, as defined by their offence. Even this was a haphazard 
enterprise, as ‘during the 1980s Statistics Canada abandoned efforts to collect 
national court data’ (Johnson & Rodgers, 1993: 96). Ms Shaw’s report to the 
Working Group was a preliminary view of the greater detail she was due to provide 
in December and the following, derived from the full report, illustrates the scattered 
nature of the population.10 Eighty-five percent of all federally sentenced women 
were interviewed.
Table 1. Distribution of Incarcerated Federally Sentenced Women’s
Population in 1989
Location Native French Other Total
P4W 25* 14* 87 125
Quebec 1* 26* 6 32
Manitoba 4 - 3 7
Saskatchewa
n
5 - - 5
Alberta 6 2 12 20
B.C. 5 1 8 14
Total 46* (23%) 43* (21%) 116 (56%) 203
* two women were both Native and French-speaking
(From The Survey o f  Federally Sentenced Women Shaw et al 1991b)
From the above it can be seen that 78 women were living in provincial prisons. Ten 
of those classified as ‘other’ were from outside Canada. It can also be seen that the 
number of Aboriginal women, although disproportionate to their numbers in 
Canada as a whole, was roughly equivalent to that of francophone women.
10 The Survey o f  Federally Sentenced Women was to be published as a companion volume to the 
Task Force’s eventual report and concentrated on those federal women actually in custody. The 
Release Study: Survey o f  Federally Sentenced Women in the Community and the Survey o f  
Federally Sentenced Aboriginal Women in the Community provided another view o f these women 
and their lives.
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Table 2. Average Sentence Length of Federally Sentenced Women in 1989
under 5 years 5 - 9  years 10 years & over
48% 22% 30%
Table 3. Distribution of populations by offence in 1989
Offence
Murder 44 (22%)
Attempted murder 3 (1%)
Manslaughter 38 (19%
Robbery 34 (17%)
Assaults 21 (10%)
Theft, fraud etc. 30 (15%)
Drugs 24 (12%)
Other 9 (4%)
Total 203 (100%)
(Adapted from The Survey o f  Federally Sentenced Women Shaw et al 1991b)
Other relevant information
•  over 33 percent of the women were first-time offenders;
• 87 percent were first-time federal offenders;
• 50 percent had never previously received any prison sentence.
• 64 percent of the women had children and 48 percent of those interviewed had 
responsibilities for at least one child of school age or below;
• women held provincially had far greater contact with their children than did 
those at the Prison for Women and the interviews had revealed an intense wish 
on the part of most women to maintain contact with their children.
• alcohol and drug addiction was, or had been, a problem for almost 75 percent of 
the women;
• 71 percent of women with addiction problems claimed this had contributed to 
their offence or offending history;
• for Aboriginal women, problems with and caused by addiction were even more 
marked; of the 39 interviewed, only three (8 percent) said they were not 
addicted.
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• 68 percent of those interviewed had experienced physical abuse and 53 percent 
had experienced sexual abuse (the abuse was self-identified);
• these figures were much higher for Aboriginal women, with 90 percent having 
experienced physical abuse and 61 percent sexual abuse;
• the women drew their own parallels between the abuse they had suffered and 
their subsequent addictions. A little over 50 percent of the women had self­
harmed, either by cutting, or by attempting suicide, and 20 percent of these had 
attempted self-harm during their time in prison.11
Working towards a solution
In considering possible options the Working Group had to face the central 
conundrum:
If a capital investment is made in construction (or lease/buy), how will the 
strategy to replace prisons with community alternatives (including 
Aboriginal community alternatives) be moved forward?12
As the Task Force later explained, they believed that society had to ‘move towards 
the long-term goal of creating and using community-based, restorative justice 
options, and an alternative Aboriginal justice system’. They also thought that 
‘substantial and significant changes [should be] made immediately in the
13environment of federally sentenced women’ (TFFSW 1990: 78). However, 
legislative constraints meant that, while they could articulate hopes for community 
and Aboriginal alternatives, they had no option but to plan for further 
imprisonment. To have planned on the basis that legislation might be enacted in 
the future would have fatally compromised the possibility of the report’s eventual 
implementation. It was also essential that their planning should be transparent and, 
as co-chair Felicity Hawthorne commented, ‘detailed testing of [the] options
11 All this information is taken from The Survey o f  Federally Sentenced Women, Shaw et al 1991b
12 Working Group Minutes 25th -  27th October 1989
13 Canada has embraced the principles o f restorative justice in a correctional context and victim- 
offender mediation has been in use for nearly 25 years. Community conferencing, based on the 
New Zealand model o f family group conferencing, is now being used more widely. Community 
sentencing panels are also being set up. The Restorative Justice and Dispute Resolution Unit o f 
CSC produced a lengthy list o f projects, either on-going or about to be implemented, in 1998. 
Much o f the emphasis appeared to be on Aboriginal-style projects, which is not to say that they are 
necessarily faithful to Aboriginal principles o f justice. The new Aboriginal Healing Lodges are 
based on Aboriginal principles o f justice, which also happen to be restorative.
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[would] minimise the possibility of individual reconsideration after the Report 
[was] delivered’.14 Before beginning the process, each member of the Working 
Group took time to explain her own view of the way forward and it was clear that 
Sandy Sayer’s death was central to their unanimous decision that the Prison for 
Women should close. They answered the ‘central conundrum’ by accepting that it 
would be impossible to plan for the longer-term goal of community solutions for 
federally sentenced women without first having an interim accommodation option 
available to replace the prison. This meant the adoption of a dual-track strategy. 
Any move towards a community solution inevitably meant that their new plan 
should have a regional dimension. This led to the suggestion that a limit should be 
placed on the number of new prison places provided so as to increase the likelihood 
of returning women to the community. In an unconscious replication of the 
rationale underpinning the replacement of Holloway Prison in England, one 
member suggested that the new accommodation should ‘be designed to facilitate its 
conversion to other non-correctional functions in the event the long-term goal [of 
community disposition] is achieved more quickly than projected’.
Having decided against the possibility of retaining the status quo -  the Prison for 
Women, ESAs and provincial prisons -  the Working Group had to decide how, and 
with what, these would be replaced. At the same time they also rejected other 
options, but needed to demonstrate their unsuitability so that the logic could not 
later be questioned by those responsible for implementation. Consequently, the 
Working Group evaluated each possibility, using a check-list of ten factors. In 
outlining the reasons for rejecting the Prison for Women I shall list each factor and 
it can be assumed that these also applied to the other options discussed. I do this in 
order to augment the public record because, as will become apparent, the reality of 
the Prison for Women quickly faded in both the public and civil service 
consciousness. We need to understand -  and remember -  just why the prison was 
thought to be so unfit for federally sentenced women. According to the Minutes, 
there was a considerable degree of unanimity on the main issues and this can partly 
be explained by what was, by then, the Working Group’s shared experience of 
visiting both the Prison for Women and some provincial prisons. These had
14 Working Group Minutes 25th -  27th October, 1989
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powerfully illustrated what they did not want, making it somewhat easier to focus 
on what they did want. And, undeniably, exhaustion played a part: We’d talk and 
talk and talk until we were too exhausted to fight anymore. That’s how consensus 
worked.15
(Deciding against) Retaining the Status Quo
Community involvement:
• the Prison for Women’s design physically precluded much community 
involvement;
• Kingston was not the home community of most federally sentenced women;
• federal women electing to be held provincially received variable community 
access, depending on their home province.
Existing realities (those facilities across Canada which already held federally 
sentenced women):
• the new prison at Burnaby (British Columbia) had to be part of whatever they 
recommended, irrespective of whether it fitted their developing philosophy. 
There were deep concerns about its design and the ability of its staff to operate 
within a new philosophy (see chapter 3), so the Working Group inserted an 
important proviso -  that the existing Burnaby Agreement should be re­
examined after seven years to see if it met the federal standards operating 
elsewhere (something which did not actually happen);
• the (proposed) Fort Saskatchewan Agreement (another Exchange of Service 
Agreement), which covered women in Alberta and parts of Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan, should not be pursued because it relied on a co-corrections16 
model, which the Working Group opposed;
• Maison Tanguay (also see chapter 3), on the outskirts of Montreal, was subject 
to the Tanguay Agreement. The Working Group were especially critical of
15 Interview 31
16 A distinction should be made between this co-corrections or ‘mixing’ model and ‘shared-site 
detention’, wherein men and women are housed totally separately on the same site, sharing 
programme and recreation facilities, but at different times (see Faith, 1993; Hayman, 1996). With 
the co-corrections model most activities may be jointly undertaken, but accommodation is generally 
separate.
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Maison Tanguay’s design, lack of programmes and correctional philosophy, but 
acknowledged that its location was ‘ideal’ for community access.
Aboriginal needs:
• neither the Prison for Women nor any of the provincial facilities provided a 
‘culturally appropriate physical environment [with] access to the outdoors, 
spacious grounds [or a] dedicated space for a sweatlodge’;
• Aboriginal people were disinclined to work in traditional facilities and Kingston 
was not close to an Aboriginal community;
• none of the existing facilities showed any sensitivity towards, nor respect for, 
Aboriginal spirituality and traditions.
Proximity to home /  cultural environment:
• to be offered the choice between location (province) and programming (the 
Prison for Women) was in effect no choice at all. Women had always had the 
threat of a transfer to the Prison for Women hanging over them, while held 
provincially, and the Working Group rejected this coercion of ‘good 
behaviour’.
Access to appropriate programming:
• programming at the Prison for Women was limited by the design of the building 
and its management. Provincial facilities offered fewer programmes and those 
available were not designed with the needs of the long-term prisoner in mind.
Ease o f addressing language requirements:
• neither the needs of the francophone living in the Prison for Women, nor of the 
anglophone residing in Maison Tanguay were adequately met.
Consistent with views o f the federally sentenced women:
• the choice between location and programming was unfair and unacceptable to 
the women. Most wanted to be closer to their families and home communities 
and to be able to serve their sentence in an environment which did not 
infantilise them by removing most elements of choice in their daily lives. (In
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this the Working Group favoured the majority view, but 19 of the 170 women 
interviewed by Shaw et al (1991b) preferred to remain at the Prison for 
Women).
Consistent with consultation and research feedback:
• the Prison for Women’s physical environment, lack of programming and 
location had been rejected during the consultations. The commissioned 
research had shown that most women did not require the levels of security to 
which the prison subjected them and that high security also militated against 
effective programming.
Ease o f meeting design assumptions:
• none of the design assumptions (which will be discussed elsewhere) could be 
met.
Ease o f facilitating release:
• in the absence of adequate community support (unavailable to most women in 
Kingston) women did not become eligible for release at the earliest possible 
point in their sentence.
Upon reviewing these, we can see the direction in which the Working Group was 
moving: the Prison for Women, measured against most criteria, was unacceptable; 
provincial Exchange of Service Agreements provided inadequate resources for the 
women; access to families, home communities and culture was essential; the 
women’s needs had to be allied to choices. Yet in striving to avoid ‘coercion’ of 
good behaviour, the Group showed perhaps unwarranted hope, or naivety, that 
different behaviour might emerge, without coercion, and be consistent in a new 
prison. They were certainly ignoring the lessons of history, which showed that 
failure was ‘the inevitable result of attempting to improve prisoners within coercive 
settings’ (Rafter 1985: 74). They were also disregarding the fact that prisons are 
what Sparks et al (1996) call ‘dominative institutions’, in which people are 
involuntarily confined and deprived of the right to make the most fundamental 
decisions about their own lives. Under the Working Group’s emerging plans good
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behaviour might no longer have been coerced by the threat of transfer to another 
prison, but to imprison a woman in a furnished ‘room’ in her own province, rather 
than in a barred cell, did not eliminate the reality that the ‘room’ was still a place of 
confinement. They were in the process of moving from ‘open to hidden discipline’ 
of the women (Mathiesen 1983: 139), with the women’s regulation undiminished.
In planning new prisons the Working Group were following the historic path paved 
by ‘good intentions’, while paying less attention to the possibility that ‘prison 
reforms always take place within political conditions which might result in their 
outcomes being very different to the intentions of those who put the reforms in 
place’ (Carlen 1998: 98).
The other options 
An enhanced status quo?
The Working Group moved on to look at the possibility of retaining and renovating 
the Prison for Women and having it operate in conjunction with enhanced 
Exchange of Service Agreements. All of the arguments previously used against the 
prison still applied, but the Working Group wanted to emphasise the impossibility 
of transforming the bleak prison, or the shared provincial prisons, into ‘truly adult 
environment[s]’. This ignored the reality of imprisonment; that an ‘adult 
environment’ was not consistent with the removal of personal autonomy.
A central facility?
Having rejected the Prison for Women, in any manifestation, was another central 
prison a possibility? The Group decided not, largely because of previously 
rehearsed arguments, but also because of the necessary scale of a replacement.
They felt that ‘its size alone [would] inevitably result in an institutional 
environment and ... the re-appearance of traditional institutional administration’. 
Security would be disproportionate to the needs of most of the women and it would 
be difficult to establish ‘positive and supportive relationships between staff and 
prisoners’. The Group did not discuss the possibility that more and better 
programmes could be made available precisely because of a central prison’s scale; 
the argument against geographic dislocation had already prevailed. Similarly, there 
was no apparent acknowledgment that ‘an institutional environment’ is an
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inevitability wherever there is a prison, however modified, but this could be a 
failure of the Minutes, rather than of the Working Group.
Co-corrections ?
The possibility of a co-corrections model, which would mostly have entailed 
‘sharing all facilities apart from living quarters’ (Shaw et al 1991b: 57), was also 
rejected. Shaw’s research showed that a ‘significant’ number of women favoured 
this as an option, with some citing the ‘more normal atmosphere’ of being 
alongside males (Shaw et al 1991b: 59). The prime reason given for rejection of 
co-corrections by the Working Group was that it was ‘insensitive to the situation of 
many federally sentenced women who have been abused and exploited by men’. 
The Working Group felt so strongly about the inappropriateness of co-corrections 
that they declared this choice to be ‘as unacceptable as the location/program choice 
of the status quo’. In this the Working Group seem to have assumed that their own 
expertise surpassed that of the women and that they should recognise women’s 
victimisation, even if the women refused to recognise it on their own behalf. This 
was yet another instance of the Working Group tending to see all federally 
sentenced women as a homogeneous group, not even separated by ethnicity, but 
defined by its victimhood and inability to act independently of this definition. It 
was also another instance of the ‘matemalism’, which suggests that women have 
qualities and insights unique to their sex, which Hannah-Moffat (2001) took great 
care to detach from the ‘maternal feminism’ described by Freedman (1981) and 
Rafter (1985), suggesting that the two were not necessarily compatible.
Exchange o f Service Agreements?
The Group soundly rejected Exchange of Service Agreements as a stand-alone 
option, commenting that ‘effective implementation of the proposed innovative 
interim strategy for federally sentenced women require[d] direct federal 
management’. This left Quebec effectively grouped with the anglophone majority, 
with no recognition that the province might wish to act independently, on the basis 
of its distinct cultural needs, as indeed it considered doing once implementation 
was under way.
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Labelling the ‘difficult to manage’ woman
The Working Group had shown why none of the proposed options should be 
pursued, in the hope that this explicit dialogue would remove any possibility of 
their decisions being questioned at a later stage. They knew that regionally-based 
facilities provided the best chance for federally sentenced women to be closer to 
their home communities. They expected that the new facilities, because of their 
size, would allow the possibility of a greater range of programmes being offered to 
the women than were then available in the provincial institutions.17 But what 
would these new facilities be like? Where would they be located? To be able to 
answer these questions the Working Group had to focus more intently on the 
composition of the federal women’s population and, initially, this meant deciding 
what proportion of them might not easily fit a new model.
The Security Classification Exercise (which would have provided more detailed 
information on the security needs of the women, as explained in chapter 3) had 
been cancelled because of the fear that the situation at the Prison for Women might 
lead to over-classification of the women. A Case Management Review, which 
might also have given some information about risks posed by individual women,
1 fthad been rejected as it was ‘not designed for women offenders’ , so that was 
another closed avenue. In the absence of specific figures the Group looked at those 
women ‘whose behavioural problems currently result in their removal from the 
general population at the Prison for Women’. Without the guidance of the Warden, 
who did not attend this meeting, and failing details from CSC itself, they had to rely 
on advice from Group member Sally Wills, the Executive Director of the Kingston 
E. Fry Society. The assumption underlying the focus on these women was that the 
provinces only held federally sentenced women whose behaviour was 
unproblematic. In other words, those federal women who were held provincially 
would be representative of the mass of federally sentenced women, because any 
found to be difficult would already have been transferred to Kingston.
17 Although the new institutions would be smaller than the Prison for Women, and more akin to 
provincial prisons in size, programmes within them could be designed in relation to the needs of  
federal women. When housed within the provincial system the programming needs o f federal 
women tended to be ignored, in much the same way that imprisoned women’s needs were generally 
considered after those o f imprisoned men.
18 Steering Committee Minutes 19th September, 1989
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Nevertheless, the Working Group believed that all federally sentenced women 
should be categorised as ‘high need’, requiring ‘high support’ levels, yet another 
instance of the Group emphasising the women’s presumed lack of agency. (‘High 
need’, linked to ‘low risk’, was later to become part of the discourse surrounding 
federally sentenced women.)
It was estimated that of those women ‘removed from the general population’: four 
were psychiatrically / psychologically ill; ten had serious behavioural problems, 
making them ‘a danger to themselves and / or others’; twelve required protection 
from other inmates. These comprised a group of twenty-six women. Referring to 
Shaw’s Survey o f Federally Sentenced Women, and using the numbers provided 
therein, during the months of August through to November 1989 there were 203 
women serving federal sentences, with 125 being detained in the Prison for 
Women. So the twenty-six women represented 21 percent of the total population at 
the Prison for Women and 13 percent of all federally sentenced women. However, 
the Working Group considered that ‘oppressive environments such as the Prison for 
Women [fed] unacceptable behaviour’. They also thought that ‘a series of 
regionally-based facilities would assist the re-integration of the twelve “protective- 
custody inmates” into the standard living accommodation’.19 Therefore, the 
number to be considered was reduced to fourteen. Having assessed the ten who 
were ‘behaviourally disordered’ the Group decided that five would ‘function well 
in a different environment’. The remaining five would require a ‘therapeutic 
milieu’, as would the four thought to be psychiatrically ill, and these nine women 
represented less than 5 percent of all federally sentenced women.
The conclusions, reached without benefit of any empirical evidence, must raise 
questions about how aware the Group was of the evidence that women were being 
increasingly sentenced, for longer periods, for crimes of violence, even though 
Shaw’s research had alerted them to this in July (see Shaw 1991a: 45 & 84). Yet, 
although more federally sentenced women were being sentenced for crimes of 
violence, their violence was often set within a context of abuse and addiction.
19 The Minutes are contradictory, at first referring to twelve women in protective custody and later 
to ten. I have calculated on the basis o f twelve being in protective custody.
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Once imprisoned, they were not necessarily seen as institutional risks by the prison 
authorities. Although Margaret Shaw herself attended this meeting to present 
preliminary findings from what was to be the (separate) Survey o f Federally 
Sentenced Women, that study was never intended to be an examination of why or 
how women had become federal prisoners (although informed deductions could 
certainly have been made from the assembled data). Rather, it was designed to 
show who they were and ‘to assess the views of the women themselves on the 
experience of imprisonment’ (Shaw et al, 1991b: 1). In the eighties much of the 
discussion in Canada about violent women -  when, indeed, there was discussion -  
centred on women as victims of male violence, who reacted to rather than 
instigated violence. But in the late seventies and early eighties there had been 
much debate about Adler’s hypothesis that women’s liberation, as exemplified by 
second-wave feminism, would lead to an increase in their criminal activity and that 
their behaviour would more closely resemble male patterns of violent offending 
(see Adler, 1975: with commentaries by Box, 1983; Heidensohn, 1985, 1994; 
Gavigan, 1987). So it could not be said that the spectre of the violent woman was 
unknown, even if Box, amongst others, had largely dismissed this view, 
demonstrating that ‘the increase in female convictions for violence seemed to be 
explained by changes in social labelling practices’ (Box, 1983: 198).
While in Canada it had been important, politically and socially, for the extent of 
violence against women to be recognised (see Rock, 1986) there was also an 
‘underlying predisposition to view criminal women as more victims than 
aggressors, more sinned against than sinning, more to be pitied than blamed’ 
(Allen, 1987: 93). Further, ‘that feminist discussions are ready to explain female 
offending by reference to social or economic forces,... or to [their] oppressive 
domestic and familial situations’ (Allen, 1987: 92). Although Allen was writing in 
an English context, her words were equally applicable to Canada, where feminists 
also found it difficult to grapple with the idea that (some) women could be 
intentionally violent in situations where they were not themselves under threat.20
20 The 1993 conviction o f Karla Homolka in connection with the murder o f her sister and two other 
young women, received enormous publicity in Canada. The controversy surrounding her trial -  
and plea-bargain with officials -  focused attention on women’s capacity for violence. The graphic
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However, as Johnson (1987: 30) noted, in the late eighties there was ‘a serious lack 
of information about women offenders [in Canada and] their role in crimes of 
violence’. She cited statistics showing that ‘7,000 charges were laid against women 
in 1985 for acts of violence, up from less than 1,200 in 1965’ and suggested that 
much of this could be explained as women retaliating in abusive domestic 
situations. (It must be remembered that only a small percentage of these women 
would receive a federal sentence). She also cautioned that the base figures for 
women were very much lower than for men, so that any percentage shifts had to be 
treated with care. This was a position that Johnson and Rodgers were to adopt 
again in 1993, when they also had pertinent comments to make about Aboriginal 
women in conflict with the law, making specific links with their offending and the 
‘near-complete breakdown of the Aboriginal culture and traditional way of life’ 
(Johnson & Rodgers 1993: 110). La Prairie amplified this point when discussing 
the ‘role strain’ experienced by Aboriginal men and how this had frequently 
manifested itself in violence towards those closest to them -  their partners and 
children. La Prairie (1993: 237) believed that ‘the importance of links between the 
victimisation of Aboriginal women as children, youth or young women due to 
sexual assault or family violence and future conflict with the law cannot be 
overemphasised’.
All on the Working Group were aware of the social and economic circumstances of 
the majority of federally sentenced women. But it is too glib to say that the Group 
erred in characterising these women as victims rather than (some) as simply violent 
offenders, because the research evidence supported this view, especially regarding 
Aboriginals. It seemed they did not want to take the next step and see federally 
sentenced women as both victim and victimiser. Yet the question of violence and 
hard-to-manage behaviour was discussed, even if it did not appear in the Working 
Group’s minutes: Some o f us were saying... but supposing, once in a blue moon, 
all that nice stuff doesn ’t work... are you going to have solitary confinement... are 
you going to have the normal range o f  punishments available? What are you going 
to do when it comes down to a really tough situation? [And] certain people were
facts o f the case, preserved on video by both Ms Homulka and her husband, have unsurprisingly 
coloured the public debate on women’s propensity for violence.
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saying ‘no, you never have to do that because these new places are going to be so 
well run '.21 Because the veracity of the ‘victim’ discourse had been accepted by a 
large proportion of the Group, members felt unable to label too large a number of 
federally sentenced women as violent. Under the consensus model to which they 
were working, this perspective prevailed. As we shall see, an added dimension 
resided in the Group’s reluctance to criticise Aboriginal views. In tacitly accepting 
that Aboriginal women were victims, the Group’s reliance on ‘consensus’ meant 
that it would have been impossible for them only to label non-Aboriginal women as 
violent or disturbed offenders. Some would also have felt that in many instances 
women’s violence had a kind of rationality attached to it and that they were 
acknowledging women’s agency, rather than denying it, as was later alleged.
Undoubtedly, there were some members who continued to be unhappy with the 
failure to address yet another of the ‘tough’ issues. Largely, these were the civil 
servants, yet one member from the voluntary sector also remembered: There were 
those o f  us who didn’t agree, who fe lt that there were very serious and real 
problems to be addressed -  and that they had to be addressed in a more secure 
environment.... It was hard to think how we could accommodate them ... without 
building another prison that looked like a Special Handling Unit. But some o f us 
fe lt very strongly that there were women in that category ...W e finally had to come 
to something we all could live with, not necessarily comfortably, so we couldn’t put 
the spotlight on them that they probably deserved ...22 A civil servant commented, 
in the context of the need to complete their task: The least productive outcome is to 
have no report, no solutions. E. Fry didn ’t get everything they wanted because they 
wanted to do away with prisons altogether. I  guess CSC got most o f what they 
wanted, but the solution to the most difficult female offenders they didn 't.... The 
advocate groups had come a long way and they didn’t really want to discuss 
dangerous women and had we tried to push them ... there would have been a big 
argument leading nowhere and they would have held o ff as long as they could in 
agreeing with anything 23 Pragmatism aided consensus and, as another civil 
servant added: I  think there was [a feeling of] le t’s get a consensus now and, on the
21 Interview 31
22 Interview 28
23 Interview 27
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part o f the CSC folks, there was a recognition that we would get it done later.24 
Some from the voluntary sector failed to recognise that CSC would then be able to 
define the eventual provision for violent and / or disturbed women, perhaps because 
they had come to know and trust some of the civil servants who might later be 
involved in the report’s implementation. This was to have consequences later. Yet 
those same members from the voluntary sector would have contended that, had they 
been prepared to plan definitively for the ‘difficult to manage’ women, CSC would 
then have taken it as an opportunity to expand provision once implementation 
began. As a consequence, the Working Group continued to plan almost entirely for 
a homogeneous ‘woman’ who required support, rather than security.
Through the media, and often in the public mind, the violent woman is sometimes 
conflated with the mentally disordered woman. Kendall (1999: 90) shows that 
‘serious anxieties about women’s mental health’ did not really emerge until the 
release of the Task Force’s Report and the separate 1990 Task Force on Mental 
Health, Special Needs o f  Female Offenders. The latter said that ‘only five per cent 
o f women prisoners show[ed] no evidence o f serious disorder’ (emphasis added) 
which makes it especially notable that relatively little attention should have been 
paid to them by the Task Force. Even if the specific information was not available 
to them at that precise moment, it was certainly mostly available prior to the time 
the report was completed. What Kendall terms the ‘psy-sciences’ had been well 
and truly entrenched in Canadian prisons for years and, with the acceptance of the 
medical model during the 1960s, the ‘psy-experts’ had an even higher profile 
(Kendall 1999: 87), even if ‘they were not the primary mechanisms for the 
governance of women prisoners’ (Hannah-Moffat 2001: 105). The medical model 
was never entirely displaced, even when other jurisdictions had moved away from 
it. Within the Prison for Women inmates were subjected to some highly irregular 
treatments, and during the 1960s LSD was given to at least 23 women and electro- 
convulsive therapy administered to others. Although these experiments were 
conducted ‘with the full knowledge of the prison’s superintendent and senior 
corrections official in Ottawa’ and published in the Canadian Journal o f  
Corrections in 1964, at issue was the question of obtaining informed consent. It
24 Interview 31
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was only in 1998 that an official complaint was made and an investigation launched 
(Kingston Whig-Standard, 1998; Kendall 1999: 87; Hannah-Moffat 2001: 102-4).
By the early 1990s there were a significant number of psychologists and therapists 
at the Prison for Women, many of whom used a feminist model of treatment, the 
key principles of which are: ‘personal autonomy (empowerment) and connection 
with others’ (Kendall 1993a: ii); seeing women within a broader social context than 
solely as individuals with emotional problems; and stressing ‘the equalisation of 
power differentials between therapist and client’ (Shaw 1997: 80, 81). Kathleen 
Kendall was contracted to evaluate the prison’s services in 1992 and, although she 
found that ‘inmates [were] very supportive of the individual counselling currently 
provided’, she also stressed that ‘the very nature of prison imposes control’ and that 
prisoners needed ‘a choice of whether or not to engage in therapy’ (Kendall 1993a: 
45, 39; also see Kendall 1993b, 1993c). In this, Kendall’s use o f ‘choice’ echoed 
the language which had earlier emerged from the Task Force, but her interpretation 
of the term was significantly different. Thanks to the Task Force, language-use was 
to undergo a transformation and ‘healing’, which was also part of Aboriginal 
discourse, was to become part of the softer language used by Corrections to 
describe what Kendall refers to as the ‘opportunities model’ which now co-exists 
with the ‘medical model’ (Kendall 1999: 89).
The Working Group had reluctantly identified a small group of ‘difficult to 
manage’ women, but where should they most appropriately be housed? Within 
Canada there are Regional Psychiatric Centres (RPC) and Regional Treatment 
Centres (RTC), both of which groups of institutions could be used to house women 
requiring intensive help. This option was not acceptable as the small numbers of 
women involved would mean their being isolated within a much larger group of 
men, in an environment where the correctional emphasis overwhelmed the 
therapeutic. Faced with the women’s small numbers, would it be better to have a 
specialised unit attached to one or two of the new regional facilities (with the 
implication that specialised staff would be better able to provide for their needs)? 
Again there was a negative response, occasioned by the fear that such a resource 
could be used as a dumping ground by the other prisons, when challenged by
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women’s behaviour, in the same way that the Prison for Women had been used for 
some provincially sentenced women. It was therefore decided that each new 
institution would manage these women using mental health specialists on an ‘as- 
needed’ basis, reinforced by ‘unobtrusive security measures’. An important aspect 
of this was that federal women, who in the community would have been assessed as 
requiring hospitalisation, were expected to be admitted to provincial psychiatric 
hospitals, rather than to correctional psychiatric facilities. The Task Force dealt 
with the lack of concrete evidence in their report, noting that although they had 
received ‘preliminary data on the mental health needs of women ... as assessed by 
the Diagnostic Interview Schedule Survey (DIS Study) ... more analysis need[ed] to 
be done’, but the DIS study ‘confirmed ... that federally sentenced women have a 
high need for mental health related support and intervention’ (TFFSW 1990: 86). 
Creating Choices emphasised that, because of this lack of information, the Task 
Force could not make a ‘definitive recommendation’ as to appropriate 
accommodation. The Working Group, affected once again by the demands of 
consensus, felt unable to be prescriptive in terms of specifying anything other than 
the standard accommodation, with additional small support units. The image of the 
homogeneous ‘woman’ continued to prevail.
The Healing Lodge; accommodating a ‘distinct’ group
The decision that women with mental health needs should be provided for at each 
new prison left the Working Group free to concentrate on planning completely new 
institutions which would house all federally sentenced women. But there was one 
further decision to make before the precise number of new prisons could be settled 
upon. Would there be specific provision made for Aboriginal women, or would 
they be integrated in all the new prisons?
It is at this stage that the official strands become confused. The October Working 
Group Minutes refer to a proposal made during their September meeting, but 
nothing was actually noted in the September Minutes. The Aboriginal Women’s
25 Detailed Notes were provided for the September Steering Committee meeting. The Steering 
Committee subsequently decided that Detailed Notes would not be provided and that all recordings 
and notes would be destroyed once the Minutes had been drawn up. In the light o f the repeated 
complaints by the Aboriginal participants that their comments were frequently omitted from the
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Caucus had met for three days at the end of August and their records show 
discussions of a possible half-way house, or Medicine Lodge, but this was 
envisaged as a resource for Aboriginal women released into the community. 
Following the September Steering Committee meeting the Aboriginal women had 
all met and it is likely that they discussed the possibility of a dedicated Aboriginal 
facility then, but there is nothing in the official record to indicate precisely when 
the idea first emerged. What is clear from anecdotal evidence is that the idea of a 
Healing Lodge was first mooted by Alma Brooks, a member of the Aboriginal 
Women’s Caucus and NWAC, and that this concept had been articulated, if not 
fleshed out, some time prior to when it was first proposed to the Working Group. 
The October Minutes clearly credit Patricia Monture with articulating the 
‘preliminary conceptualisation’ which was ‘based on her discussions with other 
Aboriginal women’.
The preliminary vision and its transformation into reality will be discussed in 
greater detail in chapter 8, but it is important to establish here the unique nature of 
what was being proposed; specifically, that all Aboriginal women should be able 
to choose to go to a Healing Lodge, irrespective of their security classification. 
They would not be sent there because a court had stipulated they should be; rather, 
the choice would be theirs and could be made at any stage of the sentence. The 
Lodge would be situated in open, spacious grounds and its heart would be a Targe 
round room to be used for ceremonies, teaching, workshops with Elders, healing 
...’. An Elder would be essential to its function as a place of healing. Almost as 
essential was that the Lodge should be ‘affiliated with an Aboriginal community’, 
yet it ‘would also have to be located near a major urban centre in recognition that 
Aboriginals live in a dual reality’. How this initial vision should be transformed 
into physical reality was the task awaiting them and the Group was advised that a 
Lodge would not lessen the need to provide Aboriginal programmes and services in 
the other facilities. Any sense of the correctional aspect of the Healing Lodge was 
almost complete effaced from the discussions, almost as though the name itself 
accurately denoted its purpose. It is interesting that this concept should have taken
official record this was a bizarre decision, even if  it continued the consensus model agreed by the 
Working Group.
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so long to be placed on the Working Group’s table. A civil servant commented: It
didn’t come up early on because most o f the meetings were about just women and
what were we going to do ... recommend new prisons, joint options? ... and all with
the understanding that in the mean time the Aboriginal representatives were in
discussions with the Elders and that they would bring to the Working Group the
results o f those deliberations.... There was also a sense that the Aboriginal
members were not prepared to devote the final meetings to fleshing out the Healing
26  * •Lodge because it was all very new to them as well. This provides another 
example of the Task Force declining to be prescriptive about a proposal but, with 
the Healing Lodge, the outcome did not leave the final definition entirely in the 
hands of CSC.
The sentenced Aboriginal woman was seen by other Aboriginals as being almost 
entirely a product of colonial oppression, whose personal choices were 
circumscribed by the larger socio-economic environment in which she lived. The 
criminalising of Aboriginal women was thought to be the consequence of a 
colonialism which had left Aboriginal communities across the country ill-prepared 
to cope with the outcome.27 For Aboriginal women ‘healing’, or coming to terms 
with those factors, had to take precedence over any notions of punishment, because 
the greater harm had been inflicted by the dominant culture, even if its 
manifestation had been a criminal offence by an Aboriginal woman. Of course, the 
same argument regarding victimisation could be used for many non-Aboriginal 
federally sentenced women (and the final report perhaps goes some way towards 
doing this) but it was acknowledged that Aboriginal women experienced double 
discrimination, or what Monture preferred to call ‘discrimination within 
discrimination through the addition of racial stereotypes’. For Aboriginal women 
the law remained a dominant society construct, despite the fact that it was also 
intended to protect them, and their own experience was that justice was not applied 
equally.
26 Interview 30
27 Some communities managed to fmd their own solutions, but only after years o f struggle. Alkali 
Lake is perhaps one o f the most famous examples, because o f the way in which it managed to find a 
collective way back to sobriety. (See Warry 1998; Morrison and Wilson 1986).
140
This Canadian concept of ‘healing’ while incarcerated, as exemplified by the 
Healing Lodge, was then unique and came to be the cornerstone of the Task Force’s 
report. But in the Aboriginal context it was also an extraordinary venture into the 
unknown. As Creating Choices makes clear, ‘the [Euro-Canadian] concept of 
punishment is alien to the Aboriginal culture. The focus on restoration of harm and 
finding direction through teachings and spirituality in traditional culture is 
diametrically different from the punitive models that have grown up in non- 
Aboriginal... civilisations’ (TFFSW 1990: 90). Yet, in an effort to lessen the 
damaging effects of conventional imprisonment on Aboriginal women, here was a 
group of Aboriginal women proposing that a new prison should be built -  and that 
it should be done in alliance with the administrators of the old. This was indeed a 
step bom of desperation and a recognition that the legislative constraints would not 
immediately be removed. Underpinning this were the refusal to include 
consideration of Aboriginal jurisdiction in the Task Force’s remit and the hope that 
Aboriginal self-determination would eventually enable such a facility to be 
administered solely by Aboriginals. But the type of facility they wished to have -  
where women tmly could ‘heal’, as well as restore harm done -  was then 
unattainable and the first step towards it remained in the gift of CSC.
28 TFFSW 1990: 69
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Deciding the locations
Having accepted the need for a separate Aboriginal prison, where were the other 
facilities to be placed? The necessity of ‘a national plan for regional facilities’ was 
already accepted and narrowing the focus to specific locations was largely 
determined by existing geographic realities. The Working Group had to decide 
which city, in each region, best provided the existing support network required for 
the community release strategy. They also had to ask whether this targeted city 
was the most easily accessible to the majority of federally sentenced women -  and 
their families -  from that region. In reality, the immense size of Canada meant that 
wherever the new facilities were eventually sited, some of the women would still be 
many hundreds of miles from their home communities.
Halifax CSC’s ‘Atlantic Region’, covering the Maritimes (Nova Scotia, New 
Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island), in addition to Newfoundland, presented 
little difficulty for the Working Group. The immediate choice was for a facility to 
be ‘located ... close to Halifax’.29 Halifax, with Dartmouth just across the harbour, 
was by far the largest of the Maritime cities and its selection could also be justified 
on the basis of the percentage of federal women coming from Nova Scotia.
Whether or not that province should then ‘buy in’ provision for its non-federally 
sentenced women was a question which could be deferred, because additional units 
could be added to a new facility at a later stage. We might well ask; if it were 
unacceptable for federal women to be outnumbered by provincial women under 
Exchange of Service Agreements, why should the reverse be considered 
appropriate? But the Atlantic Region presented a unique case amongst the 
correctional Regions because of the relatively few women sentenced to federal 
custody. Offering to accommodate provincial women gave the projected facility 
greater scope, both in design and the possibility of wider programming.
Montreal Quebec presented larger considerations, partly because of the size of the 
province (it is the largest in Canada) and the spread of population. The 
accommodation provided at the existing Maison Tanguay was thought inadequate 
in almost every respect, apart from its easy accessibility by public transport.
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Montreal, while the largest city in Quebec, is situated between two other large 
cities, Quebec City and Hull (which is adjacent to Ottawa). A case could partially 
have been made for two facilities within the province, thus allowing more women 
to live closer to their homes, but the cost and programme disadvantages -  and the 
fact that some Montreal women would be dislocated in order to keep both equally 
full -  persuaded the Group that Montreal was the only logical choice.
The Hamilton corridor Ontario is the second largest of the Canadian provinces but 
is the most heavily populated, despite vast, unpopulated tracts. The greatest 
concentration of people can be found in Southern Ontario, focused on Toronto and 
the surrounding smaller cities. The Working Group knew that the majority of 
federally sentenced women from Ontario were from this area so it might have been 
assumed that Toronto would be the chosen city. It was felt, none the less, that 
Toronto was simply too large and that there would be ‘too many competing 
interests for available resources’, so the Working Group chose the Hamilton- 
corridor area.
The October Minutes record, however, that there was one dissenting voice, that of 
Sally Wills, the Executive Director of the Kingston Elizabeth Fry Society, who 
asked that her ‘continued support of the Kingston location should be documented in 
the Minutes’. She explained that her support for Kingston (as the Ontario site) was 
based not only on her personal knowledge of the ‘resources available in Kingston’, 
but also on the fact that some of the women had partners in the various Kingston 
male prisons, which made private family visiting easier.30 There was a further 
dimension to her concern and this is not mentioned in the Minutes. Many of the 
women whom she had met during the course of her work had spoken of the 
difficulties they faced with the ‘revolving door’, meaning that the Prison for 
Women continually had women coming and going. For those serving particularly 
long sentences it was hard to live with the fact that many women would be released 
long before they would and this made the creation of their own support networks
29 Working Group Minutes 25th -  27th October, 1989
30 A prisoner’s entitlement to Private Family Visits is dealt with in the Commissioner’s Directive 
(CD) 770. Prisoners may no longer have a Private Family Visit with another prisoner as, under the
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within the prison doubly hard -  and doubly important. They needed a reasonably 
settled existence where they could comes to terms with the length of their sentence, 
supported by substantial numbers of women experiencing the same difficulties. It 
was feared that smaller regional facilities, with a proportionately smaller number of 
women serving lengthy sentences might make it even harder for them to do so. (As 
we have seen, Shaw’s research showed that a significant minority of federally 
sentenced women were in favour of the status quo).
A further dimension lay in the group of women needing extra support with mental 
health needs; Ms Wills thought it unlikely that smaller facilities would be able to 
provide the range of programmes and support the women needed. She wanted a 
new Kingston prison to have two extra functions: to be a national resource to which 
women could opt to be sent if they were serving longer sentences; and to be a 
national resource for those with mental health needs.
Edmonton For its own purposes CSC classes the Prairie provinces -  Saskatchewan, 
Alberta and Manitoba -as one administrative area. CSC is dealing with a smaller 
client group than in Ontario, but one coming from a huge geographic area. The 
Working Group had roughly forty-five women to consider, of whom the majority 
were Aboriginal. As with their deliberations about Quebec, they were initially 
inclined towards two facilities, as well as a Healing Lodge, but acknowledged that 
the Lodge would be likely to ‘attract a significant number of Prairie women, 
thereby making two additional facilities unrealistic’. With that decision made, the 
choice of province was largely determined by the higher percentage of women 
coming from Alberta, and Edmonton was eventually ‘tentatively’ selected as the 
location, despite competing claims from Calgary. The Group did not go so far as to 
select a site for the Healing Lodge, but did conclude that it should be in 
Saskatchewan. The rest of the geographic divide was to be covered by 
‘immediately’ establishing a half-way house in Winnipeg.
CCRA, a ‘visitor’ is ‘any person other than an inmate or staff member’. See, Gilles Laliberte v. 
Commissioner o f  Corrections and Attorney General o f  Canada 27th April, 2000.
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The Northern Territories were not considered during the meeting; it was so 
unusual for a woman from the Territories to be sentenced that the Working Group 
felt ‘innovative alternatives on a case by case ... basis’ would be required.
British Columbia This left British Columbia, but the discussion here was driven 
by the reality of the Burnaby Correctional Centre. Although its design in no way 
resembled what the Working Group envisaged for federally sentenced women, it 
was accepted that a replacement facility could not be built. Accordingly, it was 
agreed that Burnaby would house federally sentenced women for a ‘minimum 
twelve year period’, but that ‘following this initial period, a new-style federal 
facility should be available in the Vancouver area if the Burnaby option [had] not 
been successful in accordance with the principles set out in the Task Force Report’. 
Burnaby would be encouraged to ‘focus on implementing, within the [Bumaby] 
Agreement, as many of the programme recommendations as possible’. Above all, 
CSC needed to ‘acknowledge that the Task Force principles appl[ied] to federally 
sentenced women housed in Burnaby’. The Working Group had little choice but to 
accept that Bumaby was a fait accompli but, in doing so, they were consigning 
women from British Columbia to a style of imprisonment not applicable to other 
federally sentenced women. In effect, they were allowing two tiers of federal 
punishment, because Bumaby could never hope to replicate the proposed cottage- 
style living of the new prisons, leaving British Columbian women disadvantaged by 
comparison.
Conclusions and looking ahead
Most on the Working Group had known instinctively, almost since beginning the 
task, what the final decision would be. All that they had heard, seen and discussed 
in the intervening months had simply led them to concur with MacGuigan’s view 
that the Prison for Women was indeed ‘unfit for bears, let alone women’.
Moreover, the dangers inherent in any prison were magnified at Kingston because 
of its design and its distance from the home communities of most federally 
sentenced women, as had become devastatingly apparent with the death of Sandy 
Sayer. The Working Group had reached the point of declaring openly where they 
stood -  and their unanimous decision was that the Prison for Women should be
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closed and replaced by five regional prisons. They had selected the areas where the 
new prisons should be built, had determined that one should be an Aboriginal 
Healing Lodge and had reluctantly conceded that the new British Columbia prison 
was a fixture they had to accept. They had also made clear that the new prisons 
would provide for all levels of security so were, in effect, duplicating the Prison for 
Women, even if not physically manifesting it. At this point it is important to 
emphasise that the Healing Lodge was also expected to be a multi-level prison.
But this chapter, despite the fact that the federally sentenced women have emerged 
from the shadows, thanks to the assiduous research of Shaw and her colleagues, has 
primarily been the tale of a group of women attempting to reconcile their personal 
and professional perspectives for the greater good of federally sentenced women. 
Unlike those early female prison reformers, they recognized the need to be careful
n  1
of their ‘biases’ and acknowledged the expertise of imprisoned women. Yet at 
times they could not resist assuming a greater knowledge and, while they might 
have rejected the label of ‘matemalism’, their stance could not always be thought of 
as feminist. The Group had also been forced to confront their own lack of 
homogeneity; while working for a common purpose, they were frequently aware of 
the gulf between them, whether professionally or culturally inspired. This was 
particularly the case between the Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal members. While 
none denied the common bonds of womanhood, and an innate sympathy for, and 
possible empathy with, other women there was the irrefutable gulf occasioned by 
history between the Euro-Canadians and the Aboriginals. Monture suggested that 
the relationship of Aboriginal women with the women’s movement could ‘not be 
understood without an understanding of the past’, arguing that it was impossible to 
divorce feminism from Canadian colonialism and the consequent ‘exclusions and 
intrusions’ (Monture-Angus 1995: 177). That historic understanding was brought 
to the Working Group’s table and the women, most of whom would certainly have 
described themselves as feminists, were continually being asked to assess their 
decisions in the light of that colonial history. What has already emerged is the way 
in which that knowledge successfully subverted and extended the government 
agenda.
31 Working Group Minutes 13th -  14th April 1989
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In the next chapter I will examine how the Task Force’s conclusions were 
presented in Creating Choices: The Report o f the Task Force on Federally 
Sentenced Women and ask to what extent these might have been affected by 
Aboriginal perspectives. I will look at the language of the report and, in returning 
to the earlier questions of why the Aboriginals were originally excluded and the 
Quebecois were ignored, I will also ask if the report unexpectedly became a vehicle 
for political aspirations.
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5. Returning to the cottages; abandoning the prison?
The proposition that the Prison for Women should be replaced was an historic step, 
but one which had been made frequently before, as chapter 1 has shown. How their 
planning should be translated into government action was beyond the authority of 
the Task Force, which could only hope that the Commissioner’s public 
commitment to change would survive the pressures of the inevitable political 
process to follow. Where the Task Force departed from other Commissions and 
Inquiries was in the way it carefully delineated a style, if not actual design, for the 
proposed new prisons, together with a philosophical foundation for their 
management. The highly visible security of the old prison, manifest in its immense 
stone walls, signalled that containment of an apparently dangerous population had 
been its major function. The Working Group wanted their new, model prisons to 
relay an equally strong message; that federally sentenced women were yet another 
part of diverse Canadian communities. During the October meeting the Group 
needed to articulate what they had individually and collectively been considering 
since beginning their work, and to do so in some detail.
They were united by a common knowledge of what they did not want, having 
visited many of the provincial prisons. The new Bumaby Correctional Centre for 
Women, with its Benthamite central rotunda augmented by the addition of 20th 
century electronic surveillance, had dismayed them (see chapter 3; Faith, 1993).
The design of the Prison for Women was considered inherently dangerous and 
Maison Tanguay, in Quebec, offered no vision upon which they could build. So 
what did the Working Group finally propose? Fundamental to their concept was 
that all the new prisons should be ‘close to larger cities which offer the desired 
infrastructure: university teaching hospital, specialised services and proximity to an 
Aboriginal community’.1 This had led them to select Halifax, Montreal, Edmonton 
and the Hamilton corridor. In these cities each new prison would be placed in no 
less than ten acres, with ‘non-obtrusive perimeter security’. They would have a 
‘core building’, containing a ‘gym, library, school/program area, administration, 
health services, cafeteria,... chapel, ... inmate committee office, offices for
1 Working Group Minutes 25th -  27th October, 1989
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volunteer / community programs’. Each would have a ‘garden; family visiting unit; 
a dedicated Aboriginal ceremonial / sweat lodge area; occupational buildings’. The 
living units (described as cottages) would be ‘house-style’ and hold ‘approximately 
five women’. Each cottage would contain ‘spacious bed-study rooms, living room, 
study, kitchen, dining room, playroom, telephone comer, staff office / lounge, 
counselling room’. One of the cottages would be ‘smaller, with more staff space to 
house trauma cases requiring intensive support’.2 (Chapter 4 has briefly outlined 
the separate vision of the Healing Lodge).
All the new prisons would be equally provisioned, irrespective of how many 
women they held; the women were not to be disadvantaged by accident of 
geography and sentencing trends. The language used reflected a concern with 
providing care and, by extension, ‘healing’, both of which would be facilitated by 
the new architectural style of the prisons. Insofar as we can rely on the Minutes, 
staff do not appear to have been discussed, except in relation to whether they might 
be stationed within the new houses. The major focus of the Group always 
appeared to be on the women themselves. Creating Choices expanded upon the 
staffs role, suggesting that they should have wide ‘life experience’ alongside an 
understanding of women’s and cultural issues, yet was not so prescriptive as to 
limit the field. What was clear was that the military model of staffing, with its 
emphasis on security and hierarchical relationships had been rejected. Staff would 
play their part in creating ‘dynamic security’ (TFFSW 1990: 116) and this was 
dependent upon the relationships they were able to develop with the women. 
Through the example of the staff the women would be encouraged to take control 
of, and responsibility for, their own lives. This was a return to staff assuming the 
position envisaged by Elizabeth Fry, wherein ‘ “respectable” female warders might 
play a positive role as a “consistent example of propriety and virtue” ’ (Fry, cited in 
Zedner 1995: 301; also, see Dobash et al, 1986), ‘acting as loving but demanding
2 Ibid
3 In all o f the Minutes there was relatively little discussion o f staff, which is an interesting 
omission, bearing in mind their important role within a prison. The May 1989 Working Group 
Minutes indicated that members o f the Group were to meet Union members at the Prison for 
Women, so staff views would have been heard then, but, overall, their knowledge o f the women was 
not called upon. This can partly be related to the Group’s wish to avoid importing any o f the old 
staff culture into the new prisons and staff at the Prison for Women were later told that they would 
not ‘fit’ the new prisons.
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mothers who forgave past errors but insisted on obedience (Freedman 1981: 95). 
Creating Choices specified that males should not be hired as guards (‘front-line’ 
staff, with access to the living units), but that they should be allowed to work in 
certain educational and vocational roles.4
While this brief description conflates the minutes and Creating Choices, it gives a 
general idea of how the Task Force’s ideas were built upon and expanded, with the 
general point being that the Task Force provided the foundation for what later 
followed. The Task Force suggested the houses / cottages; the home-like regime 
within the cottages; the ‘holistic’ approach to programming, centred on community 
standards and community provision; exemplary staff; the mother and child 
programme; the involvement of volunteers who would provide ‘important social 
and intellectual variety’ for the women (TFFSW 1990: 123). Yet, irrespective of 
how any of these concepts might have been redefined as the new prisons took 
shape, the basic structure was not new and the Task Force was not breaking new 
ground. The women who had been instrumental in founding the first reformatories 
for women had got there first. Rafter, citing the first annual report of the 
reformatory at Albion, New York, shows that ‘the idea of family life, each cottage 
with its own kitchen, its pleasant dining room adjoining’ was reproduced in a 
custodial setting some hundred years prior to the Task Force’s concept of cottages 
and exemplary regimes. Freedman wrote of children being permitted to stay until 
the age of two in the early reformatories and the way in which the early reformers 
could influence prisoners through ‘womanly sympathy’ (1981: 96 & 54). Indeed, 
as the Working Group’s October minutes noted, the Minnesota Correctional 
Facility-Shakopee, which had begun as a reformatory for women in 1920, seemed 
to be ‘representing the most coherent expression of [a female corrections model] to
4 Madam Justice Arbour recommended that a Cross Gender Staffing Monitor should be appointed 
to deal with the issue o f whether or not men should be front-line workers at the new prisons (1996: 
252-3). dditionally, Arbour (1996: 217) suggested that women should have the option o f serving 
their sentence in a prison which had no men working as front-line correctional officers. CSC 
designated Edmonton Institution for Women free o f men and, through the Public Service 
Commission, obtained a three-year exclusion order, which was then extended for a further year. 
(See CSC, 1995b.) The Cross Gender Monitoring Project’s Third Annual Report (September 2000) 
recommended that all males should be barred from front-line positions, because CSC had failed to 
implement four recommendations regarding the deployment o f male staff which had been made in 
its Second Annual Report (2000: 4). Both Edmonton and the Healing Lodge initially decided 
against hiring male Primary Workers, whereas Joliette and Nova took a small proportion.
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date’. Canada also had its own earlier model of a reformatory-style prison for 
women, the Andrew Mercer Reformatory in Toronto (see chapter 1). So in 
adopting Shakopee as a paradigm, the Task Force was also returning to its 
Canadian roots, albeit with an added Aboriginal dimension.
Following their lengthy October meeting, having committed themselves to closure, 
the Working Group revisited the Prison for Women to ‘present the women who 
have given so freely of their time and energy, both in the consultation and the 
research, with a token of appreciation’, which took the form of a ‘give-a-way’.5 
Many of the women were by then familiar faces and the sense of ‘them and us’ -  
where it had existed -  was becoming blurred. There was more chance of the 
women being seen as individuals who had experienced adversity, rather than 
simply as offenders; moreover, they continued to live with adversity because of 
deteriorating conditions within the Prison for Women, in the aftermath of Ms 
Sayer’s suicide. In a sense, the Working Group had collectively begun to cross the 
divide separating empathy from objectivity, but this was scarcely surprising, as the 
fear of another suicide at the Prison for Women was only too real. This degree of 
consultation with imprisoned women -  and, indeed, deference -  was remarkable, 
even in its Canadian context, and without parallel in other jurisdictions.6
Another aspect of this ‘blurring’ was the Working Group’s knowledge of feminist 
research showing ‘that women in prison have more in common with other women 
than they do with male inmates’ (Shaw 1991-3: 11, cited in TFFSW 1990: 68, 
emphasis added). While this is true, from the strict perspective of gender, it is not 
the whole picture. Hannah-Moffat deconstructed the analogy, stressing that in 
denying difference we deny the diversity of women and their unique, individual 
experience of imprisonment. The most profound difference between the majority
5 This derives from the ‘potlatch’ and refers to a gift given to mark an event. It was originally used 
to denote the status o f the giver, with gifts o f different value being conferred according to the rank 
o f the recipient. Historically, the potlatch became more and more extravagant and the alleged 
excesses associated with them were used as an excuse for their being banned in 1884, under the 
Indian Act. This prohibition was only removed in 1951, when the Indian Act was rewritten. See 
McMillan (1995) for a fuller discussion.
6 In the United Kingdom, for example, prisoners would not be included in a Home Office- 
sponsored planning group. Their views and needs might be ascertained by means o f commissioned 
research, but they would not have their approval sought while plans were being formulated.
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of women and imprisoned women is the question of freedom; imprisoned women 
are not free (Hannah-Moffat 2001: 191). (This is not to ignore another profound 
difference; that some women offend and a larger proportion do not). Yet it is 
perhaps not too fanciful to say that some within the Working Group, while aware of 
these distinctions, had begun to feel as though they might be the ‘other woman’, 
with an instinctive understanding of what federally sentenced women felt and, in 
particular, needed as the Group had collectively demonstrated by its refusal to 
countenance co-corrections. Whilst not going as far as English 18th century non­
conformist prison reformers who viewed prisoners as ‘machines to be tinkered with 
... because they had a conscience like everybody else’ (Ignatieff 1978: 71), the 
Working Group did believe that the provision of exemplary institutions would 
encourage change in women. The new physical surroundings, allied with the 
(moral) structure provided by skilled staff, would facilitate those changes.
As previously alluded to, the Working Group had come to believe strongly in a 
dual-track approach to providing for federally sentenced women and this was 
articulated in the Central Conundrum, which asked whether a capital investment in 
new ‘residences’ might ‘divert focus and attention from the long-term objective’ [of 
providing community alternatives] (TFFSW 1990: 78). While this strategy might 
have had something to do with the reluctance of many from the voluntary sector to 
be associated with building more prisons, it was much more than that. For the 
Working Group ‘community’ meant an amalgam of both ‘culture and geography’7 
and for a woman to be released successfully into such a community, she had to 
have an easily accessible route, peopled by those whom she had come to trust. 
‘Community’ would be represented within the prisons by programmes and mentors 
and a recognised pathway to Community Release Centres, half-way houses and 
satellite units. Planning for eventual release would start immediately a woman was 
received into prison and this would be facilitated by her community worker, who 
would be from the voluntary sector. The initial vision of the community worker 
was based on Jerome Miller’s concept of client specific planning and it was 
expected that the community workers would take the lead in planning for a 
woman’s release. Commenting on this aspect of the proposals, agreed at the
7 Working Group Minutes 25th -  27th October, 1989
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October meeting, a Group member -  who happened to be a civil servant -  later
noted that this was not clarified in the report. She thought the consensus had been
that as they could not ‘control the evolution of any facility, it was best to build in
“watchdogs”, “advocates”, “checks and balances” In a wry aside, reflecting the
difficulties they had all experienced, she ended the memo by saying ‘perhaps I was
8 »hearing a consensus because I wanted to -  on this occasion, as on others ...’ . It is 
instructive that a civil servant, rather than a member from the voluntary sector, 
should have alerted the Group to the possibility that planning might go awry. For 
unexplained reasons Creating Choices concluded that a team approach was 
preferable, with a CSC employee being in overall charge. The role was not seen as 
being part of any ‘checks and balances’ necessary to ensure successful 
implementation.9 It was envisaged that the community strategy could be 
‘implemented independently and in advance of the accommodation model’10 and 
the ultimate failure to do this -  funding was refused by government -  was to have 
repercussions once the new prisons were opened. Additionally, in wanting to 
provide new standards for half-way houses to which the women could be released, 
the Task Force was again faced by legislative impediments which were beyond the 
immediate authority of the Solicitor General. Once again, the Task Force could not 
think as ‘broadly’ as they might have wished.
Conflicts of interest
Work had started some time previously on drafts of the various chapters for the 
final report, and these were circulated so that all members of the Working Group 
had the opportunity to comment before the next stage was reached. Most of the 
Group contributed to some of the initial writing, but some had greater overall 
responsibilities, and by October Patricia Monture had completed the fourth draft of 
what was to become Chapter II, The Voices o f Aboriginal People. It will be 
remembered that the Working Group had faced problems when formulating the 
Guideline Questions to accompany the Consultation documents; these related to 
whether there should be a question about Aboriginal self-determination injustice
8 Memorandum: 21st December, 1989
9 The ‘checks and balances’ themselves were similarly absent and the lack was highlighted when
CAEFS withdrew from the implementation process in June 1992, leaving CSC free o f any external 
auditor.
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issues. The view formed then was that the Task Force had to be careful not to 
exceed its brief by venturing into the jurisdiction of other government departments. 
Prof. Monture’s draft ended with a list of nine recommendations, which elicited a 
hostile response from some of the civil servants within the Working Group, with 
the sticking point again being the question of Aboriginal sovereignty. Her first 
recommendation was a very broad one:
The Correctional Service of Canada with the Commissioner, the Ministry of 
the Solicitor General and the Solicitor General of Canada must actively 
lobby the federal legislature to secure future meaningful negotiations with 
Aboriginal governments who are now willing to take over full or limited 
jurisdiction in the area of criminal justice.
One of the civil service respondents replied that the Task Force was ‘a very narrow 
plank upon which to rest such a broad recommendation’, and pointed out that the 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) was responsible 
for Aboriginal self-government negotiations, rather than the federal legislature.
She abruptly dismissed the idea that either CSC, the Commissioner, or the 
Ministry of the Solicitor General, themselves relatively small cogs in the larger 
federal wheel, should be encouraged to ‘lobby’ the federal legislature.11 Prof. 
Monture’s nine recommendations were subsequently omitted from the final report, 
but the debate is included here as it is further evidence of the difficulties faced by 
some Working Group members in attempting to balance their official positions -  as 
government representatives -  against the insistent political manoeuvring of some of 
the Aboriginal Task Force members (even if those Aboriginal members did not 
always see their actions as ‘political’, but as a necessary reaction to intransigence). 
Looking at the civil servant’s response to these recommendations it is possible to 
see how the bureaucratic imperative impinged upon her reply; she knew the 
impossibility of making recommendations which could not be implemented by the 
department to which she was answerable. Yet her response would have dismayed 
the Aboriginal members of both the Working Group and the Steering Committee, 
and it emphasised the gulf in understanding still to be bridged. Throughout the 
work of the Task Force, Aboriginal members had sought to ‘educate’ the others 
regarding the reality of Aboriginals’ experience of the dominant society. As a
10 Working Group Minutes 25th -  27th October, 1989
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group within the Task Force they knew that they were ‘an afterthought’ and that
19they had ‘had to fight for meaningful recognition’. They had not been part of the 
discussions about the Mandate, and the Terms o f Reference were only amended to 
reflect the over-representation of Aboriginal women in the criminal justice system 
at a later stage. It seemed to them that at every point in the deliberations they had 
to remind the rest of the Task Force of the Aboriginal perspective. This was 
encapsulated in the response of an Aboriginal Task Force member to a draft 
section, then entitled ‘The Special Needs of Aboriginal Women are Not Met’. She 
wrote: ‘We do not understand what special means. Can someone define it for us? 
Our needs are culturally unique but they are basic to what every human being needs 
to survive. Does special mean we are somehow handicapped? or disadvantaged? or 
perhaps not as ‘good’ as white people?’
Had Aboriginals been uniformly represented in other government initiatives the 
dissension regarding the Mandate might have been better anticipated by both 
Aboriginals and civil servants, but the Aboriginal women on the Task Force were 
mostly newcomers to such a government-sponsored enterprise -  and the civil 
servants were largely unaccustomed to working with Aboriginals. While some of 
the Aboriginals might not necessarily have been aware that the published Mandate 
customarily could not be altered, others simply would not accept the political 
reality. Therefore, to fight for change seemed logical, whereas the mainly Euro- 
Canadian CAEFS, with its greater exposure to political stratagems -  having been 
part of the initial Task Force discussions -  would have recognised the apparent 
impossibility of changing what had already been agreed upon. Additionally, 
CAEFS had no accountability to a wider constituency, although it was, of course, 
indirectly answerable to CSC because of its need for government funding.
However, it might also be said that, having recognised the limitations of the 
Mandate early on, the Aboriginals found it a very convenient political bargaining 
point and one to which they could turn whenever they thought it necessary. As we 
shall see, they were ultimately successful in ensuring that self-government was 
referred to in Creating Choices.
11 1st November, 1989
12 Taken from undated chapter comments, submitted to editors o f TFFSW.
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Achieving consensus?
The November Steering Committee meeting, also attended by the Working Group, 
was held in Ottawa, some two hours drive from what remained a very troubled
1Prison for Women in Kingston, where the repressive lock-down policy continued. 
There had been no official response to the Committee’s Motion following the death 
of Sandy Sayer, which left the question of provincial transfers unresolved, and 
further underlined the impotence of the Task Force when it came to effecting 
immediate change. The Working Group accepted the need for external guidance, 
but some members were unhappy about having to defend what they had struggled 
so hard to achieve. The Steering Committee was not required to meet so often and 
membership was far from consistent, yet the Committee was commenting on work 
which had required enormous effort to produce. The Working Group was 
constrained by the wish not to appear divided, so could not be as vociferous as 
perhaps it might have wished in defending its decisions. As one Group member 
commented, ‘how could there be a dialogue with fifty people around the table?’.14 
Nevertheless, the Steering Committee and its joint chairs played an important role 
in supporting the Working Group, adding a further perspective to the deliberations, 
especially with regard to francophone, Aboriginal and provincial needs. The 
Steering Committee was the only means -  apart from the public consultations -  
through which individual interests, such as other minority ethnic groups and 
religious organisations, could be heard. Yet there was a tension between the roles 
of both sections of the Task Force, which undoubtedly added to the burden of the 
Working Group.
It was important that the final layout of the report should be decided, and it is worth 
noting that James Phelps, Co-Chair of the Steering Committee and a Deputy 
Commissioner of Corrections, suggested that the Aboriginal chapter should be 
placed close to the beginning, ensuring it an eventual centrality which no-one at the 
outset would have envisaged. From a practical point of view the most important 
section of the report concerned the proposed new facilities: their siting; their
13 Until otherwise indicated, all quotations which follow are from the Minutes o f the Steering 
Committee, 20th November, 1989.
14 Interview 19
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design; and the proposed new style of management. All the careful garnering and 
presentation of information regarding what had previously existed were therefore 
fundamental, for the foundations of the new would arise from a controlled 
demolition of previous penal rationales. As a member remarked, ‘some of the 
concepts were in need of greater development and were not ready for 
operationalization, but would receive more attention at the implementation stage’ 
(emphasis added). (In this the Minutes show a prescience which would later return 
to haunt many on the Task Force because CSC took charge of implementation, 
unhindered by outside scrutiny, except at the Healing Lodge, as chapter 6 outlines). 
Most decisions had already been taken regarding the new prisons so the Steering 
Committee was more in the position of fine-tuning than recommending, but some 
important points were still raised. Specifically: the need to provide for the majority 
of the mentally ill within the new institutions, rather than within existing secure 
settings; the possible difficulty in providing programmes for all women in all of the 
prisons; the need to plan for those behaving aggressively towards other inmates. 
And perhaps most importantly, in the light of what happened subsequently, that the 
‘areas [of] security and staffing should be clearly discussed [so as] to direct the 
implementation committee, and to avoid undesirable traditional responses’.
One of the Task Force’s lengthiest discussions focused on the Principles section 
and, in particular, what some took to be the characterisation of women offenders as 
‘victims’, rather than as women who had also themselves created victims through 
their offending behaviour.15 The Committee feared the report would be ‘rejected as 
fantasy’ if  it did not address the issue of personal responsibility for offending, yet 
also agreed that the social factors behind some offending should be acknowledged. 
As has already been made clear, the Working Group was less certain that this was 
how the women should be viewed, and the apparent framing of the women as 
victims themselves is an aspect of the final report for which the Task Force was 
later criticised.
The Healing Lodge itself was considered separately, with the Steering Committee 
being cautioned that it remained ‘a concept, an idea to be developed’ and that, for
15 The Principles have been alluded to on a number o f occasions and are an important part o f the 
final report. They are discussed more fully at the end o f this chapter.
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the Lodge to become a definite option, ‘the matter of trust, which ha[d] been 
lacking between the Aboriginal community and parties of the criminal justice 
system must be addressed’. The Aboriginal members of the Task Force stressed 
the importance of the ‘ownership of the initiative’ and asked for ‘support and 
flexibility’, while they returned the concept to the Elders and the Aboriginal 
community at large. It is remarkable quite how completely the initial planning of 
this prison was left to these Aboriginal members. Even though the principle of 
consensus applied to them all, this was not an area to which the non-Aboriginal 
members of the Group felt they could contribute expertise. Yet the reverse did not 
apply when it came to the planning of the other prisons. Aboriginal members of the 
Task Force were involved in planning for all the women, because Aboriginal 
women would continue to be part of the wider federally sentenced population as 
some would not wish to go to the Healing Lodge.
However, the Task Force had been struck on the premise that it would be planning 
for what was initially assumed to be a homogeneous group of federally sentenced 
women, even if the Terms of Reference recognised the ‘unique ... aspects of the 
experience of [federally sentenced] Aboriginal women’ and the ‘unique needs of 
[all] these women (including, but not limited to, different abilities, race, culture, 
religion, sexual orientation, language)’. Nowhere in the accompanying Terms of 
Reference did it say that these different needs could only be addressed by those 
with specific knowledge, so there has to be another explanation for the reluctance 
of the non-Aboriginal members of the Task Force to be directly involved in 
planning the Healing Lodge. Perhaps the following comment by a civil servant 
gives some indication of what was happening within the Task Force: [it had been 
made clear to us] ‘you have been speaking for Aboriginal people fo r  some time.
It ’s time to stop and let Aboriginal people speak fo r  themselves ’. I  didn ’t have a 
whole lot o f difficulty saying ‘you know i f  we were doing such a good job speaking 
fo r  Aboriginal people maybe we wouldn ’t have had all those incidents, all those 
deaths, all that over-representation, so what do we have to lose by standing back 
and saying ‘ok, we 11 speak for this and we 11 let you speak fo r  that and we 11 see 
where it comes together and where it doesn 1 ’.16 Part of the answer to the profound
16 Interview 30
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reluctance to comment on Aboriginal issues may be found in the history of Euro- 
Canada’s relations with Aboriginal nations and the growing understanding within 
the dominant culture that this engagement had been unjust and oppressive. While 
most on the Task Force would have known this Aboriginal reality theoretically, it 
did not mean that they had individual contact with many Aboriginals or knowledge 
of Aboriginal communities. Yet during the life of the Task Force they were all 
sharing the same table, and the Aboriginal members spoke with a personal authority 
and experience of living as an Aboriginal within an often hostile dominant society. 
What can most easily be described as post-colonial guilt paralysed any possibility 
of extensive critical examination of Aboriginal perspectives. Mercredi (1994: 119) 
referred to the guilt harboured by some Canadians and suggested that, while it was 
not the ‘basis for a future relationship’, it was still ‘quite a powerful force when ... 
harnessed for changing the socio-economic conditions’ of Aboriginals. I would 
suggest that guilt and a concomitant paralysis was the main reason for non- 
Aboriginals’ reluctance to engage in criticism of Aboriginal perspectives, rather 
than simply the internalised racism suggested by two members of the Task Force -  
although this undoubtedly also existed.
It had long been planned that writing of the report would be completed by 
November and two members of the Working Group were due to be closeted in a 
hotel room in Ottawa while doing it.17 At the end of November’s joint meeting one 
of the designated writers from the voluntary sector decided that she would be better 
removed from the project, because of her earlier difficulties when working with a 
co-writer. Consequently, another of the civil servants was unexpectedly required to 
fill the gap, thus leaving the final draft of the report (apart from the Aboriginal 
chapter) in civil servants’ hands, even though members of the Group individually 
provided extensive comments. Drawing all the information together, particularly as 
some of the research material was still unavailable, presented the writers with 
enormous challenges, bearing in mind that the Task Force wished to produce 
something radical and strikingly different from other task forces. The Steering 
Committee received what was termed the ‘first major draft’ prior to their meeting 
on the 18th December 1989, albeit a draft which did not include the Aboriginal
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chapter. In discussing the report, many of the comments from participants reflected
the interests of the organisation or department each was representing, but three
1 £areas of concern predominated.
Federally sentenced women and mental health
As earlier discussed, the Working Group had spent considerable time debating how 
best to provide for those needing higher levels of security. Lacking details of the 
number of women in that category, the Group had worked out its own figures. 
Within that specific group, there was a sub-group of those termed psychiatrically / 
psychologically ill but, looking at the whole federally sentenced population, there 
was a larger group of women also requiring help with mental health needs. By the 
time the report was being written the Working Group had been able to read the 
preliminary findings of the Mental Health Survey (CSC Research Branch, 1989), 
which had been commissioned by the Correctional Service of Canada, but was not 
part of the body of research commissioned specifically for the Task Force. The 
Survey differentiated between the ‘types and incidence’ (TFFSW, 1989: 42) of 
mental health disorder displayed by men and women, making clear that many of the 
problems experienced by federally sentenced women could be ‘linked directly to 
past experiences of early and / or continued sexual abuse, physical abuse and sexual 
assault’ (TFFSW, 1989: 42).
Some on the Steering Committee were concerned that they had been unable to read 
the Survey themselves, or question its conclusions, and that reference to it in the 
final Task Force report might imply agreement with the findings. Felicity 
Hawthorn thought it ‘appropriate to be aware of the findings’ which ‘supported] a 
general impression that there are many women with mental health problems which 
need to be addressed’ and she was backed by Jane Miller-Ashton, who suggested 
that failure to mention the Survey might ‘work against’ the Task Force. It was 
believed prudent to retain the reference, if only to keep open the programming 
capacity, which would need to be funded by the Treasury Board. Again, the ‘pay-
17 The outside assistance o f Linda McLeod as the final co-ordinator / editor o f the transcript had 
already been agreed.
18 Subsequent quotations are taken from the Steering Committee Minutes, 18th December, 1989, 
unless otherwise indicated.
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master’ rather than broader concerns informed their decision-making. The 
Committee asked that the report should be amended to show the ‘limitations to [the 
Mental Health Survey’s] impact in the deliberations of the Task Force’, which 
Creating Choices failed to do, simply saying that the Survey ‘underscore^]... the 
urgent need to provide appropriate mental health services oriented to the specific 
needs of federally sentenced women’ (TFFSW, 1989: 42).
Nowhere does Creating Choices quantify the numbers of women who might be 
requiring significant help with mental health issues, although it might have been 
deduced from the figures Creating Choices quoted from Jan Heney’s research on 
self-injurious behaviour -  55 percent of a sample of 44 women self-harmed 
(TFFSW, 1989: 42) -  that the numbers would not be small. The actual section on 
mental health services in Creating Choices implied that most women with mental 
health needs would be able to continue living ‘in their own cottages’, ‘in a stable 
environment and familiar surroundings’ while receiving psychiatric care. Those 
who were ‘severely psychotic or certifiable’ would be ‘referred to a local mental 
health centre’ (TFFSW, 1989: 119). Looking back, a Working Group member said: 
What we missed the boat on was the whole issue o f  mental health. Are they mental 
health needs [first] and offenders second -  or vice versa? I  feel i t ’s very unfair to 
the general community out there who treat women with mental health needs to say 
that the women who come to us are just like them. They are n o t... they committed a 
criminal act and I  don’t think we can get away from that, because there are a 
whole lot o f people out there who have been abused who do not go out and hurt 
others.19 This failure can partly be linked to the Group’s reluctance to label 
federally sentenced women, as we have seen in their discussions about women as 
victims. The extraordinarily high number of women identified by the 1990 Task 
Force on Mental Health, Special Needs o f  Female Offenders as having ‘serious 
disorders’ -  95 percent -  presented the Group with yet more difficulties. They 
believed that a new environment would benefit most federally sentenced women 
and that individual behaviour would be modified by a less stressful location.
Having found it impossible to suggest that maximum security women should live in 
anything other than a conventional cottage, albeit with extra staff in situ, they were
19 Interview 30
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unlikely to adopt a different approach for women with mental health needs. The 
figures provided late in the day by the Task Force on Mental Health would also 
have appeared suspect, because women’s problems were frequently pathologised 
and given a psychiatric label, rather than seen as being a result of their socio­
economic status in the wider community. This failure to address the issue fully -  or 
perhaps an unwillingness further to label an already labelled group -  was to have 
consequences once the new facilities were running, and it left a further area of the 
report vulnerable to reinterpretation by CSC.
Criminals or victims?
Women’s ‘criminality’ was also much discussed, as it had been during the 
November joint meeting, when a member of the Task Force feared the report would 
be ‘rejected as fantasy’ if it did not address the issue of personal responsibility for 
offending20. One member of the Committee declared that the draft ‘read as a 
victim’s report’ and another said that ‘if she were “an outside reader” she would be 
left with the impression that all federally sentenced women are victims, that there is 
no criminality among women, and that they are there [in prison] only because of 
their past experience [of victimisation]’. She believed that there was ‘an element of 
choice involved in their behaviour’. Whilst one member had understood the report 
to be writing of women as ‘survivors’ rather than victims, it was clear that the 
Committee felt a need for more clarity on the subject. This, however, was 
something the Working Group had struggled with and related to the difficulty they 
all had in reconciling differences of opinion. As is by now very clear, their early 
commitment to a consensus model of operating meant that the Group was reluctant 
to identify publicly areas of dissent. It was impossible for them to agree on what 
constituted ‘the criminality of federally sentenced women’ and they felt that ‘not 
mentioning it was preferable to showing the diversity of views and lack of 
resolution on this issue’. It is curious that the Group had felt their collective 
expertise was sufficient to allow them to plan the new facilities, but that it was 
insufficient to allow them accurately to define this problem.
20 Steering Committee Minutes 20th November, 1989
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It is not unreasonable to suggest that the demands of consensus and the absorption 
of Aboriginal perspectives had by then coloured the Task Force’s view of what 
actually constituted criminality and victimisation. But something else was also 
going on, as I have earlier suggested; a crossing of the boundaries which had 
initially separated members of the Task Force from the women at the Prison for 
Women. Perhaps the issues had, for some, become more blurred than could ever 
have been anticipated. A Working Group member from the voluntary sector 
attempted to crystallise her impressions regarding changes wrought in some of the 
civil servants during the life of the Task Force. She had earlier spoken of the 
impossibility of hearing the women and not being ‘touched’ by what was said: /  
really think that fo r  the CSC women it was the same. ... I  think they were seeing it 
through different eyes. Before, the visits [to] the institutions had kind o f  been more 
in the bureaucratic line. This time they were coming to really talk to the women ...
I  think probably it was very different [for them] and my guess is that it was 
probably an eye-opener. I  don't think that they had spent any time around the 
prisons with the actual inmates -  they had been in prisons to go to the Warden’s 
quarters, to go to different meetings, to see the files, but to sit down in the common 
rooms with the women and drink their coffee and listen to their stories, their pain 
and anger, I  would expect that they were probably pretty touched by that.21 The 
women had stepped off the pages of the files and become women of infinite variety. 
They had also become more than ‘offenders’; their individual histories now had a 
familiar face -  and any one of them could be at risk the longer they stayed at the 
Prison for Women. So the language of ‘victimisation’ prevailed in a way that 
would have been incomprehensible some months earlier. And, as we shall see, the 
final language was influenced by the Aboriginals’ experience of victimisation and 
racism within the dominant Euro-Canadian society.
Quebec
At this very late stage in the Task Force’s deliberations the question of Quebec was 
again raised. CSC’s Quebec representative made it clear that the province did not 
support the proposals for a new regional facility and hoped for a ‘modification’ of 
the situation at Maison Tanguay by means of an ‘enhanced Exchange of Service
21 Interview 28
164
Agreement’. Although the conclusion that none of the existing facilities were 
adequate had already been reached by the Working Group, the Steering Committee 
debated the possibility of making an exception in the case of Quebec. If Tanguay 
were exempted from the regional plan and remained in provincial control, 
jurisdictional issues would have made it almost impossible to enforce ‘the 
principles and standards’ enshrined in the Task Force’s report (a point already 
reluctantly conceded with regard to British Columbia). The federal government 
could not order a provincial government to build a facility, housing both provincial 
and federal women, matching standards elsewhere, so the federal government had 
to set the standards itself.22 Were the provinces to be given the option of 
individually ‘modifying’ their existing provision the result would be delay and ‘a 
nail in the coffin for a truly new future for federally sentenced women’. When the 
Committee was asked if they agreed with the idea of an exemption for Quebec no- 
one, apart from the Quebec civil servant, supported it. Arguably, had a Quebec 
representative been on the Working Group, such debates would have been 
forestalled because the issue would have been discussed at an earlier stage.
Putting a woman at the top table
As Creating Choices was later to highlight, the Ouimet Report had suggested as 
early as 1969 that a woman should be appointed to ‘a position of senior 
responsibility and leadership’, and CAEFS had suggested in 1981 that ‘a Deputy 
Commissioner for Women should be appointed’. This position had been bolstered 
by Lee Axon’s research suggesting that ‘the successful implementation of woman- 
based corrections is dependent on the appointment of a woman to a very high level 
management position’ (TFFSW 1989: 95). How could the Task Force ensure that 
women’s interests were not again subordinate to the numerically more pressing 
interests of men once the new facilities were built, and monies allocated by the 
federal government incorporated into the budget of the provincial correctional 
authorities? For once the Task Force acknowledged its lack of consensus. CAEFS 
still favoured the appointment of a woman Deputy Commissioner, but the
22 To an extent, this did happen at the Bumaby Correctional Centre for Women, where the federal 
government shared responsibility with the provincial authorities. The crucial difference was that the 
federal government paid the provincial government to provide programmes and services equal to
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‘decentralised, management of CSC was alleged to make that difficult’ (TFFSW 
1990: 95). CSC was not called to account until 1996.23
The report was at last returned to the writers and the Task Force was able to present 
a draft copy to the Commissioner, with the Steering Committee’s comments 
appended in a letter. The Aboriginal chapter was missing and the crucial Short 
Term Recommendations (Emergency Measures, see below) were still to be 
finalised, but Mr. Ingstrup would have been in no doubt as to the radical nature of 
what was being proposed.
Consensus founders
A start had to be made on drafting the Emergency Measures to accompany the 
report. These were intended to provide immediately for those detained at the 
Prison for Women, as the Task Force knew that action should not be forestalled 
while the report was being considered by CSC. After an exhausting run-up to the 
December Steering Committee meeting, in early January some of the Working 
Group were involved in re-writing the report. It therefore fell to two others, again 
civil servants, to draft the Emergency Measures, based on what had been discussed 
(but not minuted) during their October meeting in Edmonton. An administrative 
oversight led to an incomplete copy of the preliminary Measures being sent to 
Patricia Monture, and she was astonished to note the lack of reference to Aboriginal 
women and their distinct culture. The content was so alarming as to prompt an 
angry letter from her, saying she had reached a conclusion that she had ‘been 
avoiding’. ‘You have used our participation to say that the First Nations were 
consulted. That consultation and our participation was meaningless’.24 This 
incident occurred at a particularly crucial time, when it was essential that the Task 
Force should present a united front to the Commissioner upon presentation of their
those available to federally sentenced women in the new prisons. However, the federally sentenced 
women held in British Columbia remained subject to provincial rules and regulations.
23 In 1996 Madam Justice Arbour recommended the appointment o f a Deputy Commissioner for 
Women and Nancy Stableforth was appointed later that year. However, the Wardens o f the new 
prisons reported directly to their Regional Deputy Commissioners, rather than directly to Ms 
Stableforth, so women still remained at a remove from the top level o f correctional administration.
24 4th January, 1990
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report. The civil servants on the Working Group realised this and advised the 
Solicitor General, to whom Prof. Monture had also written, that the ‘goal’ must be 
one of ‘maintaining the active participation of Aboriginal members in advancing 
the work of the Task Force’.25
Agreement on changes was eventually reached, but the question of incorporating 
Aboriginal perspectives did not end there. The Aboriginal chapter had been 
completed and submitted to the Working Group for inclusion in the final report. In 
one crucial paragraph, when discussing the interlinked nature of being both 
Aboriginal and a woman, the chapter stated: ‘ ... it is important to understand that 
we also share a common Aboriginal history. That common history is the history of 
racism, oppression, genocide and ethnocide’ (TFFSW 1989: 15, emphasis added). 
One of the Working Group, Joan Nuffield, was later to say: ‘My understanding was 
and is that while the United States’ government might reasonably be accused of
9£having such a policy [of genocide], this was never the case in Canada’. Further, 
Ms Nuffield doubted whether anyone on the Task Force was qualified to state
97definitively whether this had been Canadian policy. There was some discussion 
about the options available to her: that she should simply remove her name from 
the report; that she should leave it, but have an added footnote showing that she had 
withdrawn from the Task Force prior to finalisation of the report; that the issue 
should be treated with greater clarity in the chapter itself. However, by the time 
she received her copy of the draft report it had already been decided that time 
constraints made further alterations to the text impossible and, as a consequence,
Ms Nuffield decided that she could not sign the final copy. This decision meant 
that the report could be published without any hint of dissension attached to it and, 
publicly, the goal of consensus had been achieved. The omission of Ms Nuffield’s
25 Briefing Note 16th January, 1990
26 Note to author 20th September, 1999
27 For an alternative view see Chrisjohn & Young, with Maraun (1997) who present what they 
term the Irregular Account o f Indian Residential Schools, suggesting that genocide does not always 
involve killing. Forced assimilation can also be seen as a form o f genocide, with the Residential 
Schools’ policy being seen by some as an example o f this.
28 12th March, 1990
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name means, however, that few are now aware of her contribution to the Task 
Force.29
The task completed
The final report could not, and did not wish to, avoid the issue of suicide; the death 
of Sandy Sayer had been fundamental to the Working Group’s unanimous decision 
that the Prison for Women should be closed. The December draft had opened with 
almost the complete text of Ms Sayer’s submission, followed by: ‘Her death, her 
life and her words became a touch-stone ... a reference point whenever we were 
tempted to put our words and ideas before those of the women living through a 
federal sentence’ (draft, 14th December 1989). It was, however, eventually thought 
‘wrong and insulting to use her words [in the report] since she should not even have 
been at the Prison for Women’ [as a provincially-sentenced, involuntarily 
transferred prisoner]. An even earlier draft had dwelt in some detail on her death 
and concluded by saying that such ‘tragedies ... create profound doubts regarding 
the humaneness of the current system’.30 The completed report referred to suicide 
very briefly and contained an unfortunate editing error, which reads: ‘The questions 
posed around these tragedies leave no doubt about the humaneness of the current 
system’ (TFFSW 1990: 71, emphasis added). Nothing could have been further 
from what the Task Force saw as the truth.
Task Force members received the final draft of the report just prior to their final, 
joint meeting on the 19th February, 1990. All had been invited to submit 
comments earlier and one respondent from the Working Group wrote to the editors: 
‘I want to say that I have some appreciation for the difficulty you must be having in 
pulling this together while pleasing us all. In reading it through I see so many 
points that really didn’t get our fullest attention as a group and yet need to be dealt 
with in this brief. Two or three days with copy in hand and all editing together for 
consensus sake, (not to mention clarification) would have made quite a difference’.
29 The front cover o f the first edition o f Creating Choices carried a hazy photograph o f all the 
Working Group and Ms Nuffield is seen standing amongst them. However, as the members were 
not individually identified many readers o f Creating Choices would have had no idea who any o f  
those women were. Additionally, because the number o f women in the photo exceeded those listed 
in the report as belonging to the Working Group, the connection would not necessarily have been 
made.
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Indeed it would, but they had not been granted the time and the report was 
consequently more open to subsequent reinterpretation than anyone would have 
wished. There were some members who felt that the report left too much to 
chance, that it ‘unfailingly glossed over how the inevitable problems would be 
addressed once they began appearing’ and ‘that it painted a rather idyllic picture of 
how smoothly these new institutions would operate’.31 But in producing their 
report the Task Force ultimately achieved what had eluded other previous Inquiries; 
the closure of the Prison for Women. Although it had been a co-operative 
endeavour between the Steering Committee and the Working Group, the key 
members were the eleven women on the Working Group. At times uneasily co­
existing, they had attempted to cover every conceivable facet of imprisonment for 
federally sentenced women. By means of commissioned research, public 
consultations and their own individual expertise they had assembled a mass of data, 
which had had to be absorbed, processed and presented to the Commissioner within 
an extremely short period. It was inevitable that their best endeavours would in 
some areas be insufficient, given that they had only nine months in which to repair 
the damage occasioned by fifty-five years of federal imprisonment at the Prison for 
Women. It was also inevitable that the differing perspectives they individually 
brought to the deliberations should impinge on their ability to deal fully with all the 
issues raised.
On the 26th February, 1990 the Task Force Emergency Measures were presented to 
Commissioner Ingstrup and that same day another Aboriginal woman from 
Saskatchewan committed suicide in the Prison for Women. The Measures 
contained eight recommendations and perhaps the most important one, bearing in 
mind the suicides which had taken place during the lifetime of the Task Force -  and 
again directly afterwards -  was that transfers from provincial correctional 
institutions to the Prison for Women should be stopped. That recommendation was 
implemented almost immediately.
30 Undated draft o f what was then Chapter VI.
31 Letter to author 1999
169
Creating Choices was published on the 20th April, 1990 and on the 30th 
September, 1990 Mr. Ingstrup publicly accepted the report in its entirety. Work on 
implementation could begin.
Creating Choices
The previous chapter described the process by which the Working Group decided 
what should be done with the Prison for Women. They chose: closure; that the 
prison should be replaced by regional prisons, including a Healing Lodge; and 
where the new prisons should be located. In this chapter we have read something 
of what the Group envisaged as a new physical model of imprisonment. We 
already know that the ‘cottage’ had apparently returned to reclaim its historic place 
as an exemplar for women’s imprisonment, while the congregate-style penitentiary 
had been abandoned. The fruits of the Task Force’s deliberations were placed in 
the public domain with the publication of Creating Choices, and it is to this 
document we now turn to see if some of the questions raised in earlier chapters 
were warranted. In particular, we need to examine the truth of the supposition that 
the old prison had been displaced as an exemplar and ask if prisons are ever truly 
remodelled. We should also consider whether, as Shaw (1996: 195) has suggested, 
the report has contributed to the diverting of attention from ‘rethinking the use of 
imprisonment’, by disguising the true disciplinary intent of the prison.
We need to be clear, however, about the scope of the report itself. It attempted to 
paint a very broad picture of what had led to the formation of the Task Force. An 
analysis of the history of federal women’s imprisonment, and previous efforts to do 
something about its inequities, was set alongside the voices of imprisoned women 
themselves. The Task Force-commissioned research was used to provide a fuller 
picture of the women, their backgrounds and histories. We already know that an 
entire chapter was devoted to the Voices o f Aboriginal Peoples. Voices from the 
community were added to show that prisoners were also the responsibility of 
society, rather than solely CSC’s. There was less emphasis on the responsibility of 
the women themselves, for reasons which have already been discussed. It was a 
carefully developed schema intended to lead logically to the crux of the report, 
which was that the Prison for Women should be shut and replaced by new regional
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prisons. The Task Force wanted to demonstrate that they had covered all possible 
ground and that their final decisions were well-argued -  and irrefutable. They 
expected those responsible for implementation to be able to proceed, confident of 
being on the right path.
I do not propose examining in great detail what the report recommended, as much 
of this has already been covered here and elsewhere (see Shaw, 1993, 1996a,
1999b; Hannah-Moffat, 1994, 1997, 2001; Faith, 1993, 1995; Kendall, 1999, 2000; 
Monture, 2000; Pate, 1999). We know that the Task Force recommended:
• five new prisons and a Healing Lodge;
• spacious grounds to which the women would have access;
• a cottage-style of architecture, where women would live independently in small 
groups, while preparing for their eventual return to the community;
• cottages which could also accommodate children with their mothers;
• carefully selected and trained staff;
• innovative, holistic programmes, appropriate to the needs of the women, as well 
as programmes recognising cultural differences;
• planning and management of the Healing Lodge by Aboriginals, with 
Aboriginal ceremonies and programming being central to its day-to-day 
running;
• a complementary package of community-based services for women, including 
half-way houses and addiction treatment centres.
I do, however, want to look specifically at the use of language in Creating Choices; 
and then at the way particular perspectives consistently appeared throughout the 
report, while asking how and why this might have occurred.
32 Although the Task Force had accepted that the Burnaby Correctional Centre would not be 
replaced, they still recommended that a fifth prison should be in ‘the lower mainland o f British 
Columbia’ (TFFSW 1990: 114).
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Explaining the choices
Much of the critical debate about Creating Choices has centred on the way in 
which the language of feminism was incorporated into a penal strategy and 
subsequently had its original meaning reinterpreted. The Principles (chapter 10, 
TFFSW, 1990), which I have not previously discussed but have mentioned at 
various points, were central to the integrity of the report itself and its subsequent 
implementation. The Task Force always intended that, should questions arise at a 
later date, the Principles would provide a context for any decision-making. 
Although the Task Force does not appear to have made a minuted decision about 
this Creating Choices was, apart from one paragraph, remarkably free of references 
to feminism, choosing to describe itself as ‘women-centred’ instead (perhaps 
because they knew it would be easier for CSC to adopt the report if it were not seen 
as polemical). Nevertheless, the writers of Creating Choices believed they were 
espousing a largely feminist vision, even if the language used was not entirely 
‘owned’ by feminism, and this was particularly evident in the Principles (which are 
here briefly paraphrased).
1. Empowerment Federally sentenced women had been ‘dis-empowered’ by 
‘inequities’ and ‘reduced life choices’. Women were to be empowered through 
the provision of programmes which would help raise self-esteem and enable 
them to ‘accept and express responsibility for actions taken and future choices’ 
(TFFSW 1990: 105-107).
2. Meaningful and responsible choices This was linked to the principle of 
empowerment, in that raised self-esteem could be achieved through the 
availability of ‘meaningful options’ which would ‘allow them to make 
responsible choices’. The ‘options’ included better programmes within the new 
prisons and better community alternatives post-release. These ‘choices’ were to 
be relevant to their own needs, and in learning to make better personal choices 
women would be better equipped to avoid the cycles of dependency ‘on men, 
alcohol or drugs and / or on state financial assistance’ once their sentence was 
completed (TFFSW 1990: 107-108).
3. Respect and dignity This assumed the need for ‘mutuality of respect’ among 
‘prisoners, among staff and between prisoners and staff; that ‘if people are
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treated with respect and dignity they will be more likely to act responsibly’. It 
also recognised the importance to individuals of spirituality and cultural 
identity (TFFSW 1990: 109).
4. Supportive environment Empowerment, responsible choices, respect and 
dignity could only be aspired to -  and achieved -  in an environment which was 
positive and conducive to good physical and psychological health. This 
principle stressed that ‘equality ... cannot be reduced to equality of treatment in 
the sense of “sameness” of treatment, but must be understood as equality of 
outcome’ (TFFSW 1990: 110).
5. Shared responsibility This principle acknowledged that none of the others 
could be achieved without understanding that both corrections and the outside 
community shared responsibility for federally sentenced women (TFFSW 1990: 
111).
All of these Principles were later reinterpreted by CSC and moved some distance 
from what the Task Force, which remained faithful to its largely feminist roots, had 
intended. Perhaps the most immediately contentious appropriation of language 
centred on the use of empowerment and its relationship with meaningful and 
responsible choices. Kendall (1994: 3) wrote that she was: ‘concerned that the 
language of feminism [was] being appropriated and stripped of its subversive 
potential by corrections in order to facilitate the correctional agenda’. Hannah- 
Moffat examined the way in which, post-publication of Creating Choices, the 
interpretation of the language changed from the feminist or woman-centred 
approach of the Task Force, which assumed that women’s offending could not be 
divorced from ‘their life circumstances and the social context of their offences’, to 
one which had been defined anew by CSC, wherein a woman was ‘responsible for 
her own self-governance and for minimizing and managing her needs and the risk 
she posed to herself and the public’ (Hannah-Moffat 2001: 175,155; also see 
Balfour, 2000). The complexity of Hannah-Moffat’s analysis cannot be 
paraphrased here but, drawing partly on work by O’Malley (1992), she teased out 
the connection between what he referred to as ‘prudentialism’ (whereby individuals 
have responsibility for managing their own risk) and CSC’s assumption that, given 
appropriate options, imprisoned women would be able to make appropriate choices.
173
Moreover, that they would voluntarily choose to make these within the constraints 
of an environment in which they had been involuntarily confined and where the 
available options had been determined by CSC. In adopting this ‘responsibilising’ 
strategy CSC moved beyond the older ‘welfare strategies of rehabilitation 
[wherein] the state is responsible for the offender’s reformation’ to a position where 
the woman herself is entirely responsible (Hannah-Moffat 2000: 32).
In the Creating Choices model an interesting aspect of taking responsibility was the 
relationship between Hannah-Moffat’s ‘self-governing’ woman and staff, a 
connection characterised as ‘dynamic security’ which contributed to the smooth- 
running of the prison (TFFSW 1990: 117). Although a member of the Steering 
Committee had, at their concluding meeting, urged that the section in the report on 
staffing should be strengthened, the final version did not dwell at great length on 
their role. It recognised that there would have to be changes in the way staff were 
both selected and trained, but did not fully address the inherent inequality between 
women and staff and the fact that it was ‘the authority of the position [of guard] 
which exact[ed] co-operation (Faith 1993: 163; also Kendall, 1993). It certainly 
did not address the possibility that new staff would require intense support from 
CSC as they coped with new jobs, in untested prisons, with prisoners also adapting 
to a new environment. One of the expectations of staff was that they should ‘create 
an environment where relationships based on role-modelling, support, trust and 
democratic decision making’ could thrive (TFFSW 1990: 88, emphasis added), 
ignoring the point that coercive environments could never be democratic 
environments. The tension between the security and supportive role of a guard 
would always be resolved in favour of security, because the prime function of a 
guard was to retain control (Liebling & Price, 2001). Much of the Task Force’s 
planning was contingent upon the success of staff / prisoner relationships: the levels 
of physical security; how many, if any, staff should be in each living unit; the 
willingness of the women to respond to a different type of guard. The self- 
governing woman became, in effect, an integral part of the governance of the prison 
because her ‘responsible’ choices -  made possible through the benevolence of CSC 
-  contributed to its good order. Her choices could never be made entirely in what 
she perceived to be her own best interests, because the welfare of others also had to
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be taken into account, as did the probable judgement of staff. Additionally, the 
final judgement as to what was an appropriate choice was made by others, rather 
than herself, so in correctional terms, ‘consequence’ appeared to be the obverse of 
‘choice’. While this might be said to replicate the choices made on a daily basis by 
those living outside prison, the crucial difference is the loss of autonomy. This 
applies to everyday events where, in certain situations, the expression of anger may 
be construed as an entirely appropriate response, yet in the confines of a prison it 
may be seen as inappropriate. Within an abnormal environment -  and the 
involuntary discipline attached to prisons means that they can never be anything 
other than abnormal by comparison with life on the outside -  prisoners are 
expected to behave in an abnormal fashion in order to be seen to be behaving 
responsibly. For prisoners to resort to normal human behaviour is to risk the 
possibility of its being interpreted as failure to address the reason for their 
imprisonment. To resist within an abnormal environment, especially when the 
resistance is focused on choices which the prisoner might feel are inadequate, is not 
seen as a positive response. It is again seen as failure, whereas Shaw argues that ‘in 
such circumstances, the actions of prisoners should be regarded as rational 
responses rather than character flaws’ (Shaw, 1994 cited in Kendall, 1998; also, see 
Bosworth, 1999). Eaton suggests that women ‘preserve something of the self by 
‘withold[ing] that self from engagement with the world of the prison. ... [and that 
the women’s] ‘way to make a choice [is] to choose not to choose’ (Eaton 1993: 42, 
emphasis added). Under the model first presented by the Task Force, and later 
defined by CSC, the right to choose could not be declined. To fail to choose was 
ultimately to act irresponsibly, with consequences that could reverberate as far as 
Parole Board hearings. Yet choice was the cornerstone of the Task Force’s plan.
As I have earlier suggested, the notion of ‘responsible choice’ was predicated on its 
interpretation by a largely middle-class Task Force, whose members assumed that 
individuals should, and could, make choices which balanced the competing needs 
of those around them. Such rationality is not always easily achieved, especially 
amongst women who have not experienced much order in their own lives, and the 
rhetoric to which federally sentenced women were exposed prior to being removed 
to the new prisons did not, generally, touch on the new responsibilities they were to
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assume. ‘Choices’ were obscured by the larger vision of the new physical style of 
the prisons and, as we shall see, some of the women arrived at the prisons with 
inflated expectations of the degree of freedom to which they would be exposed, 
largely because of the enthusiasm of staff who had discussed the new prisons with 
them prior to transfer. The question of involving federally sentenced women in 
responsibility for their own imprisonment is something to which I will return in a 
later chapter, but more particularly in relation to the Healing Lodge, where the 
degree of responsibility and self-governance demanded of the Aboriginal women is 
potentially greater than for non-Aboriginals because of the added dimension of 
culture and spirituality.
Hiding the reality
Such discussions are of particular importance in terms of what emerged following 
the implementation of the report, but they have also been dealt with by others in 
some detail (see Shaw, 1993, 1996a, 1999b; Hannah-Moffat, 1994, 1997, 2001; 
Bruckert, 1993; Faith, 1993, 1995; Kendall, 1999, 2000; Monture, 2000; Pate, 
1999). Here I want to look at the fundamental use of language by the Task Force. 
We already know of the Working Group’s ambivalence towards helping create new 
prisons and this showed in the way they discussed them. In the October Minutes, 
when the Working Group was in the midst of planning five new prisons, the actual 
word ‘prison’ was not used at all (apart from the times when the Group referred to 
the Prison for Women). Instead, the prisons were transformed into ‘facilities’ or 
‘new accommodation’, each having a ‘milieu’ or ‘environment’. One member went 
so far as to stress that her ‘support for construction is contingent on not building a 
bars and cells penitentiary but rather a place where troubled people live while 
learning to deal with their problems’. It was a remarkable linguistic sleight of 
hand, echoing the language used to justify the rebuilding of Holloway (see Rock, 
1996) and the detention of women at Comton Vale in Scotland (see Carlen, 1983). 
The eventual report conjured up an image of prisons having the ‘milieu’ of a 
‘facility’ run by social workers (as, indeed, many of the new staff had previously 
been).
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Such circumlocution -  or Controltalk (see Cohen, 1985) -  continued with the 
publication of Creating Choices and subsequent CSC policy documents. When the 
new prisons opened they were named ‘institutions’, and spoken of as ‘facilities’, 
and the new Aboriginal prison remained a ‘Healing Lodge’, in itself an 
extraordinary euphemism for a place of confinement. The prisons consisted of 
‘cottages’ and the cottages contained ‘bedrooms’, rather than cells. The originally- 
named Assessment Cottage became an Enhanced Unit -  and was actually a 
maximum security complex. When the report portrayed the community aspect of 
the new plans for federally sentenced women, the accommodation was described as 
‘community release centres’, ‘half-way house’ and ‘satellite units’, avoiding the 
fact that there remained elements of supervision (or discipline) at each. By the 
implementation stage, guards or correctional officers had been transformed from 
‘staff into ‘primary workers’ (also see Bruckert, 1993; Faith, 1993). The custodial 
relationship had been made to disappear by a feat of linguistic engineering. I 
would suggest that this can be directly related to the Task Force’s and, more 
specifically, the Working Group’s reluctance, thanks to the demands of consensus, 
to dwell too much on the fact that they were building prisons. Culhane referred to 
such usage as: ‘ “system” language which denies prisoners the reality of their own 
existence [and] also serves to cloud public perception of life behind prison walls’ 
(Culhane 1991: 20). Faith also commented: ‘... to the women themselves, the 
euphemisms are offensive. To the person who is forcibly confined within them, 
these places are prisons and they are prisoners’ (Faith 1993: 123). Ross added that 
such ‘euphemisms are too gentle and subsequently, misleading in the description of 
the experience of imprisoned women’ (Ross 1998: 126). Yet such soft language 
helps legitimate the prison, conferring upon it an apparent normality, while the 
actual discipline imposed by the prison -  assisted, in the Canadian case, by the 
anticipated self-discipline of the prisoners -  is very far from normal. ‘Controltalk’ 
is not a recent phenomenon (Cohen, 1983 & 1985); it has a long and dishonourable 
history in disguising the reality of imprisonment and, as Bruckert (1993: 17) 
contended: ‘... obscures the harsh reality of coercive social control [and] allows 
middle class reformers and workers to justify (and conceptualise) their roles as 
benevolent’. Yet, in adopting such language, the Working Group had found a 
device by which they could disguise, or at least minimise, the reality of their
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endeavour -  and finally produce a plan. The ‘facilities’ and ‘institutions’ were the 
very end of the road paved by consensus; the prison had disappeared.
Different voices; absent voices
Alongside the language so consistently embraced by the Task Force there is another 
highly visible strand. To explore this we must look back at the formation of the 
Task Force and remember that the original vision was of a partnership between 
CSC and CAEFS. With the addition of the Aboriginal members a ‘distinct’ 
dimension of culture and ethnicity was added to the profile of federally sentenced 
women, dividing them into two groups. At the same time another ‘distinct’ society, 
that of Quebec, was not separately represented on the most influential of the Task 
Force’s two parties, the Working Group, and francophones were eventually planned 
for as though they had no identity other than that of Euro-Canadian. Despite 
subsequent CSC protestations that it would have been impolitic to have allowed 
separate representation, we have seen that during the life of the Task Force itself an 
unsuccessful attempt was made to co-opt a Quebecois civil servant on to the 
Working Group. I asked in chapter 2 if there might be some importance attached to 
the original suggestion that *a native person [as well as] ‘two provincial 
representatives ’33 should be on the Task Force. At the time their inclusion was 
suggested it was no more than a recognition of the significance of the two 
constituencies, but how they were both subsequently dealt with raises questions 
about inclusion and exclusion within Canadian society and the complex nature of 
ethnic identity in a colonised country. I now suggest that Creating Choices itself 
forces us to think anew about the way marginalised groups may capitalise on 
opportunities presented to them -  and that the Aboriginals exploited the 
opportunity provided by the Task Force in a manner not previously recognised.
The bare facts speak for themselves. In its 133 pages Creating Choices contained a 
separate Aboriginal chapter, alongside twelve substantial sections addressing 
Aboriginal issues and perspectives. Additionally, there were innumerable 
references to Aboriginal concerns throughout the report. Creating Choices was 
quite frank about what was intended: ‘... it was agreed that every effort would be
33 16th September, 1988
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made by the non-Aboriginal members to understand the Aboriginal perspective and 
to integrate this understanding, with support from Aboriginal members, throughout 
the report’ (TFFSW 1990: 98). Consequently, each new idea introduced by the 
Task Force was also examined from an Aboriginal perspective. The Principles, 
with only one exception, also referred to Aboriginal concerns and began with a 
preamble which further highlighted the specific injustices experienced by 
Aboriginal women. The Healing Lodge was initially introduced with a caveat not 
extended to the other proposed new prisons: ‘It was clear from the outset however, 
that this conclusion [that there should be a Healing Lodge] was only the conclusion 
of this Task Force. In order to be accepted, this idea must not only be embraced by 
the Correctional Service of Canada but must be developed by and connected to 
Aboriginal communities’ (TFFSW 1990: 100). However, when the Task Force 
introduced the ‘Recommended Plan’ they wrote: ‘it is a plan which must be seen, 
assessed and implemented in its entirety. Isolating parts of the plan, and adopting 
or rejecting these parts without seeing their vital interrelationship to the whole, 
would destroy the integrity of the plan’ (TFFSW 1990: 114). Taken to its logical 
conclusion such a statement -  in association with the previous one -  implied that, 
should Aboriginal communities refuse to be associated with the Healing Lodge, the 
entire plan would be scuppered. This, of course, was not the Task Force’s 
intention; it was simply a failure of editing, because the Aboriginal members had 
already made it clear that the Healing Lodge, while contingent upon the support of 
the Elders and Aboriginal communities, had in principle been backed. But it 
illustrates the deference accorded Aboriginal participation -  and was a deference 
not shown to others.
All of this was in marked contrast to the attention paid to that other distinct group, 
the francophones of Quebec, who might have been considered eligible for at least 
provincial consideration. Creating Choices had no separate chapter devoted to 
francophone needs and aspirations. In all, there were eight references to Quebec 
and only one paragraph focused specifically on the province. That, however, was 
set in the context of what had happened historically, rather than what might happen 
in the future. Of the 60 quotes which opened the report, from women who had been 
or were federal prisoners, 26 were from women identified as Aboriginal; there were
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no quotes recognisably from women from Quebec. Of the 54 quotes used to 
identify ‘the voices of others who care’, 14 came from representatives of 
Aboriginal organisations and one was from Quebec. There was a brief reference to 
the need to reduce language and cultural barriers for francophones, issues which 
had largely been won in the province during the 1980s, but, overall, Quebec’s 
needs and aspirations were almost totally ignored. The francophone women were 
not seen as a distinct cultural group meriting separate attention; rather, they were 
incorporated and seen as being no different from other Euro-Canadian federally 
sentenced women from across the country.
Did this matter? The most obvious point to make is one provided by a member of 
the Task Force: There was no doubt. I f  there was an institution in Quebec there 
was no doubt in any o f our minds that it was going to be French. ... I f  you have the 
institution here, we 11 take care o f it, it will be culturally ours. There’s no way, 
because o f  the people who will be staffing it, because o f the environment, that it 
will not meet cultural needs .. ,34 In the event, because of the National 
Implementation Committee’s decision that the new Quebec prison would not be 
built in Montreal but in the small, almost totally francophone town of Joliette, this 
was even more true than anticipated, yet it also reflected a characteristically 
Quebecois pattern of quiet subversion. Quebec might have been omitted from the 
Working Group, but the francophones would continue doing what they had been 
doing for centuries in the face of continued anglophone failure to recognise their 
distinct culture and status as a nation; they would cultivate their own francophone 
environment as the new prison emerged from the drawing board. This was an 
important lesson to be drawn from the omission of Quebec from the Working 
Group, yet it fails to explain why they should have been neglected in the first place 
and why I have pursued the question of Quebecois exclusion. Quebec was not a 
province that the federal government customarily ignored and, in the decade 
leading up to the Task Force, Quebec had seldom been absent from the wider 
Canadian political debate. The conclusion I have reached is that the civil servants 
were initially so focused on forging a partnership with CAEFS, partly in order to 
legitimate the venture, that the broader political perspectives, which generally
34 Interview 32
180
prevailed whenever Task Forces were formed, were no longer seen to be pre­
eminent. CAEFS was essential to the public success of the venture; Quebec was 
not. What this demonstrates is the way in which political considerations alter over 
time. Quebec has always been -  and will conceivably remain, unless demographic 
factors affect the province disproportionately -  both an integral, yet consciously 
separate, part of Canada. Its cause has been publicly espoused over centuries of 
dissension but, as Canada has become more cosmopolitan, the debate over 
Canadian identity has had to encompass many diverse groups. As the country has 
started to come to terms with its changing face it has also had to confront its 
engagement with those peoples who were stripped of their heritage by the 
successive colonisation of the French and the English. The civil servants charged 
with assembling the Task Force were unexpectedly faced by an able and forceful 
group of Aboriginal women, and the civil servants’ knowledge of Canadian history 
enabled them to recognise the strength of the Aboriginals’ claim for membership. 
As it eventually transpired, the Aboriginals’ participation became essential to the 
legitimacy of the Task Force, in the same way that CAEFS had legitimised the 
venture at the outset. For once, the Aboriginals’ claims took precedence over those 
of the colonisers -  and the less powerful of the colonisers, the Quebecois, were 
assumed to be little different from other Euro-Canadians.
When subsequently asked to justify the omission of Quebec from the Working 
Group the civil servants’ explanation relied on the difficulties associated with 
acknowledging one province ahead of another, but this was disproved by the 
attempt to co-opt a Quebec correctional official. When pressed further, it was 
suggested that conceivably CAEFS should have selected a Quebecois 
representative for the Working Group, as this would have removed the possibility 
of a federal department causing offence to the provinces, while still allowing 
Quebec perspectives to be heard at the most influential table.35 This was not the 
function of CAEFS -  and it could not be assumed that all their representatives 
would have been concerned about Quebec, either. As one CAEFS’ representative 
said: From where I  sit in the west, Quebec is another province like the rest o f us.
To me, there is another province that has its idiosyncrasies, as we do here. We
35 Private notes 2000
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struggle with some things, they struggle with others. . . . I t ’s not like the Aboriginal 
population who have a separate identity that has really gone unheard -  that really 
matters very, very strongly. In Canadian history we have not heard them, paid 
attention, and we absolutely were so committed to putting a document together that 
heard them, that said you are a part o f this experience, o f  what we need to learn, o f  
what we have to do.
The civil servants then became involved in the unanticipated issue of Aboriginal 
representation and became further distanced from federal -  provincial dilemmas. 
Part of this can best be explained from a francophone perspective: I ’m saying that 
the Aboriginal question was taken more seriously than the French question because 
they ’re [civil servants] used to the French. We’ve been saying things since day one 
... they’ve heard everything! This body o f Aboriginal strength, and what it 
represented in terms o f loss fo r  Canada ... obviously they [Aboriginals] are sitting 
on an awful lot o f  land, so what I ’m talking about is that all this can be lost, the 
consequences are enormous. And in the midst of this was a particularly important 
point; that the civil servants were dealing with an unfamiliar group and were not as 
sure-footed as usual. Obviously the French are important, but it is more 
frightening to be confronted by people you are more estranged from. Certainly the 
English are less estranged from the French than they are from the Aboriginal 
groups. So the fact that they did not know where they [Aboriginals] were coming 
from, what to expect, how organised they were, where they were going, made it 
much more threatening to the civil servants in Ottawa. And the guilt, also, that has 
been there forever. They have never fe lt guilty about the French!
Remembering the shared aspirations of both the Quebecois and the Aboriginals -  
that they should be recognised as ‘distinct’ societies and have the right to self- 
determination -  it could perhaps be assumed that, together, they might have been 
effective allies on such a Task Force. This would be to ignore the legacy of distrust 
felt by Aboriginals towards the ‘dominant culture’ (of which Quebec was perceived 
to be a part) and a fundamental linguistic divide between themselves and the
36 Interview 28
37 Interview 32
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Quebecois.38 Relatively few Aboriginals speak French: I t ’s so different because o f 
the language barrier, because most o f the Aboriginals are English speaking. ... the 
language barrier is enormous. It was almost felt, from the Quebec point o f view, 
that the Aboriginals were mostly English-speaking -  so they were separate in two 
ways.39 Moreover, the francophones had always had provincial representation of 
their perspectives, even if these were not always heard in the federal arena. This 
sense of Quebecois territoriality was not one permitted the Aboriginals who, in 
many cases, had been removed from their historic homelands. Additionally, the 
Aboriginals had no official parliamentary base to use as a platform for their 
grievances and were taking advantage of an opportunity -fortuitously provided by 
the Task Force -  both to work for the good of Aboriginal federally sentenced 
women and to publicise their wider political aspirations.
So by the time the report was being written there was a group of civil servants, 
some of whom had been hand-picked because they were there as unofficial 
representatives of the Commissioner, who found themselves unexpectedly 
outnumbered by those from the voluntary sector. The civil servants early on 
discovered that the Aboriginals had an agenda which exceeded the Mandate; they 
wanted to discuss self-government and a system of criminal justice which reflected 
Aboriginal custom. Above all they wanted to discuss the issues which contributed 
to the disproportionate criminalising of Aboriginal women -  and that meant 
exploring the period before ‘commencement of sentence’, an area specifically 
excluded by the Mandate. Despite being told that this was not part of the Task 
Force’s remit the Aboriginal members used every opportunity to pursue these 
points. Moreover, their insistence that the other members of the Task Force should 
be ‘educated’ in an Aboriginal history of racism, abuse and poverty had the dual 
effect of simultaneously raising awareness and subduing debate on Aboriginal 
issues.
38 This distrust was to explode disastrously during the standoff, lasting 78 days, between Mohawks 
and the army at Oka, in 1990. The conflict centred on 39 hectares o f land, claimed by the Mohawks 
as historically theirs, and which the local municipality wanted to develop as a golf course. See 
Frideres (1993) for a chronology and discussion o f the event. Also, see Wagamese (1996) for a 
more personal view o f what happened.
39 Interview 32
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Bearing in mind that the final draft of the report was written by civil servants it is 
remarkable just how completely the Aboriginal message permeated Creating 
Choices.40 What is perhaps even more remarkable is the way that this so influenced 
the debate on all federally sentenced women. The characterisation of federally 
sentenced women as ‘victims’ provided an illustration of this point. Although the 
Steering Committee at its final meeting had urged that greater emphasis should be 
placed on the part federally sentenced women had played in victimising others -  
and Creating Choices went some way towards doing this -  the women’s offending 
remained situated in a social context which somewhat extenuated their behaviour:
The Task Force ... is built on the acceptance of responsibility by the 
women, by the justice system, by the government and by communities. But 
while this responsibility includes the need to address and repair harm done 
by federally sentenced women, it puts these incidents into the context o f  
social inequalities and structures which define and lead to crime (TFFSW 
1990: 132, emphasis added).
As suggested in chapter 4, much of the discourse surrounding ‘women as victims’ 
originated from the largely undisputed view that Aboriginal women were indeed 
victims of an unequal society. There was no apparent debate of the feminist view 
that to label women simply as ‘victims’ was to perpetuate paternalistic notions and 
disempower women prisoners even further’ (Kendall 1993: 29). As the Task Force, 
and particularly the Working Group, came to see the imprisoned women as 
individuals who had committed offences in certain circumstances, rather than as an 
amorphous group of federally sentenced women, it became harder to categorise 
them all as women who had created victims, despite the legal reality that they were. 
As they were working within the constraints of ‘consensus’, the Working Group 
could not label just one group of federally sentenced women, the Aboriginals, 
‘victims’. They could not attach a caveat to their work and did not wish to. 
Additionally, the Working Group was determined that the final report should not be 
interpreted in a manner which might lead to groups of women being treated 
unequally. The acceptance of the Aboriginal rhetoric spilled over into how they 
came to view all federally sentenced women and, in the end, the Working Group 
found that they could not differentiate between them.
40 As earlier noted, an external editor, Linda McLeod, was employed for the final draft.
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In the light of the widespread Aboriginal influence apparent throughout the report, I 
believe that we should look at Creating Choices anew. Not just as a document on 
penal affairs, but as a political document and a subversive one at that. I think it is 
reasonable to say that Creating Choices is much more of an Aboriginal statement of 
intent than has ever been acknowledged. It is a robust riposte to the offensiveness 
of The Task Force on the Reintegration o f Aboriginal Offenders as Law-Abiding 
Citizens and to the failure of the Women in Conflict with the Law initiative, from 
which the Aboriginals had withdrawn. The Aboriginals were not expected to be 
part of the Task Force; two were then included on the most important of the two 
parties, the Working Group, and a further three were placed on the Steering 
Committee. Federally sentenced women were to be consulted, but not included on 
the Task Force; the Aboriginals ensured that two Aboriginal federally sentenced 
women joined the Steering Committee. Commissioned research was to ‘have a 
sound empirical basis’ so at to satisfy the demands of the Treasury Board 41; the 
Aboriginals were eventually encouraged to undertake their own forms of research. 
Discussion of an Aboriginal justice system was outside the remit of the Mandate; 
this impossibility was addressed frankly at various points in the report and therefore 
put the question of Aboriginal government, self-determination and justice firmly in 
the public domain. In short, Aboriginal influences permeated Creating Choices and 
the reasons were made explicit in the report: ‘Just as we cannot tack women on to a 
men-oriented system of corrections, so we cannot tack Aboriginal women on to any 
system be it for men or women’ (TFFSW 1990: 99). Yet who wrote the final draft? 
With the exception of the chapter The Voices o f Aboriginal People, that final draft 
was written by the civil servants. While it could be suggested that the civil servants 
resorted to expediency and incorporated Aboriginal perspectives in order to add 
political legitimacy to the document, I believe that, largely, they had come to accept 
the validity of the Aboriginals’ case. They had sat through lengthy, often painful, 
meetings with the Working Group and were in no doubt that Creating Choices ‘had 
to reflect / be consistent with Working Group discussions -  and the Aboriginal fact 
was very strong in these discussions’.42 The civil servants’ conversion, bearing in
41 Memorandum 28th April, 1989
42 Personal letter August, 2001
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mind the genesis of the whole project and their expected supervisory role, was an 
extraordinary turn of events.
One of the civil servants was asked if she thought that the Aboriginals viewed the 
Task Force as a political opportunity: It seems to me that [they] would have and 
[they] would have been foolish not to have seen it as that.43 Another senior civil 
servant was asked the same question and the reply was: Yes, you can see from the 
results that they brought forward the Aboriginal agenda, then adding,... the other 
element was very clearly that we were lucky with the Aboriginal representatives, 
that they made their points and got their issues on the table. Their agenda was 
fully understood and i f  we had more shy people it wouldn ’t have happened.44 A 
member of the Steering Committee perhaps best encapsulated this when she said: /  
would say that those who have gained most out o f  Creating Choices are the 
Aboriginals. That was not the original intention -  the original intention was to 
have all women gain from  Creating Choices. When you look back at what has 
happened I  would say that certainly the Aboriginals are the great winners.45
Yet all of this still does not answer why I have pursued the exclusion of Quebec 
from the Working Group. I would suggest that in doing so the civil servants -  most 
probably inadvertently -  continued the pattern, begun at the time of the Conquest, 
of assuming that the Quebecois could be absorbed into the larger anglophone body 
politic. Although the British North American Act 1867 had specifically (and 
inaccurately) referred to the British and French as the ‘founding nations’ of 
Canada, the reality had been that they had not lived as two equal nations within the 
Confederation. Quebec had consistently needed to assert its unique cultural 
identity and in the 1980s was finding it increasingly hard to do so as more 
anglophones moved in to the province. The 1980 referendum on ‘sovereignty- 
association’ had been lost, but the debate continued (and was to be the subject of 
another narrowly-lost referendum in 1995). Quebec was of paramount importance 
to the rest of Canada because its departure from Confederation, even with economic 
ties remaining, might have impelled other provinces to consider similar action to
43 Interview 30
44 Interview 27
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safeguard what they saw as ‘their’ resources, such as oil. The subject of the Task 
Force was of little importance to the vast majority of Canadians, including 
Quebecois, but it was yet another in a seemingly unending line of government- 
sponsored initiatives which ignored Quebec’s wish to be sovereign. The anglo- 
Canadians were once again taking charge of matters which, in Quebecois’ eyes, 
were sovereign. To the civil servants of CSC, intent on planning a relatively 
obscure Task Force, the participation of CAEFS appeared to be the main prize. But 
to those Quebecois aware of the initiative, the failure to consider their needs -  
especially once the Aboriginals had been included in such numbers -  was yet 
another instance of their being sidelined, another instance of their culture being 
disregarded. In short, the civil servants’ political antennae deserted them. I do not 
believe that, had the Quebecois been included on the Working Group, the final 
report would have been significantly different, but it would have reflected in a 
distinctive fashion the perspectives of those two groups of original colonisers. The 
quest for sovereignty, culture and distinctiveness as separate nations is what binds 
both the Aboriginals and the Quebecois, even though Aboriginals might dispute the 
legitimacy of Quebec’s claims to sovereignty. The civil servants recognised neither 
claim in planning the Task Force, and subsequently found their carefully balanced 
enterprise disrupted once the Aboriginals gained seats at the table. The Aboriginals 
took their opportunity and indeed might appear to be ‘the great winners’.
Conclusions and looking ahead
In the light of what has subsequently happened, following the implementation of 
Creating Choices, this last statement needs to be tested. In the next chapter we 
look at what happened once Creating Choices passed into the hands of the National 
Implementation Committee and assess how faithfully the report’s intentions were 
interpreted. I touch briefly on two seminal events which occurred prior to the 
opening of the new prisons; the decision by CAEFS to withdraw from the 
implementation process, and events at the Prison for Women in April 1994, which 
led to the Arbour Commission. After this brief summary -  which is no more than a 
bridge to later developments -  we look at the opening of the new prison in 
Edmonton and, in the following chapter, the opening of Nova Institution for
45 Interview 32
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Women, in Nova Scotia. Both of these prisons were more fully envisaged by the 
Task Force, as were the other largely non-Aboriginal prisons. It is with an 
understanding of what they faced during their first years of opening that we finally 
move to the Healing Lodge, and attempt to analyse the view presented by that 
member of the Task Force, that the Aboriginals were the great winners of the Task 
Force’s enterprise.
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6. Edmonton Institution for Women
Having completed its work, the Task Force was disbanded and its painstakingly 
prepared plan for closure and replacement of the Prison for Women was returned to 
the civil servants for the next stage; implementation. In the following chapters we 
examine what happened as all the new prisons emerged from conjecture into 
physical reality, then pay particular attention to the first three of the new prisons to 
open. It is important, for the historical record, to document how those three prisons 
individually fared because the passage of time inevitably affects and clouds what is 
remembered of events. Commentators have addressed the initiative, producing 
compelling assessments of the philosophy underpinning Creating Choices and the 
way in which this was translated into a correctional rationale justifying later 
amendments by CSC (see Shaw, 1993,1996a, 1999b; Hannah-Moffat, 1994,1997, 
2001; Faith, 1993, 1995; Kendall, 1999, 2000; Monture, 2000; Pate, 1999). Their 
analysis has not focused on specific prisons; neither have they compared and 
contrasted the development of each. Yet it is in such detail that we might find 
explanations for why things unfolded as they did and the next three chapters chart 
three different stories, all arising from the pages of Creating Choices.
Upon beginning the attempt to replace the Prison for Women, the Task Force found 
it had to devise a blueprint, rather than rely on precedent set by other jurisdictions. 
None offered innovation on the scale it was seeking and those apparent pockets of 
excellence which did exist were not always fully documented or evaluated.1 As a 
Task Force member later said, ‘we were desperate to see what was new ... ’. This 
provides another reason for a close scrutiny of Creating Choices, because its 
implementation was watched with interest across the world, not least because CSC 
went to great lengths to publicise what they were doing. The report was potentially 
a landmark document for imprisoned women, and other jurisdictions were anxious 
to see what could be learned. For the moment we need to know just what happened 
in Canada. This was a specifically Canadian enterprise and the lessons -  if, indeed, 
there are any to be learned -  may partly be drawn from what happened on the 
ground in Canada. The Canadians involved in the Task Force, even those who
1 Both Margaret Shaw (1991a) and Lee Axon (1989) provided comprehensive reviews o f  
international trends and practices for the Task Force.
2 Personal notes 2001
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were civil servants, wanted to provide solutions for Canadian federally sentenced 
women, and it was only subsequently that CSC ‘marketed’ the work of the Task 
Force as a possible model for other jurisdictions. The following chapters 
sometimes rely on straight narrative, so that we are not distracted from this 
essentially Canadian story. But the account will also be situated in the context of 
other penal reform initiatives, so that we may appreciate what could conceivably 
have been learned -  and avoided -  by both the Task Force and those responsible for 
implementation as the new prisons were built and then opened.
The background to these chapters is what has preceded them; the history of how 
and why the Task Force came together and what it jointly produced. To set the 
scene for what follows we must briefly return to the history of how the prisons were 
planned and what happened while they were being constructed. We do not need to 
know the role the individual correctional regions played in the planning process 
because, although they were undoubtedly partners in the construction, the prisons 
remained a federal venture.
Withdrawing from the partnership
The brief final chapter of Creating Choices outlined how the Task Force’s plan 
should be implemented. It was less than specific about the means, recommending 
that a ‘very senior management position’ should be created ‘for the sole purpose of 
implementing the plan’, and that ‘the Commissioner [should] establish an 
externally based implementation committee which would report directly to him’, 
and be ‘comprised of a federally sentenced women as well as representatives from 
the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, the Aboriginal Women’s 
Caucus and Status of Women Canada’ (TFFSW 1990: 130). CSC’s response was 
to establish a National Implementation Committee (NIC) in November 1990, 
consisting solely of civil servants and chaired by Jane Miller-Ashton, who was by 
then the National Co-ordinator for the Federally Sentenced Women Initiative. An 
External Advisory Committee (EAC) was later struck comprising representatives 
from CAEFS, NWAC and Status of Women Canada, but no federally sentenced 
women. The EAC was to have a role similar to that of the Steering Committee on 
the Task Force, but with very much less influence. (Aboriginal women were also 
involved in separate planning for the Healing Lodge undertaken by a NIC sub­
committee.) There were no Aboriginal women on the actual NIC, even though 
Aboriginal women inevitably had to be provided for in all the proposed new
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prisons. To begin with the NIC anticipated that all information (apart from Advice 
to Ministers) would be exchanged with ‘outside agencies’ so as not to undermine 
those agencies’ trust (NIC Minutes January 1991: 11), but within a few short 
months this position had changed dramatically. This is best illustrated in relation to 
decisions taken about site location.
At its first meeting the NIC immediately set about deciding the location and 
selection criteria for the proposed new prisons. As we know, the Task Force 
recommended five new prisons, in addition to a Healing Lodge, and had been 
specific about their locations, believing that the prisons should be placed close to 
established networks of community support and in locations most easily accessible 
for family visits. However, a new British Columbia prison was not contemplated, 
because of the newly built Burnaby Correctional Centre for Women. By their 
second meeting, in January 1991, the NIC had largely endorsed the areas chosen by 
the Task Force, but had identified Toronto as the preferred Ontario site, a city 
which the Working Group had already rejected. Other communities were not to be 
discouraged from submitting proposals, but were to be told that the ‘criteria’ 
pointed to a ‘location near a major urban centre’ (NIC January, 1991). In other 
words, the decisions of the Task Force were not considered conclusive by the NIC, 
which suggests that CSC assumed ownership of the project as soon as the 
Commissioner accepted Creating Choices. In March, however, the NIC’s Minutes 
became evasive; the ‘list of communities [to be considered for a prison]’ being 
mailed to members had to be treated as confidential. The April Minutes did not 
mention location at all -  and 128 communities across the country had already asked 
to be considered for the new prisons. By July 1991 Corrections’ officials, knowing 
there had been a change in policy, were concerned that any site announcement 
could leave the Minister ‘open to some embarrassment’ if he were to hold a formal 
news conference. The communities earlier identified by the Task Force would be 
expecting confirmation of their selection, rather than news that the site radius had 
been extended. The matter was expected to be of ‘particular concern to members of 
the EAC [External Advisory Committee] and the Halifax Elizabeth Fry Society’ as 
those ‘individuals and their organisations ha[d] been reviewing CSC documents 
pertaining to the Federally Sentenced Women’s Initiative for the past six months 
[and] none of [those] documents ha[d] given any indication that CSC ... would
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consider looking outside the vicinity of the recommended communities’. A further 
memorandum spoke of a reluctance to ‘send out the June and July minutes due to 
the confidential content, yet we have no explanation to offer the External Advisory 
Committee [for any delay]’ (13th July, 1991).4 On the 31st July 1991 it was 
announced that communities within 100 kilometres of each of the Task Force- 
specified locations (with the exception of the Healing Lodge) -  Halifax, Montreal, 
central / south western Ontario and Edmonton -  could submit bids to have a new 
prison in their area. In the prairies, Calgary was added to Edmonton as a possible 
area for consideration. As we shall see in the next chapter, there were immediate 
protests from organisations which had been closely allied to the Task Force, 
particularly regarding the Atlantic region locality.
CAEFS concluded it was being deliberately excluded from the decision-making 
process, and by the beginning of 1992 its new Executive Director, Kim Pate, was 
seeking advice from her Board as to whether CAEFS should consider withdrawing 
its support for implementation.5 CAEFS failed, as we shall see, to dissuade CSC 
from allocating the new Atlantic prison to Truro, rather than Halifax, and this 
added to their concerns. Yet their criticism had to be carefully weighed, not least 
because of ever-present worries about government funding should they be seen as 
too adversarial. It was suggested by a Board member that they had been 
‘politically naive in failing to foresee how the site selection process could become 
so politicised’.6 Indeed, the signals that CSC would not share responsibility for the 
building of the new prisons with CAEFS had been present throughout the life of the 
Task Force, beginning with Mr. Ingstrup’s announcement, during initial discussions 
with CAEFS about the structure of the Task Force, that he would be retaining 
financial accountability for the venture. There was also the indisputable statutory 
responsibility held by CSC for the penitentiaries in its care. Once implementation 
began, the fact that CAEFS was assigned to the EAC, rather than the NIC, further 
highlighted CSC’s intentions. The Task Force’s brief attempt to delineate the role 
of an implementation committee (see TFFSW 1990: 130) could not succeed in face 
of the hard fact that CSC was the paymaster. Yet, as a senior CAEFS’ member of
3 Briefing Paper, July, 1991
4 The deliberate withholding o f relevant information was already suspected by the EAC and later 
became part o f the reason for the withdrawal o f CAEFS from the Committee and the 
implementation process.
5 CAEFS’ Report January /  February, 1992
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the Task Force noted, they ‘were used to CSC having the money and the power’ 
and CAEFS’ initial decision to join the Task Force had been made knowing that the 
extent of their own influence lay in their ‘ability to walk away’, very publicly, if the 
initiative appeared to be failing.7 Their calculated choice to participate had been 
based on what they thought was best for those held in the Prison for Women, and 
the obverse of that choice was the risk of losing credibility should the venture fail 
to deliver improvements for the women.
CAEFS continued to debate its response during the months which followed and on 
the 14th June 1992, at its Annual General Meeting, carried a Motion:
That following immediate consultation with the women in P4W, Burnaby 
and Tanguay, that CAEFS withdraw from the External Advisory Committee 
created to oversee the implementation of the Task Force Report.
Only the Edmonton society opposed the Motion, as a decision was still forthcoming 
regarding the Alberta location and it was feared that the prison could be assigned 
elsewhere, by way of ‘revenge’.8 CAEFS’s President Dawn Fleming wrote to 
Solicitor General Doug Lewis, telling him of the organisation’s immediate 
withdrawal, partly occasioned by his failure to keep them ‘apprised of the progress 
of the implementation process’ and their belief that ‘the principles of the Task 
Force [had] not been adhered to’. CAEFS had decided to return to their ‘traditional 
role as advocates with and for women who come into conflict with the law’.9
This decision left the initial planning of the new prisons firmly in the hands of 
federal civil servants, even though the regions were later to become heavily 
involved. CSC had overall control of five new prisons, with four having almost no 
voluntary sector involvement as the vision of Creating Choices was expanded and 
translated into physical reality. Yet even if Creating Choices had been more 
specific about an implementation strategy it is unlikely that CAEFS would have 
remained CSC’s partner, not least because CSC’s involvement with the voluntary 
sector was not statutorily mandated to continue. The organisation’s ambivalence 
towards the entire project had shown at various stages during the Task Force, to the
6 CAEFS’ Board Minutes 23rd February, 1992
7 Private letter 2002
8 CAEFS’ Board Minutes June, 1992
9 Dawn Fleming, 18th June, 1992
193
point where ‘on more than one occasion’ they came very close to withdrawing.10 
Those CAEFS’ members who had been against the original decision to join the 
Task Force had always doubted CSC’s motives in forming the partnership, and the 
outcome confirmed their belief that CAEFS had been used to legitimate the 
venture. Others were less happy with the decision to withdraw, because that left 
CSC to interpret Creating Choices as it wished, yet still able to claim that CAEFS 
shared responsibility for the document. This nightmarish scenario had always been 
CAEFS’ fear, knowing that they would always be associated in the public mind 
with a venture that conceivably might have led to worse conditions for federally 
sentenced women. Their calculated gamble had failed, but the outcome might best 
be described as an unwanted, rather than an unexpected, consequence of the wish to 
re-form the prison. The outcome was not without precedent, in that penal reform 
initiatives have a history of being incorporated by the state. Indeed, it is the logical 
outcome of such endeavours, as prisons are generally financed and controlled by 
the state. Freedman (1981: 155) suggested that ‘women’s institutions which did 
not question the nature of the prison system’ would end up equal to men’s 
institutions because they helped to maintain the system. Of course CAEFS, while a 
partner in the Task Force, did question the prison system, but by trying to change it, 
rather than challenge its validity. To have done otherwise would have made 
participation in the enterprise impossible.
The April 1994 incidents
While planning continued for the new prisons the situation at the Prison for 
Women, which had been volatile throughout the life of the Task Force, 
deteriorated. In accepting the recommendations of the Task Force CSC had 
committed itself to a new operational philosophy for federally sentenced women, 
but this -  inevitably, given that many of the same staff remained in place -  had not 
been reflected in practice at the Prison for Women, despite the fact that a member 
of the Task Force’s Working Group continued to be Warden. Planning for the new 
prisons had the effect of encouraging experienced staff at the Prison for Women to 
apply for positions in other prisons, because quite early on it had been made clear 
to them that they were not considered suited to the new philosophy of Creating
10 Personal letter 2002
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Choices.n (This continued the Task Force’s failure to explore in any detail the 
possibility that the staff of the Prison for Women, and elsewhere, might have 
positive and knowledgeable contributions to make to their deliberations). The 
long-term staff were replaced by employees with relatively little correctional 
experience, who had no long-term prospects at the Prison for Women and little 
emotional commitment to it. Budget cutbacks led to the curtailment of 
psychological services and contributed to tensions amongst the women, who were 
themselves worried about the changes they might have to face once the prisons 
were completed and they were transferred. Additionally, there were a number of 
‘lockdowns’12 at the prison, which severely restricted the movement of the women 
on the ranges, particularly those on ‘B’ range.
Events came to a head in April, 1994. The following chronology is abbreviated 
from the official report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, which dealt with 
subsequent events at the Prison.13
• on the 22nd April 1994 a brief, violent confrontation took place between six 
women at the Prison for Women and correctional staff. A member of staff 
believed herself to have been stabbed by a syringe and other staff were 
physically threatened. The women were maced and immediately placed in 
the segregation unit. They were not properly decontaminated (i.e. allowed 
to bathe, following being sprayed);
• tensions were extremely high and on the 23rd April three women who had 
not been involved in the earlier incident, but were in segregation, 
individually harmed themselves, took a hostage and attempted suicide. 
Staff had urine thrown at them. A further macing took place and that 
woman was also not decontaminated;
11 Personal notes, 1996. However, it is government policy that staff should reapply for jobs when 
the work description is significantly altered, as was the case following the acceptance o f Creating 
Choices. Additionally, some o f the staff preferred not to move away from Kingston, as their 
partners were working in nearby prisons.
12 Lockdowns must be authorised by the head o f each prison. They are then scrutinised by CSC 
headquarters for reasonable grounds before being implemented.
13 Madame Justice Louise Arbour was appointed to head the Commission o f Inquiry into Certain 
Events at the Prison for Women in Kingston in April 1995. Her report, o f  the same name, was 
published in March, 1996.
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• many of the staff involved in the original incidents continued to work 
exceedingly long shifts in the Segregation Unit and reached peaks of 
exhaustion and desperation;
• on the 26th April correctional staff demonstrated outside the prison, 
demanding that the women in the original incident should be transferred. 
Staff also refused the Warden’s request that they unlock the ranges14;
• on the evening of the 26 April a male Institutional Emergency Response 
Team (IERT) conducted a cell extraction15 and strip search of eight women 
in the segregation unit. The team wore combat-style protective clothing and 
carried shields, which were banged against the cell bars to intimidate the 
women. The entire procedure was videotaped. At that point all the women 
were securely contained in their cells, some were asleep and the extraction 
took place during the middle of the night;
• the women either had their clothing cut off them, primarily by males, or 
removed their own, and were marched, naked, from their cells, which were 
cleared of all furniture. The women were eventually left lying on their 
concrete cell floors, wearing paper gowns (which had the effect of a 
minimal ‘bib’) and in leg irons and body belts. The windows were left open 
for over three hours, despite the cold temperatures outside, and the women 
remained in those conditions until the following day, when they were given 
a ‘security’ blanket;
• the following evening seven of the women were subjected to body cavity 
searches, which took place on the cell floor while they remained in 
restraints. There were doubts as to whether free and voluntary consent had 
been given by the women. They were then permitted to shower and were 
returned, naked, to their cells;
• all of the women involved in the various incidents were denied access to 
lawyers. The water was turned off and toilets could not be flushed;
th• on the 6 May five women were transferred to a wing of the Regional 
Treatment Centre within Kingston Penitentiary [for men];
• following a habeas corpus application they were returned to the Prison for 
Women, but remained in segregation for up to nine months.
14 The ‘ranges’ are described in chapter 1.
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A National Board of Investigation was convened by CSC to investigate the various 
events. It comprised four correctional employees, including the Warden-designate 
of the Nova Institution for Women. Madame Justice Arbour strongly suggested, 
despite the denials of the Commissioner and the Senior Deputy Commissioner, that 
their appointments were compromised by the fact of their all being in the midst of 
‘review and promotion’ supervised by those to whom they would ultimately be 
reporting (Arbour 1996: 110). The Board appeared to be confused by the extent of 
their Mandate and had a very short period of time when they could all be together 
to conduct the investigation. They did not review all the available evidence and, in 
particular, only briefly viewed the IERT tape. Their draft report was then revised 
and edited at least nine times at National Headquarters. The report gave a great 
deal of detail about all the women involved in the incidents, emphasising their 
prolonged records as violent offenders and, in a sense, providing justification for 
the way in which staff responded to them. The final report made no mention of the 
video tape and there were numerous omissions and errors of fact, most specifically 
with it being stated that the women were stripped by female staff and no indication 
being given that the women were left without mattresses and blankets (CSC 1994a: 
22; Arbour 1996: 116).
In Canada a Correctional Investigator16 acts as an ‘ombudsperson, independent of 
the Correctional Service of Canada’ and ‘reports directly to the Solicitor General’ 
(Arbour 1996: 20). Soon after the incidents the Correctional Investigator met with 
the women, and thereafter consistently raised relevant issues with CSC. His 
requests for documentation from CSC were met with lengthy delays, and 
representatives from his office did not get to see the IERT video until late January 
1995. On the 14th February, 1994 the Correctional Investigator sent a special report 
to the Solicitor General, chronicling -  amongst other matters -  his concerns about 
the use of the IERT team, the use of segregation and the failings of the Board of 
Investigation. The Solicitor General announced that there would be an independent
15 ‘The purpose o f [a] cell extraction is to remove and strip search an unwilling inmate and then to 
place the inmate in segregation if the prisoner is in the prison’s general population, or to return him 
or her to a stripped cell if  the inmate is already in segregation’ (Arbour 1996: 67).
16 ‘It is the function o f the Correctional Investigator to conduct investigations into the problems of  
offenders related to decisions, recommendations, acts or omissions o f the Commissioner or any 
person under the control and management of, or performing services for or on behalf of, the
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inquiry. On the same day the CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) 
transmitted a Fifth Estate programme, which contained substantial extracts from the 
IERT video. There was a largely horrified reaction across the country, despite a 
Toronto Sun editorial which issued ‘congratulations to the all-male emergency 
response team that so professionally put down the April riot at Kingston’s infamous 
Prison for Women’ (23rd February, 1995).17 On the 19th April 1995 Madame 
Justice Arbour was appointed to head an inquiry. Her eventual report castigated 
CSC for its ‘deplorable defensive culture’ (Arbour 1996: 174) and showed, in 
forensic detail, how CSC chose to disregard ‘the Rule of Law’ whenever it suited 
its purposes and that the Correctional Service had a ‘disturbing lack of commitment 
to the ideals of justice’ (Arbour 1996: 198).
If we remember how recently CSC had accepted Creating Choices, and that it was 
in the midst of planning the proposed new prisons, one of Madame Justice Arbour’s 
comments appears to sound a particularly relevant note of warning: ‘... despite its 
recent initiative, the Correctional Service resorts invariably to the view that 
women’s prisons are or should be, just like any other prison’ (Arbour 1996: 178).
In the chapter which follows I shall discuss the disturbing parallels between what 
happened in April, 1994 at the Prison for Women and what subsequently happened 
at one of the newly opened prisons, Nova Institution for Women. But I now turn to 
the new prisons themselves and deal with them in very general terms, before 
focusing upon Edmonton Institution for Women. It should be borne in mind that 
the Arbour Commission’s hearings were taking place as the first of the prisons were 
opening, and the publication of the subsequent report, with its damning 
conclusions, led to the resignation of the Commissioner of Corrections, John 
Edwards. He was replaced by an interim Commissioner, John Tait, who was 
himself replaced by Ole Ingstrup, who had been Commissioner at the time of the 
Task Force.
A new style of prison?
The new prisons were eventually to be sited in Truro, Joliette, Kitchener,
Edmonton and Maple Creek -  and the first three were some distance from the Task
Commissioner that affect offenders either individually or as a group’. CCRA 1992 Statute 167(1). 
For a full explanation o f his / her role see Arbour, 1996: 20-21,162-171.
17 See Shaw (1999) for an extensive discussion o f the public impact o f the tapes and the way in 
which the media responded.
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Force-specified localities. While it might have been anticipated that the Healing 
Lodge would have unique design features, it could have been assumed that the 
others would have features in common. Despite this, separate architects were 
commissioned for each prison and plans were produced which specifically suited 
each site. The one feature they had in common -  apart from the Healing Lodge, 
which did not have one -  was the inclusion of the Enhanced Units as an extension 
or integral part of the main administration building. All the prisons had ‘cottage’ 
style accommodation, in an attempt to introduce some semblance of community 
normality into the living arrangements. They were to incorporate ‘all 
environmental factors known to promote wellness ... natural light, fresh air, colour, 
space, privacy and access to land’ (TFFSW 1990: 115). The houses, apart from an 
eventual Supported Living Unit at Nova (Truro), were solely occupied by the 
women; staff visited to do ‘head counts’ but were not permanently placed in each 
house (which was a surprising and complete departure from the Task Force model). 
Overall, 285 regular and Enhanced Unit beds were provided for federally sentenced 
women. There were also a further 17 segregation cells which, officially, were not 
classified as ‘beds’.
Although the Task Force carefully considered the proposed physical layout of the 
new facilities, they were not prescriptive as to how each would look, but had noted 
Axon’s ‘speculative’ findings that there was a ‘connection between styles of 
security and the atmosphere within the institutions’. Axon said that while 
Shakopee prison (the exemplar for the new prisons) had no perimeter fence, it was 
fortunate in that it had the support of the local community and she concluded that 
the ‘optimal arrangement’ was for the new prisons to have ‘a perimeter fence to 
permit greater inmate freedom within its confines’ (Axon 1989: 10). With the 
exception of the Healing Lodge, which had none, all the new prisons had relatively 
low fences, conveying to the community the low risk federally sentenced women 
generally presented. Only around the exercise yards of the Enhanced Units were 
more substantial fences used and these were generally not visible to the public. As 
it turned out, staff considered the low fences inadequate and resorted to escorting 
women within the prisons.
Living conditions within each of these houses were radically different from 
anything previously offered at either the Prison for Women or in provincial
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prisons.18 The women were expected to clean and cook for themselves, having 
budgeted for and ordered food, and could choose to cook communally or 
individually. They were expected, with the assistance of staff, to co-exist with 
women with disparate needs and from widely varying backgrounds. Disagreements 
were to be resolved through house meetings and the ultimate sanction for infraction 
of the rules was removal to the Enhanced Unit. Each woman had her own room 
and within the house she had some degree of choice about how she might live. For 
their ‘ideal prison’19 the Task Force had also idealised women.
Providing for the ‘difficult to manage9 woman
In planning these new prisons there was an assumption that most women would be 
capable of responding to the demands and responsibilities placed upon them. With 
hindsight, this seems a curiously naive and contradictory view to adopt, but it was 
linked to the Task Force’s reluctance to label women. While they referred to ‘all 
federally sentenced women’ as being ‘high needs’ and requiring a ‘supportive 
environment’ (TFFSW 1990: 90, emphasis added), these needs evidently did not 
preclude their being capable in other, supposedly ‘womanly’, spheres. It was, once 
again, the rhetoric of the reformatory, which emphasised the femininity of both 
prisoners and those women charged with their guidance. As we know, certain 
women did not fit the profile ascribed to them by the Task Force and providing for 
them was problematic. Creating Choices was predicated on the assumption that 
federally sentenced women, were ‘high-needs / low risk’ women and the Task 
Force concluded that a changed environment would make the management of such 
women less challenging. Enhanced Units were not actually part of the vocabulary 
of the Task Force, which had envisaged the houses being used for different 
functions; one was described as being for women who were ‘especially high risk or 
high need ... requiring] high levels of staffing, support, counselling and other 
aspects of dynamic security’ (TFFSW 1990: 116). The Task Force suggested a 
separate ‘assessment cottage’ and did not envisage that cottages would have 
multiple functions, as the Enhanced Units devised by CSC later came to have.
18 While such changes in living conditions were radical, insofar as Canadian prisons were 
concerned, the communal living did not differ greatly from what was sometimes available in other 
jurisdictions, if  only with limited frequency. See, for example, Coyle’s (1994) description o f  the 
Barlinnie Special Unit in Scotland. The major difference lay in the fact that such changes were 
expected to be made available to all federally sentenced women, rather than a selected few, and the 
physical specification o f each prison was linked to community standards o f accommodation.
19 See Hannah-Moffat & Shaw, 2000
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It was not until June, 1994 (two months after the events leading to the Arbour 
Commission) that CSC officially decided to increase the number of maximum 
security beds to ten percent, having been left free to impose its own solution. Yet 
it is clear that this figure of ten percent high-needs women had been acknowledged 
by July 1992, when the Operational Plan announced that ‘approximately 10 percent
of the women will require accommodation that appropriately reflects their
01increased security needs’ (CSC 1992: 69). The same document appeared to 
contradict itself because it contained no evidence for such a leap; rather, the 
reverse. The Operational Plan discussed the classification of women and said:
‘two separate methods [of classification] ... both demonstrated that less 
than 5% of the women warranted a maximum security classification, the 
large majority being either minimum or low medium. In 1991, only 4.6% of 
the in residence Prison for Women population were classified as maximum 
security’ (CSC 1992: 10).
In then going on to describe the envisaged Enhanced Units the Operational Plan 
inaccurately cited the Task Force as being the source of the ten percent-figure (CSC 
1992: 38). At no time did the Task Force commit itself to a figure of ten percent. It 
would appear that CSC either had their own, unpublished, figures upon which they 
were relying -  or had their own plans. That initial Operational Plan suggested that 
‘the presence of vigilant, interactive staff... should preclude the need for escorts 
between the enhanced unit and the general program area’ (CSC 1992: 38), 
something which did not happen once Edmonton Institution for Women (EIFW) 
and Nova Institution for Women (Nova) opened. The Plan also indicated that the 
Enhanced Unit would be solely for ‘difficult to manage’ women, and that most 
women would be immediately assigned to a house, rather than to ‘potentially 
inappropriate accommodation (e.g. enhanced security unit)’ (CSC 1992: 30). By 
July, 1995 CSC had changed tack, acknowledging that the units were by then 
intended to house ‘those who were acting out, serious escape risks ... and new 
admissions’ and that the smallness of the new prisons precluded separate provision 
for these disparate groups (CSC 1995: 7). At the ‘Brainstorming Session’ at which
20 Board o f  Investigation Report into a Suicide in February 1996, and other Major Incidents at 
Edmonton Institution fo r  Women (1996b: 3). Additionally, CSC was concerned that the maximum 
security women should be separated from those with mental health needs.
21 Regional Facilities fo r  Federally Sentenced Women Construction Policy & Services / National 
Implementation Committee July, 1992
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these comments were made reservations were expressed about using Enhanced 
Units and the possibility that they would be ‘re-introducing and entrenching a 
“jailhouse culture” ’ (CSC 1995: 13).
New philosophy; new staff
‘Jailhouse cultures’ are not only encouraged by the type of prison building; the 
quality and commitment of staff plays a crucial role in promoting or forestalling 
such climates. The Task Force had been vague, but recommended that staff should 
be recruited from ‘a wide variety of backgrounds and educational traditions’ 
(TFFSW 1990: 116). The draft Operational Plan amplified this: ‘staff must be 
creative, demonstrate understanding of and empathy toward (sic) women and multi­
cultural groups’ (CSC 1992: 16). In the event the majority of staff recruited as 
Primary Workers (guards) for the new prisons had no previous experience of 
corrections; a large number were very young and many had backgrounds in social 
work or equivalent spheres. They underwent the basic correctional training and 
had an additional period of training in ‘women-centred’ issues. At the Healing 
Lodge, however, staff training had a further component; they all participated in a 
month-long treatment programme, allowing them to experience a programme 
similar to that which imprisoned Aboriginal women would undergo, as well as to 
deal with issues in their own lives. In line with the philosophy of Creating Choices 
there was a flatter structure to the staffing hierarchy, with a Warden (reporting to 
her Regional Deputy Commissioner), Deputy Warden, Team Leaders and Primary 
Workers, as well as a number of other professionals and support workers.
In employing such staff it was anticipated that the new prisons would rely, to a 
great extent, on ‘dynamic security’, ‘based upon active and meaningful staff / 
offender interaction [which would] be the primary means of ensuring safety and 
security’ (CSC 1992: 69). In other words, direct and frequent contact between staff 
and women would facilitate the staffs understanding and prediction of the 
women’s likely behaviour and the need for static security, such as fences and 
electronic detection systems, would consequently be minimised. Although it might 
be assumed that attitudes have changed greatly from the days when a former 
Governor of Holloway Prison could write ‘many prison officials begin by trying to 
trea t... prisoners as ordinary human beings, but are compelled by their experience 
to do otherwise’ (Kelley 1967: 58), there is nevertheless a truth within the
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statement. Prison guards’ attitudes to prisoners change, irrespective of what their 
training might have led them to expect. Their need for personal safety means that 
‘some wariness (or even mistrust)’ creeps into their relationships with prisoners 
(Liebling & Price 2001: 90). Yet their growing knowledge of some of the prisoners 
may also lead to a blurring of the professional barriers and ‘they may come to like 
and respect certain of their charges ... sometimes more than they like and respect 
their own managers’ (Liebling & Price 2001: 124). These changing relationships 
have an inevitable effect on the day-to-day management of a prison and it could not 
be assumed that dynamic security at the new Canadian prisons would remain free 
of such influences. The concept of dynamic security also implied that the women 
would be responsive to and trust such interaction and would, voluntarily, wish to 
modify their own behaviour in the interests of the prison’s security. But this is to 
assume that prisoners are passive and, as Harding et al suggested, that ‘through 
architecture and regulations a particular form of discipline ... [might be] imposed 
upon prisoners’ (Harding et al 1985: 176). In Canada federally sentenced women 
were being asked to share responsibility for the security of the prison in which they 
were imprisoned (see Hannah-Moffat, 2001). What we shall now examine is 
whether such theorising survived the reality of the new prisons, using Edmonton 
Institution for Women (EIFW) as our first example.
Edmonton Institution for Women
In the Prairies many towns had sent unsolicited bids for the prison as soon as the 
Task Force was published, even though the Task Force had stipulated where the 
new prisons should be sited. Some of the submissions were united by a common 
thread; they claimed that their communities were dying as a consequence of 
recession and changing employment patterns. One town wrote: ‘A recent mill 
closure has sent us into a crisis situation, economically. ... This could be the 
chance [for] the Federal Government to be the saviour of a town in trouble’. 
Another town echoed the sentiments: ‘... it could mean the difference between 
growth and the death of our community. Our children are leaving upon high school 
graduation and we have nothing to offer to bring them back. Edmonton doesn’t 
want this facility. They don’t need it. We do!’.24 Others towns were keen to
22 The Prairies, as a Correctional region, covers Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and the New  
Territories.
23 Town o f Hudson Bay Economic Development Committee 15th September, 1990
24 Canora Economic Development Commission 401 June, 1991
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emphasise the savings that could be made, should the prison be built alongside 
other correctional institutions in the town, an argument that was also to be used in 
the Atlantic region.25 Yet Edmonton won in the end and on the 23rd November, 
1992 Solicitor General Doug Lewis announced that, despite hundreds of 
applications received from across Alberta, the city had been successful in its 
application. (The Atlantic and Ontario sites had been announced eleven months 
earlier). Four months later the Assistant Warden for correctional programmes at
Saskatchewan Penitentiary, Jan Fox, was appointed Warden of Edmonton
*)(\Institution for Women.
‘A town that doesn’t want the prison, never wanted the prison’27
Edmonton’s successful bid did not necessarily mean that local citizens backed the 
initiative, as was soon to become apparent. In choosing a locality for the new 
prison CSC were obliged to look at all available federally owned properties in the 
area. Seven properties were identified, with only one meeting the criteria, and in 
April, 1993 it was announced that undeveloped military land would house the new 
prison. Public reaction was instantaneous and almost unanimously unfavourable. 
Local residents demanded that the facility should be moved to a non-residential 
area and that it should not ‘invade their community’. The Edmonton Sun, not 
known for its liberal views, took the campaigners to task in an editorial headlined 
‘Stop the whining’:
They’re ba-a-a-ck. That old NIMBY gang is once again in full cry. ... [Castle 
Downs] has ... the Griesbach military base on which the proposed prison would 
be located. That’s a real break for the taxpayer who for once isn’t paying big 
bucks for expensive real estate.28
CSC found that its failure to consult before deciding upon a site rebounded, 
although it is debateable whether prior discussion would have changed the views of 
local communities reluctant to have a prison in their midst (see also Faith, 1993). 
Despite a series of public meetings addressed by Jan Fox, residents remained 
concerned about public safety and the effect of the new prison on property prices.
25 Taken from a transcript o f a programme broadcast on CBC Radio Calgary on the 26th November, 
1991
26 Ms Fox was appointed on the 17th March, 1993, as were the Wardens for Nova, Joliette and 
Grand Valley.
27 Connie Sampson March, 1996
28 Edmonton Sun 14th March, 1993
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Local opposition prevailed and the site selection process was expanded to include 
other levels of government and private sector land. From the beginning of her 
appointment Ms Fox was the public face of the new prison, frequently being asked 
to defend and explain what was proposed. Decisions were made by correctional 
officials, yet she was held responsible, in the public mind, for any new 
developments. As much of the argument about where the prison should be sited 
took place through the media, the Warden continued to speak for CSC, emphasising 
that the prison would house ‘high needs’ rather than ‘high risk’ women and 
stressing the limits on the women’s movements, saying ‘it’s not like we’re opening 
up the doors every morning and saying ‘Go for it ladies, have a good day at the 
mall’. I’m accountable for what happens if one of them commits an offence.
9QGuess who will lose her job?’
Eventually, 61 sites were proposed and a shortlist of six emerged. Peter de Vink, 
the Prairie Region Deputy Commissioner for Corrections, said ‘the site that will be 
chosen after consulting with the involved communities will be the one that has the 
least local opposition’.30 CSC then spent $17,000 distributing an eight-page 
newsletter on the proposed prison and the selected sites to 172,000 households, 
only to be further criticised by some community groups for ‘distorting’ the facts. 
CSC continued its information offensive, explaining the economic benefits that the 
prison would bring to the city, while also emphasising the importance of 
community links if federally sentenced women were to be successfully reintegrated 
into society.31 In December, 1993 CSC finally announced that the prison would be 
built on a 17.5 acre site, in a light industrial area, to the west of the city. Federally 
sentenced women were to be kept physically apart from any community, hitherto 
seen as an essential component of the Task Force’s original plan.
A particularly tight building schedule envisaged the prison being ready for 
occupancy in November, 1995 -  and the local papers kept abreast of each stage.
Jan Fox continued to speak on behalf of Corrections and in July the Edmonton 
Journal, reflecting the fears of local residents, quoted her as saying that there 
would be rigorous security for the few high-risk inmates. A pre-opening audit of
29 Alberta Report (The Law) 25th June, 1993
30 Edmonton Journal 6th August, 1993
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the prison was conducted by the National Headquarters’ Audit Team between the 
25th -  29th September, 1995. At that stage, less than seven weeks before opening, 
none of the buildings was completed, so the team’s comments were necessarily 
restricted.32 However, some specific points relevant to issues which later emerged 
were addressed:
• the number of women classified as medium and maximum security -  and due to 
arrive at EIFW -  exceeded those provided for when the facility was being 
designed;
• the perimeter fencing did not reflect the security needs of that larger-than- 
anticipated group;
• contracts for the provision of programmes were not agreed;
• the Health Care Centre was not built, nor the staff for it hired;
• Standing Orders33 were incomplete. (CSC 1996b: 26)
In mid-November the Edmonton Journal described preparations for the opening of 
the prison and Ms Fox was quoted as saying ‘things are really shaping up. There 
may still be a few problems, but nothing life-shattering’. The opening ceremonies 
were held on the 18th November, 1995, and on the 20th November the prison 
formally opened with the arrival of four women, who were followed by several 
small groups from the Regional Psychiatric Centre in Saskatoon during December, 
January and February.
From concept to physical reality
We now explore what happened at EIFW during the first year of its opening. At 
this point, the prison’s design needs clarification because it was fundamentally 
linked to subsequent events.
31 Mill Woods Newsletter September, 1993
32 Board o f  Investigation into a suicide on February 29, 1996, and other major incidents at 
Edmonton Institution fo r  Women 1996
33 Prisons are governed by a series o f measures: Corrections and Conditional Release A ct (CCRA 
1992) statutes and regulations; Commissioner’s Directives (CDs), which apply universally to all 
prisons operated by the Correctional Service o f Canada and are issued under the authority of S 98(1) 
o f the CCRA 1992\ Regional Instructions (RIs), which may enlarge on CDs or be specific to 
regional issues; Standing Orders (SOs), which are specific to a particular prison and; Post Orders, 
which are specific to a ‘post’ within a particular prison. Additionally, there are policy manuals 
dealing with issues in even greater detail. For a fuller explanation see Arbour 1996: 3-4.
HHHH
Edmonton Institution for Women, Alberta. Part of the living accommodation.
photo: S. Hayman
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As initially constructed, with its two metre high chain-link fence, the prison could 
easily be mistaken for a light industrial or office complex. Seen from the road, 
there was a very large semi-circular frontage to the front of the prison, which 
contained all the working / administration areas, as well as workshops, education 
rooms, the gymnasium, chapel, aboriginal spirituality room and Health Care 
Centre. This frontage hid a large grassed and paved courtyard which contained five 
double-storey living units, outwardly similar in style to much Canadian civilian 
housing. The Private Visiting House was on the right, but scarcely seen because of 
the Enhanced Unit placed directly in front of it.34 Each living unit could house 
eleven women and included provision for children’s accommodation. A large, 
well-equipped kitchen was adjacent to the communal living area. Bedrooms were 
on both the ground and first floor and each was fitted with standard Corcan35 
furniture, with the light coloured wood giving the effect of a well appointed student 
hall of residence. The women had keys to their own rooms (cells) and each could 
purchase her own television. When the prison first opened all living unit doors and 
windows, although alarmed, could not be locked because of fire regulations. Staff 
were not permanently positioned within the houses and the women were living in 
almost a reverse panoptican, where the continuous disciplinary surveillance of staff 
was absent and replaced by the self-surveillance of the women themselves.
The Enhanced Unit, attached to the administration building, was a maximum 
security unit and, when the Institution first opened, was intended to house:
• new arrivals;
• those in segregation for purposes of discipline;
• those in crisis;
• vulnerable women (in need of protection from other prisoners);
• those whose escape could possibly place the public in danger.
34 The Private Visiting House was used by women with the right to a (largely) unsupervised private 
visit from her family or someone acknowledged as having a close tie. Visits could last up to 72 
hours. At Edmonton women needed to be on Management Levels One to Three to qualify. Those 
on Level Four were taken to Edmonton Institution for Men for private visits and those on Level Five 
were not entitled to visits. The right is defined in the CCRA (1992) under Sections 59, 60 and 71. 
CD 700 applies to Private Family Visits.
35 Corcan is the trading name o f Correctional Service o f Canada’s industrial arm.
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The Enhanced Unit (then) consisted of two euphemistically named wings, Sunbow 
and Sky Spirit, with the entrance to both being clearly visible to those sitting in the 
Unit’s central command room. Sunbow was the more secure and its six cells -  the 
use of this word reflected the difference in appearance and style compared with the 
minimum / medium living units -  had steel beds and integral lavatories. One cell 
was for observation. The Sky Spirit wing contained a kitchen and all six cells had 
wooden furniture, with the women using a shared bathing facility. The only room 
available for programming was small and needed for both wings, with the added 
complication that it also provided access to the small exercise yard. The control 
post for the whole of the prison was also placed in the Enhanced Unit. From this 
post control staff had to oversee all of the houses (alarms went off and had to be 
checked whenever house doors were opened), as well as monitor radio 
transmissions. Inevitably, control staff could not concentrate solely on the women 
living in the Enhanced Unit.
The prison was rated for a regular-bed capacity of 56 women. Additionally, the 
Enhanced Unit had 12 cells, which were double-bunked, so could actually hold 24 
women. Six of the Enhanced Unit cells were segregation cells and not considered 
part of the prison’s official capacity. As we shall see, however, they were used 
when the prison opened and it meant that the prison had an unofficial capacity 
(which could be used during emergencies) of 80. Yet in September, 1993, when 
the site of the prison was still undecided and CSC were anxious to allay fears about 
the proposed prison, the Mill Woods Newsletter said: ‘... if the prison were to open 
today a total of 44 women would be incarcerated ... The larger number is intended 
to meet our needs well into the next millennium. There are no plans to expand the 
facility ' (emphasis added). As the Newsletter made clear, these figures were ‘... 
based on [the then] 74 Prairie Region offenders, 30 of whom will be incarcerated in 
an [sic] facility for Aboriginal offenders in Saskatchewan. ... Only a small number 
of women are expected to need extra security measures’. This ‘facility’ for 
Aboriginal women was the Healing Lodge, originally planned as a multi-level 
facility, but later to be restricted to minimum- and medium-security women (see 
chapter 8), which meant that EIFW would have to take all the Prairie maximum 
security women.
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At the time the Institution actually opened it was still far from complete. The large 
administration building was unfinished, so both the Private Family Visiting House 
and offices some distance from the prison had to be used by staff instead. The 
Health Care unit, workshops, gymnasium, chapel and aboriginal spirituality room, 
education room and library were all within the administration building -  and 
largely unavailable to the women. The Enhanced Unit, where all new arrivals were 
placed, irrespective of classification, had been completed just two days prior to 
opening. Building debris cluttered the grounds and a particularly harsh Edmonton 
winter added to the difficulties all faced in coming to grips with the new prison. 
Programmes were scheduled to be held within the administration building and the 
failure to have it ready on time meant that until mid-January, 1996 all programmes 
had to be held in the Enhanced Unit, where the majority of the maximum security 
women were also living. By early 1996 the prison had converted House D to a 
living unit for maximum security women because of the overcrowding within the 
Enhanced Unit. The minimum and medium security women -  and eventually some 
maximum security women -  had to go to the Enhanced Unit for programmes and 
each time they did so they were strip-searched in order to prevent the passage of 
drugs.
An unmanageable prison?
By the end of February, when there were 25 women in the Institution, there had 
been ten incidents of self-injury, with four requiring visits to hospital; one 
attempted suicide and one attempt to swallow an unnamed substance. Only one of 
these incidents had taken place outside the Enhanced Unit. On the 29th February, 
1996 Denise Fayant, 21, was found in her cell in the Sky Spirit wing of the 
Enhanced Unit with a ligature around her neck, one day after arriving at Edmonton. 
She died on the 2nd March, after life-support was turned off.
A National Board of Investigation was then set up to investigate Ms Fayant’s death 
and other incidents at the prison. Such investigations have:
... three levels of investigation: local, regional and national. The most serious
incidents are the subject o f national investigations. In these cases, the Board of
Investigation is appointed by the Commissioner. To ensure the objectivity of the
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investigations, all National Boards of Investigation have a community member 
as a full Member of the Board (emphasis added).
Before the investigation could begin three further incidents at the prison -  separate 
assaults on a nurse and a doctor and an attempted suicide -  caused the terms of 
reference for the investigation to be enlarged. The Board of Investigation began 
work at the Institution on the 18th March, 1996 and by then two further incidents 
had occurred, so the Board finally investigated one suicide, two attempted suicides, 
two assaults on staff and thirteen incidents of self-injury. These had all happened 
within a period of a little over three months, and the prison, at that stage, had been 
open for just under four months. (There had been an incident in December, 1995, 
but this was outside the Board’s remit). The Board was also asked to comment on 
‘underlying factors that may have played a role in these incidents’ (CSC 1996b: 4). 
By the time the Board reported they knew that the cause of Ms Fayant’s death was 
murder, rather than suicide, but had not addressed it as such. Meanwhile, in 
February there had been another suicide at the still-functioning Prison for Women.
As outlined in the Board’s report, 25 women were held at the prison while the team 
was investigating: ten were in the minimum- and medium-security houses; fifteen 
were in the Enhanced Unit and House D, also maximum security. These fifteen 
maximum security women represented 60 percent of the then population of the 
prison. As has earlier been explained, the Enhanced Unit had multiple functions 
and was expected to house other than just maximum security women. Ten women 
were involved in the eighteen separate incidents, of whom seven were classified as 
maximum security and eight were Aboriginal. Eight of the women were known to 
have a history of self-injury prior to arriving at Edmonton. The overcrowding in 
the Enhanced Unit had an important part to play in events leading up to the death of 
Denise Fayant. We need to look at her death in some detail, because the 
circumstances reflected the physical difficulties faced by staff when providing for 
women in an incomplete prison. They also reflected the struggle to implement the 
actual philosophy of Creating Choices and the manner in which women reacted to 
their changed circumstances. In discussing this event I will be referring to the
36 Convening Order and Terms o f Reference, signed 13 th March, 1996. Board o f  Investigation 
Report into a Suicide in February 1996, and other Major Incidents at Edmonton Institution fo r  
Women ( CSC 1996b). Unlike the report provided by the Board o f Investigation (CSC 1994a) into 
the April 1994 incidents at the Prison for Women, which prominently displayed the offending
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Board of Investigation’s report and a subsequent Fatality Inquiry37, both of which 
provided retrospective views of events.
The death of Denise Fayant
Denise Fayant arrived at Edmonton on the 28th February, 1996. Ms Fayant had 
made five suicide attempts since 1994 and been involved in 21 violent incidents, 
many of which had targeted her. Concern had been expressed at the prospect of her 
arrival at Edmonton because she was known to be ‘incompatible’38 with a large 
number of women on the Enhanced Unit and was due to testily in court against a 
prisoner also held in the Unit. Not only was Ms Fayant incompatible with many of 
the women in the Enhanced Unit, some of those women were also incompatible 
with each other, a phenomenon unanticipated in the ‘supportive environment’ of 
the new prisons (TFFSW 1990: 90). This left the staff at Edmonton with no clear 
alternatives; they could not separate everyone. Further, although one of the 
‘houses’ had been redesigned to accommodate maximum security women, it was 
only available to those who had demonstrated their reliability, as the doors could 
not be locked because of fire regulations. According to an exhibit presented at the 
Fatality Inquiry Ms Fayant had written on the transfer form that she did not want to 
go to ‘inhance’ (sic) and that she preferred to be sent to the ‘house’ (House D, 
where the more reliably behaved maximum security women were held). As she had 
not been formally assessed and was considered a risk to the community, that was 
not an option.
In the new spirit of Creating Choices, whereby the imprisoned women were 
informed and consulted, three meetings were held with them and the staff to 
attempt to explain the difficulties posed by Ms Fayant’s arrival and obtain their co­
operation. Not only were the women being asked to take responsibility for their 
own behaviour within the prison, they were also being asked to guarantee the safety
histories o f the women concerned, this 1996 Report largely blacked out all information relating to 
the women involved in the incidents at Edmonton.
37 Report to the Attorney General: Public Inquiry into the Death o f  Denise Fayant 14th January, 
2000. The Inquiry was conducted by Judge A. Chrumka, o f the Provincial Court o f Alberta. 
Although it was held in September 1998, the Report took seventeen months to appear and was 
composed largely o f direct quotations taken from the transcript o f the Inquiry. Its strength lay in the 
fact that it clearly set out what had happened during the days preceding and following the death of 
Ms Fayant, showing the ill-prepared state o f the prison and the inability o f  its staff to provide 
adequately for the women in the Enhanced Unit.
38 This term is used by CSC to indicate that a prisoner cannot easily live alongside, or has clashed 
with, another prisoner or prisoners.
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of another prisoner. It was a further step in the ‘responsibilising’ of the women 
(see Hannah-Moffat, 2001). At the last meeting -  attended by all the women at 
Edmonton -  they agreed, in the presence of an Elder and Warden Fox, to ‘take 
care’ of Ms Fayant. As one woman present at the meeting said two and a half years 
later, this phrase was ambiguous, a point also made in the Inquiry Report.
On arrival at the Enhanced Unit Ms Fayant was visibly frightened by her reception. 
She was later advised to remain in the view of staff if she was concerned for her 
safety, and given the choice of being locked up for the night, but declined. Just 
prior to lock-up a staff member went into Sky Spirit to tell the women to return to 
their cells for the night and noticed that Ms Fayant was not in her room. She was 
eventually discovered lying between her bed and the wall with a ligature around her 
neck. Artificial respiration could not begin immediately because the first aid bag 
did not contain a mouthpiece and oxygen could not be supplied, because keys were 
unlabelled and staff could not find the correct ones for the Healthcare Centre. Ms 
Fayant was eventually taken to hospital, where she died on the 2nd March. The 
police, having been told by prison staff that Ms Fayant had been suicidal in the 
past, assumed that this time she had succeeded and conducted no immediate 
interviews, nor did they collect any possible evidence. Their theory was passed on 
to the hospital and to the medical examiner, who then made the same assumption. 
Consequently, no forensic autopsy was conducted; simply an external examination 
of the body, following which Ms Fayant was cremated. As later emerged, a 
member of the prison’s staff told police the night of the suspected suicide that she 
was unsure Ms Fayant had killed herself. A homicide inquiry was not launched 
until May, when an anonymous phone call to a local radio station suggested that 
her death was suspicious. Two prisoners (one of whom Ms Fayant was due to 
testify against) were later charged and convicted of her murder.
As Remi Gobeil, the Deputy Commissioner for the Prairies testified at the Fatality 
Inquiry, there was no option for Ms Fayant but Edmonton. The whole thrust of 
federal correctional policy was that women should be moved to Edmonton from the 
Regional Psychiatric Centre (RPC) (where they had been detained for expediency, 
rather than because of a need for psychiatric treatment). Following CSC’s 
acceptance of the Emergency Recommendations accompanying Creating Choices it
39 Personal notes October, 1998
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was not federal policy to move Ms Fayant to the still-functioning Prison for 
Women, and Burnaby, in British Columbia, had declined to take her. Mr. Gobeil 
elaborated: ‘... we were operating under a philosophy that we did not want to use 
those places. We were going to use our own facility in Edmonton. ... It was a 
program that had been accepted by our Minister, had been accepted by Treasury 
Board; had been accepted by anybody who can say yea or nay to such a thing in our 
system. And that was the total thrust of our philosophy on how to manage women 
offenders in the Correctional Service of Canada’ (Chrumka 2000: 68).
Nevertheless, Ms Fayant was consulted about the move in a manner which 
suggested that she had choices. Mr. Gobeil clarified that position: ‘... the review 
[of Ms Fayant’s proposed move was] largely to fulfil the requirements of a paper 
world, you know. It was very clear to everyone that we were closing down the 
RPC with reference to a Women’s Unit’ (Chrumka 2000: 68).
We should see that decision-making process in the context of what had been 
happening elsewhere. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Madame Justice 
Arbour had begun the public hearings into the April 1994 events at the Prison for 
Women in August, 1995. These continued for some months and she was expected 
to submit her findings no later than the 31st March, 1996. CSC could not have 
failed to anticipate that Justice Arbour’s conclusions might be unfavourable, 
because of what emerged during the hearings, and was under considerable pressure 
to proceed with the new prisons and demonstrate that it remained committed to the 
closure of the Prison for Women. Indeed, Arbour noted that her reporting deadline 
was constrained by the fact that ‘the two largest new regional facilities will open in 
the coming months, while the others have started their operation in late of fall of 
1995 (sic)’ (Arbour 1996: xvi), which suggested that her report could be expected 
to have an impact on their running. It has been proposed that Arbour ‘scared, 
rushed and revealed’ CSC and it is not improbable that the pressure to open 
Edmonton on time was related.40
We already know that Edmonton had been asked to take a larger than anticipated 
number of maximum security women; that the prison was not designed to cope with 
such numbers; and that management had no choice in the matter. The difficulties 
were compounded by the fact that the prison was not completed by the time the first
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women were transferred -  which led to the institutionalising of strip-searching for 
all the women -  and there was a great deal of pressure on the few facilities 
available within the prison. As the Fatality Inquiry into the death of Ms Fayant 
revealed, one of the women already held in the Enhanced Unit at Edmonton had 
been involved in the 1994 incidents at the Prison for Women. Although many of 
the staff at Edmonton were new to corrections, it is unlikely that they would have 
been left unaware of the woman’s history -  and the histories of other women 
classified as maximum and transferred to Edmonton. This knowledge would have 
added to the worries of new staff as they struggled to apply a new philosophy of 
corrections, while lacking many of its components, such as adequate 
accommodation and the ability to provide consistent programming.
But Gobeil’s statement was important in another sense, too, because it highlighted 
the limits of ‘choice’ at that stage. Some five and a half years after the Task Force 
had completed its work CSC was unable, within a newly-built prison, to provide ‘at 
risk’ or ‘vulnerable* women with safe accommodation. Protective custody was not 
part of the philosophy of Creating Choices. Previously, the constraints of choice 
had been illustrated by the dilemma facing federal women held provincially, who 
had to choose between location and programming. Women such as Denise Fayant 
faced a much starker choice -  safety, through being confined to a cell for 23 hours 
each day in protective custody, or risk of physical harm. The dilemma was one 
shared by staff, as explained by Ms Fox during the Fatality Inquiry:
Q: And when you were looking at some of these prisoners coming to your 
place, did you have another realistic option as to where they
could go other than Edmonton?
Ms Fox: I did not believe that I did.
Q: Could you go to Mr. Gobeil and present him with another realistic 
option?
Ms Fox: I would not have been able to present him with a realistic option 
(Chrumka 2000: 65).
At that point Edmonton was alone in being unable to refuse women. Both Nova 
and the Healing Lodge had exercised the right to do so.
40 Private letter 2002
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Further incidents
tfiIncidents at the prison did not cease with the death of Ms Fayant. On the 7 March 
an inmate was charged with aggravated assault. Inevitably, the attention of the 
media was once again focused on the prison and a television reporter, who had been 
inside the prison preparing a series of news reports, later commented on air about 
what had happened during the two days she had been filming -  the nurse assaulted, 
a doctor assaulted, a rumour of an attempted suicide and a further slashing. In the 
same way that the Task Force had expected the new prisons to make dealing with 
the ‘difficult to manage’ women easier, they had expected incidents of self-injury to 
decrease because of the assumed less stressful prison environment.
On the 12th April three medium security women escaped over the fence at 
Edmonton. One was at large for two days and two for a week. On the 27th April 
another prisoner climbed out of a window in the maximum security house, scaled 
the fence, spent three hours out, then phoned the police and asked them to come 
and get her. This was the first ever escape by a maximum security woman from a 
federal prison in Canada. During this period there were a number of calls for the 
resignation of Jan Fox, who still had the task of responding to the media. On the 
25th April Ms Fox explained that security had been heightened at the prison; there 
was an eye-in-the-sky-surveillance camera, the women were no longer allowed 
outside after dark and additional head counts were being carried out. Medium 
security women were also being escorted throughout the prison and ways of 
improving the perimeter security were being examined. But Fox wanted the public 
to know that a bigger fence did not guarantee that there would be no future escapes, 
saying ‘I don’t want people to think, ‘well gee, we have a fence therefore this will 
never happen again’. That would be misleading’.41 As the public ‘face’ of the 
prison Ms Fox was now having to defend situations which the local community had 
been told were most unlikely to arise.
On the 30th April three other maximum security women, including one later 
convicted of the murder of Denise Fayant, walked out of an unlocked door in the 
gymnasium, but were caught almost immediately. With public concern continuing 
to mount, the pressure on officialdom finally proved too much and on the 1st May, 
1996 it was announced that the prison would be closed. The manner of its closure
216
was devastating for both staff and prisoners. At 10.00 am the women were sent 
back from work to their houses, accompanied by staff and members of the Citizens’ 
Advisory Committee. The women were told not to listen to the radio or watch 
television, but did so, and heard the closure news, by which point the perimeter 
fence was surrounded by news teams. Jan Fox later visited the houses to say that 
she was doing all she could to ensure that the minimum security women would be 
allowed to stay and there was a (failed) attempt to lower the security rating of one 
of the medium security women. Late that evening the maximum and medium 
women, in the full glare of the television cameras, were removed from the prison 
and staff were left to pack up their belongings and forward them. Ted Bailey, the 
Chair of the Citizens’ Advisory Committee, was quoted as saying that four inmates 
slashed themselves after they learned from news reports that 19 women were to be 
removed from the prison. Bailey blamed the provincial correctional authorities for 
the self-harm, citing the inappropriate manner of making the announcement. Eight 
women remained at the prison during the closure period and were housed in the 
Enhanced Unit for much of that time, under constant supervision and with levels of 
security that their classification did not justify.
On the 2nd May Alberta’s Minister of Justice, Brian Evans, said he had been asked 
by the Federal Justice Minister, Herb Gray, to take charge of the more ‘dangerous’ 
inmates until the prison renovation and a security review could be completed. It 
was also announced that CSC would be spending $400,000 to make Edmonton 
more secure -  and that maximum security women were expected to return to the 
prison once the up-grade was completed.42
Ms Fox continued to take the brunt of sustained media criticism and the debate 
about EIFW spilled onto the floor of the House of Commons in Ottawa. But it was 
not only local and national politicians who were calling for Ms Fox’s departure. 
The Edmonton Journal vociferously called for Fox’s resignation, but also 
apportioned the blame more widely: ‘... Fox shouldn’t shoulder the whole blame
41 Edmonton Sun
42 Edmonton Journal
217
for the women’s prison fiasco. Everyone, from Corrections Canada to the prison 
staff, to the prisoners themselves, bears some responsibility’.43
The staff of the prison found themselves in limbo, managing a prison reduced to 
holding eight minimum security women in a maximum security Enhanced Unit, not 
knowing when the other women would be allowed back to the prison. Edmonton 
residents wanted to know just which categories of federally sentenced women 
would be returning once the prison was functioning again and no-one, publicly, 
knew what would happen to the women who had been removed from Edmonton. A 
perturbed Kim Pate wrote to Commissioner Ingstrup on the 16th July, having 
discovered that CSC was once again withholding information from CAEFS: ‘I ... 
find it most disturbing to have been advised on the afternoon of July 8, 1996 that 
the options for the Prairie women were not clearly elucidated, only to now have a 
document, dated July 9, 1996, which details said ‘options’, including a draft press 
release and allusion to a strategy regarding the manner in which our organisation 
should be dealt with’. She wanted to know: ‘what other impact has or will the 
EIFW situation have upon the transitional planning, opening, programming, staff 
training and accountability mechanisms for the other women’s prisons?’, a question 
voluntary agencies from across Canada were also asking.
Individual CAEFS’ groups added their voices: ‘... the security and other 
institutional problems there [at EIFW] are the result, not of the implementation of a 
model based on Creating Choices, but rather are the result of failure to implement a 
model faithful to Creating Choices' , wrote the Director of the Ontario Region, 
Elizabeth Forested, to Solicitor General Herb Gray.44 CAEFS’ President, Susan 
Hendricks, also wrote to Gray: ‘... despite all you have learned about the manner in 
which the senior managers of the Correctional Service of Canada have consistently 
and unabashedly mislead you in the past [as revealed at the Arbour inquiry], you 
appear to be once again accepting their notions and exculpatory explanations of the 
configuration of events in Edmonton over the past six months’.45 Once again, CSC 
was imposing its own solutions. Once again, the lessons of history were being 
relearned (see Cohen, 1985).
43 Edmonton Journal 17th May, 1996
44 28th May, 1996.
45 10th June, 1996
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Changing the image of federally sentenced women
The focus of the official discourse was starting to change. Whereas the previous 
emphasis had been on the low risk of the women, whom the local community could 
welcome, by the 23rd July Ole Ingstrup was writing to Kim Pate: ‘internal and 
perimeter security enhancements [at Edmonton] are being put in place ... 
safeguarding the community from undue risk’. Ms Pate remained a consistent 
observer and critic of developments and her interventions were not always 
welcomed, as in this letter from Remi Gobeil: ‘If indeed you have new solutions, I 
would like to discuss them, but to simply reiterate that everyone should simply be 
returned to the EIFW, in my view, demonstrates the E. Fry Society’s lack of 
appreciation for what occurred there over the winter months, an underestimation of 
the inmates we deal with and lack of responsibility vis-a-vis the safety of the 
public, the staff and inmates’.46 Just who was responsible for this 
‘underestimation’ -  and whether it was ‘underestimation’ rather than failure to plan 
adequately, or interpret faithfully, as CAEFS had alleged -  was not addressed.
Nearly three months after the women were removed from Edmonton they still had 
not been told their final destination, but on the 22nd August the Interim Instruction: 
Placement ofFSW  in the Prairie Region (CD [Commissioner’s Directive] 500) was 
issued: ‘Placement of female inmates in the Prairie Region may ... be made to an 
institution other than a women’s institution’. This paved the way for placing 
federally sentenced women back inside men’s prisons, an option which the Task 
Force had entirely rejected on the basis of federally sentenced women’s histories of 
physical and sexual abuse at the hands of men.
The openings of Grand Valley Institution, in Ontario, and Etablissement Joliette, in 
Quebec, were delayed as a consequence of events at Edmonton. Ole Ingstrup 
wrote to Kim Pate, saying that a decision had been made that maximum women 
would not be transferred to EIFW ‘at this time’ as EIFW would have enough to 
cope with in accommodating the approximately 20 medium and minimum women 
waiting to be transferred, as well as new admissions. Mr. Ingstrup added: ‘the FSW 
[federally sentenced women’s] population has increased significantly during the 
last two years. The three regional facilities do not have the capacity to house all the
46 9th August, 1996
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women in their respective region of residence’.47 Yet some three years earlier 
Edmonton residents had been told that the maximum bed occupancy of the prison 
would not be needed until ‘well into the next millennium’. Again predictions were 
being disproved.
In the same letter Mr. Ingstrup commented on the women’s mental health needs, 
citing work undertaken by Dr. Margo Rivera during the first three months of 1996. 
She had interviewed 26 women imprisoned at Edmonton, Nova Institution for 
Women and the Prison for Women, because there had been concerns that: ‘a 
minority of federally sentenced women would not be able to participate 
constructively in such an environment [at the new prisons] without very specialised 
attention being paid to their need for an enhanced level of psychological support 
services’ (Rivera 1996: 1). Mr. Ingstrup, in citing her work, was adding to the 
reconstruction of the image of some of the federally sentenced women. Moreover, 
he was pathologising the women and their alleged failure to cope at Edmonton was 
attributed solely to their own shortcomings, rather than to the failure of CSC to be 
adequately prepared for their arrival. (See Sim, 1990 for an account of similar 
medicalising of women prisoners in the United Kingdom.) While it might be said 
that the original failure stemmed from the Task Force’s reluctance to define and 
label more women as being both ‘high needs’ and ‘high risk’ (TFFSW 1990: 116), 
by 1995 the final responsibility lay with CSC.
Almost four months passed between the prison’s almost complete closure and its
tlireopening on the 29 August, 1996. The staff underwent retraining, but this had 
not been fully completed by the time the women returned 48 The prison passed its 
security audit and had: a higher fence, topped with razor wire; motion sensors; 
video surveillance; a new master control room separate from the Enhanced Unit; 
and lockable doors in the living units which did not infringe fire regulations. 
Throughout, the minimum security women continued to reside at Edmonton, with 
some reaching parole eligibility and returning to the community. Pending the 
completion of a national study on the future of high-risk females, no maximum 
security women were allowed to return to the prison. They were placed in either 
Saskatchewan Penitentiary or the Regional Psychiatric Centre (RPC), both of
47 29th August, 1996
48 Training schedule provided to CAEFS on 12th September, 1996
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which were male prisons and in Saskatchewan, rather than Alberta. Corrections 
spent $289,000 on upgrading facilities at the Penitentiary and a further $220,00 at 
the RPC. A Corrections’ spokesman said ‘we’ve learned from our mistakes. We 
know from the experiences at the Edmonton Institution for Women that we 
received too many maximum-security inmates and those with mental health needs
, AOat once .
On the 12th September, 1996 the Interim Instruction: Regional Women’s Facilities 
are not Reception Centres (CD 500) was issued:
The current policy of the Correctional Service of Canada is that no federally 
sentenced woman who is designated as a maximum security inmate will be 
accommodated at any of the new regional facilities.
A single Commissioner’s Directive swept away a central plank of Creating 
Choices,; the idea that all federally sentenced women, irrespective of their security 
level, would -  and could -  live in the same prison, sharing the same facilities. On 
the 19th September all maximum security women were removed from Nova 
Institution for Women, the only other prison to hold maximum security women 
(with consequences that will be explored in the following chapter). All such 
classified women, until alternative plans could be formulated, would be detained in 
men’s prisons, with the isolation and high levels of security consequent upon such a
50move.
Kim Pate continued her correspondence with Ole Ingstrup:
‘we ... are aware of the millions of dollars you are spending on new security 
measures for the regional women’s prisons, as well as the preparation of 
units for women in men’s prisons. ... we are extremely concerned that such 
short-sighted and excessive expenditures are being needlessly spent in this 
manner. CAEFS continues to urge you to focus upon readying the staff and 
ensuring the availability of appropriate programs and services ... rather than 
engage in the regression of women’s corrections in this country’. (24th 
September, 1996)
Having returned to its advocacy role, CAEFS was unlikely to acknowledge that its 
own representatives had contributed to the Task Force’s failure to countenance the
49 Edmonton Sun 29th August, 1996
50 These units were discrete units within the larger men’s prisons. They were separately managed 
and had their own programme staff.
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possibility that more than five percent of federally sentenced women might need 
extra help and / or extra security in the new prisons. Neither could the organisation 
even hint at repudiating the report -  nor would it have wished to, because of the 
light Creating Choices shone on federally sentenced women -  as it well knew that a 
number of its own members had counselled against the initial enterprise on the 
grounds of the possible risk of incorporation.
It was not until the 19th September, 1997 that CSC released the National Board of 
Investigation’s report.51 For the first time since the temporary closure of the prison 
Jan Fox was publicly interviewed. She admitted she had made mistakes, saying 
‘I’ve never denied that and I never will, but I still believe in the philosophy ... You 
can call it naive if you want, but we -  the Correctional Service of Canada -  believe 
that all these women can successfully reintegrate into our society. That’s our 
mission’. There were further calls for Fox’s resignation. In October the Edmonton 
police confirmed they were investigating charges of criminal negligence causing 
death and failing to supply the necessities of life in connection with Denise 
Fayant’s death.52 On the 23rd October a lawsuit was filed against Ms Fox and CSC 
by Ms Fayant‘s mother, alleging negligence in that they ‘failed to provide extra 
security for her when they knew or ought to have known that her life was in severe 
jeopardy’.53
The Report of the Fatality Inquiry was not published until January 2000. It 
contained seven Recommendations, one of which read:
Members of Correctional Service of Canada ought to be compelled to read 
the transcript of the Fayant Inquiry for its educational merit. The evidence 
demonstrates a lack of fore-thought, a lack of administrative accountability 
and a callous and cavalier approach within Correctional Service of Canada 
which cannot be condoned or tolerated (Chrumka 2000: 73).
It also referred to Denise Fayant as being ‘helpless, a victim of a process intent 
upon implementing an untested concept to manage federally sentenced female
51 Board o f  Investigation into a suicide on February 29, 1996, and other major incidents at 
Edmonton Institution fo r  Women CSC 1996b
52 Edmonton Journal 9th October, 1997
53 These charges were dropped in April, 1998. The case had been thought so sensitive that, 
unusually, four senior prosecutors were involved in the decision not to proceed.
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inmates. She was the test. The process failed tragically and inhumanly. Her death 
was avoidable’ (Chrumka 2000: 71).
The burden of expectation
This chapter has outlined the most prominent events during the first year of the 
prison’s opening. It is clear that none of these events happened in isolation. The 
situation was perhaps best summed up by a newspaper columnist, writing earlier, 
but encapsulating what happened:
‘I have been reading about human sacrifices recently.... We think of them 
as relics of the ancient world but really, they aren’t ... If anything, today’s 
human sacrifices are more cruel. We sacrifice the person publicly and then 
let them live to endure it all. Last week the recently opened Edmonton 
prison for women made the news again. ... And this in a town that doesn’t 
want the prison; never wanted the prison and shows no sign of ever thinking 
a prison for women in Edmonton is anything but a bad idea to be terminated 
soon. ... But as the criticism of Canada’s new policy grows, who do you 
think will go on the chopping block? Will it be the people who insisted on 
the policy? Those who put it in place? The government who awarded the 
new prison as a prize to Edmonton? The inmates? The people who 
designed a prison that can’t hold prisoners? Or shall we sacrifice Jan 
Fox?’54
Edmonton Institution for Women was the first of the new prisons to open. It had 
taken five and a half years for the vision of Creating Choices to take physical shape 
and, inevitably, Edmonton carried a huge burden of expectation. The events which 
have been outlined here had a profound impact on all the other new prisons, if 
perhaps less visibly, but no less deeply, at the Healing Lodge. Why was the labour 
of five and half years so precipitately derailed, judged and found wanting as a result 
of the presumed failings of one prison which had been open for only five and a half 
months? Further, why did this particular prison cause so many individual women 
to respond to it in such a distressed manner?
It is reasonable to assume that certain factors did not help Edmonton during those 
first months:
• pressure to close the Prison for Women, largely occasioned by what was heard 
during the Arbour hearings, led CSC to open Edmonton before it was physically 
complete;
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• the local community largely did not want the prison and the media interest 
escalated with every incident;
• the prison was not designed to cope with the number of maximum security 
women it eventually had to take;
• the prison appeared -  to the public, at least -  to be insufficiently secure;
• there were insufficient programmes in place at opening to provide for the 
varying needs of the women.
As we shall see, there were other factors at play, such as: inexperienced staff; a 
demanding communal life for those women who were able to move from the 
Enhanced Unit to the houses; a lack of Standing Orders. There were also some 
factors specific to Edmonton, such as excessive use of strip searching and a 
preponderance of Aboriginal women who had not been allowed to transfer to the 
Healing Lodge. I address those two now, because they were so intimately linked to 
Edmonton. In the following chapter I deal with issues which were common to both 
Edmonton and Nova Institution for Women.
Strip searching
One of the immediate consequences of failing to have the prison completed on time 
was that, in an effort to ensure that drugs did not pass into the Enhanced Unit all 
women coming and going from the Enhanced Unit were routinely strip searched 
each time they moved. This meant as many as eight strip searches per day for some 
women, irrespective of their security rating. CAEFS believed that the ‘notion of 
dynamic security did not contemplate regular and routine invasive searches’:
CAEFs regards the strip searches of the women in Edmonton as an illegal 
practice that is antithetical to the principles of Creating Choices. Given that 
the enhanced units are not classified as segregation units, the stripping of 
women in and out of those units contravenes your policy (CD #571) and the 
legislation governing this area (s.48 of the CCRA: s.7 of the Canadian 
Charter o f Rights and Freedoms).55
Mr. Edwards replied that ‘the interim practice of routine strip searches prior to 
entering the temporary program area in the Enhanced Unit was completely 
terminated on January 29, 1996’. He also added that women on Security
54 Connie Sampson March, 1996
55 Letter from Susan Hendricks, CAEFS’ President, to Commissioner John Edwards 2 1st February, 
1996
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Management Levels One and Two were never stripped ‘as it was considered that 
their minimum security classification implied a level of trust and self-responsibility 
which should be recognised’.56 Further, CSC had decided that the definition of 
what constituted a ‘segregation unit’ was flexible and Mr. Edward’s reply 
explained that the law did not reflect the reality of the multi-purpose design of the 
new institutions. It appeared from his letter that CSC had adopted a policy of 
having a moveable segregation area; this meant that wherever a Level Five 
(Administrative Segregation) woman happened to be at a given time became, for 
that period, a segregation area.57 CAEFS’ response was to label his explanation 
‘legal gymnastics’.58 As the Board of Investigation made clear in their report, all 
women were stripped, and ‘thus minimum security offenders were subjected 
routinely to procedures normally reserved for maximum security individuals* (CSC 
1996b: 2), so the Commissioner was ill-informed. It became apparent that strip 
searching had not ceased in January, and in March the Calgary E. Fry Society wrote 
to Jan Fox to complain. At the end of April strip searching was still continuing, 
prompting a letter from all the Prairie E. Fry Societies to Ms Fox, commenting on 
how negatively this affected the women’s relationships with staff.59 The practice 
continued until the removal of the majority of the women from the prison.
Strip searching was particularly important both because of the impact it had on the 
way women and staff related to each other and the way in which it diminished the 
influence of the new correctional philosophy. Irrespective of how strip searching is 
carried out, it involves the public display of parts of the body normally kept hidden 
from public gaze (see Carlen, 1998; Scraton et al, 1991). A strip search can never 
be carried out sensitively because the whole manner of exposing the body is 
fundamentally insensitive, denoting relations of power between those being 
stripped and those responsible for the stripping. The prisoner is in a position of 
abject humiliation. Unsurprisingly, the women at Edmonton detested being 
stripped (as they saw it, unnecessarily) and were particularly resistant to being 
stripped by a correctional officer who was also their Primary Worker. The practice 
was out of step with what women had been led to expect at Edmonton and 
immediately affected their relationships with staff. Yet the situation was largely
56 27th February, 1996
57 30th February, 1996
58 30th April, 1996
59 Ibid
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beyond the control of staff, who felt themselves just as much affected by CSC’s 
failure to provide them with a completed prison and were perturbed by being part 
of an exercise so far removed from the concept of dynamic security. Having 
resorted to stripping as a control measure because the prison was not finished, the 
instinct to check women was already inculcated in officers and management by the 
time the women finally returned to the prison. Although strip searching was then 
reserved for cases such as suspected harbouring of offensive weapons, the women 
at Edmonton continued to be frisked as they left the administration building at the 
end of each work session, and this was still the practice here in 1998, unlike that at 
the other prisons.
Aboriginal women
A high proportion of the women first accommodated in the Enhanced Unit were 
Aboriginal. Some had applied to be sent to the Healing Lodge and not been 
accepted, mainly because their security rating was above Management Level Three. 
The Board of Investigation made an important point of discussing this:
• the proportion of medium- and maximum-security [Aboriginal] offenders at 
EIFW, relative to the whole population, will be larger [because of numbers of 
Aboriginals in the Prairies];
• Aboriginal women who are not accepted by the Healing Lodge may feel less 
commitment to engage in the programme at EIFW because they are “stuck” 
there’ (CSC 1996b: 141).
This was supported by Rivera:
... it is extremely important that the Edmonton Institution is not perceived of as a 
dumping ground by Aboriginal women who are not accepted into the Healing 
Lodge. If more integration is not effected between the Healing Lodge and the 
EI4W, some Aboriginal women ... will make little effort to buy into its 
philosophy or programming (Rivera 1996: 28).
Edmonton was always going to have a disproportionate number of federally 
sentenced Aboriginal women as soon as the unpublicised decision was taken that 
the Healing Lodge would not accept maximum security women. It was an 
inescapable demographic fact. But many of the Aboriginal women themselves had 
assumed that they would be eligible for the Healing Lodge -  and some of the 
maximum security Aboriginal women held at the Prison for Women had had their
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security ratings reduced to facilitate their transfer, including one who had been 
involved in the April 1994 incidents. For those rejected women to find themselves 
subsequently accommodated in the small Enhanced Unit at Edmonton was to 
compound their disappointment and give them little incentive to participate at 
Edmonton. Moreover, Edmonton offered little by way of Aboriginal programming 
and scarcely differed, in that respect, from the prisons they had left behind. Once 
Edmonton re-opened many of these Aboriginal women were barred even from 
Edmonton, because of their maximum security status, and became yet more isolated 
within the federal system. As Morin (1999) made clear, CSC was unable to fulfil 
its own Commissioner’s Directive on the treatment of imprisoned Aboriginals, 
leaving them with insufficient services.
Conclusions and looking ahead
We have now briefly covered the traumatic early history of Edmonton: its planning; 
its opening; its closure; and its re-opening. The story highlights the areas, such as 
providing for the ‘difficult to manage women’, which the Task Force had been 
reluctant to explore in depth. While the Task Force may be held responsible for its 
collective lack of foresight when planning its ideal prisons for idealised prisoners, 
we must also remember that the civil servants allowed some aspects of the plan to 
pass almost by default, because they assumed they would be able to change them 
once implementation began. As developments at Edmonton have demonstrated, 
this, largely, did not happen. This may partially be explained by the unanticipated 
pressures they faced from the public and, particularly, the politicians in the Prairies. 
But the civil servants also had to contend with a group of low-needs women at the 
RPC, forced to co-exist with a volatile group of high-needs women, and increasing 
numbers of federally sentenced women. With both the Prison for Women and 
Burnaby removed as an accommodation option, the civil servants had no choice but 
to send more women to Edmonton. Had these pressures been less intense it is 
conceivable that the prison would not have been allowed to open before it was 
physically complete, thus removing some of the complications of the opening 
process. But this did not remove the basic fact that more maximum security 
women than the prison could contain were due to be held at Edmonton. In dealing 
with the aftermath the larger organisation behind the civil servants -  CSC -  
attempted to move responsibility for its own failings on to the shoulders of 
federally sentenced women, rather than acknowledge its own shortcomings.
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Edmonton’s opening was closely followed by that of Nova Institution for Women, 
in Truro, so it is instructive for us to see how that prison fared during its first year 
of opening, a period of time roughly contemporaneous with that of Edmonton. Did 
any similar situations arise? Are we able to note parallels? Did events at 
Edmonton influence policy at distant Nova? Above all, did the two prisons 
embody the vision of Creating Choices? We need to understand the successes and 
failures associated with these two prisons because their genesis was so very 
different from that of the Healing Lodge. They were largely the result of 
correctional officials’ planning, divorced from the influence and scrutiny of the 
voluntary sector. The Healing Lodge, by contrast, was conceived and inspired by 
Aboriginals during its transformation from concept to physical reality.
Correctional officials facilitated the transformation, but were not its entire source. 
Potentially, then, we have the possibility of two different correctional outcomes. 
The question arises whether the continuing influence of the Aboriginals at the 
Healing Lodge has enabled a radical model of imprisonment to emerge from 
Creating Choices -  distinct from that of the largely non-Aboriginal prisons -  or 
whether the hand of corrections might still be seen as the Healing Lodge’s pre­
eminent guiding force. To begin the journey towards answering that we now turn 
to Nova Institution for Women.
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7. Nova Institution for Women
Canada is a vast confederation of provinces, the majority being geographically 
larger than most European countries. Federal departments will not necessarily 
separate one province from another administratively and, for correctional purposes, 
the ‘Atlantic Region’ covers the smaller provinces of Nova Scotia (NS), New 
Brunswick (NB), Prince Edward Island (PEI) and Newfoundland (NF).1 During the 
consultations undertaken by the Task Force in these provinces a great deal was 
heard about the inadequate facilities available for provincially sentenced women 
and the enormous distances between some communities. Federally sentenced 
women were particularly disadvantaged, generally having little option but 
confinement at the Prison for Women for the major part of their sentence. As one 
presenter at the Consultations said: ‘it was not just Aboriginal women who were 
‘dislodged from their culture [by imprisonment at the Prison for Women], but 
Maritime women as well’.2 Those who returned from the prison to complete their 
sentences under provincial jurisdiction had great difficulty in adapting to the 
regimes of the local prisons and, eighteen months after the publication of Creating 
Choices, the Solicitor General of Nova Scotia appointed a special committee to 
examine the needs of provincially sentenced women. Their report, largely echoing 
the methodology and findings of Creating Choices, provided specific information 
about women ‘in conflict with the law’ in that province.3
1 At times I will refer to the women from this region as being from the Maritimes, which is an area 
covering the first three o f the ‘Atlantic Region’ provinces. Newfoundland is not part o f the 
Maritimes but, for the purposes o f this chapter, can be assumed to be included when the term is 
used.
2 August, 1989
3 Blueprint fo r  Change: Report o f  the Solicitor General’s Special Committee on Provincially 
Incarcerated Women (1992) The Committee acknowledged the ground-breaking role o f the Task 
Force on Federally Sentenced Women (TFFSW) and adopted ‘many o f the Task Force’s principles 
and methods, and found [its] work made easier by these pioneers in systemic change’ (1992: ii). 
Whilst being an examination o f provincial provision for remanded and sentenced women, the 
conclusions reached by the final Report, Blueprint fo r  Change, revealed that many o f the problems 
encountered by provincially incarcerated women were similar to those o f federally sentenced 
women. Importantly, the Report highlighted the plight of black women within the correctional 
system, pointing out the neglect o f their needs in correctional planning. (The TFFSW was criticised 
for failing to consider this group separately in Creating Choices). Although there was a fairly 
sizeable Aboriginal population living in the Atlantic region, the sentenced population did not reflect 
the Canada-wide trend o f disproportionate Aboriginal representation in the prisons. The Maritimes 
also has a distinct group o f Acadians, with different cultural needs. Little in the Report was 
subsequently implemented.
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Everyone wants a prison?
As we know, the Task Force had identified a site ‘in or near Halifax’ (TFFSW 
1990: 114) as its preferred location for a new prison, reflecting the fact that most 
federally sentenced women from the Atlantic Region came from Nova Scotia.4 
While the Task Force’s recommendation would not lessen the geographic 
dislocation for many other women -  St. John’s (NF), for example, was 
approximately 600 miles from Halifax -  it would ensure that a greater proportion of 
women remained in their home province. However, by May 1991, some eight 
months after Mr. Ingstrup had accepted the report, thirteen communities across 
Nova Scotia were already competing with each other to attract the proposed new 
prison. The Atlantic provinces had significant unemployment problems compared 
with other parts of Canada and there was intense political lobbying for the prison to 
be sited in various areas, because of the associated financial benefits. Communities 
such as Springhill (NS) and Dorchester (NB), which already had federal 
penitentiaries, stressed the savings on administrative costs that the federal 
government could make were it to build in their area, in much the same way that 
Drumheller had, in Alberta. There was an awareness of the benefits Kingston 
(Ontario) derived from the several prisons located in its vicinity and an assumption 
that some of those benefits could be enjoyed in the Maritimes.
In chapter 6 we learned of CSC’s July, 1991 decision to allow communities within 
a hundred mile radius of the Task Force-designated locations for the new prisons to 
be considered as possible sites, and towns in the Maritimes who had not already 
done so were encouraged to submit bids. The Halifax MP, Mary Clancy, 
immediately said that no further time should be wasted ‘listening to people ... from 
Truro or Bridgewater or whatever. ... Let’s start looking right away for sites within 
the metropolitan [Halifax] area that are close to the facilities these women need’. 
She was echoed by Felicity Hawthorne, a co-chair of the Task Force, speaking on 
behalf of CAEFS, who said that if the Government were truly addressing the 
criteria laid down in Creating Choices, then it had no option but to choose Halifax 
as the site, [as] ‘we certainly don’t want those facilities out in the sticks so that 
every time a women wants to go to hospital or her counsellor or whatever it’s a
4 These two cities face each other across a shared harbour. Halifax is the capital o f Nova Scotia, 
while Dartmouth is the province’s second largest city.
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major performance to get her there’.5 Halifax was becoming more vocal in its 
lobbying for the prison and much of the public comment focused on the economic 
benefits the prison would bring to any area. Dartmouth, Nova Scotia’s second 
largest city, situated just across the harbour from Halifax, voted to pursue its own 
case with the federal government, with the city council’s administrator speaking of 
the ‘multi-million dollar economic development opportunity for the city’ which the 
prison would be.6 An irate resident countered, ‘no way ... It’s going to blow our 
property prices to you know where! If you want to sell your house, you wont have 
a snowball’s chance in hell if that prison comes in’.7
In November 1991 Halifax City Council publicly released its bid for the new prison 
and revealed that it included a list of eight possible sites, some of which were
Q
residential and had owners who had not been consulted. There was an immediate, 
negative response from residents, who feared that land might be expropriated. 
Shortly afterwards the Council barred the prison from any residential sites, 
removing five of the eight proposed sites from contention. Halifax’s Deputy Mayor 
said that, by removing all residential sites from the list ‘we might have sealed our 
own fate’.9 That same month CSC’s evaluation team assessed the various 
submissions, and public expectation was that either city could readily fulfil the 
location criteria stipulated in Creating Choices.
CSC’s decision was not long in coming and the small town of Truro, on the very 
edge of the extended search radius, had unexpectedly won out over all the other 
Nova Scotia contenders. Solicitor General Doug Lewis travelled to Truro on the 
17th December 1991 to confirm the news, telling townspeople that the prison’s $5 
million budget would create between forty and fifty jobs during construction, with 
26 permanent positions eventually being available at the prison. The Minister was 
unable to specify exactly where the prison would be built and went so far as to say
5 Chronicle Herald 1st August, 1991
6 Chronicle Herald 22nd August, 1991
7 Daily News 26th August, 1991
8 Daily News 20th November, 1991
9 Daily News November, 1991
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that, if programmes were not in place by the time the facility was scheduled to open 
in 1994, then ‘we’ve got a problem’, but he was convinced it was one the local 
community could solve.10
Few outside Truro had ever considered it a possibility, either. Elizabeth Forestell, 
then Director of the Halifax-Dartmouth branch of the E. Fry Society, said they were 
‘deeply disturbed’ by the selection of Truro, which had no women-centred 
programmes for healthcare, mental health and substance abuse. There was intense 
anger over the decision and immediate assumptions that the decision was a political 
one. In January 1992 Ms Forested complained that Solicitor General Lewis and the 
conservative (Tory) government of Brian Mulroney had put political favouritism 
ahead of women’s rights in deciding to award the prison to Truro, noting that the 
Cumberland-Colchester (Truro) MP, Bid Casey, was a Tory whereas Mary Clancy, 
MP for Halifax, was a Liberal. The Native Women’s Association of Canada 
(NWAC) added its voice, pointing out that the criteria specified in Creating 
Choices had been ignored and, fearing that a similar disregard might be exhibited 
when it came to selecting the Prairies’ site, asked for the Steering Committee to be 
reconvened urgently.11 By February 1992, however, CAEFS had recognised that 
the decision would not be reversed. Kim Pate, CAEFS’ Executive Director, having 
met with Doug Lewis and Commissioner Ingstrup, said that the Association 
(through its Halifax branch) would work with Truro in order to ensure that the best 
possible services would be available.12 This position of cooperation -  in a sense 
coerced because of the needs of federally sentenced women -  survived the 18th 
June, 1992 decision by CAEFS and its nineteen member societies to withdraw from 
the External Advisory Committee (see chapter 6), and the Halifax E. Fry Society 
continued to work with those planning the new Truro prison.
There were behind-the-scenes negotiations during the summer months of 1992 in 
an attempt to locate and agree on a site and in July an application for re-zoning of 
land in the east of the city was made, without any prior public consultation. (This 
failure to consult with the local community before making decisions was repeated a 
year later in Edmonton, where CSC did not appear to have learned from the
10 Chronicle Herald 17th December, 1991
11 Letter 16th January, 1992
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mistakes made in Truro.) After protests, the re-zoning request was withdrawn and 
plans were announced for ‘a series of public meetings to explain how the prison 
[would] be built and which sites [were] most appropriate’.13 On the 28th October, 
1992 Corrections announced that a site in a suburban area whose residents had 
expressed little opposition, would house the new prison, and approval was finally 
given by the Truro council in April 1993. Therese LeBlanc was appointed Warden 
on the 17th March, 199314 and throughout the site selection process she was the 
‘face’ of Corrections, as was Jan Fox in Edmonton.
The local MP, Bill Casey, represented the Solicitor General at the sod-turning 
ceremony in James Street on the 12th October, 1993. The prison, at that stage, was 
expected to provide 21 beds. Casey lost his seat in the election which followed 
later that month and his Liberal successor had to deal with rumours in December 
that the prison had been put ‘on hold’ because of calls from Liberals in Dorchester 
(NB) that the prison should be re-sited there. Therese LeBlanc attempted to allay 
fears, explaining that there would be considerable costs should the prison be 
relocated, because the design work was specific to the site already chosen.15 This 
‘hiccup’ overcome, tenders were expected to be let by February 1994, but in March 
there was a further delay when the prison was again put ‘on hold’, following 
allegations that Ottawa was considering locating the prison in the military base in 
Chatham (NB), the riding [constituency] of the Liberal Premier of the province, 
Frank McKenna. The matter was finally resolved when the new Solicitor General, 
Herb Gray, intervened, confirming that Truro would indeed house the prison.
In examining the way in which the prison site was selected what becomes apparent 
is that the prison was much sought after. Although residents in Halifax and 
Dartmouth, as well as in Truro, voiced disquiet about certain aspects of the prison, 
it was largely perceived as a desirable acquisition for whichever community 
happened to win in the end. This was in stark contrast to what was rumbling on in 
Edmonton, a largely prosperous city, where the local community had huge 
misgivings about such a project and anticipated that there might be some danger 
attached to it. The extending of the search radius was an economic blessing for a
12 Daily News 8th February, 1992
13 Chronicle Herald 9th July, 1992
14 CSC News Release 17th March, 1993
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small town like Truro beset by recession and the drift to the cities. This also 
explains why other Maritimes’ communities did not see the awarding of the ‘prize’ 
to Truro as the end of the matter and why members of parliament continued to 
lobby for the prison to be assigned elsewhere. Had the smaller communities been 
bidding for a saw-mill the reaction would have been the same, because any new 
businesses meant jobs; the prison was seen as benefiting the community. Whether 
the community had anything to offer in return, apart from a potentially willing 
work-force, was not part of the debate. Whether the federally sentenced women 
would benefit from being accommodated in their community seemed to be entirely 
lost from view. This was admitted by a member of the local steering committee 
which had originally worked to bring the prison to Truro: ‘Originally our focus for 
bringing the Correctional Centre to Truro was based solely on what it would mean 
for our town in employment opportunities and other spin-offs’. ... ‘The balance 
quickly changed, however, as the community became more involved. Now there is 
no question the correctional facility will definitely realise benefits from being 
located in Truro’.16
Building begins
Construction of the prison commenced some three years after the planning for a
new Atlantic facility began. In September 1994 Warden Therese LeBlanc (who
had recently been a member of CSC’s National Board of Investigation into the
1 ^
April 1994 events at the Prison for Women, see chapter 6) left the prison to take 
charge of the Prison for Women. An interim successor held the reins at Nova until 
Christine Manuge was appointed Warden on the 17th February, 1995. At that stage 
some of the senior team members were already in place, but the bulk of staff were 
still to be appointed and the nine-week training programme for those selected was 
due to begin just two months later. It was subsequently suggested that the hiring 
authorities rejected any applicant at the outset if they did not have a university 
education, thus losing the potential talents and life experiences of those who had 
pursued other career paths, and ignoring the wishes of Creating Choices (Manzer, 
1996).
15 Daily News 15th December, 1993
16 CSC Communique 27th October, 1995
17 See chapter 6 for Madame Justice Arbour’s comments.
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In April 1995 Therese LeBlanc returned to Truro to address a meeting of the Nova 
Scotia Criminology and Corrections Association. She thought the women who 
would be arriving at the new prison might find it harder to be there than at the 
Prison for Women, saying ‘this will be very frightening for them. They’ll be losing 
friendships, leaving what has been their home for several years and they will have 
to rekindle their family relationships’. With a degree of foresight, she added that 
‘the first six months will make or break these new facilities. ... If we fail it will
1Khave consequences on our communities’.
At the beginning of August the federal government officially took possession of the 
new prison, which was almost completed. A census of federal women prisoners 
had revealed the need for increased capacity for Atlantic federally sentenced 
women, so a fourth living unit -  which had been dropped from the original plan for 
economic reasons -  was added to the prison, increasing regular bed capacity to 28. 
Officials inspected the prison to ensure that it met federal standards and a 
spokesperson said ‘it’s now a matter of getting familiar with the surroundings and 
carrying out training onsite to ensure all staff know the facility and what to do in 
the event of an emergency’. To assist the opening process, women were to be 
transferred in groups of four.19 The Truro public was encouraged to tour the prison 
and reaction was divided, as was encapsulated in an article in the Chronicle Herald'. 
‘Prison or country club? That’s the question under discussion over coffee in many 
places around Truro as tours of the soon-to-open prison move into high-gear’. Ms 
Manuge said that while some might see the facility as excessive, the majority 
supported the approach, arguing that it was less costly to build a prison in a
9 0residential style. This theme was expanded upon by Commissioner John 
Edwards, who came to Truro for the prison’s official opening on the 27th October 
1995. He said ‘it would be so much easier, perhaps, to build the more traditional 
type of penitentiary, with high fences, cell blocks full of steel and concrete 
surrounded by all the latest in high-tech security systems and hardware. ... For a 
number of inmates such institutions are and will continue to be required. They are 
also very expensive to build and operate. These new units cost about two thirds of
18 Daily News 24th April, 1995
19 Chronicle Herald 3rd August, 1995
20 Chronicle Herald 21st October, 1995
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01what it would normally cost to build a traditional prison’. But Nova already 
contained a small section ‘full of steel and concrete’ for that group of women; an 
Enhanced Unit, which had not been increased in size when all the other prisons had 
their Enhanced Units doubled. Corrections had publicised the Enhanced Unit in a 
Communique it produced to mark the opening of the prison, explaining that it 
would be used both to assess new arrivals and to house those who were a danger to 
themselves or others. Yet the fact that some women might be a danger to others 
had rarely been part of the public debate about the prison. The four (unfunded22) 
beds in the Enhanced Unit potentially added to the capacity of the prison, but it was 
still referred to as a 28-bed prison, in the same way that Edmonton was known as a 
56-bed prison, whilst having a 12-bed (24, if double-bunked) Enhanced Unit 
capacity.
Both Edmonton and Nova opened at almost the same time, but Truro had been 
identified as the site of a new prison a full year before Edmonton was named. Site 
selection caused delays to both projects and construction at Nova started a little 
after Edmonton. Nova was half the size of Edmonton and the construction team did 
not have to contend with the ferocity of an Albertan winter, so Nova was completed 
on time and physically ready for the women when they first began arriving. 
However, there had been little time for staff to become accustomed to the new 
prison and to be able to test it. In examining the first year of Nova’s opening we 
shall see if there are similarities between what happened there and at Edmonton. In 
describing Nova and subsequent events I continue to adopt the language commonly 
used by CSC, such as ‘multi-faith spirituality room’, ‘special needs’ and ‘Enhanced 
Units’, even when they might be thought of as euphemisms for other things.
‘Not a home, but a prison’
f L
The first three women arrived at Nova on the 9 December 1995. They had been 
carefully selected and all were minimum security women, even though one was 
serving a life sentence. They had flown from Kingston and, as an observer 
commented: They were just in a state o f shock [at seeing the style of the prison and
21 Speaking notes for John Edwards at the official opening o f the Truro (sic) Institution for Women
22 Beds in the Enhanced Unit were not ‘funded’ as regular living spaces for the women. The 
assumption was that they would be used, intermittently, by women who were normally 
accommodated in the houses. They were not considered to be part o f the total capacity o f the 
prison, even when they were used as such at Edmonton.
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having to grapple with the degree of autonomy offered them]. Shortly afterwards
CAEFS’ Kim Pate was asked to comment on Nova. She hoped that the opening of 
the facility marked a new approach by CSC towards female offenders, but ‘her 
Association fear[ed] that the new plan for communal living ... could be jeopardised 
by a lack of planning and support for the transition the women [would] have to 
make. Warden Manuge countered by acknowledging that there was bound to be 
conflict in the living houses, saying ‘the residential housing mirrors community 
living. They will have to learn conflict-resolution so that they can solve their own 
problems and not end up screeching, swearing or smacking each other’.24
The prison to which the women were transferring was in stark contrast to the high- 
security Prison for Women. Nova was designed specifically to take advantage of 
its sloping, wooded site and located at the end of a quiet residential street. The 
Project Brief provided a broad-brush outline of what was required but, beyond 
being specific about the number and type of rooms required in the living houses 
and the enhanced unit, left the architects with remarkable freedom to design the 
new facility. As in Edmonton, the final design gave the initial impression of an 
office complex, which, indeed, the frontage was. The living units were not visible 
from the road and, even from within the prison, were partially hidden by the tree- 
filled central area, providing immediate problems of supervision for staff. Walking 
into the building, past the staffed control area, the open visits area was the first 
thing to be seen, with the paved outdoor visiting area beyond that. Part of the 
administration area was to the left of the entrance and, when the prison first opened, 
this was open-plan and easily accessible to the women, leaving administrative staff 
unable to work freely with confidential materials (a situation later amended by the 
addition of an extra wall). A corridor led around to the education, library, craft and 
other areas and eventually to the gymnasium. The second floor of the 
administration building contained the multi-faith spirituality room26 (not easily 
accessible to the women), further office space, the health centre and the Enhanced 
Unit. This was the only part of the prison which came close to resembling a 
traditional prison, but still had no bars and was furnished with conventional 
porcelain washbasins and toilets, as well as mirrors (with the consequences being
23 Interview 11
24 Thomson News Services 8th November, 1995
25 Correctional Service Canada, Construction Policy & Services: 11th September, 1992
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seen some months later). The Unit contained four cells, one of which could be used 
for observation purposes. Its small, high-walled exercise yard was in vivid contrast 
to the greenery of the rest of the site, and when the pre-opening audit of the prison 
was carried out it took the audit team a very short while to scale the wall. Once the 
women were in situ, there was the added complication that the locks in the
onEnhanced Unit failed to function reliably. For those few staff who had 
correctional experience, the first view of the prison was a shock. As one said: I  
thought ‘oh my, what are we going to do with this? ’ Because the way the buildings 
were all in line I  thought ‘how ever are you going to watch what’s going on? I t 's 
going to be a security nightmare... they could walk right out o f  the front door [of 
the administration building] or walk around the building’ ... it was a little bit 
scary.2*
The four living units and one family visiting house were in a semi-circle towards 
the rear of the site. Doors and windows were alarmed but, as at Edmonton, could 
not initially be locked because of fire-regulations. The same Corcan furniture 
furnished the prison, and the bedrooms (cells) again had the feel of a student-type 
residence. Two of the houses could also accommodate a child. The prison had a 
minimal fence, which acted more as a boundary marker and, in the eyes of the staff, 
compromised security. The women were consequently escorted between the 
administration building and their own houses, instead of being allowed to move 
freely, as had been anticipated by the Task Force. Staff were not resident in any of 
the living units, apart from the Enhanced Unit, and the houses were checked hourly, 
with a hand-held ‘dyster’ electronically recording each visit. This was a system not 
dissimilar to that highlighted by Harding et al (1985) when commenting on an early 
English prison which had a series of levers needing to be pressed at set intervals 
each day to ensure that regular checks took place. Male staff entering houses were 
meant to call out and alert the women and formal counts took place four times a 
day. Staff were permanently positioned in the Structured Living House when it 
opened in March 1996, providing support for a group of women with diverse needs.
26 The term used to cover a room providing for more than one faith.
27 Interview 11
28 Interview 1998
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Nova Institution for Women, Nova Scotia. Part of the living accommodation, seen from the administration building.
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By mid-January 1996 there were eight women in the prison and the local 
community was not beyond drawing unfavourable comparisons with the perceived 
privileged lifestyle of the women at Nova, when economic difficulties forced cuts 
in local budgets, leaving the bus-service for the disabled under threat. ‘People with 
disabilities in Colchester County will become prisoners in their own homes [if they 
lose their bus]’, said the service co-ordinator. ‘The real prisoners at the new 
women’s prison will enjoy a more interesting life, needing only to walk down the 
hall to access gym equipment, computer training and the pending swimming 
pool’.29
But life at the prison was not as easy as the papers would have their readers believe. 
It had been apparent almost immediately the women began arriving that a number 
would find living in the houses difficult. Nova was the only one of the new prisons 
not to have its Enhanced Unit enlarged from its original plan (the Healing Lodge 
had two ‘quiet rooms’), so was using its four-bed unit for: reception and initial 
assessment; administrative segregation; and maximum security women. This left 
little leeway for dealing with others whose behaviour required at least temporary 
accommodation within the unit and, consequently, some women in need of extra 
support were placed prematurely in houses, none of which had resident staff. As 
we already know from what we have learned of events at Edmonton, the houses 
demanded many social skills of federally sentenced women. Unlike Edmonton, 
where the houses were under-used because of the security classification of many of 
the women and the unfinished state of the prison, those at Nova were almost 
immediately occupied.
The Atlantic Region had -  and still has -  a disproportionately high number of
TOfederally sentenced women with ‘special needs’. Indeed, some could not make 
the initial move to Nova because it was recognised that they did not ‘fit’ the new 
model and, unlike the situation for Ms Fox at Edmonton, Nova’s Warden was able 
to refuse prisoners. Before the prison opened CSC realised that special provision
29 Chronicle Herald 15th March, 1996
30 In a later report commissioned by CSC, Warner categorised these as covering: ‘those with basic 
skills and cognitive challenges ...; those with emotional distress needs ...; [those who] in maximum 
security environments may require intensive programming to assist them in changing anti-social 
attitudes and behaviour’ (Warner 1998: 6). The term ‘low functioning’ is used interchangeably with 
‘mentally challenged’ in official documents, to describe women with lower intellectual capabilities 
lacking the social and educational skills necessary for many everyday tasks.
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would have to be made for these women and commissioned a study of possible 
intervention strategies from Whitehall. An initial examination of records had 
identified ten women, out of the 24 due to move to Nova, who were ‘low 
functioning or [had] mental health problems’ (Whitehall 1995: 1). There were deep 
concerns about the women’s ability to cope with the communal living, particularly 
as some of them were serially incompatible with each other. Additionally, some 
had been known to set fires both in the community and in prison, which made 
kitchen safety an issue. Under the CCRA 1992 prisoners should be housed in the 
‘least restrictive environment possible’ (cited in Whitehall 1995: 7). Acting on 
Whitehall’s advice, CSC decided that Nova would be provided with a Structured 
Living House (SLH), specifically for ‘special needs’ women, who would be 
supported by resident staff and special programming. As Whitehall’s report was 
unavailable until October 1995, the SLH was not ready until March 1996, so the 
‘special needs’ women who transferred earlier had a disproportionate impact on the 
women sharing their houses and on staff. Although most women in the houses 
were prepared to make allowances for their unpredictable behaviour, it could not be 
expected that the majority of prisoners would willingly assume the role of helper 
for an unlimited period. As made clear in a subsequent report prepared by Alan 
Warner31, the prison had little time to prepare for the SLH; an occupational 
therapist was hired to co-ordinate the changeover in March and contract staff were 
hired to provide round-the-clock support. Once the SLH was finally available in 
March it became home to three groups of women seen to be distinct: the mentally 
challenged, who needed extensive guidance in basic living skills; those with severe 
mental health difficulties, who exhibited self-destructive behaviour alongside very 
apparent emotional distress; and a small, but influential, group of women who were 
felt to be manipulative in the other living units. A programme co-ordinator was 
only hired on a part-time basis, making provision for each group even more 
difficult, and staff were challenged by the need to provide a programme which 
would adequately respond to such disparate needs. According to Shimmel,32 cited 
by Warner, ‘the Prison for Women culture was ever-present’ and ‘individuals who 
did attempt... positive changes were taunted and / or threatened to conform by 
other inmates’. Warner stated quite unequivocally that:
31 Warner, A (1998) Implementing Choices at Regional Facilities: Program Proposals fo r  
Women Offenders with Special Needs
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Largely, the structured living house was the only available supervised 
setting and thus the admission criteria (sic) became the need for supervision, 
rather than the need for a particular living situation and type of 
programming (Warner 1998: 19, emphasis added).
Creating Choices had anticipated that individual cottages might serve specific 
purposes, but had not expected that one cottage would need to provide for such 
multifarious needs, or that the combination of such needs would eventually prove to 
be so combustible. The staff -  and not just those assigned to the SLH -  had to cope 
with the outcome. The Primary Workers were almost entirely new to corrections 
and as part of their case management33 tasks had responsibility for individual 
women. Their inexperience, and what was beginning to appear to be a significant 
underestimation of how many staff would be required to run such a facility, 
eventually became manifest in tiredness and stress. The wisdom of having selected 
Truro as a site was also being tested because the rush to open on time, combined 
with the late training of very new staff, meant that programmes had not been put in 
place as soon as expected; none was available locally and the women were under­
occupied and, frequently, bored: I  was promised programmes, that’s why I  came 
here. I  took the substance abuse programme [elsewhere] but there’s no NA 
[Narcotics Anonymous] here. I  need help with drugs. That’s why I ’m here34 The 
women’s inability to move freely around the prison, as they had anticipated, added 
to their frustration and they became increasingly disturbed by what they took to be 
inconsistency on the part of the staff: They don *t know what to do. They ask us.
r
We tell them what to do.
Although programmes were to appear as the prison got into its stride, the women 
who first arrived felt that they were part of a puzzling experiment. Even those 
women with a broader experience of coping socially found the new prison 
presented them with enormous personal challenges after the constraints of the 
Prison for Women. One said she spent the first weeks wishing that she could return 
to Kingston; not because she preferred the cramped, old building, but because she
32 Shimmel, L (1996) The structured living house program: Nova Institution fo r  Women CSC 
(not obtained by writer)
33 In Commissioner’s Directive (CD) 701, section 2 reads: ‘The case management process shall 
provide for the proper assessment, classification, counselling, programme planning and supervision 
o f offenders throughout their sentence’. And, in Section 7: ‘A team approach to case work shall be 
co-ordinated by the appropriate case management officer in the institution or the community’.
34 Personal notes 1996
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found the new frightening. She had grown unaccustomed to being given choices, to 
being treated with consistent courtesy; she found that she was longing for the 
certainty of the old structure, which she might not have liked, but where she at least 
understood the ‘rules’.36 So distinct groups began to emerge: women who wished 
for change (but were also fearful of it); women who resisted change because it 
undermined the power they had previously enjoyed; and of staff who wanted to 
effect change, but were unsure of how they could do so consistently. These groups 
were functioning within a physical environment which did not always appear to 
provide security and safety. Indeed, it could be said that the new buildings were 
potentially more dangerous than the Prison for Women, because of the lack of 
direct supervision and the ready availability of kitchen equipment which could be 
used as weapons.
If we compare developments at Nova with what was happening at Edmonton at 
about the same time, we can see some similarities. In the Edmonton Enhanced Unit 
there were problems with overcrowding and disparate groups being uneasily 
imprisoned together. The maximum security women took a disproportionate 
amount of staff time and energy, leaving other women with equally demanding 
needs feeling neglected and ignored. In those cramped quarters the women could 
not have ‘time out’ from each other and tensions were increased as some attempted 
to assert their authority by ‘muscling’ others. Undue levels of security affected all 
of the women indiscriminately. This situation was partially replicated at Nova, but 
in the SLH rather than the Enhanced Unit. As the SLH had been adapted, instead 
of specially designed from the outset, its design faults made adequate supervision 
difficult. Being in the house ‘stigmatised’ the women -  the house became known 
as ‘the crazy house -  and gave them little sense of the possibility of being part of a 
larger community (Warner 1998: 20). Some of the women could scarcely cope 
with their own problems, let alone those of the other women with whom they lived 
in such close proximity, and Nova was quite unable to offer the degree of 
separation provided at the Prison for Women. At Nova the Enhanced Unit was not 
a long term option for anyone, so the houses were the last -  and only -  resort. In a 
sense, this replicated the situation at Edmonton where, as we have seen, the newly-
35 Personal notes 1996
36 Personal notes 1996
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designed prison was unable to offer a safe environment for women known to be 
incompatible with others.
We can see from this comparison that: both prisons had specific groups of women 
providing management and accommodation problems; the accommodation was 
either not ready for the women or unsuited to its purpose; inexperienced staff had 
difficulties in dealing with women who were not conforming to the image of the 
federally sentenced women they had been trained to expect. Additionally, some 
federally sentenced women, who were themselves new prisoners, ‘were affected 
and “infected” by the negativity’37 of some of the women who had transferred from 
the Prison for Women.
Distant influences; instant reactions
In May 1996 the escapes at distant Edmonton (see chapter 6) overtook the other 
prisons, with the exception of the Healing Lodge. All the fences at the new prisons 
were to be raised to three metres and crowned by barbed wire. As Nova’s Warden 
said at the time, ‘a couple of the women felt it was unfortunate that they all have to 
pay the price for what happened in Edmonton’.38 By contrast with Edmonton, the 
administration building at Nova was deemed to be part of the ‘fence’, so the 
frontage did not look remarkably different once the alterations had been made. 
These included enhanced electronic surveillance along the front, with window, door 
and roof alarms, plus infra-red cameras for night-time surveillance.
When a prison security review was announced on the 30th April one of the Nova 
women was quoted in the local paper as saying ‘we ... prefer not to be compared to 
Edmonton. What happened out there is something that they are dealing with. What 
is going on here is something totally different and we would like to keep it like
•5Q
that’. But some of the women thought the addition of the fence was a positive 
development for Nova because it provided protection from possible community 
aggression and lessened, in their eyes, the temptation to escape. Some also hoped 
that the higher fence would permit them greater freedom of movement, without the
37 Personal letter to author 2001
38 Daily News 30th May, 1996
39 The Record 7th May, 1996
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need for constant supervision as they moved from area to area.40 These views were 
not necessarily shared, and CAEFS* Kim Pate was immediate in her condemnation 
of the decision, saying that ‘despite a commitment to a more open, community 
based approach to the rehabilitation of women offenders, federal correctional staff 
are reverting to old solutions when problems at the new facilities arise*. This 
echoed the fear articulated by Madame Justice Arbour that: the Correctional
Service resorts invariably to the view that women’s prisons are or should be, just 
like any other prison’ (Arbour 1996: 178). In an editorial, the local Chronicle 
Herald expressed disappointment that a high fence should be considered necessary 
for the prison:
It is a visible denial of philosophies and policies which were strongly 
expressed when the prison was announced. It has been suggested the fence 
will be made as inconspicuous as possible but the fact it is felt necessary to 
do that further underscores the anomaly of its construction. No matter how 
inconspicuous it may be made to appear it clearly affirms to all who pass by 
that this is not a home but a prison 41
The construction of a higher fence did much more. It was indeed a ‘visible denial 
of philosophies and policies’, but it also showed that CSC viewed all the prisons as 
being non-autonomous entities and had adopted a ‘one size fits all* approach to 
them. I am not suggesting that CSC should have treated federally sentenced 
women differently from each other, depending upon the prison in which they 
happened to be confined. Rather, that CSC gave none of the other prisons the 
chance to see if the original model proposed by the Task Force worked for them -  
and, if it did, whether their experience could benefit practice at Edmonton. At 
times the women felt that there was a higher level of surveillance at Nova than had 
been the case at the Prison for Women, where the high walls allowed some freedom 
of movement, albeit within a confined space. Women were once again being 
subjected by CSC to the arbitrariness which they had hoped to leave behind upon 
returning to their home region. While women at Nova found the inconsistency of 
the staff hard to bear, at that point many were prepared to make allowances because 
they thought they might benefit. To find that the larger organisation, CSC, was 
prepared to allow events at a prison some 3,000 miles from Nova, to determine 
what happened to them was entirely different. The 1995 ‘Brainstorming Session’
40 Personal notes 1996
41 Chronicle Herald 31st May, 1996
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had anticipated that this might arise and warned that inconsistency could foster 
anger, as a reaction to ‘powerlessness’ (CSC 1995a: 3).42 The women’s resentment 
was shared by the staff, whose idealism had been tested as they struggled to 
provide for women for whom they had been inadequately prepared. The women’s 
unpredictable behaviour left many staff exhausted and unsure of their 
professionalism, but still largely committed to the vision of Creating Choices.
Staff were ‘flying by the seat of their pants, creating policies as circumstances 
arose, and then changing them when they did not work’ (Rivera 1996: 21). The 
sudden appearance of much more overt security was unwelcome evidence of the 
fragility of the new philosophy they were meant to be pursuing. Additionally, the 
raised fences signalled to the communities that all the women were ‘high risk’, 
completely contradicting public assurances earlier given by CSC. Such official 
responses are not uncommon, as evident in the United Kingdom when escapes from 
male prisons (documented in both the Woodcock and Learmont inquiries) led to an 
escalation of security measures in women’s prisons as well. (See Carlen, 1998 for 
a discussion of the most immediate impact of these decisions on women prisoners). 
To act unilaterally is the simplest way to implement policy, but when such actions 
appear unjust they undermine the informal structures of control within a prison. In 
the Canadian context such a heavy response undermined the ‘dynamic security’ so 
essential to the running of the new prisons. The relatively ‘good’ behaviour of the 
women at Nova was immaterial and they faced tangible proof, in the form of higher 
fences, that their cooperation was no longer essential to the security of the prisons.
Staff were increasingly under stress as their workload increased and Warner later 
highlighted some of their difficulties. When the SLH was opened the contract staff 
brought in from outside the correctional service had little -  or no -  experience of 
security and mental health issues. While these new staff were then spending up to 
eight hours each day with the women and building up a knowledge of them, they 
were not always able to communicate what they had learned to the Primary 
Workers, who retained responsibility for individual women, yet spent far less time
42 The ‘Brainstorming Session’ was held in Ottawa in July, 1995 and organised by CSC, which 
was attempting to develop a ‘programming framework for federally sentenced women in the areas 
o f anger and violence’ (CSC 1995a: 1). CSC staff did not participate, but attended each session as 
‘observers’. The workshop was held against the unfolding backdrop o f  the Arbour Inquiry and the 
official participants drafted a Statement, which included: ‘We cannot emphasise enough that these 
incidents and the manner o f characterising them in the media have the potential to influence the
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with them. The Primary Workers felt aggrieved that their direct contact with the 
women had been so minimised because they had come into their positions 
expecting to have responsibility for individual women. Instead, they were 
preoccupied with security and form filling and, as Warner highlighted, this gave 
some of the women in the SLH the opportunity to play staff off against each other 
(Warner 1998: 19).
Escalating difficulties
It was against this backdrop that the situation in the SLH came to a head on the 4th 
September, 1996. Following an attempted knife attack on one of the women living 
in the house, who had complained about alleged lesbianism, an attempt was made 
to remove the assailant. (The use of weapons is always taken seriously in any 
prison.) Some of the other women tried to intervene on her behalf and this resulted 
in four women being removed to the Enhanced Unit, where they were double­
bunked because of lack of space. The following day they began to damage the two 
cells they were occupying and that evening an all-women cell-extraction team 
(CET) entered the Enhanced Unit and removed the women. They were then strip 
searched and removed to a prison in Saint John, New Brunswick. The whole 
procedure was video taped and a member of the Citizen’s Advisory Committee was 
present. A CSC spokesman announced that the rest of the prison had been largely 
unaffected, except for the fact that all the women were confined to their quarters 
until late Friday, by which time a prison-wide search had been completed.43 As we 
know, the houses were unlocked because of fire regulations and, had the other 
women chosen to leave their houses while the women were being extracted from 
the SLH, Nova’s staff would conceivably have been unable to cope. That the 
women did not was never officially recognised. Nor was it recognised that some of 
the new staff were as frightened by the turn of events as some of the women 
observing developments from their houses.44 One later reflected on the incident: 
With a little support and consideration things could have been different. Indeed, it 
didn 7 have to happen at all and in fact it wasn 7 THAT big a deal. I ’ve seen men 
riot and this was a bump in comparison. And do we not expect the occasional 
upset? These are people -  and often disturbed people -  enclosed in a space
manner in which the public, CSC staff and the women themselves are inclined to view violence in 
women and understand how to most effectively address it’ (CSC 1995a: Appendix C).
43 Chronicle Herald 7th September, 1996
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together, one feeding on the other. What did they think? That this was going to be 
a tea party?45
Nova did not have a breathing space before national decisions, again stemming 
from previous events at Edmonton, affected the prison. It was announced that 
maximum security women would no longer be held at the new prisons. This only 
affected Nova since those at Edmonton had been removed, the Healing Lodge had 
never been allowed them, and the opening of both Joliette and Grand Valley had 
been postponed. The news was due to be relayed to the women on the 19th 
September. The Deputy Commissioner for Women, Nancy Stableforth, and the 
Regional Deputy Commissioner, Alphonse Cormier, were also scheduled to visit 
Nova on the same day. A dinner was to be held in the prison’s gymnasium, to 
which a number of local residents, members of both the Citizen’s Advisory 
Committee and the Regional Advisory Committee, representatives from the 
Elizabeth Fry Society and women from the prison were invited. The meal was to 
be a celebration; the prison had been open for almost a year and it was thought that 
its record compared favourably with Edmonton’s, despite the recent incident. The 
Atlantic Region appeared, publicly, to be developing a prison with a style of its 
own and the attempt to provide a Structured Living Unit, while flawed, was seen as 
a creative attempt to find effective ways of dealing with women who had been 
insufficiently provided for by both the Task Force and, subsequently, the NIC. Yet 
Nova was also a prison under stress, with staff and women having taken the full 
brunt of opening in a very short space of time, without many of the requisite tools 
to hand, such as sufficient programmes and community contacts. Many of the high 
expectations had not been realised and for all involved there had been a very steep 
-  and severe -  learning curve.
Once it was realised that the planned removal of the maximum security women 
would clash with the dinner there were attempts to have the dinner cancelled, or at 
least postponed. Pressure from the Region meant this was not possible, as was 
explained to me by a number of people on the actual day. I was in the midst of 
fieldwork and had been asking why the dinner should be going ahead in such
44 Personal notes 1996
45 Personal notes 2001
248
circumstances.46 The venue was moved to a local hotel and the women were 
eventually provided with a ‘takeaway’ ordered in as compensation for having been 
excluded from the meal. During that day the prison was in a ‘lockdown’ situation, 
with all movement suspended and the women confined to their houses. They were 
told during the morning that the three maximum security women were to be 
removed to Springhill Institution, a male facility holding some 400 men 47 The 
women were eventually removed from the prison and taken to Springhill late on the 
evening of the 19th, arriving at a unit which had been hastily prepared for them. 
CSC’s spokeswoman was later to say that ‘the announcement created some minor 
reaction among the general population, but not those women classified as 
maximum-security risks (emphasis added)’. She stressed that the ‘three or four 
inmates’ being sent to Springhill were not necessarily those involved in the incident 
two weeks previously.48
The dinner took place and, as one observer noted, the guests were told: ‘We ’re just 
going to update you on what we ’re doing and we ’re just going to move the 
maximum women out o f Nova and send them to Springhill Institution ’. Ijust 
couldn ’t speak ... /  was just so angry. They have us there fo r  what I  thought was a 
nice little supper ... getting to know each other, kind o f lighten the mood after the 
incident [on 4th - 5th September], end on a positive note -  and this is what it is. It 
surprised everybody.49 What those at the dinner largely did not know, was what 
had actually happened at the prison during the day.
Much of what follows has been documented in a report prepared for the Atlantic 
Region Deputy Commissioner, Alphonse Cormier.50 By contrast with Edmonton’s 
National Board of Investigation, this was a middle tier investigation, reflecting the 
assumption that the incidents were not at the same level of seriousness.51 The
46 Personal notes 1996
47 The Interim Instruction ‘Annexe “A” 006’ was issued on the 19th September, 1996. It 
reclassified that portion o f Springhill accommodating women as ‘multi-level’, which meant that any 
troublesome woman could be transferred from Nova, irrespective o f her security classification.
48 Daily News 21st September, 1996
49 Interview 2
50 Investigation ofM inor Disturbance - Use o f  Force Administrative Investigation, Nova 
Institution, 96-09-19
51 It is CSC’s policy to hold either national or regional investigations into incidents which might 
have a bearing on policy and/or legal compliance. The decision is based on an assessment o f the 
seriousness o f the incident. Investigations must be national if  serious bodily harm, or a death, has 
occurred.
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initial Board of Investigation’s report was later to have an Addendum attached, 
signed by one of the members of a subsequent Disciplinary Board of Investigation, 
wherein certain events had been reviewed and discrepancies noted. These 
combined findings are now incorporated into the general chronology of events 
which follows.
On the morning of the 19th September the women were finally told of the removal 
of the maximum security women and later that morning two women in the SLH 
began to behave disruptively, to the extent that a CET was thought necessary to 
remove the women from the house. As the Addendum to the Board of 
Investigation made clear, this decision was taken by the Warden, in consultation 
with others. Once the CET entered the house, finding one inmate in her room and 
having managed to persuade the other to return to hers, the situation was thought to 
be ‘calm and under control’. Further instructions were sought and it was decided 
that both women would be removed to segregation. One of the women agreed to go 
voluntarily and was removed without the use of force. The other woman was 
offered the same choice, but reacted by breaking a picture frame, cutting herself 
and finally barricading herself in her room. Once her door was forced open, she 
was pepper-sprayed then escorted to the Enhanced Unit in handcuffs and leg irons. 
Upon reaching the Enhanced Unit at midday the woman was strip-searched and, as 
noted in the Report:
When staff leave the cell, inmate — is left handcuffed (behind her back) 
and in leg irons, lying on her stomach, on a bed frame without a mattress or 
blanket. She is naked with the exception of a towel that staff draped over 
her (CSC 1997a: 5).
Within half an hour the woman had managed to remove her handcuffs and place 
them in the toilet, refusing to retrieve them when asked to do so by staff. Again, as 
noted:
When staff leave the cell, inmate — is lying on the floor, naked, with 
flexicuffs applied to her wrists behind her back with leg irons still intact.
The cell is devoid of any mattress or blankets (CSC 1997a: 6).
An hour later the women managed to remove the flexicuffs, retrieve the handcuffs 
from the toilet and break the sink [hand basin] with them. This led to the further 
use of pepper spray and the woman’s removal to a camera cell, while still naked,
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but with a towel held in front of her. A brief attempt was made to wash areas of her 
body affected by the spray. The report noted:
In the camera cell, the CET removes the handcuffs from — replacing them 
with a body chain (positions wrists at the sides). She is left naked, kneeling 
on the bed in the camera cell with leg irons secured to the foot of the bed.
No mattress or blankets are given (CSC 1997a: 7).
An attempt by the woman to remove the body chain led to staff removing it and 
reapplying handcuffs, but again:
At this point inmate — is still nude and left lying face down on the bed, 
handcuffed behind the back with leg irons attached to the bottom of the bed. 
There is no mattress or blanket in the cell (CSC 1997a: 7).
The woman was eventually supplied with a gown at approximately 14.15 hours and 
a mattress by ‘at least’ 15.00 hours (CSC 1997b: 1). It was not until nearly twelve 
hours after the original use of the pepper spray that the woman was (forcibly) 
decontaminated by staff, who held her under a shower, although a nurse had 
sponged small areas of her body earlier. During the latter half of these events the 
naked women was clearly visible to a male member of the Citizens’ Advisory 
Committee, who was an official observer. The woman was eventually removed to 
Springhill Institution52 at some time after 10.00 pm. Every procedure was video 
taped, as required by official regulations.
In the days that followed the newspapers kept abreast of the removal of the 
maximum security women without, at that stage, being aware of what had actually 
transpired. CSC continued to use a spokesperson from outside the prison, 
reflecting a policy change stemming from the events at Edmonton. On the 2nd 
October the four women involved in the 4th -  5th September incident were charged 
and eventually had extra time added to their sentences.
The Board of Investigation into the 19th September incident began its inquiries once 
the Regional Deputy Commissioner had signed the convening order. Their report
52 The Unit was next to the men’s segregation unit and could hold up to ten women. Women- 
centred training was not provided for the staff until a year after the Unit first started operating.
There were also problems in providing sufficient female staff so that the women would not be seen 
by male staff when in the observation cells. Fluctuating numbers meant that consistent 
programming was impossible. Men and women could shout to each other when in their (separate)
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criticised aspects of the treatment of the woman involved and a Disciplinary Board 
of Investigation was assembled as a consequence. The Warden, Christine Manuge, 
was suspended on the 19th January, 1997 and eventually reassigned to other duties, 
as was a Team Leader. An official announcement was not made until the 10th 
February, when it was also announced that Jim Davidson would act as an interim 
Warden. He became the third Warden at the Institution in the space of nearly four 
years (and there had been a temporary one to cover the gap between the departure 
of Therese LeBlanc and the arrival of Christine Manuge). The fourth Warden,
Mary Ennis, was appointed in May, 1997. The prison officers were demoralised 
and many felt badly let down by managers who, as they saw it, had attempted to 
shift responsibility for their own incompetence onto the staff.
Reflecting on the Investigation
^  tViWhen the heavily vetted Board of Investigation report on the 19 September,
1996 events at the prison was eventually released by CSC54, the many deleted 
portions encouraged speculation as to whose names fitted the gaps, leaving staff 
vulnerable to assumptions about their individual culpability. The Disciplinary 
Board o f Investigation, generally dealing with management issues, was similarly 
vetted and consequently offered little explanation of why the Warden and Team 
Leader Operations subsequently did not return to the prison. The Reports as 
published allow us to have a very general idea of what transpired, but what they did 
not do was provide context by mentioning what else was happening at Nova on the 
19th September. The Disciplinary Board ‘felt that some components of effective 
management leadership and direction were lacking at Nova Institution during and 
prior to this incident’ (CSC 1997b: 1). Both reports failed to make clear that the 
Regional Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner for Women were both at the 
prison on the day when the events took place which, of itself, might be interpreted 
as CSC continuing to protect its more senior employees as it did during the Arbour 
inquiry (and for which it was castigated). The reports failed to clarify that a major 
event was planned at Nova itself for the evening of the 19th September. They did 
not follow the example of Edmonton’s Board o f Investigation and place events in
exercise yards and during the time the women were held at Springhill there were ‘serious acting out 
behaviours’ (Warner 1998: 23).
53 All such reports are vetted under the Access to Information Act 1985 and the Privacy Act 1985.
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the context of the specific difficulties staff at Nova faced in dealing with the 
disproportionate number of ‘lower functioning’ women. They did not reflect on the 
difficulties women had in coping with such a different prison and whether these 
might have contributed to the tensions within the prison. They did not point out 
that the Warden had only been appointed eleven months prior to the opening of the 
prison; that most staff were still not selected at the time of her appointment; and 
that staff then had to undergo training before they could familiarise themselves with 
the prison.
The Disciplinary Board also criticised the fact that ‘no comprehensive policies 
were available to staff on or before 96-09-19, regarding the operation and 
management of the Enhanced Housing Unit (EHU) or relating to the management 
of Use of Force or Cell Extraction situations. Staff working in the EHU learned the 
operational procedures for the area from other peers and improvised over time, but 
no formalised instructions were available’ (CSC 1997b: 1). (This was a point also 
made by the Investigation o f Minor Disturbance report). The Disciplinary Board 
did not point out that Edmonton had also operated without revised Standing Orders 
during the months prior to its closure, information which should have then been 
available to senior Corrections’ employees, even if at the regional level. There 
were subsequent allegations of selective interviewing of staff at Nova, with the 
clear implication being that both Boards heard what they wanted to hear.55 
Whatever the truth of that, in having such a narrow view of the wider enterprise -  
the opening of five new, radically different prisons -  both reports allowed all the 
failings at Nova to become solely the responsibility of Nova’s staff and the women. 
That CSC itself might have shared some of this responsibility was never the point 
at issue.
While discussion of the incident is important because of the questions raised about 
the general preparedness of the prison, perhaps the most important question to be 
asked is why, and how, such an event could have happened following the release of 
the Arbour Report in April, 1996. (See chapter 6 for a fuller discussion of those 
April, 1994 events). A woman had been left naked and manacled to a bed, without
54 The Board’s report, Investigation ofM inor Disturbance -  Use o f  Force, was initially obtained
and made public under the Access to Information Act by the local Truro newspaper, The Daily 
News. The paper published its account o f the report on the 25th June, 1997.
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a mattress to lie on, without having been decontaminated following being pepper- 
sprayed, and in full view of a male who later came into the Enhanced Unit. How 
could staff on that Unit possibly have thought such conduct acceptable, irrespective 
of whether or not they were being supervised by management? While it should be 
remembered that many of the staff were young, so had relatively little experience of 
coping with stressful situations wherever they occurred, it should also be borne in 
mind that many staff were totally new to corrections, so had only recently 
completed their training. It is unlikely that the training school would not have 
discussed the Arbour Report with them, particularly as Arbour had roundly 
criticised CSC for its failure to develop a ‘culture of rights’ within its prisons 
(Arbour 1996: 179).
The Board concluded, when examining each specific development during the 19th 
September, that the use of force had not been excessive. What it did find 
unjustifiable was the apparent lack of care in the treatment of the woman 
subsequent to each use of force. Arbour’s examination of the strip searching of the 
women at the Prison for Women is important to what has been related here because 
those April, 1994 events showed CSC’s complete disregard for the law. A similar 
disregard was shown at Nova -  and by staff also largely new to corrections, as was 
the case with those primarily involved in the incidents at the Prison for Women. 
Would more experienced staff have defused the original situation before it 
developed, or would their employment have led to a replication of the Prison for 
Women’s culture? Indeed, the event reflected that culture, which suggests that the 
training offered the new staff was not dissimilar from that previously offered. So, 
were the new staff ill-trained? The Board failed to address this point.
Also pertinent to what we are presently discussing was Arbour’s dissection of the 
original Board of Investigation report into the April incidents at the Prison for 
Women; Arbour carefully showed how the report was edited at National 
Headquarters so that the most serious aspects of the April incidents disappeared 
from view. That original 1994 Board had been composed solely of CSC personnel 
and recommendation 10(a) of the Arbour report was ‘that all National Boards of 
Investigation include a member from outside the Correctional Service’ (emphasis
55 Personal notes 1998
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added, Arbour 1996: 256). Arbour had also suggested that the list of incidents 
eligible for a National Investigation should be extended to include ‘mistreatment of 
prisoners’ (Arbour 1996: 119). The Investigation at Nova contained a community 
member -  but it was not a National Board; nearly six months after the publication 
of the Arbour Report the Atlantic Regional Commissioner, who was at the prison 
on the actual day, still thought it appropriate to investigate the Nova events as a 
‘Minor Disturbance’. While I am not suggesting that there was any deliberate 
attempt to minimise the seriousness of what happened at Nova, it remains 
interesting and a matter of conjecture as to why, especially in the context of what 
had emerged during the Arbour Inquiry and the supposed spirit of Creating 
Choices, that Edmonton was dealt with one way and Nova another. And further, no 
heed was paid to Arbour’s recommendation that ‘the fact finding methods of 
Boards of Investigation be improved, and, more importantly, that the focus of 
investigations include prominently the performance o f the Service ... ’ (Arbour 
1996: 120, emphasis added). In the case of Nova and the ‘performance of the 
Service’, two of the larger considerations were: the quality of staff training and 
whose responsibility this might have been; and the failure to have necessary 
programmes and staff in place, immediately the prison opened, to provide for those 
women with ‘special needs’.
All of this is equally relevant to the use CSC made of each Warden as 
representative of the ‘public face’ of each prison. The Wardens were encouraged to 
explain and justify these prisons to the local community, yet would have been 
unable to say what they knew from their own experience of working with prisoners; 
that the involuntary nature of co-existence meant that prisons were often places of 
stress and tension. The Wardens’ job was to smooth the passage of the new prisons 
into the local communities and to do this they had to emphasise that the majority of 
federally sentenced women were Tow risk’. While this meant that the risk they 
posed to the community was low, their institutional behaviour was not always 
predictable and unproblematic, as was clearly shown at both Edmonton and Nova. 
In doing so, the Wardens reflected the views expressed in Creating Choices, but the 
Task Force’s initial failure to address how ‘difficult to manage’ women should be 
provided for (beyond suggesting a separate house for them), was exposed by events 
at the prison. Arguably, it can also be said that events exposed the failings of both 
CSC and the regions, as they were responsible for implementing the vision of the
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Task Force’s plan. Although the Warden at Nova had largely ceased to be the 
spokesperson for the prison by the time of the September incident (as a result of 
events at Edmonton), she was still ‘the face’ of the prison to the community at 
large. Lacking an adequate explanation of what had actually happened at the 
prison, Truro’s community could simply guess at what had happened. The 
‘reassignment’ of the Warden to other duties publicly implied culpability, but the 
complete story was never fully explained.
This discussion does not imply support for one side or the other. Rather, it is to 
explore the wider role assigned to the Wardens by CSC as Creating Choices was 
being implemented and the difficult position in which it potentially left them once 
things began to go wrong. The role of the larger controlling organisation, CSC, 
behind the Wardens was not always apparent to the host communities -  and was 
certainly not made explicit in the reports. In the context of what happened at both 
Nova and Edmonton one of the main questions is why two Wardens were treated so 
differently. Had Nova’s Board of Investigation followed Arbour’s suggestion that 
‘the performance of the Service’ should be scrutinised it is just possible that Nova’s 
Warden, despite being legally accountable for what happened in her prison, might 
have remained in place, because responsibility for the event would have been seen 
as more widespread.
Shared birth; shared problems
Two prisons, thousands of miles apart, shared a common history. As we have seen, 
they also shared a common and very public birth. Edmonton and Nova bore the 
brunt of being the first of what I shall call the ‘non-Aboriginal’ prisons to open, 
(although Edmonton did, of course, have a very large number of Aboriginal 
prisoners). At this point we have an overview of what happened at both Nova and 
Edmonton during their first year of opening and there are immediate distinctions 
which should be made:
• Nova was built in a town which actively solicited its arrival, whereas the city of 
Edmonton was suspicious of its new prison from the start;
• Nova was a small prison, while Edmonton was (relatively) large;
• Nova was physically complete when it opened, whereas Edmonton was not;
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• Nova, to begin with, had few maximum security women and the Warden had 
the right to refuse women. Edmonton had many more maximum security 
women than had been planned for, or it could accommodate, and the Warden 
had no right of refusal.
Yet these differences masked what united both prisons, which was the failure to 
have all the components of the new scheme in place before it was tested; Creating 
Choices was never fully implemented. With essential pieces, such as adequate and 
sufficient programming, missing, those which remained were immediately 
compromised, yet there has been a public tendency to blame both the document 
itself and federally sentenced women for any implementation failures, rather than 
CSC. We already know that Creating Choices was a visionary document rather 
than a complete plan of action. It had a fatal flaw in that it did not sufficiently and 
prescriptively enough address provision for ‘difficult to manage’ women, but this 
should not be allowed to disguise the fact that CSC had assumed ownership of 
Creating Choices and had taken five years to plan and build the new penitentiaries. 
Even disregarding the preparedness or otherwise of both prisons during their first 
year, what cannot be avoided is that CSC: was largely familiar with the institutional 
histories of the women due to be sent to the new prisons; had planned multi­
purpose Enhanced Units; had trained the staff; had been responsible for preparing 
the women for the different and demanding institutional environments. I now 
examine several issues in more detail, because they are common to both these 
prisons and help us understand why things should have unfolded as they did. I 
focus on Edmonton and Nova because these two prisons emerged from largely the 
same planning processes, whereas the Healing Lodge -  which I discuss in the 
following chapter -  initially had less correctional input.
The fence as an image of risk
Creating Choices in rejecting traditional prison design also rejected the public 
symbolism of high walls and visible static security. The low fences surrounding 
both of the prisons did more than nominally ‘contain’56 the women. They sent a 
message to the local communities that the women were Tow risk’ and made the
56 The Draft Master Plan for Kitchener stated that the ‘boundary’ was to ‘create an identifiable 
edge that will discourage unintentional movement on to the site. No containment capability is 
required’ (1992c: 34).
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prisons appear to be a ‘normal’ part of each locality. The fences were also part of 
the ‘choices’ faced by the women and, for some, they presented a challenge to the 
women’s self-control -  would they choose to escape, or not? They made other 
women feel less safe, because they were not high enough to deter potential 
intruders, so the messages conveyed by the fences were decidedly mixed. At Nova 
the fences were a nuisance, because staff thought they compromised security and 
would not let the women walk unescorted around the prison. For a few women at 
Edmonton they were simply a challenge to be overcome once the winter ended, as 
these comments from two separate interviewees indicate: The women thought the 
fence was a joke. I  spoke to this very wise Aboriginal woman who said ‘as soon as 
the weather gets warm ... ' [so] the first nice warm day and a Friday night and the 
women were at the fence. It was a lark, it was no big deal, they didn ’t realise there 
would be consequences. 51 And:... one o f the inmates who got recaptured, she said 
to me T told you to put a fence up so I  wouldn ’t do this! ’ I  wouldn’t have escaped,
CQ
I  just wanted to show you that I  could ’. For women accustomed to being able to 
walk relatively freely within the ultra-secure Prison for Women the fences seemed 
more restrictive of their freedom than the huge wall to which they were 
accustomed.
Once the fences were increased in height and more overt security was installed the 
message they conveyed to the local communities also changed. All the women 
confined by the fences were now characterised as ‘high risk’, whereas with the 
removal of the maximum security women from the prisons it might have been said 
that the women were even more Tow risk’ than they had previously been. 
Paradoxically, the fences gave the women more freedom, but also left them less 
supervised, a nuance which might not have been apparent to the host communities.
Containing risk behind the fences
We know what happened in the Enhanced Units at Edmonton and Nova and that 
they were inadequate for the purposes to which they were put. The inadequacy 
begs the question of why they were built in the first place. The Task Force did not 
envisage Enhanced Units but, by refusing to be prescriptive about a more secure 
environment for those women whom they managed to classify as ‘high needs / high
57 Interview 10
58 Interview 8
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risk’, the Task Force left CSC free to define the environment considered 
appropriate for them. At the outset the Enhanced Units were not planned to assume 
the style they later adopted. A very detailed Draft Master Plan for the Grand 
Valley Institution, already available in November 1992, described what was termed 
the ‘Enhanced Security House’. It was clearly intended that its design should be 
similar to the other houses, except that it would have ‘containment capability in 
each bedroom and for the house envelope’. Women would retain ‘the same 
responsibilities for food preparation, cleaning etc’ as the rest of the houses (CSC 
1992c: 50). The same Master Plan also clarified policy for newly admitted women 
who were to ‘be assigned to a specific house’ and ‘within 4 to 6 weeks a complete 
assessment of [their] needs [would] be made’ (CSC 1992c: 54). This largely 
replicated the language of the slighter earlier Operational Plan (CSC 1992a: 30).
Yet by June 1994 the Enhanced Units had been ‘modified and enlarged’ (CSC 
1995b: 4). It had also been decided that the Enhanced Units would house ‘two 
different groups: inmates who behave violently and inmates who require a greater 
level of staff monitoring for a period of time, for example, new admissions and 
some special needs inmates’ (CSC 1995b: 4 - 5). The curious point is that the June, 
1992 NIC Minutes suggested that the Enhanced Units should become extensions of 
the administration building, rather than stand-alone houses with extra security, 
which suggests that those providing the blueprints were not being kept abreast of 
NIC decisions.
The size of the new prisons, relative to the Prison for Women and the overall size 
of the federally sentenced women population, ensured that provision could not be 
made for every group of women with distinct needs, and this basic fact eventually 
led to the concept of a multi-purpose / multi-level Enhanced Unit (albeit one built 
to maximum security standards). What both prisons created was essentially the 
same; a prison within a prison, separating some women from the others. As one 
interviewee observed: How do you think it would feel i f  you were a really difflcult- 
to-manage woman anyway and you really need healing and you ’re locked in a cell 
in that Enhanced Unit and you have a window and you get to look o u t... and see all 
those other inmates tossing round a frisbee, planting a garden, interacting with 
staff, having visits ... How do you think you ’d react to that? I  might get a little
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violent myself because I  wouldn’t see myself as getting there.59 This was a point 
echoed by Rivera (1996: 31), who referred to the ‘status differential’ of various 
women in the Enhanced Units, who ‘saw themselves in the Enhanced Unit for the 
foreseeable future’. Prison managements have to make immediate, difficult 
decisions when admitting prisoners because they, and their needs, are sometimes 
unknown quantities. However, had the prisons been allowed to follow the original 
plan outlined in Creating Choices -  even in part -  then a separate house could have 
been used for assessment purposes, with staff permanently attached, and this 
separation of purpose might have made the management of the maximum security 
women at Edmonton somewhat easier. But was the fact that this did not happen 
surprising? Even the most superficial of utopian enterprises show that 
bureaucracy’s plan for their own convenience (see Rothman, 1980; Cohen, 1985).
It was conceivably easier and less costly to contain disparate groups together, rather 
than fund staffing of individual houses.
Adjusting to life behind the fences; the women and the staff 
Immediate challenges
No amount of theorising was able to prepare the women for the communal living 
awaiting them at Edmonton and Nova. Hitherto their prison lives had been highly 
structured. They lived in small cells, had meals provided for them, had little choice 
of work or programmes and were supervised by correctional officers with few 
doubts about the precise nature of their role as correctional officers. Coming from 
such an environment, many women found the style of the new prisons unnerving 
and, at times, frightening.
At Edmonton it was estimated that it took an average of six weeks for a woman to 
complete her assessment and move from the Enhanced Unit to her cottage. During 
that time she had to come to terms with living with a diverse group of women, then 
make the switch to a very different type of accommodation and another group of 
women. Despite assumptions that being ‘female’ meant an instinctive knowledge 
of how to cook, clean and budget and having the social assurance needed to live 
successfully with a group of strangers, many lacked some or all of these skills. The 
relatively few who had experienced a settled home-life found it hard coping with
59 Interview 8
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others who had no idea of how to maintain a house, let alone the concept of 
preparing and having meals at fixed times. The stress the women experienced was 
compounded by the strip searching and the need to be escorted throughout the 
prison because of its unfinished state.
At the same time they were expected to work. Edmonton’s management had 
decided that each day should reflect the most common working pattern on the 
‘outside’, so work occupied much of the day. Programmes essential to the 
women’s successful parole applications, such as anger management, had to be fitted 
in after work had finished. Consequently, there was the initial spectacle of some 
staff being employed to work with the women during the very hours the women 
were unavailable to them.60 As an observer at Edmonton reflected: [the women 
said] their treatment needs were completely ignored. Work was so important and 
the work they needed to do on themselves was when they were tired. ... There 
wasn’t a single woman in the maximum security unit who had ever worked to this 
bizarre concept o f 9 - 5, o f  eating meals at a particular time.61
The needs of the maximum security and Tow functioning’ women took up a 
disproportionate amount of time, and staff were unable to give sufficient support to 
all the women as they made the difficult transition from the conventional prison to 
the new prison. The women were expected to conform to values appropriate to life 
outside the prison, such as time-keeping and appropriate decision-making, without 
it being acknowledged that the absence of those values from their non-prison lives 
had perhaps contributed to their offending. To cite these ‘values’ is not to 
denigrate their importance -  and they were certainly values 19th century reformers 
were keen to impart to imprisoned women -  but they could not always be acquired 
immediately or easily and needed to be delivered as part of a structured and gradual 
programme. Without these skills many women could not take advantage of the 
changed environment, and their failure to do so was sometimes seen by staff as a 
refusal to do so. The staff did not always understand how much was being asked of 
the women (and how frightening some of the women found their changed 
circumstances). Conversely, the women had no idea that staff had been trained to 
expect different responses and were themselves sometimes frightened by the
60 Personal notes 1996
61 Interview 10
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challenges presented. Faith (1993) asserts that the idealism of such staff does not 
always withstand prolonged exposure to their work, and cynicism, in the face of the 
women’s perceived obduracy, certainly began to affect how staff at the new prisons 
dealt with the women.
The women received were further confused by the level of supervision to which 
they were subjected and staff more comfortable in their own roles might have felt 
able to avoid escorting women throughout the prisons. Yet there is a more 
important aspect to be considered; the fact that staff were not continuously present 
in the houses. The new prisons were a reversal of the panoptican, where prisoners 
could always be observed. Indeed, the design of each prison prevented staff from 
seeing the women from a central point. The new houses required the women to be 
responsible for their own surveillance, and also for the surveillance of those sharing 
their accommodation. Surveillance, in the context of prisons, is a form of 
discipline. It may -  or may not -  encourage resistance and in these new federal 
prisons was part of the ‘responsibilising strategy’ (see Hannah-Moffat, 2001) 
imposed upon the women. It became an internalised discipline and part of the 
‘choices’ philosophy, whereby women could choose whether to act responsibly. If 
a woman chose to ignore the need for self-surveillance this was interpreted as an 
act of indiscipline, rather than as an act of resistance to control imposed on an 
involuntary population. (See Bosworth, 1999 for a wider discussion of women’s 
resistance within prisons.)
‘Reading’ the staff
Beyond the difficulties posed by life in the houses and the Enhanced Units lay 
those posed by the new staff themselves. Officers at the Prison for Women had 
more reflected the background of the women themselves. Staff were generally not 
highly educated, or necessarily ‘middle class’, yet had often achieved their 
positions despite social disadvantages sometimes the equal of the women’s. They 
had an understanding of the women tempered by their own experience. While this 
is not uncommon within correctional environments (see Liebling and Price, 2001 
for some discussion of this), the Task Force hoped to create a new professional
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mould. In selecting young social work graduates for their new prisons CSC set up
fi)a ‘cultural disparity between the guards and the prisoners (Faith 1993: 165).
The ambivalence felt by many of the women towards the Primary Workers had an 
additional impact on ‘dynamic security’, because there appeared to be no clear lines 
of demarcation. Coyle wrote: ‘prisons are never places of love and companionship 
... but there is normally a sensation, at least at a superficial level, of mutual 
tolerance’ (Coyle 1994: 99). The mutual tolerance and respect intended by the 
Task Force to underpin the dynamic security was undermined by the mixed 
messages the women received. The staff had been trained in a form of risk 
management which suggested that there should be a move from the idea of ‘risk / 
security’ to ‘risk / support’, which they would provide (TFFSW 1990: 91). The 
improved physical conditions of the prisons and the greater autonomy of the 
women were meant to create easier relationships between staff and women, a 
departure from the traditional correctional model of the ‘guard’ and the ‘guarded’. 
But this anomalous role baffled and upset the women: They [staff] didn’t realise 
that the women needed to debrief what it was like having a Primary Worker who 
wasn ’t a screw. ... as a counsellor you maintain confidentiality; as a correctional 
officer you cannot maintain confidentiality. So the women were telling these 
people who were Primary Workers things that were very important and treating 
them as counsellors -  and then they’d [staff] go and tell a supervisor and then 
there would perhaps be a kind o f correctional disposition.
Some staff, being new to corrections, were equally confounded by the behaviour of 
the women: They’d  [women] slash and the staff were crying and that was 
completely unnerving fo r  them [the women]. They didn’t see that as support at 
all.64 Yet the staff were correctional officers, rather than social workers, and had to 
be prepared to perform the tasks traditionally expected of them; the strip-searches, 
the room searches, being members of cell extraction teams (see Faith, 1993). These 
tasks did not sit well with the new image of the Primary Worker, but became
62 There was a deliberate attempt to avoid importing any o f the ‘old’ corrections into the new 
prisons and staff at the Prison for Women were told quite bluntly that most o f them would not be
offered jobs in the new system. (Personal notes 1996)
63 Interview 10
64 Ibid
263
increasingly necessary as the prisons absorbed larger numbers of women. 
Relationships between staff and the women began to alter and some of the staff 
found it hard to be, as they saw it, rejected by the women. This was articulated by 
one observer at Edmonton: They [women] were just like princesses fo r  the first 
little while and then, as more and more staff were beginning to say “no ” to a few  
things, the women slashed a few  times. And the first time a woman slashed the staff 
fe lt that they had been slapped across the face. “I  treated you with respect and you 
slash yourself? ” ... And what they [staff] hadn ’t realised is that maybe these 
women hadn’t lived with respect fo r  their entire lives.65
Most Primary Workers were initially clear about where their loyalties lay but, by 
being asked to assume the status of ‘role model’, by being encouraged to use their 
social work skills, by being available to the women bn a one-to-one basis, their 
whole position was less than clear to the women and eventually to the staff 
themselves. Not that this was a new phenomenon. At the Mercer Reformatory, in 
the late 19th century, staff found it difficult ‘tempering severity with feminine 
tenderness’ (Strange 1985: 85). Kelley (1967: 176) wrote, in England, that in 
‘period[s] of transition’ prison officers sometimes feel they have ‘the worst of both 
worlds, the old and the new’.
Inconsistency
The staffs inexperience led to an unexpected role reversal; the women, whether 
they lived in ordinary cottages or in the secure units, became the correctional 
experts (...w e told them what to do!).66 Yet, having transferred from the Prison for 
Women or the RPC, the women were ‘experts’ in the old style of corrections and 
often confused by the new, which seemed to have few recognisable rules. It did not 
take them long, however, to discover that some of the staff were just as unsure of 
their own roles and the prison’s rules, and that Primary Workers could be overruled 
by their Team Leaders, or the Warden. This was commented on by Rivera, both in 
the context of both the often irreconcilable dual role of the Primary Workers and 
the lack of coherent policy at Edmonton and Nova. The latter was partly 
attributable to the ‘different backgrounds, philosophies and styles of the Wardens 
(Rivera 1996: 22). Some women chose to take advantage of the confusion by
65 Ibid
66 Personal notes 1996
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playing staff off against each other, while many of the staff lacked any instinctive 
sense of what to do in a given situation and were often having to seek guidance 
from others.
But the inconsistency could also be ascribed to the pressures staff encountered as 
they tried to make sense of prisons housing populations for which they were not 
designed. As another Edmonton interviewee said: We weren ’t given a blue-print... 
each institution is designed individually. You’ve got to figure it out, how i t’s going 
to work fo r  your place and a lot o f energy is consumed doing that, and i f  you don’t 
have the right numbers o f  staff in the first place, your staff are really tired and you 
priorise [sic]. ... You wouldn ’t believe the external pressure that was put o n u s ... 
from within the service, from the higher-ups. ... I f  you have staff that aren ’t used to
filworking in that environment you frustrate them and bum them out very quickly.
Part of the physical model of the prisons, as exemplified by the Enhanced Units, 
did not fit the philosophical model. All were feeling their way and, as the number 
of ‘difficult to manage women* increased, staff were left reeling and many ended 
up being reactive to events, rather than proactive. Inevitably the women were 
affected: Over and over w e’ve told them ‘we ’re not used to you guys being nice to 
us ’. I t ’s like this concept, this new thing... I  don ’t know what to think o f  it.6*
Mathiesen (1990) examined the role of staff in the light of Sykes’ five ‘pains of 
imprisonment’ and suggested that there ought to be a sixth, ‘the power which the 
prison wields in and over the lives of prisoners’ (Mathiesen 1990: 130). He made a 
particular point of the power exercised by staff over inmates and the manner in 
which it is used, an issue also explored by Sparks et al (1996) and Liebling and 
Price (2001). The latter coined the phrase, ‘the un-exercise’ of power, to describe 
the means by which staff carry out their duties, and differ from Sparks et al (who 
referred to much the same process as ‘accommodations’) by asserting that the ‘un­
exercise’ of power constitutes ‘the best of prison officer work’. In other words, 
judicious use of discretion helps maintain good order within a prison, rather than 
undermines authority. Such discretion is not necessarily something that may be 
taught at staff training college, but is acquired through practical experience. In the 
Canadian context the women were generally not being exposed to judicious
67 Interview 8
68 Eyewitness News, CFRN (TV) Taken from transcript 19th March, 1996
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discretion because the staff were too new to have acquired it, so the women were 
living under Mathiesen’s sixth ‘pain’; power. It was an inconsistent power, making 
it all the more difficult for the women to endure the apparent goodwill of the staff.
Supporting the staff
At Nova the incidents happened when staff were feeling the effect of having 
worked at full stretch for a year while still learning their own jobs. They were 
stressed and many were at ‘burn-out’ point. Warner (1998: 19) alluded to this: 
‘When the violent incidents finally occurred [at Nova], line staff felt blamed for 
their handling of the incidents when they believed they should have been 
acknowledged and supported for preventing them for such a long period, given the 
mix and explosiveness of the house’. Following the September incidents some 
reacted by changing their working practices, feeling the need to look after 
themselves, rather than their colleagues, because they were not confident that the 
larger organisation would support them should another incident happen. (Liebling 
and Price (2001) dealt with similar issues, saying ‘it’s about covering your back’.) 
Filling in forms, getting the paperwork right, took on a new meaning as they 
endeavoured to protect themselves from possible misinterpretation. As some at 
Nova made clear, they also had the example of what had happened to their Warden, 
whom many felt had been unfairly ‘reassigned to regional headquarters’.69
Further complexity was added to the situation by the status of individual staff at 
Nova. Those who were ‘indeterminate’ (permanent) staff had a reasonable degree 
of job security, but those who were ‘casuals’ and ‘term’ employees had no such
7 ficertainty. Nevertheless, all ‘casuals’ and ‘term’ staff were given responsibilities 
commensurate with being a permanent member of staff, suggesting that while CSC 
required loyalty it was not always prepared to offer it in return.
At Edmonton the incidents happened much sooner than at Nova, with the staffs 
situation exacerbated by the physical inadequacy of the prison and their own 
inexperience. Although they received debriefings after individual incidents, there 
was no follow-up provided, and the prison management seemed unaware of official
69 The Daily News 11th February, 1997
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procedures. Neither prison had a Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) 
team in place, in contravention of CSC’s own policy, as explained in CD 257. 
Edmonton’s Board of Investigation said that, following the incidents, they had 
‘interviewed a number of very enthusiastic, very dedicated employees who 
exhibited symptoms of burn-out and post-traumatic stress’ (CSC 1996b: 173). At 
both these prisons the large proportion of new staff meant that there was no 
collective memory of how stressful incidents had been dealt with in the past and 
staff could not necessarily see that some of the stress was inherent in being a 
correctional officer. They did not always know where ‘normal’ prison stress ended 
and where the ‘abnormal’ stress engendered by being part of an ‘untested concept’, 
as Chrumka (2000: 71) termed it, began. The wider issue here, as with the 
Standing Orders, is that CSC had failed to ensure that the formal structures, 
essential to the running of each prison, were in place.
Standing Orders
The staffs inconsistencies could partly be attributed to the lack of up to date 
Standing Orders (see earlier footnote, in chapter 6) and the failure of both prisons 
to have these ready by the time of opening. This was an astonishing oversight on 
the part of CSC, even though such Orders are prepared locally, rather than 
centrally. Whenever new prisons opened it had always been customary to adapt 
Standing Orders from other prisons, but the new women’s prisons could not be 
dealt with so easily. Part of the rationale for Creating Choices was that women 
should not be discriminated against because they happened to be in different 
prisons from other federally sentenced women. It was essential that there should be 
uniformity in the overall administration of the prisons, with each Order being 
measured against the Creating Choices model (insofar as it applied by the time the 
prisons opened). This was important for two reasons: the women would have 
known where they stood and realised that they could not appeal against decisions 
over the heads of individual officers; the staff would have had a reliable point of 
reference. The Nova Investigation o f Minor Disturbance made it clear that ‘the 
security Standing Orders were not up to date’ (CSC 1997a: 23) and the Disciplinary 
Board added that ‘no comprehensive institutional policies and procedures were
70 ‘Casuals’ were trained correctional staff, but could not work more than 125 days in a year. They 
could be offered ‘term’ positions, which were o f at least three months duration but, again, there was 
no certainty that the ‘term’ would be translated into ‘indeterminate’ status.
267
available to staff (CSC 1997b: 1). The same criticisms were levelled in the 
Edmonton Board o f Investigation, which commented on ‘out of date’ Standing 
Orders and the fact that directions to staff were liable to change ‘on a daily basis’
... ‘making it very difficult for Primary Workers to keep up to date’ (CSC 1996b: 
142-3). When faced with crisis situations staff at both prisons had no formal 
written guidance at their disposal. This oversight was entirely the responsibility of 
CSC but, again, it was not a recent phenomenon. Strange (1985) recounted a 
similar happening at the Mercer Reformatory.
Programmes
Failure to have adequate programming can lead to a woman not completing her 
sentence plan. Such failures can delay parole hearings and might be interpreted by 
the Parole Board as the woman’s unwillingness to address the root causes of her 
‘offending’. The Task Force had selected the initial prison locations partly because 
they were linked to women’s networks and larger educational facilities, which 
could ease re-entry to the community for the women. Edmonton certainly had 
networks which could be tapped, but at the time the prison opened there were still 
large gaps in provision. The physical constraints of the unfinished prison then 
limited the delivery of the programmes which had been arranged, as did the 
insistence that work should take priority during the day. In Truro networks had to 
be created and there were considerable delays in arranging programme contracts. 
There were also financial consequences to locating the prison in Truro, as large 
sums of money were needed to send women to see specialists in Halifax. Similarly, 
extra money was needed to fund the Temporary Absence programme, under which 
women are entitled to home visits. As most of the women did not live in or near 
Truro, this was a considerable drain on the prison’s budget.
Funding limitations dictated the scale of the facilities provided in each prison and 
education rooms, though well resourced, were small and unable to cope with more 
than a few women at a time. Apart from an eventual graphics workshop at 
Edmonton, which employed very few women, and a horticulture programme at 
Nova, which struggled without a greenhouse, there were no workshops which 
would enable women to develop skills which might best be described as ‘non­
gendered’. Innovative programmes were introduced at both prisons, but the 
constraints under which they were provided -  lack of space, lack of funding to
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bring in more contract staff -  had an impact on the women. The size of the prisons 
also meant that certain programmes would only be ‘bought in’ when there were 
sufficient women to justify the expense, which again affected how quickly women 
progressed in their sentence plan. It had been anticipated that women would make 
‘choices’ regarding the programmes best suited to them, but the reality was that to 
begin with relatively few choices were available. At both prisons the failure to 
make programmes one of the first planning priorities rebounded on both the staff 
and the women. Bored women, living in either a cramped Enhanced Unit or under 
the restrictions imposed on the houses, wondered just what the new prisons were 
offering them and could see little improvement upon the Prison for Women. As 
staff became more involved -  particularly at Edmonton -  in fire-fighting the 
spiralling incidents, they had less time to devote to getting to know individual 
women and encouraging them to participate in those programmes which were 
available.
Role of the media
This chapter has already dwelt on the role assigned the Wardens. Such positioning 
of key players has always been a useful device for large organisations, which are 
then able to shield behind individuals while preserving the careers and reputations 
of others. But, once the prisons opened there was another dimension to be added to 
the public debate; the voices of the women themselves. Under the Commissioner’s 
Directive (CD) 022, prisoners have the right to talk to the press.71 It was alleged 
that: They [press] often manipulated what the women had to say72 and at Edmonton 
the comments, appearing out of context, contributed to the public impression of a 
prison out of control. At Edmonton there were also unforeseen consequences: In [a 
woman’s] discussions with the press, other offenders in the population interpreted 
quite differently what she intended to say. So there was not only the public out 
there listening to th is ... the women [in the prison] started to experience difficulty in
•7^
living in this environment because o f some o f  the things that were said. At
Edmonton the level of outside intrusion was high and the frequency of the media’s 
attention left staff feeling undermined. Some later reflected on this and recounted
71 CD 022 covers ‘Media Relations’. Sections 1 4 -2 0  cover when and how ‘offenders’ may be 
interviewed by the media. Interviews may be in person or by phone and are dependent upon 
permission being granted by the ‘Operational Unit Head’. Permission may be refused if  an 
interview is thought to be ‘contrary to the objectives o f the offender’s Correctional Treatment Plan’.
72 Interview 9
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what it felt like to arrive at work not knowing what would happen that day; or to 
arrive at work and realise, because of the assembled media, that something had 
already happened.74 The overall affect of the persistent press attention was more 
noticeable at Edmonton because the prison had been contentious from the moment 
it was first announced and later became part of the Taw and order’ debate initiated 
by local politicians. Truro was some distance from the consistent gaze of the 
television cameras and did not present such an immediate target. Moreover, the 
town largely wanted the prison. But the underlying fact remained the same at both 
prisons; the Wardens became the public face of CSC as soon as they assumed the 
role of advocates for the prisons. They remained the public face, even after they 
had been removed from the role of spokesperson.
Whose failure?
One theme was much rehearsed by CSC during the implementation of Creating 
Choices^ that some federally sentenced women did not, and never would, fit the 
model. If we are only to judge by their reaction to the new prisons, as revealed in 
the last two chapters, CSC was right to make this point. Some women manifestly 
did not cope with what was offered. Some reacted most forcefully against the new 
model -  and some of those were women who had responded in similar fashion 
when imprisoned in the Prison for Women or the RPC. So perhaps CSC could have 
metaphorically shrugged and said that they had tried. Indeed, this image of a 
separate group was further emphasised by the Deputy Commissioner for Women, 
Nancy Stableforth, during the Fayant Fatality Inquiry, when she said ‘some theories 
in favour of kinder, gentler prisons were shattered by Fayant’s slaying’ and ‘we’ve 
learned in the last couple of years that we had to look at whether the women had 
the capacity for change ... we learned a small group of women don’t have the 
capacity for change’.75 She was denying CSC’s Mission Statement Core Values 
One and Two, which recognised the ‘potential for human growth and development’ 
and ‘that the offender has the potential to live as a law-abiding citizen’. Ms 
Stableforth was also implicitly saying that Creating Choices, rather than CSC, had 
got it wrong with a significant minority of women. What Ms Stableforth did not 
speak about was whether the model presented at Edmonton and Nova was the
73 Ibid
74 Personal notes 1998
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model envisaged by the Task Force. She was blaming the women for failing to 
take advantage of a model which had never been fully or properly implemented at 
the time Ms Fayant was murdered. This failure could not, of course, ever excuse 
the violence which took place in the Enhanced Unit at Edmonton that February 
evening, but Ms Stableforth’s comments, being made some two and a half years 
after the event, ignored all that had preceded and followed Ms Fayant’s death. It 
ignored the fact that the women were participants in an experiment for which they 
had been inadequately prepared. It ignored the fact that staff themselves were 
attempting to implement a model without all the necessary components. The 
consequences were profound. As an interviewee commented: What about the 
maximum women who did nothing? They might have been able to function here. 
Did we ever really try this model? No. Has this model ever been evaluated? 
Absolutely not ...we are at various stages working towards it, but it sure as heck 
isn’t implemented.
While it is tempting to blame CSC for the failures of implementation at the two 
prisons, this would be a partial view of what transpired. The Task Force which 
produced Creating Choices has to bear some responsibility for the outcome. It was 
not just implementation which failed, but Creating Choices itself and the way in 
which the report reflected the Task Force’s concerns about labelling women. In 
refusing to deal fully with the ‘difficult to manage’ women, and in being reluctant 
to accept that women’s violence was not necessarily linked to their victimisation, 
the Task Force presented CSC with the opportunity to define the problem and 
decide upon a solution. The consensus model under which the Working Group 
worked reflected the ambivalence of many voices. CSC was familiar with 
producing a single response and, with an unerring eye for an opportunity, adopted 
the plan as its own.
Conclusions and looking ahead
Having examined what happened at the first two of the four ‘non-Aboriginal’ 
prisons to open we now move to look at the Healing Lodge itself. From what we 
have already learned we know that there were significant planning lapses which
75 Edmonton Journal 9th September, 1998. Statement made at Fatality Inquiry in to the death of  
Denise Fayant.
76 Interview 8
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contributed to the difficulties both Edmonton and Nova experienced during their 
first year. Some women found the changes which confronted them profoundly 
disturbing and reacted -  sometimes aggressively -  to the demands made of them. 
Some staff responded to this unanticipated behaviour from a position of fear 
themselves; as one interviewee said, they were ‘confounded’. What is perhaps not 
so apparent is that much went well at those prisons. Some women benefited from a 
less restrictive environment and were enabled to make choices that assisted them in 
coping with imprisonment -  and sometimes moving beyond it, to a life outside. 
Some of the new staff were able to find their own means of balancing their 
competing, and often irreconcilable, roles. The ‘vision’ of Creating Choices, while 
diminished, never entirely disappeared.
We are not at the point where we can come to any final conclusions about the work 
of the Task Force and the manner in which its report was brought to life by CSC. 
What we must do now is see if the Healing Lodge experienced any similar 
difficulties and, if it did, whether they were manifested in the same way. Is it 
conceivable that the Healing Lodge might have shown itself to be such a unique 
prison that little comparison is possible? Or will we discover that prisons, 
irrespective of how they are named and run, share common characteristics and are 
little different from those the reformers of the Task Force tried so hard to move 
beyond?
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8. Okimaw Ohci Healing Lodge; a healing prison?
The opening of the Healing Lodge was, at that time, an experiment unique to 
Canada. The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) had embarked on a venture 
without precedent or guideline. The importance of the Healing Lodge to the story 
told so far has been the way in which it emerged from the deliberations of a Task 
Force which had not originally been expected to include Aboriginals. As the 
previous two chapters have discussed, the consequence of Creating Choices was 
that CSC was planning five prisons for federally sentenced women. Four were 
entirely the responsibility of the National Implementation Committee (NIC), and 
responsibility for the fifth, the Healing Lodge, was largely devolved to a sub­
committee of the NIC, the Healing Lodge Planning Circle (HLPC ). Planning of 
the Healing Lodge was undertaken with the active advice and assistance of 
Aboriginals, two of whom had played a major role in influencing the content of 
Creating Choices, whereas the NIC itself had no voluntary sector or minority 
representation. Creating Choices’ assertion that ‘control over our [Aboriginal] 
future ... must rest within Aboriginal communities’ (TFFSW 1990: 15) was about 
to be tested in a very practical sense. The fact that CSC was prepared to allow the 
Aboriginal community such a role attested to what had been achieved during the 
Task Force itself; recognition of the Aboriginals as a distinct group and one 
possessing an increasing political clout. The story I continue to develop in this 
chapter differs from the previous two in that there are no major ‘incidents’ to relate, 
no tales of inadequately prepared staff, no tales of women completely unable to 
cope with their new environment. The story becomes one of how such a prison was 
developed and the ways in which its planning markedly diverged from that of the 
others. As a consequence, there is no strict chronological narrative to this chapter. 
Rather, it discusses important emerging strands in the context of the community 
which welcomed the prison, the factors which affected planning, and the style of 
the prison’s management. This chapter also differs from the others in that it covers 
a longer period of time, because the issues which eventually surfaced at the Healing 
Lodge were not so immediately apparent. At times it is necessary to describe some 
Aboriginal ceremonies and this is done in order to clarify decisions taken and 
procedures decided upon. I do this cautiously, while acknowledging that 
Aboriginal custom is for things to be spoken, rather than written.
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As we already know, it was difficult for Aboriginal women to participate in the 
Task Force, partly because doing so implied the legitimacy of Euro-Canadian law. 
But bringing Aboriginal women into the Task Force was difficult on other, more 
personal levels, as articulated by this observer: When you have the people who are 
involved in CAEFS, they ’re all interested in women in prison. We don’t have that 
luxury or privilege o f that experience as Aboriginal people because... this 
[imprisonment] is a big picture in our families that we experience on a daily basis 
-  and i t ’s not an experience that’s separated by gender.1 The Aboriginal chapter in 
Creating Choices amplified this: ‘Aboriginal culture teaches connection and not 
separation. Our nations do not separate men from women, although we do 
recognise that each has its own unique roles and responsibilities (TFFSW 1990:
18). It was not culturally appropriate to view imprisonment through the prism of 
gender, but this was what the Aboriginal women agreed to do by virtue of 
becoming members of the Task Force. CAEFS had similarly to reconcile its 
fundamental, if not then actual, abolitionist principles with the reality of the 
deteriorating situation at the Prison for Women. Having begun the process during 
the Task Force, NWAC and the Aboriginal Women’s Caucus continued to be 
involved once planning for the Healing Lodge began. In this they stood alone, as 
CAEFS was not included on the NIC and later withdrew from the External 
Advisory Committee (EAC) (see chapter 6).
Planning an Aboriginal prison
The Healing Lodge required an exceptional approach. To begin with, an 
Aboriginal Advisory Committee (AAC) was planned and was expected to guide the 
NIC, in the same way that the Steering Committee guided the Task Force’s 
Working Group. Its first meeting took place in February 1991, shortly after another 
Aboriginal woman had committed suicide at the Prison for Women. For the two 
Task Force members who had agreed to join that Advisory Committee it would 
have been a particularly painful reminder of the earlier suicides during the life of 
the Task Force -  and they, together with the other Aboriginal representatives, 
resorted to direct action. Rather than pass a formal motion to send to the 
Commissioner asking for change at the Prison for Women, as had the Task Force 
on that earlier occasion, they instead pressed for a more ‘hands on involvement in
1 Interview 20
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the development of the Healing Lodge’. This meant altering their role so that 
‘Native women / Elders [would] join with CSC to form a combined committee [to] 
develop the Healing Lodge’.2 The importance of this lay in Aboriginal women 
again managing to circumvent CSC’s strategy and place themselves in a position 
where they would have direct influence over planning for Aboriginal federally 
sentenced women. Just as important was CSC’s acquiescence at that stage.
In April, 1991 the Advisory Committee officially became the Healing Lodge Sub- 
Committee, reporting directly to the NIC and having its own distinct Terms of 
Reference. Sharon Mclvor and Fran Sugar were the sole Aboriginal representatives 
from the Task Force to be included on the twelve-strong committee, but they were 
joined by three Aboriginal Elders and three other Aboriginal women, as well as 
four CSC representatives. Creating Choices had tacitly conceded that the 
establishing of the Healing Lodge would not be solely an Aboriginal endeavour 
when it said: ‘The development of the Healing Lodge will draw on the expertise of 
Aboriginal women’ (TFFSW 1990: 115). The Sub-Committee had several 
responsibilities, some of which were:
• to develop a Vision Statement;
• to develop and co-ordinate all operational input for the planning, design and 
construction of the Healing Lodge in consultation with the NIC and CSC 
Construction;
• to prepare the location and site selection criteria, to assess potential sites and to 
make recommendations regarding the final site;
• to develop a management framework, including staff selection criteria;
• where necessary, to review, develop or suggest policy changes;
• to ensure that all aspects of operations were culturally appropriate.
The Sub-Committee was expected to remain functioning until the Healing Lodge 
was fully operational. Sharon Mclvor became the Committee’s ‘facilitator’, acting 
as the liaison between it and the EAC.
2 Healing Lodge Sub-Committee Progress Report 14th March, 1991
3 Healing Lodge Terms o f Reference
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Creating Choices had stipulated that the Healing Lodge should be in an unspecified 
‘prairie location’ (TFFSW 1990: 115), whereas the Working Group had earlier 
suggested that Saskatchewan was the logical choice. The selection of the prairies 
as a location was unsurprising, given that the majority of federally sentenced 
Aboriginal women originated from there. Narrowing the field to a site in either 
Alberta, Manitoba or Saskatchewan was less easy. The considerations leading to 
the Task Force’s having selected Halifax, Montreal and Edmonton as the preferred 
sites -  that a network of well-placed support organisations should be readily 
available -  no longer fully applied. Having a supportive Aboriginal community 
was the pre-eminent basis for selecting a site for the Healing Lodge; indeed, this 
community was seen as ‘essential to its survival’ (TFFSW 1990: 115).
Although the location criteria4 for the Healing Lodge were decided relatively 
quickly by the Sub-Committee, they were not immediately published as they first 
had to be approved by the Solicitor General, Doug Lewis. The NIC was concerned 
that his failure to publish them at the same time as he announced the extension of 
the search radius for the other prisons to 100 kilometres (on the 31st July, 1991) 
would leave the Aboriginal members of the Sub-Committee feeling marginalised. 
Mr. Lewis then announced that the Healing Lodge criteria had been accepted, but 
by the end of September they were still being kept secret. CSC feared that early 
publication of the criteria, without specifying a province, would lead to many 
communities, without a realistic chance of success, submitting bids to have the 
Healing Lodge in their localities. The Aboriginal members of the Sub-Committee, 
however, did not want the process to exclude any prairie Aboriginal communities 
from consideration. In October Mr. Lewis privately declared in favour of 
Saskatchewan, yet CSC was still unable publicly to narrow the field by declaring 
forthrightly that the province, on any reasonable analysis, was the logical choice for 
the Lodge.
Possible reasons for this inability may be conjectured. CSC was experiencing 
considerable delays with the entire prisons’ project and was unlikely to be delaying 
the announcement out of consideration for Aboriginal sensibilities. Conceivably,
4 These listed specific requirements, such as: proximity to the home communities o f the majority o f  
federally sentenced women; being near a supportive Aboriginal community; proximity to women’s 
support networks.
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there might have been a political reason for the delay. Doug Lewis, a Progressive 
Conservative, became Solicitor General in April, 1991. At that point a new 
location submission was prepared by the civil servants and the 100 kilometre search 
radius concept was also proposed, but not immediately publicised. We already 
know that the decision to locate the Atlantic region prison in Truro was thought to 
be linked to the political allegiance of the Truro MP, who was a Progressive 
Conservative. There were similar suspicions of political opportunism when the 
prison was briefly put on hold in 1993, after the Truro riding elected a Liberal MP. 
If we look at the decisions made regarding the siting of the rest of the prisons we 
can see a pattern:
• in Quebec, Montreal (largely Liberal) was ignored in favour of Joliette, 
which had a Progressive Conservative MP;
• in Ontario, where the (Liberal) Hamilton corridor had been favoured by the 
Task Force, the town of Kitchener was chosen instead. Kitchener had a 
Progressive Conservative MP;
• in Alberta, Edmonton had six MPs, five of whom were Progressive 
Conservatives. The city survived the 100 km extended-search radius to be 
selected for a prison.
During those years the Reform Party was beginning to make political inroads in 
many prairie constituencies, but particularly in Alberta and parts of southern 
Saskatchewan. In the 1988 federal elections the Cypress Hills-Grasslands 
constituency, which was eventually to house the Healing Lodge, retained its thirty 
year Progressive Conservative hegemony, and the adjacent constituencies were also 
Progressive Conservative. In the 1993 federal election the Progressive 
Conservatives lost all but two of their 169 seats across the country and by the 2000 
federal election the Alliance Party (formerly Reform) had swept across Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, winning almost all of the seats. Based on these trends, I think it is 
not unreasonable to suggest that the selection of sites for the new prisons, at times 
in clear disregard of the Task Force’s wishes, had a party-political dimension to 
them. Whatever the truth of this supposition, it took until the 10th December, 1991 
for Solicitor General Lewis to announce that the Healing Lodge would indeed be 
located in Saskatchewan.
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A number of communities in Saskatchewan had already shown interest in the 
Healing Lodge and others were invited to declare their intentions by the middle of 
January. The delay in deciding on an actual province allowed for a very brief 
response time and applicants had six weeks in which to complete their submissions 
and return them to CSC, which hoped that the preferred site could be announced in 
March, 1992.
Bidding for the Healing Lodge
Maple Creek, a town of 2,500 (with a further 3,400 in outlying areas) in the south 
west of Saskatchewan, had been one of the many prairie communities to bid for the 
new regional prison, which was eventually awarded to Edmonton. When the Town 
Council was told that their application had been unsuccessful they were also asked 
if they might be interested in hosting the Healing Lodge. As with other small 
prairie towns, unemployment was a concern and the Council thought it worth 
pursuing the possibility of attracting the Lodge to the area. Some eighteen miles to 
the south of Maple Creek, in part of the Cypress Hills, the 250 person Nekaneet 
Band (of the Cree Nation) lived on their reserve and the Band had also received 
information about the proposed Lodge. As a (then) Band councillor explained, his 
reaction w as:... that some o f these bigger reserves should probably apply fo r  this 
and politics would be involved and ... they would probably get it and we shouldn ’t 
even bother applying. So I  left it at that, but then the Economic Development 
worker [from Maple Creek]... phoned me and asked i f  I  had seen this ... and 
wanted to know i f  we wanted to jointly submit the proposal. I  told her about my 
reservations about doing tha t... but then I  thought, we were on this mode o f  
working together and getting along with the community in Maple Creek so that this 
would be a good thing to practise with, you know, putting this proposal together.5 
(During the winter the Nekaneet had jointly worked with the town’s Economic 
Development Committee on various Government-funded training initiatives).
A small committee was set up to take the proposal further. Underlining the lack of 
professional expertise of the Maple Creek group, as opposed to the commercial 
organisations hired by some other areas to put their proposals together, the Band
5 Interview 15
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Councillor explained: We scheduled a meeting and it just so happened that I  was 
taking my son to skating and there was a girl there from the University o f 
Saskatchewan ... and she was wanting to do some work on Aboriginal communities. 
... I  said “well I ’m actually going to a meeting right now and we ’re going to talk 
about this thing and you can come and sit in and see how we work with the town ”.6 
As a consequence of this unexpected meeting, the student agreed to put the 
proposal together, using information supplied by the rest of the committee. The 
finished submission was not large and a great deal of emphasis was placed on the 
willingness of the two communities to work together. The history of the Nekaneet 
was briefly touched upon:
When the Plains Cree inhabiting these hills were ordered to move o u t... in 
the early 1880s they refused. The [Nekaneet] Band was forcibly shipped 
out of the area but they moved back and hid in the hills. Because of their 
refusal to move, this small Band was cut off from any government 
assistance and left to fend for itself. ... For over eighty years, they lived 
without reserve7 or status, providing for themselves by hunting, trapping, 
selling fence posts, and working for ranchers. The Nekaneet Band lives on 
its ancestral territory, remaining true to its traditions (emphasis added).8
To the Nekaneet, this last was of particular importance, because they saw their 
traditions as being undiluted by outside influences. As was explained: You drive 
around here [reserve] you won’t see any semblance o f  a church or anything like 
that. We’ve never been watered down in that sense ... What Ifind  in different 
communities, some people did get the right teachings or the teachings that coincide 
with the Nekaneet teachings, but the problem with them is that they take it a step 
further and they try to parallel it with Christianity. We don’t bother with that.
We ’re secure with the fact that this is the way our Elders were taught by their 
Elders ... and that’s good enough for us.9 The Nekaneet felt that they could offer 
imprisoned Aboriginal women a culturally appropriate and safe environment as 
they began their ‘healing’ journey. In particular, the Nekaneet believed that they 
had a cultural environment largely unadulterated by Euro-Canadian mores and that 
Aboriginal women first needed to understand the broader Aboriginal heritage 
before attempting to deal with an imposed culture’s norms. In applying to CSC the
6 Interview 15
7 This is not strictly accurate. The Band was granted its reserve in 1913, but did not receive 
benefits until 1975. The Cypress Hills (1994) Hildebrandt, W & Hubner, B p .l 11
8 Federally Sentenced Women Initiative: Healing Lodge Facility Nekaneet Band/Maple Creek 
Proposal
9 Interview 15
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Band showed remarkable trust in a federal organisation, given the history of 
government betrayal of the Nekaneet.10 In offering the assistance of their Elders 
and Medicine People the Nekaneet clarified their position: ‘The Indian teachings 
and practices are orally taught and preserved, therefore, it would be inappropriate to 
write about how the Native women attending a healing lodge would be healed’.11 
The assumption, though, was that Nekaneet Elders would be involved with the 
women should the Healing Lodge be awarded to their community.
The proposal emphasised the beauty of the location and the ‘healing’ nature of the
landscape. In terms of what the town could offer, much was made of its location
vis-a-vis the main cities in Alberta and Saskatchewan; the local services available
in Maple Creek; and, above all, the fact that both Nekaneet and the local council
had co-operated enthusiastically in putting together the proposal. As the Band
Councillor said: I  think what they [CSC] wanted at the time was a non-Aboriginal /
Aboriginal proposal that had already specified that they do get along as opposed to
1 0they ’re going to get along. Nevertheless, not all of the Nekaneet and residents of
Maple Creek were happy with the suggestion that the Healing Lodge should be 
sited in their community, but few thought it likely that the proposal would be 
accepted, and there was no organised opposition. The proposal was submitted and 
the committee waited for a decision to be made. One committee member recalled: 
We worked at it, like we really did this in a time frame o f about two weeks I  think. I  
remember [another committee member] tossed it across the table and said ‘what do 
we do i f  we get this? * I ’ll never forget that.13
Despite my earlier suggestion that there might have been party-political 
considerations leading to the selection of Maple Creek, there is a further 
perspective to be added. The selection process for the Healing Lodge was the same 
as that undertaken for the other prisons and a group of evaluators scrutinised each
10 Chief Nekaneet signed Treaty Four in 1874, yet the Canadian authorities failed to provide a 
reserve for the Nekaneet until 1913 and the Band received no treaty benefits until 1975. On the 
23rd Septembe, 1992 the Nekaneet Band signed an agreement finally settling their land claim, 
receiving $8.3 million in compensation. Under the terms o f the agreement they were obliged to buy 
16,160 acres o f land, which was equal to the acreage Chief Nekaneet failed to receive when he 
signed Treaty Four. For a fuller exploration o f the history o f the Nekaneet see Hildebrandt and 
Hubner (1994).
11 Federally Sentenced Women Initiative: Healing Lodge Facility Nekaneet Band/Maple Creek 
Proposal
12 Interview 15
13 Interview 16
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proposal. As one assessor said: Each o f us went through all the proposals 
[beforehand] and then we all came together in Saskatoon. We had set aside a week 
where we could go through each proposal... We had our Elders with us ... We 
were in to our third day and we had all o f our sheets up, each o f them scored and 
we weren ’t quite finished. We had a stack o f the proposals on the table and they 
[Elders] came in and said ‘well how is it going?’. [We said] 'well, we ’re about half 
way there and we anticipate being done maybe tomorrow night’. ... There were 
three o f them [Elders] ... They went over to the table and Mary [Elder] took one 
[proposal] and she passed it on [to the other Elders] and they did this to all 28 [of 
the proposals]. And there were three [proposals] they put in a pile and then they 
did it again [handled the three proposals] and [Mary] looked at them [Elders] and 
she said, ‘what do you think? I  think i t ’s this one here ’ and they both said, ‘yes, 
that’s the one ’. So they said ‘well this is the one here ’ and we all looked at each 
other, because we still had our process to finish. So we said ‘ok, but in order for  
Corrections to be able to defend the decision w e’ve got to finish the process ’. The 
Elders had chosen Maple Creek. Upon being asked during an interview if the 
official process also selected Maple Creek, an assessor continued: Yes. Head and 
shoulders above the rest as a matter o f fact. It was interesting because the Maple 
Creek proposal had already been evaluated [before the Elders handled them], so 
we finished them off, being very diligent, and we didn’t know what the scores were 
because they hadn ’t been compiled. And when we finally had them compiled the 
score [for Maple Creek] was half again as much as the [next one] and those next 
ones were the other two [selected by the Elders].14
In mid-May Maple Creek’s committee was asked to assemble a group of local 
representatives to meet the Solicitor General, who was coming to the town on the 
22nd May 1992. Prior to that, both the Band office and the Mayor had received a 
call asking how much land was being offered, and CSC’s property management 
group was astonished to discover that it was a quarter section. (In ranching 
country, such as at Maple Creek, land is traditionally reckoned in quarter sections, 
which comprise 160 acres). It was a far larger amount than had been anticipated, 
but the Band thought this amount of land necessary for spiritual ceremonies. 
Solicitor General Lewis arrived, together with Commissioner Ole Ingstrup, and 
spelled out the economic gains for the community: the expected 60 short-term jobs
14 Interview 21
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during the period of construction; the 26.5 positions which would be permanently 
available at the Lodge; the proposed $1.6 million yearly operating budget. Mr. 
Lewis was offering a contradictory vision, because the retention of jobs relied on 
the continuation of the prison and, as Cohen suggests, the ‘possibility that they 
[civil servants] will support policies which will result in anything other than more 
work ... for people like themselves is ... incredible’ (Cohen 1983: 118).
Guiding the Planning Circle
Town and country had collaborated with little expectation of success and the reality 
of the hard work involved was soon to become apparent. Unlike the other prisons, 
the planning of the Healing Lodge involved a great deal of local input and support. 
Representatives of both the Band and the town were invited to join the Healing 
Lodge Planning Committee, which then underwent its final transformation, 
becoming the Healing Lodge Planning Circle (HLPC).
With the change in function of the original Aboriginal Advisory Committee, from a 
group which in January 1991 was expected solely to advise to one which a month 
later, having consulted the Elders and NWAC, had ‘joined’ with CSC, the workload 
became immense. From May, 1992 the enlarged HLPC initially met at least once a 
month, for a period of two to three days, with members flying in from across 
Canada and being accommodated in Maple Creek. The immense cost of this, 
between $17 - $19,000 per meeting, was borne by CSC. The meetings were no 
ordinary civil service meetings; each day began with ceremonies and prayers, and 
the end of the day’s work was often marked by further prayer, and ‘talking circles’, 
which sometimes extended into the evening. The protocol attached to such 
ceremonies meant that agendas could not always be adhered to. Speakers could not 
be interrupted and the size of the HLPC, with at least twenty attendees and often 
more, meant that business proceeded slowly.
The HLPC was helped in its deliberations by two documents which had been 
written by the earlier Committee:
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• a Role Statement15, which amplified the bare description of a Healing Lodge 
contained in Creating Choices;
• a Vision Statement16, devised by the Aboriginal members, but also signed by the 
CSC representatives. This was intended to provide a spiritual rationale for the 
Healing Lodge and, by extension, for the HLPC as it deliberated. The Vision 
Statement had immense significance because it both continued the political 
discourse begun during the Task Force and broke with oral tradition, by writing 
down the principles underpinning Aboriginal culture and spirituality. It was a 
necessary means of educating the Euro-Canadians.17 The Vision Statement 
(1991: 3) briefly emphasised the political reality that: ‘as long as our people can 
remember, the Aboriginal people of Turtle Island [North America] ... lived 
here long before history was written. ... We were sovereign’. It showed how 
Aboriginal understanding of the world was explained by the teachings of the 
‘Circle of Life’18 and how the practical application of those beliefs enabled 
Aboriginals to live in harmony with themselves and others. Without explicitly 
saying so, the Vision Statement thus became a model of Aboriginal justice and 
therein lies its other importance, because CSC accepted that the HLPC would 
be influenced by the Vision Statement as it planned the Healing Lodge.
15 December, 1991
16 Healing Lodge Vision Statement December, 1991
17 The arrival o f the first Christian missionaries on Turtle Island (North America) heralded a 
sustained campaign to rid the continent o f supposedly pagan beliefs. As explained in chapter 2, in 
Canada many Aboriginal spiritual ceremonies were banned and the passing on o f  traditional 
Aboriginal practices was disrupted by the removal o f children from their families and their 
placement in (largely Christian) residential schools. As Aboriginals have begun to reclaim the right 
to practice their own spirituality, there has been a tendency amongst some Euro-Canadians to assert 
that the expression o f such beliefs has more to do with making a political statement than it does with 
actual cultural traditions. While this is incorrect -  even if, as Waldram (1997) shows, spirituality 
within prisons has o f necessity needed to emphasise its pan-Aboriginal aspects, rather than those of  
individual nations -  it is also offensive. McGee puts it bluntly: ‘We have been told over and over 
by Christian missionaries that a man, bom o f a virgin, died, rose again three days after his death, 
pushed a big stone back from his tomb, and then ascended into the spiritual world. An Indian would 
consider it poor manners to make fun o f this spiritual story, especially if  it is part o f a people’s 
spiritual history’ (McGee1990: 6). The renaissance o f interest in Aboriginal spirituality and culture 
is a consequence of, and inter-linked with, Aboriginals seeking their ethnic identity. As 
Aboriginals’ own oral histories have taught them, they have always had a unique responsibility for 
the stewardship o f what they see as ‘their land’. That this stewardship should be expressed in 
stories is entirely consonant with the practices o f other nations who might, for example, term their 
faiths Christian, Muslim or Jewish. All faiths rely on story-telling as a means o f  explication; all 
faiths are subjected to criticism from non-believers; all faiths have played a part in the creating o f  
distinct cultures within nations. The Vision Statement provided by the HLPC should be understood 
in the light o f its attempt to make rational, for a sometimes sceptical audience, core Aboriginal 
beliefs.
18 The ‘Circle o f Life’ reflects the Aboriginals’ relationship with the Creator, the earth, and 
everything and everybody inhabiting the earth. It charts an individual’s progress through infancy,
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The HLPC itself then produced:
• the Healing Lodge Operational Plan19, a ‘blueprint’ covering most aspects of 
the day-to-day running of the Lodge, defining (amongst other things): the 
management model; the living arrangements; the physical care of the women; 
the programming;
*yc\• the Planning Parameters , which fleshed out the physical details of the 
proposed Lodge, while emphasising that the design had to be ‘culturally aware’ 
and reflective of the Vision Statement.
The name ‘Healing Lodge’ is a euphemism for prison. CSC was allowing a non- 
CSC-defined philosophy to be the guiding rationale for one of its new prisons. As 
all these documents were accepted by CSC, we need to consider the possibility that 
CSC’s use of the HLPC’s language might have been ‘knowing’, in the sense that it 
gave CSC’s new venture legitimacy, or might have been an open acceptance by 
CSC of the Aboriginal dimension of the prison. This will be done in the 
concluding chapter.
Providing the land
A site for the Healing Lodge had to be selected, but it was not simply a question of 
looking for the place which appeared, from a construction perspective, to be most 
suitable. The Healing Lodge had to be in a place imbued with spiritual qualities 
and close to a source of water. A Vision Quest was the traditional means of 
locating such sites. Mary Louie, the Elder instrumental in originally selecting the 
Nekaneet / Maple Creek proposal, led the Quest, having been given details of a few 
locations which Band members thought might be suitable. Two descriptions of the 
event unite in one major respect. First: They went right to that hill. I  thought 
maybe they would chose the other side as there was more open spots and a road 
could be built in. As fa r  as construction and all that, they probably chose the spot 
that was most difficult!21 Second: They had a group o f Elders who were meeting in
childhood, adulthood and old age. It delineates the responsibilities they assume for the continuation 
o f an unbroken ‘Circle o f Life’. Nothing may be seen in isolation: everything is inter-linked.
19 February, 1993.
20 March, 1993
21 Interview 15
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the Planning Circle and they went out this one afternoon to the Reserve and
actually walked through the bush ... and they tracked these hillsides and they said
when they came to this spot that that was it, they knew that was it. . . . I t ’s been
questioned since. It was a very difficult place to build, I  tell you ... right on the side
00hill and the rocks, i t ’s solid rock out there and the poor architects ... The 
architects struggled to find solutions to the difficult, steeply sloping terrain on 
which they were told to build. The buildings needed to reflect the Four Directions 
(as explained by the Circle of Life), yet also had to ‘fit’ the land on which they 
were to be constructed. Deciding on the general design of the Lodge took
considerable time, but there was unanimity on the need for the prison to be circular
0*1
and, eventually, take its general shape from the eagle, when seen from above.
The amount of land to be handed over by the Band was a further complication.
CSC was extremely reluctant to accept a quarter section because of the cost 
implications and the fear that the Treasury Board would not authorise the 
expenditure. CSC was not allowed to take on more land than was actually required 
for a new prison, so the quarter section was justified by a Land Rationale24, which 
outlined the number of acres required for ceremonies such as the Sweatlodge, 
fasting, the Sundance and the Rain Dance. The Rationale was written by a non- 
Nekaneet woman and based on six nations (Cree, Saulteaux, Sioux, Dene and 
Mohawk). It explained that many nations would be present at the Lodge, with 
conceivably different needs. The preamble elaborated:
For ceremonial purposes, Aboriginal people require large areas of land.
This is to allow for the natural state of the land to provide cleansing and 
healing for its people. Aboriginal people do not take from the land without 
giving back to the land; therefore, the replenishment of the land is critical.25
This relationship with the land was fundamental to the planning of the Healing 
Lodge and a difficult -  and different -  concept for CSC as an organisation (but not 
necessarily for its individual employees) to accept. Some of the difficulty lay in 
accepting that CSC was party to constructing a prison which, in theory, permitted
22 Interview 16
23 The eagle is believed to carry prayers between the earth and the spirit world. To be given an 
eagle feather is the highest honour amongst Aboriginals.
24 Healing Lodge Land Rationale 1993
25 ibid
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women to walk alone to isolated places in order to ‘greet the new day’,26 rather than 
restricting them to houses set behind fences where their movements would be more 
easily monitored. CSC also had to accept the logic of the site selection, the rocky 
nature of which presented them with enormous structural difficulties. Yet the 
Aboriginals could point to the Vision Statement for validation: ‘At Creation, we 
were given four Sacred Gifts of Life: From the East, the gift of Fire; from the 
South, the gift of Rock; from the West, the gift of water; and from the North, the 
gift of Wind’. CSC was in uncharted territory and the logic of the ‘dominant 
culture’ did not find expression in such abstract ways, as the HLPC’s minutes 
showed in May:
Perhaps it is better that the Planning Circle meet with the Treasury Board ... 
as other people don’t always understand the [land] rationale no matter how 
it is explained on paper, primarily due to the fact that spirituality cannot be 
explained in detail or with Justice on paper.27
Land, culture, spirituality and protocol
Aboriginal land was inextricably linked to spirituality and culture. Although the 
original Operational Plan provided for women of varying faiths -  ‘there may be 
some Federally Sentenced Aboriginal Women who practice a religion / faith and 
their needs will have to be accommodated through a non-denominational chapel’ 
(CSC 1992b: 29) -  in February, 1993 the HLPC decided that there would be no 
chapel at the Healing Lodge. The other prisons were to have multi-faith rooms, 
rather than simply chapels, and Aboriginal women preferring to have a Christian or 
alternative option would have to forego the Healing Lodge. The then Nekaneet 
Chief explained why he was opposed to other faiths being represented at the Lodge: 
‘It was for the Aboriginal person to follow their traditional spirituality and ... other 
faiths were not Aboriginal peoples’ path to take’. An Elder supported him, 
explaining that the ‘women at the Prison for Women did not want religious 
denominations at the Healing Lodge [as] there remain[ed] a lot of pain to heal from
98the wounds inflicted by religious institutions’. (The Elder was largely referring to 
the residential schools.) Creating Choices had suggested that there should be ‘a 
minimum of one Elder available at the Lodge on a full-time basis’ (TFFSW 1990: 
124), but that the position would not always be filled by the same person, as there
26 bid
27 HLPC Minutes 26th May, 1993
28 HLPC Minutes 24th February, 1993
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was a need to recognise that Aboriginal women came from different nations, with 
different spiritual traditions. The Nekaneet did not wish to exclude other 
Aboriginal traditions from the Lodge (although they did wish their own to be 
recognised), as was evident when an Elder from British Columbia, rather than the 
Nekaneet, led the Vision Quest. Monture-Angus (2000: 55) drew attention to the 
fact that there is considerable protocol attached to Aboriginals entering another 
Nation’s territory and that it is essential to respect the ‘sacred protocols’ and 
‘traditions’ of the host First Nation. In the case of the Healing Lodge this meant 
acknowledging the wisdom of the Nekaneet’s Elders and having their active 
involvement in the Lodge. The Final Operational Plan, surprisingly, did not deal 
with this directly when it discussed ‘spirituality’ as a separate issue. Elders were 
mentioned in the context of health care and counselling, but there was no actual 
mention of any role to be played by the Nekaneet. The only time the Nekaneet 
were mentioned was in connection with the Ke-kun-wem-kon-a-wuk (the keepers 
of the Healing Lodge vision), when it was suggested that ‘three National Healing 
Lodge Elders’ and ‘local Elders from the Nekaneet’ should be included. Although 
the failure to specify the Nekaneet was possibly an unfortunate omission on the part 
of the drafters of the Operational Plan, it left an opening for CSC later to be able to 
assume responsibility for decisions regarding Elders.
Fiscal reality; mismatched expectations
The original estimates for the prison had failed to take fully into account the cost of 
supplying utilities to the Lodge and the specific difficulties occasioned by the site 
itself added considerably to costs. As delays in the project occurred, and costs 
continued to rise, there was continual pressure from CSC that the HLPC should 
reduce the size of the prison. In February, 1993 the HLPC deferred the 
gymnasium, reduced the size of the administration area and deleted a work room 
from the plans, yet CSC continued to press for more savings and greater speed in 
planning. Despite this, the Cedar Tipi (spiritual lodge) was increased to 
accommodate 100 people, because of the necessity to accept the Aboriginal concept 
of ‘all my relations’ (meaning, the extended family) and the fact that the local 
community was also expected to participate in ceremonies at the Lodge. CSC was 
insisting on budgetary restraint, while also conceding ‘Aboriginal’ additions to the 
plan. The consequence was that basic facilities such as a gymnasium were denied 
to Aboriginal women, but were permitted in the other prisons, where spiritual needs
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were also provided for. CSC was allowing the construction of an Aboriginal- 
influenced prison, yet seemed to be assuming that costs would -  and should -  be 
proportionately no greater than elsewhere.
Two months later the Commissioner was expressing concerns about delays. The 
Healing Lodge was three months behind schedule, which was affecting the date of 
the closure of the Prison for Women. The prison was already considerably over 
budget, there was no possibility of persuading the Treasury Board to provide more 
federal money, and a CSC member of the HLPC was asking that the Circle provide 
‘true’ figures, rather than ‘figures from the sky’. This request highlighted the 
mismatch of experience and expectation, with a good proportion of the HLPC being 
involved because of their connection with the Nekaneet Band or Maple Creek, 
rather than because of their financial and planning expertise. They were 
unaccustomed to presenting detail in the manner essential to procuring both federal 
dollars and support. During May the discussion continued to focus on the 
considerable costs of the Healing Lodge, which were some $3.2 million over 
budget, and the Circle was once again asked to look at ways of trimming 
expenditure. Despite this, the HLPC proceeded to expand the space allocated to 
various parts of the Lodge. Discussions still had to be held with the Department 
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), the Department of Justice, 
CSC and the Nekaneet Band in order to draft terms and conditions for the use of the 
land because, although planning for the Healing Lodge was well advanced, 
agreement had still not been reached with the Nekaneet for the land transfer. 31
By September, 1993 the HLPC had been meeting for seventeen months and CSC 
was deeply unhappy with progress. There was a clear divergence in manner of 
operating between the Aboriginal and Maple Creek representatives and those of 
CSC. Even the style of the minutes would have exasperated the civil servants 
because they contained the barest details of discussions, with little indication of 
precisely what had been agreed. A senior representative from CSC attended the 
meeting and later sent a list of ‘actions which we agreed to take at the [last]
29 HLPC Minutes 20th April, 1993
30 HLPC Minutes 27th May, 1993
31 Formal permission had to be obtained from all members o f the Band, by means o f  a referendum, 
for land to be leased to CSC. The Band needed to achieve a ‘majority o f the majority’ vote to pass 
the referendum, (i.e. 160 eligible, 81 required to vote, 41 to vote yes)’.
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meeting’, taking care to reassure HLPC members that the minutes were not being 
superseded.32 There was a distinct air of ‘let’s get on with this’ attached to the 
letter, despite the diplomacy of the language. Representatives of the HLPC were to 
attend an ExCom (Executive Committee of CSC) meeting and a civil servant was 
asked to draft the presentation, which would ‘situate all the critical issues in a 
comprehensive framework’. They had to be able to say that the land designation 
had been agreed with the Nekaneet and all agreed that it was necessary to ask for 
the quarter section, but the wording of the Land Rationale needed to be transformed 
into ‘bureaucratic language’ for it to be acceptable to ExCom. It was being made 
clear that the HLPC needed to adopt what CSC considered to be a more 
professional approach to their work.
Providing that construction began by April, 1994 it was expected that the Lodge 
would be completed by April, 1995, yet the Band’s approval was certainly not a 
foregone conclusion, not least because of the financial implications of the package 
being proposed. But it was the Aboriginal dimension to the plans which needed to 
be understood by ExCom; why was it necessary to do certain things in certain 
ways, and how could they be justified to the public at large? The need to have the 
buildings reflect Aboriginal beliefs complicated the design process. The HLPC had 
already been cautioned that the other Wardens questioned the necessity for having 
two-bedroom living units, (thought by the Elders to be essential to the ‘healing’ of 
Aboriginal women when in an Aboriginal-influenced prison), and that these might 
be perceived as being unfair when other facilities were making do with much 
larger cottages. ExCom eventually approved the two-bed arrangement and the 
Healing Lodge was unique in achieving this, as all the other prisons had a minimum 
of seven women per living unit. An added concern was the size of the day-care 
centre, in view of the fact that such provision had been deferred at all the other new 
facilities, but to remove children from the plan would have been entirely 
unacceptable to the Aboriginal members. However, a second Private Family 
Visiting House was deleted from the plans (again on the grounds of excessive cost), 
which was a considerable loss, bearing in mind the isolation of the Healing Lodge.
32 Letter 28th September, 1993
33 HLPC Minutes 17th November, 1993
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By November, 1993 CSC already knew that the closing date for the Prison for 
Women would have to be deferred because of the late opening of all of the new 
prisons. A further letter from CSC to all Circle members stressed: ‘... the 
importance of the upcoming events such as the land designation, the hiring process 
of the Kikawinaw [Director / Warden] ... [as] these events impact directly on the 
selection process for the candidates to be trained [and] any modifications in our 
plan will demand that we readjust the other planned starting dates.34 The official 
pressure and loss of patience increased. The Kikawinaw (Director) of the Healing 
Lodge was appointed in December, 1993, although the formal announcement that 
Norma Green was to hold this position was not made until March, 1994. The 
Competition Board35 comprised two representatives from CSC, an Elder and an 
Executive Member of the Native Women’s Association of Canada. The Chief of 
the Nekaneet Band and his son, a Band Councillor, attended as observers, but were 
not permitted to ask any questions, which was an unfortunate breach of Aboriginal 
protocol.
On the 12th January, 1994 the Circle signed off the conceptual design of the 
Healing Lodge. CSC’s design representative indicated that the budget was in 
‘reasonable order’ and that savings could be made in the materials used, without 
impinging on the overall quality of the prison. The budget for the Circle meetings 
was not similarly under control and the CSC representatives explained that there 
was ‘no money available for the continuation of the large Circle, Sub-Committees 
and frequent meetings, nor could [these] be justified to their superiors’. Without 
clarifying who might have contributed to the following extract, the Minutes showed 
resistance to the idea:
The reorganisation of the Circle could be detrimental to the entire vision as 
it appears it would become a Circle without any decision making power but 
rather a rubber stamp for what happens, to praise when things are going 
well or voice concerns when not, but really have no power to make 
decisions. It was voiced that the vision cannot be carried out by individuals 
who have not been an integral part of the vision.
34 2nd December, 1993
35 A Competition Board is used within government departments for interviewing candidates for
positions.
36 HLPC Minutes 12th January, 1994
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Land clearing for the Healing Lodge did not begin until May, 1994, resulting in the 
projected completion date being postponed until the end of June, 1995. The 
Blessing of the Land Ceremony was held on the 8th June, 1994 when a small group 
of Elders and members of the Planning Circle joined together for the ritual. It was 
an important occasion for both local communities, marking what was for them an 
unprecedented degree of co-operation and hope. On the same day the 
Memorandum o f Understanding, covering the lease of the land, was signed. The 
Memorandum provided the Nekaneet with an initial $21,000 dollars per year and 
in return, the Band ‘surrendered’ the land to CSC for a period of 25 years and 
allowing CSC an option to renew for a further 25 years.
New philosophy; new staff
The Memorandum o f Understanding between the Nekaneet and CSC contained a 
number of Specific Undertakings o f the Solicitor General. Section 14.3 agreed to:
a) implementing a staffing and training plan for the operation of the 
Healing Lodge designed to be inclusive of the Nekaneet Band members 
with respect to eligibility for consideration;
b) implementing a staffing process for available positions at the Healing 
Lodge ... by open competition until 50% of the Healing Lodge staff 
positions are occupied by Nekaneet Band members ... [and the provision 
that]... future commitments with respect to staffing targets will be 
determined as part of the periodic review of this Memorandum ...
The HLPC knew from the beginning that they needed -  and wanted -  to employ a 
large number of Aboriginal women at the Lodge. While they could not provide for 
all the nations who might be represented by the federally sentenced women at the 
Healing Lodge, they could work towards an environment which reflected essential 
Aboriginal beliefs, but would achieve this only with the help of a high proportion 
of Aboriginal staff. Nekaneet women were the obvious first choice, not least 
because the Band had made much of its commitment to working with the women. 
But employing Nekaneet women was not straightforward, as many had not 
remained at school long enough to complete their Grade Twelve education, an 
essential requirement for correctional staff. By the beginning of 1993 fifteen
37 This figure was agreed following calculations as to what the Band could realise for the land if  it 
were used for pasture, the most common use o f land in that part o f Saskatchewan. A n annual 
percentage adjustment relative to the Consumer Price Index was made each year
38 Memorandum o f  Understanding between the Nekaneet Band, the Minister o f  Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, and the Solicitor General o f Canada.
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women were attending upgrading classes in Maple Creek and more were expected 
to join them. Large numbers applied for posts at the Lodge, with the vast majority 
being local, and a good proportion from the Nekaneet Band. The HLPC decided 
that 40 candidates, including eighteen Nekaneet women, would be selected for 
training even though only 26.5 posts were actually available (to ensure that a 
reservoir of trained people could be called upon at a later date). Four phases of 
training were planned. The first, lasting almost a month, took place at two non- 
correctional Treatment Centres and, with this strategy, the Healing Lodge set out on 
its own path. As explained by one Circle member: What we thought we could 
provide fo r  the workers was fo r  them to be able to start at a place where they 
weren’t superior to the women. So that was one o f the rationales fo r  sending them 
offfor treatment as clients, as opposed to just shadowing someone and learning
■JQ
how to do it. The staff needed to develop an understanding of what it was like to 
battle addiction and / or cope with the aftermath of abuse. Some prospective staff 
also needed to confront addictions, particularly alcoholism, in their own lives, 
before they could support other women. Staff became participants in the 
programme, rather than observers, and took that knowledge back with them to the 
Healing Lodge.
Thereafter, all training took place in Maple Creek so that local women could more 
easily take part and covered areas such as: cultural / Aboriginal awareness; 
counselling; co-dependency, as well as the Corrections Training Programme (CTP), 
a component common to all staff at the new institutions. The latter introduced staff 
to their formal role of correctional officer, a role perhaps belied by the term 
‘Kimisinaw’ or ‘older sister’, which was the equivalent of a Primary Worker in the 
other prisons. (More senior staff were known as Kikawisinaw or ‘aunt’.) The 
Kikawinaw, despite the initial expectations of the HLPC and the hiring committee, 
did not participate in any phase of the training.40
The significance of the training programme should not be underestimated. The first 
phase was demanding of all the participants, not least the Aboriginal trainees, who 
were confronting issues which had played a large part in the destruction of
39 Interview 16
40 HLPC Minutes 7th July, 1993
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Aboriginal communities across Canada, if not necessarily their own. Additionally, 
although the bid for the Healing Lodge had been a joint undertaking by the Band 
and the town of Maple Creek, it did not mean that the two communities generally 
mixed, and all the women had to adjust their perceptions of each other. The end 
result was that the women emerged from their training with a cohesion which staff 
at other prisons could not match. Yet knowledge of Aboriginal culture, although an 
essential part of the training, could not be sufficiently imparted to the Euro- 
Canadians within such a short period. Neither could the disparities in levels of 
education be overcome and this meant that mostly non-Aboriginal women were 
appointed to senior positions once hiring began. Knowledge of Aboriginal history 
should have alerted the Circle to this possibility and some form of affirmative 
hiring plan, leading to the identification of Aboriginal women who could be trained 
to take on senior positions, might have made Aboriginal influence at the Lodge 
more secure.
The formal opening of the almost completed Healing Lodge took place during the 
23rd and 24th August, 1995.
An Aboriginal prison?
I now outline details of the Healing Lodge itself and the daily routine provided for 
the women during the first year of its opening. This is simply a description, largely 
without critical discussion of how the Lodge actually functioned as a prison, and is 
based on fieldwork carried out in 1996. I then move forward to 1998 and document 
changes which took place during those two years, while discussing their relevance 
to the larger endeavour of establishing an Aboriginal prison.
The Nekaneet Reserve, in the Cypress Hills, is some 1,200 metres above the 
surrounding countryside, which extends below in a seemingly endless vista of 
plains. Apart from a monitored gate on the approach road to the Healing Lodge, 
there is no other visible security and, unlike the other new prisons, the prison was 
exempt from the later requirement that a fence should be constructed. The Lodge is 
visually striking amongst the dense stands of aspen which surround it, with vivid 
use of colour in all the buildings being in stark contrast to the grey stone austerity 
of the Prison for Women. The administration building is circular, reflecting the 
Circle of Life, and is where the main daily activities of the Lodge take place.
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Around a small inner courtyard are ranged the various offices, healthcare unit, 
education and library rooms, large children’s nursery and the focal point of the 
building, the communal eating and cooking area. A large deck extends from the 
dining area, providing a panoramic view of the surrounding land. The steep terrain 
means that the lower floor of the main building only extends part-way underneath 
and this contains -  amongst other rooms -  a small ceramics workshop. The Cedar 
Tipi (Spiritual Lodge) lies immediately in front of the main building, with the 
living lodges extending separately on either side of it.
Although the administration building is the functional heart of the prison, it is the 
Cedar Tipi which provides its spiritual and philosophical heart. Designed to be 
entered from the Four Directions41, it is also circular, with its roof rising steeply to 
reflect the shape of a traditional tipi. The interior immediately draws the eye to the 
centrally positioned fire, with its chimney extending through the great height of the 
roof. The fire is surrounded by a circular seating platform, which in turn is 
surrounded by a further circle of seats attached to the wooden walls. The Cedar 
Tipi is a place for reflection, instruction and celebration; it is also, it must be 
remembered, the heart of a prison.
The living lodges each hold two women, who have a single bedroom and a shared 
living and dining area, where meals may be prepared on those occasions when 
women are not obliged to eat together. Some of the lodges are designed to 
accommodate children and one is used by visiting Elders. Another lodge is more 
secure (the Lodge’s equivalent of an Enhanced Unit), with camera monitoring 
available as necessary. This was reluctantly conceded by the HLPC in recognition 
of the fact that some women might occasionally need a more protected 
environment. A series of beaver dams lie below the living lodges and, depending 
on the season, women may collect and braid the sweetgrass -  essential to the 
ceremonies within the Cedar Tipi -  from the surrounding land. The sweat lodge 
moves as required and, as on most of the Healing Lodge’s grounds, women must be 
accompanied by a member of staff, or an Elder, when visiting it. The freedom to 
move about the land was never extended in the manner envisaged by the Land 
Rationale.
41 North, south, east and west
Okimaw Ohci Healing Lodge, Saskatchewan. The Spiritual Lodge.
photo: S. Hayman
Okimaw Ohci Healing Lodge, Saskatchewan. The living lodges.
photo: S. Hayman
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The shock of change began for all new arrivals as soon as they left their previous 
prison. The women were not required to wear handcuffs or shackles while being 
transferred and the long car journey from either airport or previous prison 
culminated in 30 kilometres of rutted, unsealed road leading to the Healing 
Lodge.42 For those federally sentenced women who first arrived at the Healing 
Lodge, direct from the confines of the Prison for Women or a similarly enclosed 
prison, one of the most immediate challenges was presented by the change in 
physical environment. After the ceaseless noise of the ranges at the Prison for 
Women the quietness was almost alarming. One woman spoke of how difficult the 
transition had been and that it had taken her at least a year and a half to settle into 
the Lodge. She was fearful of coming out of her house in case alarms went off; was 
initially frightened by the voices coming out of the walls, because she had failed to 
notice the intercom system; was astonished to be given keys to her house, room and 
mailbox.43 The ability to walk freely between the living units and the 
administration building, without waiting for staff to unlock cells and gates, 
challenged the women’s perceptions of imprisonment and required a degree of 
confidence which, for many, took some time to emerge. Yet in disguising the 
prison’s reality both the Circle and CSC encouraged women to believe that the 
overt discipline of the old penitentiary in Kingston had disappeared, rather than 
been replaced by more subtle forms of self-discipline, or self-surveillance. The 
living lodges at the Healing Lodge were a continuation of the reverse-panoptican 
evident at the non-Aboriginal prisons, with the extra dimension of culture adding to 
the burden of reponsibilisation imposed upon the women.
The pattern of each day was decided in consultation with the Elders. Women are 
generally expected to begin their day in the Cedar Tipi.44 The ritual then, as now, 
remains much the same. The fire will already have been lit. An offering of tobacco 
is made to the Elder or person leading the day’s ceremony45 and this is followed by 
the burning of sweetgrass and herbs, which leads to the ‘smudging’ of each
42 Historically, this was not a new tactic, although it was unprecedented in more recent times. 
Freedman (1981: 89) wrote o f a woman arriving at an Indianapolis reformatory in manacles, 
whereupon the Superintendent asked for them to be removed, saying to those delivering her ‘she is 
my prisoner, not yours’ before embracing the women and taking her to her room.
43 Personal notes 1998
44 Women may not enter the Spiritual Lodge when it is their monthly cycle.
45 Tobacco is fundamental to most Aboriginal ceremonies. It represents the ‘unity o f humans and 
the Creator. ... Tobacco is one way the humans can touch the Creator. The smoke from burning
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participant.46 There is an opening prayer and perhaps a ‘teaching’ for the day. 
Following this, each member of the circle is invited to speak. Nothing much needs 
to be said -  a simple ‘good morning’ suffices -  but it is also an opportunity for 
those who wish to say more to do so. They will not be interrupted and there is a 
sense of formality and courtesy attached to the occasion. Staff also participate in 
the circle.
Following the Spiritual Circle the women attend various activities. The education 
classes are fully subscribed, and on a part-time basis in order to accommodate the 
demand, while a very few women are involved in the ceramics workshop. Some 
undertake outside maintenance and others are part of the catering team. Because 
of cutbacks forced by budget considerations at the planning stage there is relatively 
little room for education, workshops and programming (although additional space 
was built some four years after the Lodge opened)47
During the working day children are cared for by a trained nursery nurse, but 
become solely their mother’s responsibility during the weekend. (Although 
Etablissement Joliette, in Quebec, has a very well equipped nursery, the Healing 
Lodge was the only one of the prisons initially allowed to house children.)48 The 
primary concern is that the children are not exposed to any risky or distressing 
situations and all the women are well aware of the possible consequences for 
themselves should their behaviour have an impact on a child -  they will be shipped 
out.
tobacco naturally rises and can touch the spirits o f the sun and wind. The smoke carries one’s 
prayers to the Creator’ (Waldram 1997: 97).
46 The fragrant smoke is ‘drawn’ towards the body and wafted over the head and chest.
Sweetgrass ‘represents “unity” between the mind, body and spirit. It is typically woven together 
into three braids’ (Waldram 1997: 97).
47 To begin with, whenever a programme such as substance abuse was ‘bought-in’, all 
programming was suspended and every woman would participate. All were at the same starting 
point and it was assumed that all would benefit. As more women arrived, and others began to leave, 
this rationale could not be sustained and the question o f cost-effectiveness became more important. 
Completion o f programming is vital to the success o f a woman’s sentence plan.
48 This was one issue about which some in the local community felt very strongly. The children 
were a welcome addition to the Healing Lodge, but their nursery attracted adverse criticism because 
o f the lavishness o f its provision. Many o f the HLPC’s minutes referred to the Indian Auctions 
which were held at the conclusion o f each monthly meeting and raised a considerable sum. As one 
observer said: When I  walked in [to the nursery] Iju st stood there with my mouth open. I  could not 
believe how it was equipped. ... When we were having our monthly meetings the Government told 
us that we could have a day care centre, but there’d  be no money to equip [it] so we'd have to raise 
the money locally to do that.... I  tell you that there’s $6,000 sitting in a bank account down there 
and that money was to go to equip the day care. I  agree with the day care centre, I  think that’s a 
good idea, but where do you draw the line? Where’s the fiscal responsibility? (Interview 16)
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Lunch is taken communally, with staff joining the women, which does not happen 
in the other new prisons. From the start, the wider expectation at the Healing 
Lodge, was that barriers between staff and the women would be lowered as they 
jointly experienced everyday activities in more natural circumstances. Evening 
meals are cooked by the women themselves in their own houses and there are 
occasional evening activities, such as a round-dance, involving members of the 
Nekaneet Band.
An ‘Aboriginal’ prison?
Taken at face-value, this description of the Healing Lodge belies the reality of its 
being a prison. However, while the Healing Lodge is a beautiful, if  isolated, 
institution, it is governed by rules which separate it from the local community. 
Paradoxically, the community does not feel it is altogether set apart, because it is a 
prison created by the community; without the active solicitation of the local 
community, the prison would not have been built in the Cypress Hills, whereas the 
new prison at Edmonton was imposed upon the local community. It is striking that 
the Healing Lodge did not generate anything like the press coverage received by 
both Nova and Edmonton and this was largely because there were no ‘incidents’ 
(with one exception) that found their way into the public domain. But it was also to 
do with the remoteness of Maple Creek, the size of the local community and the 
way information about the Healing Lodge was initially provided for the local 
newspaper by a member of the HLPC and then by the Kikawinaw herself. With 
hindsight, this was a clever device which kept the local community informed, 
solicited help and, above all, located responsibility for the Lodge within the 
community, rather than solely with CSC. It represented a continuation of the 
cooperation which had initially brought the prison to the Cypress Hills. The local 
citizens were never part of an angry crowd, questioning the reason for having a 
prison in their area, as at Edmonton. The Kikawinaw, while still the ‘public face’ 
of CSC, was never forced to defend her prison as had been Ms Fox and Ms 
Manuge. Had there been any major incidents the smallness of the local population 
would have ensured that few in Maple Creek and on the reserve remained unaware 
for long. Generally, there was little sense of a community keeping close watch 
while waiting for things to go wrong. Outside press interest largely focused on the 
uniqueness of the whole endeavour and often featured the same women as
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representatives of the others. Without continual public observation and comment, 
the Healing Lodge was permitted a rare degree of freedom to develop its own style.
Yet there is a paradox at the heart of the Healing Lodge which sets it apart from 
other prisons. Women imprisoned there feel constrained by two sets of rules; those 
officially imposed by CSC and those unofficially implied by the women’s 
acceptance of the Aboriginal dimension of the prison. To break the ‘rules’ imposed 
by CSC is one thing; the women are being held involuntarily and feel no loyalty to 
the correctional authorities. But to break the trust of Aboriginal Elders is another 
matter entirely, because to do so is to dishonour them and what they represent. The 
fact that the Elders are working alongside the correctional authorities further blurs 
the issues, as I shall shortly explore.
Imprisoning our sisters
From the beginning there were particular expectations of the Healing Lodge: it 
would be supported by the local Aboriginal community; Aboriginal staff would be 
employed to the fullest extent possible; there would be a non-hierarchical structure 
to the staffing; Aboriginal culture, healing and spirituality would inform its day-to- 
day running. I will now look at these from the perspective of what existed in 1996 
and what had changed by 1998. But there are two points which first should be 
considered.
The Ke-kun-wem-kon-a-wuk (Keepers o f the Vision).
When the Operational Plan was devised it clearly delineated the management 
structure of the Lodge. The Kikawinaw was to ‘support, assist and guide’ the 
women and was also ‘accountable’ to two other tiers of management, the Regional 
Deputy Commissioner and the Ke-kun-wem-kon-a-wuk (comprising National 
Elders, local Elders and members of the HLPC). The Ke-kun-wem-kon-a-wuk’s 
role was to provide ‘guidance, support and assistance’ to the women and the 
Kikawinaw, but it was not ‘accountable’ to the Kikawinaw (CSC 1993a: 4-5).
By the time the Lodge opened this position had been reversed and was made quite 
specific in the Memorandum o f Understanding signed by the Nekaneet Band on the 
5 June, 1995. Schedule B 3(a) reads: ‘the operation of the Healing Lodge will be 
the responsibility of the Kikawinaw (Director) who is appointed by CSC. CSC will
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establish a national committee, the Ke-kun-wem-kon-a-wuk ... to provide 
guidance, support and assistance to the Kikawinaw and CSC ... ’ The 
Memorandum made no mention of the Kikawinaw being accountable to the Ke- 
kun-wem-kon-a-wuk. The Band had been required, as part of its undertaking, to 
seek advice from a solicitor regarding the Memorandum before they signed it, but it 
is doubtful whether anyone who had not been part of the HLPC decision-making 
would have recognised the significance of that section. It also appeared to nullify 
part of the intention of Section 1(d) of the same Schedule, which acknowledged 
that the Band had entered into the agreement based upon consideration of: ‘the 
ability of the Band to participate in the management of the Healing Lodge through 
the Ke-kun-wem-kon-a-wuk ... (emphasis added). The word ‘management’ could 
not be equated with ‘guidance, support and assistance’. The interpretation of the 
HLPC’s intentions was central to the issue of who had responsibility for the 
Healing Lodge, because the Memorandum o f Understanding consigned final 
authority to CSC. Moreover, the Kikawinaw was solely accountable to CSC and 
the Ke-kun-wem-kon-a-wuk was left with little authority. The effect was twofold; 
Aboriginal, including Nekaneet, influence was restricted and the Kikawinaw 
became a Warden, just as much as any of the other new wardens, with CSC being 
the ultimate authority to which she must answer.
This development was unsurprising, given the reality that CSC was statutorily 
responsible both for the administration of the prison and its financing. However, 
the failure to honour the earlier agreement -  that the Kikawinaw should be 
answerable to the Ke-kun-wem-kon-a-wuk -  again raised the possibility that CSC 
knowingly used the Aboriginals to legitimate a venture over which it had no 
intention of relinquishing control. The same allegations were earlier made in 
relation to CAEFS’ involvement in the Task Force, and the way in which the 
organisation was omitted from the key implementation committee, the NIC. We 
already know that CSC had far exceeded any previous arrangements in agreeing to 
the Aboriginals having such a central role on the HLPC, and that CSC had agreed 
to the construction of a prison radically different from the other new federal prisons 
for women. But in altering the lines of accountability, so that the Kikawinaw was 
answerable to the Regional Deputy Commissioner and not the Ke-kun-wem-kon-a- 
wuk, CSC was binding the Kikawinaw into its own structures. CSC had also 
ensured that the Nekaneet would be sidestepped. As I have suggested, there are
301
questions raised about: how deliberate this amendment was on the part of CSC; 
whether CSC used the Aboriginals to legitimate the new prison; or whether the 
change was simply a consequence of the reality that CSC was pay-master. It 
should be remembered, however, that the Nekaneet were a small Band and not 
necessarily ready, at that point, to assume an administrative role at the Lodge. 
Additionally, some on the HLPC felt that CSC would be in a better position to 
maintain the Lodge as a national resource during its initial operational phase.
A multi-level prison?
The intentions of the HLPC regarding maximum security women were also ignored 
by CSC. Unlike both Edmonton and Nova, the Healing Lodge never 
accommodated maximum security women, although it was originally expected to 
do so. The 1992 Commissioner’s Directive 006, Classification o f  Institutions, 49 
showed that all the new regional women’s prisons were classed as ‘multi-level’.
The Healing Lodge Operational Plan specified: ‘The Healing Lodge will 
accommodate Federally Sentenced aboriginal women for all or part of their 
sentence, regardless o f  their security classification, therefore women may be 
admitted directly upon sentencing ... (CSC 1993a: 8, emphasis added). HLPC 
Minutes in November, 1993, written eight months after the Operational Plan was 
published, clearly indicated that the prison was intended to be a multi-level one; in 
the absence of any fence, security bracelets were being explored as a possible 
means of allowing ‘multi-level women’ more freedom ‘in the 160 acres’. However, 
the June, 1994 HLPC Minutes stated that a member ‘had been alerted by the RPC 
[Regional Psychiatric Centre] staff in Saskatoon that only minimum security 
women would be able to get to the Healing Lodge ... [and that th is]... apparent 
CSC position had also been heard by other Planning Circle members as well as the 
women’. This was the first hint for the HLPC that the multi-level nature of the 
facility might be altered. The meeting was told that ‘women would apply for 
placement at the Healing Lodge’ and that the Kikawinaw would decide whether or 
not to accept a woman, clearly breaching the Operational Plan’s expectation that 
women could be admitted ‘directly upon sentencing’.
49 11th September, 1992
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Arbour (1996: 224) had strongly urged that the Healing Lodge should be accessible 
to all, ‘regardless of their present [security] classification’.
Even now, there is no CD referring to the barring of maximum security women 
from the Healing Lodge. The 1992 CD 006, classifying all the new prisons as 
multi-level (meaning that they could be any combination of security level), was not 
superseded until 22nd August, 1996, when the Interim CD 500 declared that Prairie- 
region maximum security women were barred from Edmonton Institution . A 
further interim CD 500, issued on the 12th September, 1996 and referring 
specifically to GVI, Nova and Joliette, barred maximum security women from these 
prisons as well. None of these applied to the Healing Lodg,e and the situation has 
been made no clearer since then.
Based on anecdotal evidence,50 my understanding of events is that the decision to 
bar maximum security women from the Healing Lodge was taken in June, 1994, 
when the HLPC was first alerted to the possibility. During that meeting it was 
decided that the Healing Lodge would not have an Enhanced Unit, but would, 
instead, have a ‘safe lodge’. This did not meet the security standards of an 
Enhanced Unit, and officials from CSC then announced that maximum security 
women would consequently be barred from the Lodge. CSC’s position was made 
more explicit during negotiations with the Nekaneet, prior to the vote leading to the 
designation of the land for the Lodge. It was then clear that maximum security 
women would not be eligible for the Lodge. Moreover, some Aboriginal members 
of the HLPC had, together with some of the Nekaneet Band, been concerned about 
the ability of the Lodge to function as a place of ‘healing’ if  it had to cope with 
women with multiple problems. There is also another factor to be considered, and 
that relates to the numbers of women the Lodge can accommodate. It is limited to 
thirty women and there are, as we know, many more federally sentenced Aboriginal 
women . The HLPC had not wanted the Lodge to be so large that staff could not 
work on a relatively intimate level with the women. It might quite justifiably be 
maintained that maximum security women are in even greater need of what the 
Lodge might offer. Yet, it is possible that CSC, having invested so much in the 
credibility of an Aboriginal prison, was not prepared to face the possibility that
50 Personal notes 2002
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some maximum security women might disproportionately influence its 
development. Incidents similar to those seen at both Nova and Edmonton would 
have shattered the carefully prepared image of a peaceful place of ‘healing’. 
Consequently, a substantial group of Aboriginal women have never been able to 
move to the Healing Lodge.
This is yet another aspect of the overall Task Force plan which has not been 
implemented. However, it must also be acknowledged that the Kikawinaw, guided 
by the Elders, initially exercised considerable discretion in deciding which women 
should be reviewed for a security re-classification, based on her conclusion that the 
woman was appropriate for the Healing Lodge programme and operation. One of 
the first arrivals at the Lodge was a woman who had been involved in the April, 
1994 incidents at the Prison for Women and been labelled one of Canada’s most 
dangerous women. Her eventual release from the Lodge on parole some eighteen 
months later was to earn her a quarter page spread in the Maple Creek News,51 
including a photo of her being given a farewell hug by the Kikawinaw.
Having discussed points which were fundamental to both the governance and the 
scope of the prison, I now move to other issues. While we should never forget that 
the Healing Lodge is a prison, it is above all an Aboriginal prison so it is that 
distinctiveness, rather than the similarities with the other prisons, upon which we 
now concentrate.
A supportive Aboriginal community?
Schedule B 1(a) of the Memorandum o f Understanding acknowledged the 
Nekaneet Band’s wish to ‘make available the experience of its members in 
Aboriginal healing’. This made explicit what had been written in the original letter 
of support by the Nekaneet Chief, who viewed the Lodge as an opportunity to 
‘share these gifts and our home with women who are looking for a place to be 
healed’ (24 February, 1992). When the prison first opened the Nekaneet Elders 
were a very visible part of everyday life. They led the Spiritual Circles, conducted 
sweats and were available to counsel the women. From the beginning, Elders from 
outside the area were also brought in on a rotational basis, so the teachings were not
51 21st January, 1997
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always those of the Nekaneet. As a visiting Elder commented: You have the system 
to work with, people who come from different levels o f understanding. So the 
system said we will hire some Elders ... w e’ll have a holistic approach and that 
means other nations coming here as teachers. But, to me, anybody who knows 
about the culture should never forget where they are and should have respect. I t ’s 
like me coming into your house and trying to take over your house, disregarding 
your own background.
From the Nekaneet perspective the situation was less than satisfactory, irrespective 
of how respectful visiting Elders might have been. Their assumption had been that 
as providers of the land they would have the main responsibility for the spiritual 
and cultural teaching of the women, as articulated here by a member of the Band: I  
guess I  automatically assumed that we would be directly involved, because it was 
on Nekaneet land. That’s where the difference o f  opinion occurred with 
Corrections ... i t ’s the Aboriginal people who worked in Corrections who wanted to 
spell out that this was a national facility, therefore the Aboriginal programme 
should be national in scope, whereas my thinking is that this is a Healing Lodge 
and i t ’s located on Nekaneet [land] so therefore you should use traditional protocol 
and utilise Nekaneet’s Aboriginal teachings first and foremost. ...W e’ve kind o f  
been shunted aside.52 The consequence has been that the Nekaneet Elders now 
play a very reduced role at the Lodge and two Aboriginal women skilled at 
‘facilitating’ have been hired to do some of the work usually undertaken by 
Elders.54 How Aboriginal a concept ‘facilitating’ might be is debateable, but the 
underlying point is that Elders are not created by decree of an outside authority. 
Their wisdom is recognised by those around them, by their Bands, by their Nations. 
They are the keepers of the history, the link with the land and, thus, with the 
Creator. It is not the job of CSC to define who might fill that role, as is made 
explicit in CD 702 (1995-09-06), which defines an Elder as ‘a person recognised by 
an external Aboriginal community as having knowledge and understanding of the 
traditional culture of the community ... Elders may be identified as such by 
Aboriginal communities only (emphasis added). While this is a worrying instance, 
from an Aboriginal perspective, of CSC exercising control in an area over which it
52 Interview 14
53 Interview 15
54 Personal notes 1998
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should have no authority, the underlying question is whether it is unsurprising from 
a penological perspective. The answer to this must be that it is not. If we think in 
Harding et al’s terms (1985) that prisons are ‘reactive’, both to public demands and 
to their own internal needs, then we can see that CSC might find it convenient to 
retain control over who works within its institutions. More widely, there are the 
lessons of history which consistently demonstrate that the instinct of correctional 
authorities is to incorporate, rather than work alongside their organisations (see 
Rothman, 1971, 1980; Cohen, 1983, 1985).
Passing the Vision to the staff
When the Lodge was first planned it was expected that 26.5 staff positions would 
be necessary to run a prison accommodating thirty women. None of the other 
institutions managed with the staff numbers originally allocated to them, so it was 
unsurprising that the Healing Lodge might similarly have miscalculated.
(However, it could also be said that increased staff numbers reflected more of an 
emphasis upon security than had been anticipated). The increased staffing certainly 
did not disprove the efficacy of the ‘dynamic security’ model because, in the 
absence of the maximum security women, it was never fully tested.
During the first months of opening immense care and effort went into settling the 
women into the new prison. Staff were highly visible and accessible, joining the 
Spiritual Circle, eating with the women at meal times and being available to talk. 
There was, as I have noted, a disparity between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
staff, with the more senior positions being filled by the non-Aboriginals.
Moreover, a non-Aboriginal male held the position of Assistant Kikawinaw 
(although how a male could be an Assistant ‘Mother’ was never satisfactorily 
explained) and he was generally assumed by other staff to be CSC’s particular 
‘representative’ at the prison, despite the fact that all staff were CSC employees. 
(His appointment was also replicated at Edmonton when it reopened.) By late 1998 
the changed environment was visible immediately to anyone who entered the 
Healing Lodge (as noted by Monture-Angus, 2000). Staff screened visitors to the 
Lodge with a hand-held scanner, as well as women returning from outside visits or 
work. In most prisons such a security function is the norm, and thus unremarkable, 
but during its first years of opening the Healing Lodge had managed to incorporate 
more fully than the other new prisons the concept of ‘dynamic security’, and such
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searches did not occur. The change emphasised the official relationship of the 
women and the staff, and also its inequality, a fact which had been somewhat 
masked by the apparent equality of all during the morning Spiritual Circles. Staff 
were finding that they could not easily surmount, or cope with, their ‘status 
differential’ (Faith 1993: 163) and retreated. By 1998 staff numbers had increased 
and there were 50 staff employed for a maximum number of thirty women. Staff 
were conspicuous by their absence, generally to be found in their offices, with 
doors shut; the demands of bureaucracy appeared to have overwhelmed them. The 
majority no longer sat with the women at mealtimes and there were few signs of the 
casual chat which had previously been so visible (see also Hannah-Moffat and 
Shaw, 2001: 35). There was also evidence of the changing relationships between 
staff and their managers, with distinct groups having been formed amongst them, 
and an underlying unhappiness with what staff perceived to be the changing style 
of the Healing Lodge. It was not uncommon to be told -  by both women and staff 
-  that the Healing Lodge was turning into a conventional prison, wherein staff 
could not focus adequately on the needs of the women, and the women had less 
time to concentrate on that which made the Healing Lodge unique; its Aboriginal 
dimension.
There was another reason for the change. Thirty-eight people underwent the 
original training and a number subsequently left. Their replacements were not 
exposed to the intense training of that first group, and came to the Healing Lodge 
with more traditional correctional approaches, altering the balance between the 
women and the staff. In 1998 the top tier of management remained largely 
untouched and still, with the exception of the Kikawinaw, non-Aboriginal. While it 
was never expected that the staffing of the Lodge would quickly reach a full 
complement of Aboriginal staff -  there were too few in the system at large, and 
certainly too few with the requisite qualifications available locally -  there was a 
barrier to promotion, because CSC was reluctant to change the rules so that capable 
local staff could be promoted.
Aboriginal culture and spirituality within a prison
There are always risks involved in new ventures, but the particular risk in the 
opening of the Healing Lodge lay in the use of Aboriginal culture and spirituality 
within a penal setting. As Faith (1995: 80) noted: ‘Spirituality, the central force of
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traditional healing, is the antithesis of a prison regime’. While Faith was referring 
to the voluntary nature of spiritual beliefs, it is important to understand that the 
Aboriginals were also offering, if not strictly imposing, a spiritual standpoint in 
much the same way that early prison reformers offered the principles of 
Christianity as a moral exemplar (see Ignatieff, 1978; Rafter, 1985; Hannah-Moffat, 
2001). However, the crucial difference in the Canadian case was that spirituality 
could not be divorced from culture and, together, they contributed to an essentially 
Aboriginal perspective being offered within a prison setting. For the Aboriginal 
planners this combination was essential to the environment they were working to 
create. Many of the women who first arrived at the prison made the choice because 
they wanted to be in an Aboriginal environment while serving their sentences, but a 
woman’s decision to go to the Healing Lodge did not necessarily mean that she felt 
a specific need to explore her own culture; rather, that she wished to be away from 
the ‘dominant culture’ of Euro-Canada, and to be surrounded by other Aboriginals. 
As I have already suggested, this left the women answerable to two sets of rules; 
the official correctional ones and implicit Aboriginal ones. In choosing to go to a 
prison where there would be a number of Aboriginal staff and a partially- 
Aboriginal daily routine, women were also agreeing to participate in the spiritual 
and cultural life of the prison. While for many this was a welcome choice, it is not 
the point I wish to make here, which is that the issue of choice for other federally 
sentenced women was never predicated on their agreeing to participate in a 
particular spiritual worldview. For Aboriginal women their choice was between a 
total package of environment and spirituality and culture, or a prison with few 
Aboriginals.
There are three issues which are of particular importance here. The first relates to 
the aspect of compulsion and whether this is compatible with participation in what 
are spiritual ceremonies. This element was clearly evident by 1998, when 
attendance at the morning ceremonies had become compulsory (see also Monture- 
Angus, 2000). Some of the women resented this coercion of spirituality because it 
debased something fundamental to their lives. Other women, who were perhaps 
discovering this aspect of Aboriginal culture for the first time, similarly resented 
the coercion, because it took away any element of choice.
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The second relates to staff and their relationship with the women while 
participating in spiritual ceremonies. This is most visible in the Cedar Tipi, where 
staff are expected to join the women for the morning ceremonies (although few 
actually did by the time of my second visit, and even fewer by my third). The 
Circle then formed is meant to be a place of safety and confidentiality, where 
women can speak and not be judged. While women are likely to reserve certain 
matters for private discussions with Elders, the Circle in its intimacy invites 
relaxation of a woman’s guard. Should a woman inadvertently reveal something 
during the Circle which might be thought relevant to her correctional record, staff 
are then brought face-to-face with the reality of their own positions; they are 
correctional officers and should record the information. The women privately 
expressed concerns about the changed nature of the Circle and said that they were 
extremely careful about how they joined in.55 The ultimate concern was that 
information unintentionally disclosed during the spiritual circle might end up on a 
woman’s official record and harm her future release prospects. This incorporation 
of Aboriginal spirituality for correctional purposes compromised the sanctity of the 
Circle. In such circumstances the Cedar Tipi could never assert its authority over 
the prison because it had become part of it. Kendall (1993: 84) suggests that those 
working in prisons should ‘truthfully inform’ prisoners of ‘the realities associated 
with confidentiality and other related factors’, but at the Healing Lodge these issues 
were blurred by the Aboriginal dimension. Aboriginal members of staff were 
expected to participate in, and respect, religious ceremonies -  and, in effect, be 
equal to their Aboriginal prisoners -  yet were simultaneously compromising 
Aboriginal spirituality by the possibility of having to breach confidentiality. This 
meant that they were in the invidious position of potentially betraying both their 
Aboriginal ‘sisters’ and their Aboriginal culture. Their role as correctional officer 
was undoubtedly made harder by their ethnicity. Non-Aboriginal staff were not 
placed in such doubly difficult situations (although they still had to inform, when 
necessary), but contributed to the compromising of Aboriginal culture by attending 
ceremonies which they only superficially understood. The tensions in attempting to 
provide an Aboriginal environment within a coercive setting were irreconcilable. 
They were also unlike anything that staff at the other new prisons faced, although 
they, too, had to balance being a guard with that of quasi counsellor and role model.
55 Personal notes 1998
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This leads to the third issue, that the ‘success* of the prison will inevitably be 
judged by the ‘success’ of its prisoners once they return to the outside world. What 
is ‘success’? Is it the ability to stay out of prison completely? Or to stay out for 
twice as long as previously? Or to return with a lesser charge, because certain 
behaviour has been modified? Or will anything less than avoiding all conflict with 
the law be adjudged failure? If the judgement is failure, who or what will be 
blamed? Will it be the prison for failing to provide women with the tools of the 
‘dominant culture’, so necessary for survival in the outside world? Will it be the 
women themselves for having failed to take advantage of what the prison offered 
them? Will it be CSC for having established an ‘Aboriginal’ prison over which 
Aboriginals had no final authority? Might it conceivably be the actual culture and 
spirituality of the Aboriginals themselves which is found wanting; will they be 
blamed for failure? And what of the women themselves? Having been exposed to 
this ‘Aboriginal’ prison, how will they react to having ‘failed’ as Aboriginal 
women? Are we, in fact, seeing the birth of an additional form of prison discipline, 
whereby women are regulated through their ethnicity? And, if we are, who should 
be held accountable -  CSC, or those Aboriginal members of the Task Force who 
fought so hard for Aboriginal voices to be heard?
It is important that these questions are mentioned and considered because it leads 
back to the point I raised earlier; the extra responsibilities assumed by women who 
elected to transfer to the Healing Lodge. If we think of this in the context of 
Hannah-Moffat’s ‘responsible woman’, who is drawn into accepting responsibility 
for her own self-governance and, by extension, the good-order of the prison 
wherein she resides, we see that Aboriginal women are being asked to shoulder 
extra burdens. Comack (1996: 15) suggests that we should use the word 
‘prisoning’ ‘to get at the process of confinement and individuals’ experiences of 
that process’. The word seems apt here, in that the process to which Aboriginal 
women are exposed has extra layers, one of which has clear connections to cultural 
and spiritual responsibility.
Alongside these points we also need to consider the importance of the Healing 
Lodge to CSC’s overall strategy, in the sense that the whole initiative has been 
perceived internationally -  and some would say promoted -  as a blueprint for
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women’s imprisonment. It cannot be assumed that what is appropriate for women 
in one country will necessarily be appropriate for women in another. This is even 
more the case when it comes to dealing with cultural elements of a plan. Madame 
Justice Arbour considered the Healing Lodge in some detail in her report, 
suggesting that: ‘Qualitative program reforms of this kind [implementation of 
Creating Choices], if taken to their mature potential, could revolutionize 
correctional care for women prisoners ... Eventually, the success of program 
initiatives in women’s corrections ... may serve as a blueprint for initiatives 
adapted to male offenders’ (Arbour 1996: 218). This belief that programmes 
specific to a particular group of women are transferable -  and translatable -  needs 
to be treated with caution. It appears to be the reverse of what has traditionally 
happened to women prisoners, who have been offered what is appropriate for men, 
rather than themselves. When Aboriginal-influenced programmes are offered as 
part of a correctional package by a non-Aboriginal authority the question of 
ownership becomes murky and there is considerable risk of cultural expropriation.
It would be wrong, however, to assume that the Healing Lodge had nothing to teach 
the other Canadian prisons or, indeed, other countries. The very fact that the Lodge 
remained so free of trouble during its opening years suggests that much could be 
learned from it. One aspect stands out: to begin with, women at the Healing Lodge 
were not charged and mediation was used as a solution to problems. Charging was 
known to have an adverse effect on parole applications and this was the Healing 
Lodge’s solution. As charging has an impact on all imprisoned women, mediation 
could be much more widely applied, with the proviso that it is understood to be a 
‘dominant culture’ interpretation of the original concept, rather than the 
incorporation of Aboriginal cultural practices. Other sanctions have been applied at 
the Healing Lodge. On New Year’s Eve, 1998 four women were found to be under 
the influence of prescription drugs and one assaulted another woman; all four were 
removed from the Lodge.
There have been also been allegations of sexual abuse at the Lodge, details of 
which I am unable to discuss, because of provisions of the Privacy Act 1985.56 
Following consultations with the female Elders, it has been decided that male
56 Personal notes 1998
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Elders may no longer be alone with any of the women. This offers protection to 
both the Elders and the women. Yet, whatever happened during the alleged 
incident, at the Healing Lodge, there is the historical dimension of physical and 
sexual abuse within residential schools, and its subsequent extension into 
Aboriginal communities, to be taken into account. Many of the women imprisoned 
at the Lodge have experienced sustained abuse during their non-prison lives (as 
have, it must be said, many other federally sentenced women). For Aboriginal 
women to be, or feel, exposed to further abuse while at the Healing Lodge lessens 
its authority as an Aboriginal-influenced institution. Yet prisons are places where 
acts of abuse and intimidation are common and it is this reality which collides with 
the visionary nature of what is aspired to at the Healing Lodge: to be a place where 
Aboriginal women may safely begin the ‘healing’ journey back to their 
communities. However, even that aspiration needs to be closely dissected because 
prisons are not places of ‘healing’; they are places of involuntary confinement, 
where punishment is administered through the deprivation of liberty and autonomy. 
Perhaps the very name ‘Healing Lodge’ adds to the complexity of that expectation, 
with the gentleness of the wording implying support and comfort. Had the Lodge 
been named the Okimaw Ohci (Thunder Hills) Prison, would expectations have 
been lessened? I explore the contradiction of prisons punishing in order to heal in 
the final chapter.
Looking ahead and conclusions
I have raised questions which need to be considered, alongside the wish of the 
Nekaneet Band to assume responsibility for the Healing Lodge under Section 81(1) 
of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. The isolation of the Healing 
Lodge means that women serving very long sentences, of whom there are a 
disproportionate number at the Healing Lodge, will face considerable difficulties 
living in such a small community once they have exhausted programme 
possibilities. Will the Lodge have provided them with sufficient inner resources 
should they then choose to move to one of the other prisons? We also need to 
dissect the question I posed at the end of chapter six: did the continuing influence 
of the Aboriginals during the planning of the Healing Lodge enable a truly radical 
model of imprisonment to emerge?
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But perhaps the larger question is whether Aboriginal women are being asked to 
show a degree of involvement in their own imprisonment unparalleled elsewhere, 
precisely because they are answerable to two disparate cultures: a correctional 
culture and an Aboriginal culture. Are they being regulated through their ethnicity? 
This obliges us to turn full circle, to the Task Force, in which Aboriginal women 
through sheer strength of character and argument, forced the Healing Lodge on to 
the correctional agenda. It should make us question the consequence of their 
pivotal role and ask whether they were right to overcome scruples about’ 
imprisoning their sisters’ and become partners in the planning of a new prison? 
Might there not be personal consequences for them, too, should the original dream 
of a place where Aboriginal women could truly ‘heal’ turn out to be just another 
prison? Or, in the light of Aboriginal history, an adult residential school? These 
questions will be addressed in the concluding chapter.
313
9. The lessons learned?
It is now almost twelve years since Creating Choices, the Report of the Task Force 
on Federally Sentenced Women, was accepted by Commissioner Ingstrup and just 
over six years since the first of the new prisons opened. On the 6th July, 2000 the 
Prison for Women finally shut and the Task Force achieved what had been denied to 
so many other reformers. These three events encapsulate all that I have focused on 
in this Canadian story of an attempt to reform conditions of imprisonment for 
federally sentenced women. Individually they are significant, because of what they 
represented for the reformers, those responsible for implementation and, most 
importantly, the imprisoned women themselves. Collectively, they provide lessons 
which are not necessarily new. The cottage re-emerged to reclaim its historic 
position as a place of rehabilitation for women, wherein they might be encouraged to 
exercise choice and assume responsibility for their own lives. Yet appropriate 
choices were still defined by staff. The cottage remained a place of discipline, albeit 
one where the disciplinary impulse and responsibility had been partially transferred 
to the women themselves, under the guise of ‘choice*. Guards, transformed into 
Primary Workers or Older Sisters, assumed the mantle of the early maternal 
reformers and were expected to instruct and socialise prisoners through example. 
Their new role only superficially belied the fact that their ultimate loyalty continued 
to reside with the correctional authorities.
Although the preceding chapters have focused on the first three prisons which 
opened, this is not to ignore the fact that there are two other prisons, in Kitchener 
and Joliette. Events at Edmonton and Nova delayed their opening until 1997, when 
CSC was finally able to claim that the implementation of Creating Choices had been 
achieved. As we know, this was not the case, because the maximum security 
women were by then barred from all of the new prisons and accommodated in 
annexes within men’s prisons. Further, Creating Choices’ projected community 
element was not funded by CSC, (and how this might have been realised should be 
the subject of separate research). With the ‘difficult to manage’1 maximum-security 
women removed from the central equation, the new prisons held a presumably less
1 In this chapter I use the term ‘difficult to manage’ collectively to cover both maximum-security 
women, and those with mental health needs.
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risky group, yet the minimum and medium security women -  with the exception of 
those held at the Healing Lodge -  were confined behind fences commensurate to the 
risk of maximum security women.2 Additionally, all federally sentenced women 
imprisoned in British Columbia remained in their technological panopticon at 
Burnaby. It appeared that the implementation of Creating Choices benefited only a 
proportion of federally sentenced women, those classified as medium security, 
whereas the Task Force had resolutely planned for them all.
Six years later the situation has not improved. The physical attractiveness of the 
new prisons cannot hide the reality that minimum security women continue to live 
with disproportionate security (Moffat, 1991; Hannah-Moffat and Shaw, 2000; 
Hannah-Moffat, 2001). The maximum-security women, having been characterised 
by the Deputy Commissioner for Women as being ‘without the capacity for 
change’, appear (as we shall see) to have been abandoned, supporting the 
proposition that ‘reforms only reach a minority of prisoners’ (Gamberg & Thomson 
1984: 136). This was far from the intentions of the Task Force and we must ask if 
its members should have anticipated such an outcome.
To begin answering that we need to remember those intense months during which 
the Task Force -  and, specifically, the Working Group -  edged towards the 
completion of Creating Choices. As has earlier been made clear, the Working 
Group: did not necessarily have a comprehensive knowledge of the consequences of 
attempted penal reform in other jurisdictions; had insufficient time to read 
thoroughly all the background material provided for them, including both Shaw’s 
(1991a) and Axon’s (1989) overviews of international trends and practice; wanted a 
Canadian solution to the problems posed by the Prison for Women. Additionally, 
the Working Group members’ diverse backgrounds and competing perspectives 
could only be reconciled by adopting consensus as an operating tool. Consensus led 
to the Working Group’s construct of the homogeneous, passive, victimised ‘woman’ 
and to the Group’s final failure -  or refusal -  to plan definitively for the few 
‘difficult to manage’ women whom they reluctantly identified, as was related in
2 It should be acknowledged that medium-security federally sentenced men do not have the degree 
o f physical freedom provided for similarly classified federally sentenced women.
3 Edmonton Journal 9th September, 1998
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chapter 5. The unusual aspect was that the civil servants, whose anticipated function 
was to influence and steer the tri-partite Working Group, were part of that consensus 
as well. With few exceptions, they also came to accept the characterisation of 
‘federally sentenced woman as victim’, rooted as it was in the history of Aboriginal 
federally sentenced women. While the original impetus towards this could 
accurately be described as politically driven, in that the Aboriginal members of the 
Task Force were using the Task Force to focus upon the historic reasons for 
Aboriginal offending, the Task Force’s eventual perspective was not one of simply 
excusing deviant behaviour. Rather, as I have previously explored, they wanted to 
situate the offending of all -  not just Aboriginal -  federally sentenced women in its 
socio-economic context and to show that women transcended the stereotype of the 
‘bad’ or ‘mad’ offender. Aboriginal history could not be divorced from this process. 
The initial means of assembling the Task Force was a shared conscience regarding 
the safety of women within the Prison for Women. An unanticipated shared 
conscience regarding the treatment of Canada’s Aboriginals became the reason for 
finally seeing federally sentenced women as ‘victims’ in their own right. This did 
not mean that the Task Force failed to accept that federally sentenced women had 
themselves created victims. Neither did it mean that federally sentenced women 
should be unregulated by the discipline of the prison. It meant that the solution they 
sought had to recognise the Canadian dimension of their enterprise, which involved 
acknowledging their colonial history.
It was this understanding, rather than the broader historical narrative of penal 
reform, which captured them all and enabled, for many, the discounting of the 
possibility that their carefully devised plan might later be captured by a less 
sympathetic implementation team. They were absorbed by what was appropriate for 
the Canadian federally sentenced women they had come to assume they knew, and 
the women’s eventual shared identity incorporated the socio-economic dysfunction 
common to many Aboriginal women prisoners. In that context the lessons of penal 
reform from elsewhere seemed remote and irrelevant. Why, for example, should the 
redevelopment of the infinitely larger Holloway have been seen as an exemplar, 
when it was planned exclusively by civil servants -  as an eventual secure hospital -  
for a much smaller catchment area? They felt they were breaking new ground and,
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however naive that might appear at this remove, there was a rationality attached to 
it, because of the cultural element and the logic of geographic dislocation.
However, it is what brought two of these three disparate groups -  CAEFS and 
NWAC -  to the Task Force which provides perhaps the clearest answer to whether 
they should have anticipated the derailment of their project. Those organisations 
had suspended their instinctive distrust of ‘the prison’ because of the stark fact that 
the Prison for Women was a life-threatening institution (as are most prisons). They 
were troubled by the responsibilities they shouldered and the possibility that their 
work might lead to further ‘oppression’4 of federally sentenced women. Yet neither 
group could fully allow themselves to contemplate the eventual failure of the Task 
Force, because that would almost certainly mean that more women would die, 
should they remain in Kingston. Simply continuing to call for the Prison for 
Women’s closure was no longer an option for CAEFS and NWAC. (The civil 
servants, on the other hand, needed no such rationalisation as the Task Force was an 
extension of their professional lives; they had to provide a realisable plan for the 
Commissioner.) In the final December, 1989 Steering Committee meeting, during 
which the almost completed report was discussed, an Aboriginal member queried 
Creating Choices' failure to discuss the fact that there were ‘two schools of thought’ 
on the Task Force (the abolitionists and the reformers), and suggested that the 
omission might leave readers puzzled by the seeming lack of consensus on some 
matters. While the Task Force was united by a shared conscience regarding the 
safety of those in the Prison for Women, addressing what divided them -  those ‘two 
schools of thought’ -  offered the very real prospect of the Task Force collapsing 
around them. Put simply, an acknowledgment by CAEFS and NWAC of possible 
failure of the Task Force would have removed any justification for their 
participation.
So the important underlying question is whether the voluntary sector members were 
right to set aside their individual reservations about the enterprise and actively join 
with the civil servants in the planning of new prisons. On the simple grounds of 
humanity, they were; they could not, having finally been offered the chance to effect
4 Working Group Minutes 13th -  14th April, 1989
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change, stand on principle and watch more women die within the Prison for Women. 
Yet to participate -  for the best of reasons -  was also to accept responsibility for the 
possible consequences, and the closure of one dangerous prison did not mean that 
their solution would necessarily be a safer one. In accepting the challenge and the 
risk the Task Force firmly allied itself with the long tradition of benevolent 
reformers. While both Rothman (1980) and Cohen (1985) suggest we should 
distrust the outcome of penal reformers’ good intentions, this is not to say that 
benevolence itself should universally be distrusted. Without benevolence and 
identification with those oppressed by the state, or conglomerates, or individuals, we 
would remain in stasis. In the sphere of criminal justice we would not have seen the 
influence and achievements of the victims’ movement; we would not have seen 
changing attitudes towards domestic violence, or abuse of children, with 
concomitant changes in legislation. However, Rothman and Cohen are right to warn 
us of the unintended consequences of benevolence within the specific sphere of 
prison reform, and to alert us to the historic parallels which demonstrate that the 
correctional enterprise has an astonishing power to subvert and reinterpret ‘good 
intentions’. Bureaucratic institutions resist attempts to change them from the 
outside. Moreover, civil servants have little incentive to work towards successful 
change, irrespective of the public rhetoric, because of the consequent diminution of 
their power and authority. It is the incorporation and distortion of benevolence 
within a larger correctional agenda which we should guard against.
But in this Canadian story it is not simply the bureaucrats who bear the final 
responsibility for what has unfolded, despite being responsible for implementation. 
The Task Force itself presented a report which unfailingly glossed over the difficult 
issues. The language of Creating Choices distorted the reality that it was a 
document about imprisonment: that it was concerned with the building of new 
prisons, rather than places where women would simply ‘heal’; that it was concerned 
with offending women, rather than women with multiple problems. When the 
language of victimisation prevailed it became almost inevitable that the Task Force 
would not -  and could not -  plan specifically for the ‘difficult to manage’ women, in 
part because the image of the homogeneous federally sentenced ‘woman’ had 
already been constructed. In transforming federally sentenced women into an 
idealised ‘woman’ the Task Force determined the nature of the rest of their planning,
318
and that ‘woman’ became the touchstone for all that ensued. The cottages, so often 
devoid of staff, reflected her low risk, as did the absence of fences and the small 
enhanced units. The range of accommodation was inevitably limited by the 
‘woman’s’ apparent lack of diversity. The new staff, responding to her low risk (but 
high needs) profile, had a brief more akin to that of social workers than actual 
guards -  and were then bewildered by her unanticipated reality. Having stripped 
this ‘woman’ of her diversity, the Task Force ensured that she could not then re- 
emerge as a possibly violent or disturbed woman, because that would have shaken 
the foundations of the Task Force’s original conception. In denying the multiplicity 
of women, the Task Force -  inadvertently -  helped set them up for failure once they 
transferred to the new prisons. These diverse women could not collectively respond 
in the calculated, rational matter so essential to the realisation of the plan, and the 
more they responded (inappropriately, as it seemed) to the new regime, the more 
they appeared to be in need of restraint. The question became not one of whether 
extra restraint was necessary, but why. The demands and physical inadequacies of 
the new Edmonton prison overwhelmed a proportion of the women but, in 
interpreting this outcome, the public assumption appeared to be that it was the 
women’s failure, rather than that of the prisons themselves.
Nevertheless, the civil servants and the correctional hierarchy bore a particularly 
heavy and final responsibility for what transpired, because they allowed Edmonton 
to open before it was physically complete and then transferred a disproportionate 
number of maximum security women to its inadequate Enhanced Unit. These 
decisions had a profound effect on all the other prisons. The bureaucrats were also 
responsible for the training which failed to prevent staff at Nova, post-Arbour, from 
treating a woman with flagrant lack of care (see CSC, 1997a). The spirit of the Task 
Force was unable to survive either the pressures of planning, or the pressures of 
politicians, once the prisons opened, despite the fact that some of the Task Force’s 
civil service members were involved in much of the implementation. We might 
return to Rothman to summarise the outcome: ‘Progressive innovations may well 
have done less to upgrade dismal conditions than they did to create nightmares of 
their own’. As we shall see, one of the outcomes of this particular venture has 
indeed turned out to be nightmarish.
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The consequences of involvement in the Task Force have been various for the four 
distinct groups represented. The civil servants have seen their working estate 
increase and achieve a higher profile. The non-Aboriginal voluntary sector is 
inextricably linked to a plan it helped devise, but played no part in implementing, 
and can now only criticise from the sidelines. The Aboriginals have an allegedly 
Aboriginal prison which denies entry to a significant number of Aboriginal women, 
who are now even more isolated from the rest of the federally sentenced women’s 
population by virtue of their security classification. A good proportion of federally 
sentenced women continue to live in conditions of security disproportionate to their 
actual risk, as they did in the Prison for Women. Furthermore, they appear to have 
been blamed by CSC for many of the problems which emerged at the new prisons, 
despite the fact that CSC itself bore a considerable responsibility (and acknowledged 
this in an internal presentation called ‘The Lessons Learned’ in June, 1996). These 
strands come together in the two issues I now explore: the consequence of the Task 
Force’s (or more specifically, the Working Group’s) failure to plan for the ‘difficult 
to manage’ women; the question of whether the Aboriginals have actually turned out 
to be the ‘great winners’ of the whole enterprise, as chapter 5 suggested might be the 
case.
Finally providing for the ‘difficult to manage’ women
Chapter 6 explored the development of the Enhanced Units and the fact that they 
were not planned by the Task Force. It also showed how the Task Force’s tentative 
identification of five percent of women possibly needing extra support and 
supervision was increased to a figure of ten percent by CSC within the space of a 
year. Most of the new Enhanced Units were consequently doubled in size. While 
the Task Force’s unwillingness to quantify the problem can be understood, both in 
the light of its reluctance to ‘label’ and in CSC’s subsequent unblushing adjustment 
of the numbers (again, see chapter 6), it cannot be said too forcefully that the Task 
Force’s refusal to address this significant group opened the door for CSC 
subsequently to impose its own interpretation of, and solution to, the problem. 
Twelve years later, we can assess more fully the importance and consequence of the 
Task Force’s failure.
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As the new prisons began to receive the first groups of women, and events, 
particularly at Edmonton, impinged on the national consciousness, it seemed that 
significantly higher numbers of women did not ‘fit’ the new ‘theories’ of 
imprisonment, as Deputy Commissioner for Women Nancy Stableforth suggested at 
the fatality inquiry into the death of Denise Fayant. Neither did it seem that the 
prisons were adequately designed to cope with these women. We know, however, 
that the Creating Choices model was never fully tried at Edmonton and that the 
prison’s unfinished state played a major part in contributing to the unravelling of its 
supposed dynamic security. Pressure to close the Prison for Women, and the 
demographic fact that large numbers of Aboriginal women lived in the Prairies, and 
were classified as maximum security (and ineligible for the Healing Lodge), led to a 
disproportionate number of maximum security women being sent to Edmonton 
within a very brief period. Once the incidents began, it appeared to the public that 
more federally sentenced women were ‘high risk’ than had earlier been thought.
CSC was under increasing political pressure, which culminated in the removal of 
most of the women from Edmonton to separate secure units in male prisons. CSC 
then had to decide whether or not the most problematic women should ever return to 
the new prisons.
In September, 1999 CSC announced its Intensive Intervention Strategy for the 
‘difficult to manage’ women, which was for the creation of secure units and 
Structured Living Environment (SLE) houses at Nova, Edmonton, Joliette and 
Grand Valley. The Healing Lodge was exempt from the plan. The existing 
Enhanced Units were to be upgraded and become totally separate secure units within 
the perimeter fences of the prisons. Maximum security women would be kept apart 
from other federally sentenced women, but have ‘the opportunity and flexibility for 
integration into the less secure part of the prison’ by virtue of being accommodated 
in the prison (CSC, 1999). Minimum or medium security women, with mental 
health and / or special needs, were to be assigned to the SLEs and have 24-hour staff 
supervision and support. It was estimated that ‘approximately 30 women’ would be 
in the secure units and ‘approximately 35 women’ (within the then federally 
sentenced women population) would be in the SLE’s. A woman may refuse to enter 
a SLE, but faces the possibility that she could be confined in maximum security if 
she fails to cope with life in one of the unstructured houses.
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Enhanced Units have two functions. They accommodate maximum security women 
and those who are in administrative segregation (from any security categorisation). 
(All life-sentenced prisoners now have to spend two years under maximum security 
conditions.) Cells classified as being for purposes of segregation are not counted as 
part of the official capacity of each prison, as it is assumed that they will be 
occupied intermittently by women who will shortly return to the general population. 
However, we know that at Edmonton the existing Enhanced Unit was capable of 
holding 24 women because of the possibility of double-bunking (see chapter 6; CSC 
Board o f  Investigation Report 1996b), yet it officially only added six beds to the 
rated capacity of the prison.5 The new secure units contain single cells, but might 
again be used for double bunking in exceptional circumstances if a Warden obtained 
permission from her Regional Deputy Commissioner.
It has been difficult to obtain totally accurate figures for what the ‘regular’ capacity 
of the prisons themselves was first intended to be. CSC’s publications give slightly 
differing figures, but they are not significantly at odds with each other. For the 
purposes of this chapter I will work with the figures published in 1995 (see CSC, 
1995b). The Enhanced Units are not included in any of the official capacity figures. 
Using the 1995 figures for regular beds, and adding the Enhanced Unit beds, we can 
see the following:
Table 4. Bed Provision When New Prisons First Opened
regular beds Enhanced 
Unit beds
total
Nova 28 3 31
Edmonton 56 6 62
G rand Valley 70 8 78
Joliette 76 8 84
Healing Lodge 30 - 30
260 (91%) 25 (9%) 285
These figures show that CSC originally provided space in the Enhanced Units for 
slightly fewer than the projected 10 percent of women labelled ‘difficult to manage’
5 Double-bunking has to be approved by the Commissioner o f Corrections, under CD 550.
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in their 1992 Operational Plan. By adding the 17 segregation cells to these figures, 
the capacity is increased by a further 6 percent, making a total of 15 percent of all 
beds available for those women. (I do this knowing that segregation cells are not 
part of a prison’s official capacity, but that they were used as such at Edmonton).
At the same time it was planning to expand the secure and SLE provision at each of 
the prisons, CSC also decided to add further regular houses at Nova, Edmonton and 
Grand Valley, increasing regular bed capacity by 54 places. (A further ten beds will 
be built at Edmonton when funding permits, but are not included in the following 
calculations.)
If we now include the latest figures we have the following:
Table 5. Anticipated Bed Provision Upon Completion of Re-Building
regular beds
(old) (new)
Secure Unit 
beds
SLEs total
Nova (28 + 28) 56 10 8 74
Edmonton (56+ 10) 66 15 8 89
Grand Valley (70+ 16) 86 15 8 109
Joliette 76 10 8 94
Healing Lodge 30 - - 30
314 50 (13%) 32 (8%) 396
This last set of figures shows that provision has been made for 21 percent of total 
bed capacity to be available for women thought to be in need of the Intensive 
Intervention Strategy, with secure unit beds increased from 1999’s projected figure 
of 30 to an actual figure of 50. If we then add the segregation cells to these figures -  
whose numbers have been slightly reduced to 15 -  a further 4 percent of beds 
become available, bringing the total number of beds available for intensive 
supervision to 25 percent. Even if we ignore the segregation cells, as is official CSC 
policy, when these new units are completed the bed capacity for federally sentenced 
women will be increased by 39 percent compared with when the prisons first 
opened. Based on past precedent, we cannot be confident that segregation cells will 
never be used to accommodate women on a more permanent basis should inmate 
figures increase even more rapidly than anticipated. These calculations should also 
be seen in the context of the increasing numbers of women sentenced to federal
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terms of imprisonment since the new prisons opened, and for whom CSC has had to 
provide -  a 55 percent increase since Creating Choices was published.
It must not be forgotten that, although the Healing Lodge appears to have been 
largely unaffected by these changes, this is not the case. With more women being 
sentenced to federal terms, and with 21% of all federally sentenced women being 
Aboriginal, we can deduce that approximately 80 women should theoretically be 
eligible for the Healing Lodge, even though we know that there have always been 
restrictions on who would be admitted. Aboriginal women are disproportionately 
likely to be classified as maximum security, or to be assessed as in need of help with 
mental health problems. The outcome of these changes in bed provision will have 
an excessive impact on Aboriginal women and leave them further isolated from the 
general inmate population.
The most alarming and contradictory aspect of this strategy is that at least 21% of 
federally sentenced women will be subjected to increased levels of intervention and 
supervision within prisons which were meant to offer them choices and autonomy. 
The possibility of empowering women, under these circumstances, to take 
responsibility for their own lives (as well as accept responsibility for the dynamic 
security of the prison itself) appears remote. Yet, CSC would counter this by saying 
that if, as an organisation, they were unconcerned by the needs of these women, they 
would not have commissioned extensive research into their needs. Neither would 
they have incurred the vast expenditure necessitated by the implementation of the 
Strategy. Indeed, that if the perceived failure of implementation had been solely the 
fault of the women -  a point which I have earlier raised -  then a more traditional 
correctional approach could have been adopted. It is right that we should remember 
that plans may be introduced by correctional authorities because they, too, are 
concerned about the needs of the women.
However, the Intensive Intervention Strategy has not been CSC’s last word on the 
subject of ‘difficult to manage’ women. A Management Protocol for maximum 
security women involved in major incidents is currently being considered. This 
consists of three stages, which are much abbreviated in the following summary:
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• Stage One The woman concerned will be subject to an ‘emergency involuntary 
inter-regional transfer’ from her current prison to a segregation unit, within a 
Secure Unit, in another prison. She may have no contact with other prisoners 
and is to be ‘in restraints’ when outside her cell, with these being fitted through 
the food slot. Her door may only be opened by two officers and, depending 
upon her assumed risk, one officer may be carrying OC (oleoresin capsicum, i.e. 
pepper) spray. If she has to leave the Unit, for whatever reason, she must be 
handcuffed and in leg irons and in the company of three staff;
• Stage Two The woman will continue to reside in the segregation unit and will 
gradually be permitted access to programmes available within the Secure Unit. 
She will have some contact with other prisoners in segregation but, should she 
have to leave the Unit, will also be in restraints and in the company of two staff.
• Stage Three The woman will gradually be reintegrated into the Unit, but her 
access to activities outside the Unit will be dependent upon her assumed risk.
The latest draft of the Protocol suggests that, although ‘the time frame is not fixed, 
an inmate will probably need a minimum of 6 months to successfully complete the 
steps of the Protocol to ensure she no longer jeopardizes the safety and security of 
the institution’ (CSC, 2002). No decisions regarding placing a woman on the 
Protocol may be taken without the consent of the Deputy Commissioner for 
Women, and all policy and legal requirements must be respected. If the woman’s 
behaviour deteriorates to the extent that administrative segregation is justified, she 
can be returned to Stepl.
If this Protocol were to be implemented it would be a complete denial of all that 
Creating Choices hoped to achieve for federally sentenced women. Moreover, it 
would appear to be in contradiction of the clear intention of Section 31 of the CCRA 
1992 that prisoners should not normally be kept in segregation for more than 30 
days at a time (although this may be increased to 45 days, if multiple convictions are 
involved) (see Arbour 1996: 185). It also contravenes the existing Commissioner’s 
Directive (CD) 590 regarding the length of time prisoners may be kept segregated, 
because women placed on the Management Protocol may be returned to Stage 1
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whenever their behaviour seems to require it. In practical terms, this means that a 
women might, theoretically, be liable to unlimited periods of segregation. Arbour 
was particularly concerned about CSC’s ‘frequent violation of the rules and 
regulations governing detention in segregation’ and quoted the Correctional 
Investigator’s concern that past practices might re-emerge in the new prisons 
(Arbour 1996: 187,191).
If the Management Protocol should be introduced, CSC will have exceeded 
Arbour’s worst imaginings. She documented the long-term damage segregation 
caused to prisoners’ mental health and this was reinforced by Martell, who 
suggested that ‘confinement in such conditions produces severe effects often 
detrimental to their [women’s] attempts at rehabilitation or, as the more recent 
correctional discourse intends it, at healing’ (Martell 1999: 105, original emphasis). 
The degree of staff surveillance and supervision necessary for the monitoring of any 
woman subject to the Protocol, combined with the isolation from her peers, would 
be an extraordinary about turn. In practice, it would be producing segregation 
conditions worse than ever prevailed at the Prison for Women. It might be 
countered by CSC that they are presently faced with a very small group of women 
who disproportionately, and chaotically, disrupt the regimes of the existing 
Enhanced Units. But to provide specifically for them offers a vista of providing, 
even more rigorously, for a sub-group within that small group. Where does 
maximum-security end?
Should CSC again resort to ‘emergency involuntary inter-regional transfers]’ this 
would take federally sentenced women back to the situation so painfully highlighted 
during the life of the Task Force, when Sandy Sayer, an involuntarily transferred 
provincial prisoner, committed suicide. One of the main reasons for the closure of 
the Prison for Women -  as highlighted in the Motion sent to Ole Ingstrup following 
the death of Ms Sayer, and the Emergency Recommendations issued at the same 
time as Creating Choices -  was that women should be held in their own provinces. 
Mr. Ingstrup conceded that issue when he immediately arranged for inter-provincial 
transfers to cease on the day that Creating Choices was first published. The return 
of such a correctional option would be a devastating blow to the credibility of 
Creating Choices.
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Expropriating culture
While this story is about the consequences of the reforms for all federally sentenced 
women, it is also very specifically about the consequences for the disproportionate 
number of Aboriginal federally sentenced women. The failure to recognise their 
needs, and thus to include them in the Task Force, was historically unsurprising. 
Aboriginals have been the backdrop to Euro-Canadian history since colonisation 
began; a group of Nations, displaced from their own lands, removed from their 
cultures and never seen as being at the forefront of their country’s history. NWAC 
understood this and insistently pushed for greater inclusion in the Task Force. The 
organisation finally succeeded in an unprecedented manner, politicising the 
deliberations, imbuing the final report with Aboriginal ‘language’ and perspectives, 
and eventually becoming influential partners in the planning of the Healing Lodge. 
So, were the Aboriginals the ‘great winners’ of the Task Force?
Prisons have always been sites of political action. They represent the power of the 
state to discipline and warehouse its citizens and embody the political spirit of each 
age, making resistance by some prisoners and reformers to that spirit inevitable 
(Kidman, 1947; Sullivan, 1990; Culhane, 1991; Adams, 1992). Prisons are also the 
focus of public approbation, again reflecting a prevailing political ethos. Yet while 
prisons are seen to be a means o f ‘warehousing’ the ‘dangerous’ citizen (Christie, 
1993), they do not resolve the point that most of these citizens will eventually return 
to the community from which they were ejected (Coyle, 1994). While resistance 
within the prison might take the form of disorder, in women’s prisons it most 
commonly centres on the self, being manifest in self-mutilation, at its most extreme, 
and in quiet strategies of survival adopted by individual women (see Bosworth, 
1999).
The Aboriginals saw a government-sponsored Task Force as a vehicle both for 
expressing their own resistance to Euro-Canadian authority, and furthering the 
interests of Aboriginal federally sentenced women. This meant, paradoxically, that 
they were using what was for them an illegitimate Euro-Canadian legal body (‘Our 
Peoples ... have never consented to the application of Euro-Canadian legal systems’ 
(TFFSW 1990: 17) to demonstrate their rejection of Euro-Canadian law. The
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outcome was that they then became responsible, to an extraordinary degree, for the 
planning of a new prison. Yet prisons were not central to Aboriginal justice, so they 
were again adopting Euro-Canadian constructs in order to achieve greater separation 
from the dominant culture and their own means of ‘healing’ Aboriginal women.
This was a careful and risky calculation. In becoming partners with CSC -  an 
organisation which had hitherto not shown itself to be trustworthy in its treatment of 
their peoples -  the Aboriginals risked the possibility of further incorporation, as both 
they and CAEFS had done when the Task Force was first undertaken. Additionally, 
the Aboriginal members of the Healing Lodge Planning Circle (HLPC) were having 
to be the ‘voice’ of imprisoned Aboriginal women, which presupposed an intimate 
familiarity with imprisonment itself, and placed them in a position similar to 
European and North American prison reformers. As we know, imprisonment was a 
part of the Aboriginals’ daily lives in that their families and communities had all 
been touched by it, and one member had been a federally sentenced woman herself. 
But this did not remove the fact that, despite their personal knowledge, they were 
planning for a captive population and could only be an approximation of the captive 
voice, in a manner similar to the non-Aboriginal members of the Task Force.
As the records of the HLPC show (see chapter 8), the Aboriginals resisted the 
planning methods of CSC and were frequently successful in overcoming them. But, 
having contributed to planning a prison which reflected Aboriginal principles -  they 
ended up with its day to day running left firmly in the hands of non-Aboriginals 
(with the exception of the Kikawinaw). Moreover, they were non-Aboriginals with 
little previous exposure to Aboriginal culture or spirituality, whose brief training 
could not hope to provide them with more than a superficial understanding. With 
hindsight, it seems that Aboriginal participation in the planning of the Healing 
Lodge might have facilitated CSC’s expropriation of a philosophy and way of life 
for its own purposes, even though the proportion of Aboriginals employed at the 
Lodge was markedly higher than at other federal prisons for women. As we also 
know, CSC ensured that Aboriginal participation would be restricted in the day-to- 
day running of the Lodge when it signed the Memorandum o f  Agreement with the 
Nekaneet, and the story unveiled so far has charted the steady decline of local 
Aboriginal influence within the prison (also see Monture-Angus, 2000). So 
ostensibly the Canadians built an Aboriginal prison but, in practice, the Aboriginals
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now have relatively little to do with the most important aspects of its management 
and have allowed Aboriginal women to be additionally regulated through their 
ethnicity and culture. This is not to say that Aboriginal beliefs are ignored or 
entirely absent from the new prison, but to make the point that Aboriginal influence 
is mediated through the authority of both CSC and its Euro-Canadian employees.
With this background knowledge we should be asking if a prison can ever be a 
Healing Lodge. Can women ‘heal’ within prison and should we assume that 
principles of discipline may coexist with cultural and spiritual values and contribute 
to a healing environment? It might be argued that to accept any belief system is to 
accept a form of discipline, yet the discipline is more about self, rather than 
imposed, control. We might extend this argument and accept that CSC’s new 
strategy of ‘responsibilising’ women prisoners also requires the exercise of self- 
control, yet this is simultaneously an externally imposed control made necessary by 
the ‘choices’ philosophy of the new prisons. Aboriginal women electing to be 
transferred to the Healing Lodge have to accept that the symbols of Aboriginal 
culture and spirituality -  such as the use of sweetgrass ceremonies, the Cedar Tipi 
and the sweatlodge -  will be components of their imprisonment. One group will 
accept the symbols at face value and find them a means of support as they attempt to 
evaluate their own lives. A second group will accept them as a ‘contemporary 
identity that is a reaction to oppression ... supported by age old traditions ... recast 
as answers to contemporary problems’ (Waldram 1997: 217). They will have 
decided to cloak themselves in the symbols of their Aboriginal identity and 
participate in ceremonies, while not necessarily accepting the beliefs that underpin 
them. A third group will accept ceremonies as the price they must pay to be with 
other Aboriginals, even though they would not choose to do so outside the prison.
Having made their individual decisions there is little doubt that some women derive 
a healing strength from these symbols and, as Waldram contends, ‘symbolic 
healing’ is more concerned with ... teaching people to cope with trauma and 
dysfunction’ than with achieving a ‘cure’ (Waldram 1997: 73). But, as Kendall 
(1993a) demonstrated regarding the Prison for Women, prisons are unsafe 
environments for women attempting to unravel the complexities of their lives. 
Prisons can be extraordinarily dangerous places because they isolate, rather than
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consistently support, prisoners undertaking a ‘healing’ journey. The presence of 
counsellors -  or Elders -  is no guarantee that the prisoner will be undamaged by the 
journey. The Healing Lodge offers more than conventional prisons, in that it is not 
hemmed in by walls, or built in the least attractive part of a city. There is a sense of 
space and potential freedom, as well as access to the Elders, but if the ‘healing’ is 
seen as being imposed, it can never be anything other than a form of discipline 
(Bruckert, 1985). The fact that the Elders are working alongside the correctional 
authorities must raise questions about their ultimate responsibility and loyalty 
because, in the same way that the Kimisinaw (guards) must breach the 
confidentiality of the healing circle, should certain information be revealed, the 
Elders face constraints of their own. They cannot work in a fully Aboriginal manner 
and must adopt dominant-culture styles of operating. Waldram (1997) cites 
instances of Elders working within male prisons being obliged to try and fit 
ceremonies and counselling into the correctional timetable, and the reluctance of 
management to accept that such events differ greatly from those common in, for 
example, the Christian tradition. This uneasy relationship with the correctional 
authorities compromises the Elders’ traditional role of priests / counsellors / healers, 
and brings them into conflict with their own Aboriginal traditions, forcing them to 
become more European in their strategies in order to avoid outright conflict (also see 
Ross, 1996).
The Elders’ quandary reflects the wider issue of prison reformers attempting to ‘do 
good’ while collaborating with corrections, but is made more specific when issues of 
race, culture and spirituality converge. In an Aboriginal context this means a denial 
of traditional justice based on mediation and the restoration of individuals to their 
communities, because individuals working with corrections have no choice but to 
collaborate if they are to be allowed to assist Aboriginals subject to Euro-Canadian 
law and punishment. All Aboriginals working within the correctional system have 
to compromise their Aboriginal identities because they cannot ignore the constraints 
under which they work. These compromises become apparent to prisoners, who 
soon realise that they are being offered an ‘Aboriginal-lite’ environment and that 
even this can be reduced by the demands of bureaucracy and security.
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There is a wider dilemma here which links this Aboriginal-inspired prison to the 
extended prison network. The debate about the extent to which Aboriginal culture 
and spirituality should be part of penal discourse reflects the older question of 
providing therapy within prisons. The wish to transform prisoners can be traced to 
the early reformers, such as Fry, who first saw that prisons might have a function 
other than a punitive one. It survives in the use of the word ‘corrections’, with the 
implication that prisoners may be ‘corrected’ or, by extension, ‘cured’ of their 
offending behaviour (see Duguid 2000:33). The model most explicit at the Lodge is 
one of healing and encapsulates, despite the fact that it is taking place within an 
Aboriginal prison, the dilemmas posed by the bifurcated tensions of the therapeutic 
model. This is centred on the dual roles expected to be played by staff, whose 
difficulties we have seen rehearsed at the other prisons, where they frequently found 
the competing demands irreconcilable. The Healing Lodge faces similar problems, 
which are exacerbated by the dimensions of culture and spirituality. Prisoners at the 
Healing Lodge must undergo the same programmes provided for other federally 
sentenced women, yet are doing so in the context of an environment which relies 
largely on other Aboriginal women to be frontline guards and role models. The 
Healing Lodge is in many respects another version of a therapeutic community, 
wherein the women and the staff are expected to be ‘mutually responsible’, while 
experiencing ‘intensive social interaction’ (Rotman 1995: 170). While a few 
prisons, such as Grendon in the United Kingdom, have partially overcome the 
problem of reconciling authority with treatment, ‘the externally imposed 
requirement that the treatment-oriented prison restrain and punish the inmates who 
are being treated also creates internal conditions that make transformation of the 
organisation into a true treatment centre extremely difficult’ (Cressey 1960: 505). 
Mutual responsibility is largely unattainable in any coercive environment and at the 
Healing Lodge the staff are responsible to CSC, rather than to the women. This 
means the subordination of culture and spirituality to the correctional enterprise and 
imposes separate strains on Aboriginal staff.
This leaves us with the uncomfortable thought that perhaps the Healing Lodge was 
itself an unwise concept -  even though we might see the integrity and desperation 
which inspired it -  because the compromises necessary for a prison meant that too 
much was lost in terms of Aboriginal identity and honour. In the hands of CSC
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culture and spirituality became but concepts on which to hang another style of 
imprisonment, despite their initial acceptance of the legitimacy of an Aboriginal 
prison. They also became concepts which could be ‘sold’ to other jurisdictions by 
corrections. So while a new model of confinement might have been developed for 
Aboriginal women, it was still imprisonment, and therefore a non-Aboriginal 
construct. As I have earlier suggested, the consequences of this development for 
Aboriginal federally sentenced women have been very specific. In a coercive 
environment they have become part of a doubly-responsibilising strategy.
Aboriginal federally sentenced women are now answerable to two authorities; CSC, 
and their own Nations, as represented by the Elders and the Ke-kun-wem-kon-a- 
wuk. Their instincts might incline them towards Aboriginal authority, but the reality 
remains that the Healing Lodge is a Euro-Canadian operated prison. In order to 
overcome the hurdles imposed by Euro-Canadian laws, and reach their parole 
eligibility date, Aboriginal federally sentenced women must primarily abide by the 
demands of the dominant culture. Aboriginal women -  and their Elders -  are being 
asked to compromise and deny their Aboriginal heritage by an organisation which 
has only a superficial grasp of what this might mean. And when women fail, as 
some inevitably will, it is likely that it will be the Aboriginals’ vision of a prison 
which is blamed, rather than the actual source of discipline, CSC.
So, were the Aboriginals right to join the Task Force and fight so hard for the 
primacy of their views? What cannot be ignored is the fact that most of the women 
dying in the Prison for Women were Aboriginal and on that basis alone NWAC 
could justify their decision to participate, as had the other voluntary sector members. 
Whether they should have taken the next step and become involved in planning a 
Healing Lodge is far harder to answer. While I share Waldram’s conclusion that 
Aboriginal culture and spirituality have a part to play in the healing of Aboriginal 
prisoners, I am not convinced that an Aboriginal prison itself has a part to play in the 
restoration of Aboriginals to their own communities, as the history of the prison 
teaches us that prisons have an extraordinary power to adopt the language of reform 
and subvert it. The incorporation of Aboriginal beliefs into penal discourse can only 
weaken the authority of Aboriginal culture once prisoners see that it has no final 
power over Euro-Canadian belief systems, as has become painfully apparent at the 
Healing Lodge, with the now compulsory attendance at the morning Spiritual Circle.
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The Aboriginal members of the Task Force might have been left in a less distressing 
position had they simply pushed for the employment of more Aboriginal staff within 
the new conventional prisons, rather than for a so-called Aboriginal prison now run 
by Euro-Canadians. By this means Elders could have continued to participate in the 
life of each prison openly, while acknowledging the limitations -  imposed upon 
them by their relationship with CSC -  which have a particular impact upon 
confidentiality. At the Healing Lodge the women need immediately to be aware that 
they cannot assume matters disclosed to an Elder will remain private.
The advent of Section 81(1) of the CCRA, whereby Aboriginal communities can 
apply to ‘provide correctional services for Aboriginal offenders’, offers a means for 
Aboriginals to take responsibility for offenders within their own communities, albeit 
still under the authority of Euro-Canadian law, and it will be instructive to see what 
solutions Aboriginals eventually find solely for themselves. Having been 
inextricably linked to the planning of the Healing Lodge the Aboriginals cannot now 
avoid being linked to its outcome. As I suggested in chapter 8, failure at the Healing 
Lodge could lead to the creation of an Aboriginal-inspired and sanctioned version of 
the despised and discredited residential schools, wherein Aboriginal women are 
subjected to discipline in order to make them ‘good’ Aboriginals, as opposed to 
‘good’ Canadians. The Aboriginal members of the Task Force and of the HLPC 
have all taken a tremendous risk.
And yet, and y e t ... it remains hard to be largely critical of the enterprise. The 
position I have taken is, in many respects, based upon a critical examination of the 
compromises required of Aboriginals, flowing from their participation in the 
planning of the Healing Lodge. The position itself can be subject to criticism 
because it concentrates on questions relating to loss, rather than what might have 
been gained by the enterprise. While I believe it is essential that we should examine 
the consequences of the incorporation of culture and spirituality into penal 
discourse, in order to broaden our understanding of the way in which bureaucracies 
warp intentions, I accept that the perspective is also distorted if we do not include 
what is gained by the process of reform. What cannot be denied is that some 
Aboriginal federally sentenced women have derived support and comfort from the 
Healing Lodge. They are not necessarily concerned about some of the issues I have
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explored in this chapter and have found at the Healing Lodge the personal space to 
reconnect with who they are as Aboriginal women. They might not all have 
succeeded in avoiding a return to prison, but have begun a journey which might 
finally enable them to achieve that. My assumption is that the Aboriginal members 
of the Task Force would take comfort from that possibility, because few of their 
‘sisters’ would have found such strength within the Prison for Women.
Learning the lessons?
The risk of failure is not confined to the Healing Lodge. One of the main concerns 
of the Task Force was that their work might lead to the creation of five mini-Prisons 
for Women, and the advent of the new Secure Units suggests that four of the new 
prisons are perilously close to realising that fear. The prisons face enormous 
challenges as they enter a new phase. With only one exception, they all have new 
Wardens and, with other staff also leaving, the vision of Creating Choices is now 
dependent upon the skill and commitment of those who have assumed their roles. 
The woman-centred training, so essential when the first staff were being recruited, 
was reduced by half, and some new workers transferring from other prisons received 
none at all.6 Although this has implications for all the prisons, especially as more 
men are hired, it has a particular impact upon the Healing Lodge, where staff 
underwent training of a quality and depth which could have been the exemplar for 
the rest of the prisons.
Whatever my criticisms of Creating Choices might be, the report undoubtedly 
contained a visionary, if utopian, model of imprisonment for federally sentenced 
women. Had it been fully implemented, a larger proportion of federally sentenced 
women might have benefited from the greater degree of physical freedom which it 
anticipated. However, this Canadian model has also demonstrated the ‘severe 
limitations of seeking change through the justice system’ because of the ‘unequal 
impact of reform’ (Shaw 1997: 11). More specifically it has highlighted the manner 
in which bureaucracies incorporate the language of reform, redefine its meaning and
6 The women-centred training has recently been re-instated as a 10-day course.
7 The Cross Gender Monitor was appointed by CSC following a recommendation o f Mme. Justice 
Arbour. The Third Cross Gender Monitoring Report (2000) recommended that males should no 
longer be hired as front-line Primary Workers because CSC had failed to pay attention to the 
Project’s earlier recommendations regarding how men might be deployed.
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strip it of context. Because the Task Force remained faithful to its largely feminist 
instincts in refusing to ignore the women’s ‘before-prison’ lives, it has been 
criticised for the way in which it characterised the majority of federally sentenced 
women as victims of socio-economic exclusion. This perspective largely did not 
survive implementation and the reality of the women’s lives outside prison, most 
often defined by poverty, racism, abuse and limited choice, impinged little on the 
way the women were subsequently provided for by CSC. The women were seen as 
in need of help to address the offending which had led to conviction, and their 
offending was frequently dealt with as an innate part of their pathology, rather than 
as a response to exclusion. By using the language of feminism -  such as 
‘empowering’ women to make ‘responsible choices’ -  in an official correctional 
document, the Task Force unwittingly permitted CSC to appropriate and re-define 
the language. As Hannah-Moffat (2000: 190) shows, ‘feminists and correctional 
officials have conflicting interpretations’ of this shared language and the Task Force 
could not disown the language once it was subsequently reinterpreted. The woman- 
centred vision of the Task Force, however well intentioned, ignored the reality that 
prisoners are often rendered powerless by virtue of their containment, and that 
‘empowerment’ is limited by both lack of power and the inability to choose freely.
As has been articulated in more detail elsewhere, prison is frequently seen as the site 
wherein offending women’s needs may best be addressed. There is a widespread 
tendency to assume that ‘something must be done’ with prisoners, simply by virtue 
of the fact that they are held captive. Indeed, CSC is legally mandated to work 
towards the rehabilitation of prisoners. Yet the stigma of prison is later carried into 
the community by those women whom the prison sought to ‘correct’ (see Carlen, 
2002; Hannah-Moffat, 2001, Hannah-Moffat and Shaw, 2000; Kendall 2000, Eaton, 
1993). In suggesting that each prison should be ‘programme driven’ and how this 
might ‘holistically’ be accomplished (TFFSW 1990: 118), the Task Force did not 
seriously challenge the orthodoxy that women should be ‘treated’ while in prison. 
Taking the report’s title literally, CSC set about providing programmes. These were 
not necessarily compulsory, even though many women thought they were viewed as 
such. If specific programmes were then included as part of a woman’s Correctional 
Plan, and she refused to participate, she could be penalised by reduced pay or failure 
to get a better job within the prison, and her non-participation might also be noted at
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a Parole Board hearing. The consequence of her choice was decided by the 
correctional authorities, rather than herself, denying the woman any of the autonomy 
for which the Task Force had planned.
The question of choice and agency within a coercive environment is a troubling one, 
particularly when the correct choices are so rarely defined by the women 
themselves. Hudson (2002: 43) suggests that agency and choice are frequently 
conflated, becoming a ‘synonym for will, [assuming] an either / or character, such 
that persons have (freedom of) choice or they do not’. As she continues, ‘some 
people have far more choices than others’ and this is particularly true in the context 
of imprisonment. Most choices in prison are never freely made, occurring in the 
context of the possible consequences of decision-making, and the sub-text of 
discipline, which underscores every aspect of a prisoner’s life. The additional 
expectation that these Canadian prisoners might also make ‘responsible’ choices, in 
order to contribute to the dynamic security of an institution in which they are 
involuntarily detained, further complicates their situation. They are not simply 
being asked to take responsibility for their own actions and to maintain self­
surveillance, but are being drawn into the net of control surrounding all the federally 
sentenced women and, as a consequence, sublimating their own needs. Agency and 
choice are thus conflated with responsibility. A number of women will find 
resistance to such demands an essential strategy for coping with the loss of self 
which imprisonment entails, seeing such strategies as a means of asserting their own 
identity, but correctional authorities might interpret such strategies as a failure to 
make responsible choices. This is not to suggest that women should never have 
options presented to them. The crucial point is that individual women should be 
allowed to refuse to explore -  or to delay exploring -  issues which might have 
contributed to their offending and that they should be able to do so in the full 
knowledge of the possible consequences, such as failure to meet Parole Board 
requirements. This means recognising that the women themselves are often more 
likely than staff to know the extent of their own ability to cope at various stages of 
their imprisonment. Some of the compulsory core programmes being presented to 
these women as ‘choices’ require that they explore past abuse in an environment 
which often neglects to provide consistent support. The fact that many federally 
sentenced women in Canada are returning to reasonably furnished ‘rooms’, rather
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than austere cells, after each therapeutic session does not minimise the risk inherent 
in such activities, or resolve the dilemma of involving correctional staff as 
facilitators of therapy (see Eaton, 1993). The Task Force’s attempt to make ‘bad’ 
women ‘good’ is simply a re-working of the much older debate about the competing 
aims of therapy / treatment and imprisonment. As Cressey (1960: 506) suggested, 
the ‘essential custodial and punitive functions of a prison make inmates hostile to it 
even if they are understood and treated there’. However prisons may be disguised, 
they remain places where people live under duress.
Looking Back
Those on the outside can never fully understand the demands and pain of the 
discipline of the prison, and participation in attempts to ‘re-form’ the prison is 
properly contingent upon that knowledge. This Canadian venture has demonstrated 
the limitations and risks of such attempts. Many in the voluntary sector feel 
compromised, incorporated and betrayed by their association with CSC and now 
question the wisdom of having abandoned their principles in order to join the Task 
Force. CAEFS in particular, having learned the lesson of being neutralised by CSC, 
has returned to its advocacy role and become a vigilant critic of Corrections. The 
wish to ameliorate the harm inflicted by imprisonment originally drew CAEFS and 
others into CSC’s embrace. Simply on that basis, the Task Force on Federally 
Sentenced Women was right to try and lessen some of the inequities of the Prison 
for Women. But the members were largely wrong to think that their participation 
might have a lasting beneficial impact on how most federally sentenced women 
would be provided for, not least because correctional agencies have no interest in 
seeing their spheres of influence diminish. The names and language of the voluntary 
sector have been incorporated into the larger correctional agenda and their 
participation has indeed contributed to the ‘oppression’ of some of their ‘sisters’. As 
Shaw (1996b: 195) rightly suggested, Creating Choices diverted attention from 
‘rethinking the use of imprisonment’.
Yet a proportion of federally sentenced women have benefited from the work of the 
Task Force, so the Canadians cannot be said to have failed completely. In choosing 
to use the word ‘failure’ as my assessment of the work of the Task Force and the 
implementation of Creating Choices, I am judging the outcome by the high
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standards the Task Force set itself. Their work became tightly focused on a vision 
of providing imprisoned women with greater autonomy in a less oppressive physical 
setting. In interpreting the Task Force’s vision of what ‘success’ might have been, I 
do not suggest that offending women should never be subjected to regulation. I do, 
however, contend that women’s patterns of offending, by comparison with those of 
men, should be taken into account when determining the extent and manner of the 
regulation. Federally sentenced women are, by definition, at the most serious end of 
the offending spectrum, yet their crimes are often situated in a history of extended 
abuse throughout their lives -  and sometimes from their victim -  with research 
showing that they are ‘often not at risk of re-offending violently against the general 
public’ (Hannah-Moffat and Shaw, 2001: 15). CSC’s own research shows that those 
serving long-term sentences of over ten years duration8 are amongst the most stable 
of the federal population (see Luciani, 2000; Grant and Johnson, 2000), which 
suggests that the Task Force’s reluctance to label women as ‘difficult to manage’ 
was justified. (However, stability within prison is not necessarily a prediction of 
stability outside, and correctional authorities cannot assume that such women no 
longer pose a threat to the public.) We have already seen that CSC has now decided 
that between 20 to 25 percent of the federally sentenced women are in need of 
‘intensive intervention’, with 13 percent of these likely to be housed in the new 
Enhanced Units once they open. At the other end of the spectrum, the type of 
accommodation available for just eleven minimum security women at Isabel 
McNeill House (which is outside the perimeter of the closed Prison for Women, and 
still functioning) has not been replicated at the new prisons. While the new prisons 
have relatively little of the claustrophobic atmosphere of the old prison in Kingston, 
it is still only the medium security women who now have a greater degree of 
physical freedom.
Creating Choices was premised on the notion that federally sentenced women, 
despite their offences, generally presented a low risk within prison, or to the public, 
and needed support, rather than excessive security. This is the point I wish to 
emphasise; that for many of the women, their present regulation is once again 
heavily dependent upon levels of security disproportionate to their actual risk within
8 Based on figures from 1999, when 82 women were in this category, representing a little less than 
20% o f the total federally sentenced women population.
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the prison. Moreover, that their regulation by means of available programming 
‘choices’ is now linked to the maintenance of those excessive levels of security. 
CSC’s own research also supports this, describing the long-term female population 
as a ‘resource’, in that they ‘can be trained to provide services within the prison’, 
such as Peer Support (Grant and Johnson 2000: 25). It is the link to the management 
of the prison itself which is contentious, rather than the regulation. In a sense, it is a 
denial of the very autonomy envisaged by the Task Force whereby women were 
expected to make choices relevant to their own needs, rather than the prison’s.
So I contend that, when adopting the standards of the Task Force, it is fair to attach 
the word ‘failure’ to much of what has happened following the implementation of 
Creating Choices. Whether or not the initial vision was fully realisable, insofar as it 
was too utopian in scale, the current implementation of the plan incorporates a re­
interpretation of the Task Force’s vision which appears to suit the needs of the 
correctional authorities, rather than the women themselves. The very positioning of 
the Enhanced Units as separate entities within the larger, and now fenced, prisons 
demonstrates the disparities between the various groups of imprisoned women.
Yet complete failure of the Task Force would have meant the Prison for Women still 
functioning as a prison. It has been closed. There are those who now suggest that 
the Prison for Women was not as bad as claimed, and that insufficient heed was paid 
to the problems women brought inside with them. The implication now is that the 
women were the problem, rather than the prison itself (see Hayman, 2000). What 
should never be forgotten is the sheer physical inadequacy of the malign old prison. 
In the short period between December, 1988 and February, 1991 six women 
committed suicide inside the Prison for Women and another woman took her life, a 
short distance from the prison, within days of being released on parole. In the seven 
years since the new prisons opened in 1995 there have been two suicides, at 
Etablissement Joliette. A woman committed suicide in the co-located maximum- 
security unit at Saskatchewan Penitentiary and a woman also took her life in the 
Burnaby Correctional Centre. These figures demonstrate that the new prisons have 
an infinitely better record than did the Prison for Women, and on that basis alone the 
Task Force has fully justified its work.
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But the corollary of the Task Force’s ‘success’ has been an increase in capacity for 
federally sentenced women and conditions for maximum security women which are 
certainly, in terms of their physical containment, the equivalent of anything the old 
Kingston prison offered. Summarising the Fatality Inquiry into the death of Denise 
Fayant, at Edmonton, Judge Chrumka (2000) characterised the venture as an 
‘untested concept’. In the sense that her needless death was ‘the test’, he was right. 
But, as penal history makes clear -  and as this story has charted -  the Canadian 
undertaking was not untested. It had its roots in the work of the first women prison 
reformers, who wanted both to improve prison conditions and the women 
themselves, without necessarily challenging the need for imprisonment itself. The 
Task Force hoped that federally sentenced women, in a physically freer 
environment, would be enabled to make choices leading to their personal 
reformation. Creating Choices articulated this vision, using the language of 
feminism to suggest that personal change was feasible within the confines of an 
‘institution’. The reality of the prison itself disappeared under the weight of the 
illusory language adopted by the Task Force, and members could not bring 
themselves to say bluntly that change was to be effected through the use of 
punishment. Imprisonment is punishment and reform of the prison must always 
acknowledge that inescapable fact. While punishment is fundamental to the prison 
experience, it does not mean that it should go hand in hand with a nihilism 
suggesting that no good may emerge from the punishment. So the provision of 
varied programmes should also be part of the prison, in the hope that personal 
change may be facilitated. Such assistance can be -  and is -  provided outside the 
prison walls and, if the aim were simply to make offending women ‘good’, then 
those not a danger to others or themselves could be kept in the community. But 
offending women (and men) are deliberately sent to prison for punishment, not for 
improving programmes. There is no other explanation for the existence of ‘the 
prison’. Where much of the reform enterprise comes spectacularly adrift is in its 
resolute refusal to publicise this central fact: that reform is in tandem with existing 
and continuing punishment. Creating Choices contributed to this masking of the 
real meaning of imprisonment through its refusal to make explicit such hard issues. 
But while we continue to make the prison central to the control of aberrant 
populations we should acknowledge the commitment and integrity of those prepared 
to engage in the political act of trying to lessen some of the inequities of the prison.
340
The Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women can look back at the signal 
achievement of having closed the Prison for Women.
Creating Choices has a significance beyond Canada because of its focus solely on 
imprisoned women and their needs. Indeed, the report has become part of that 
history of penal reform which the Canadians generally ignored as they tried to find 
Canadian solutions for a Canadian problem. The lessons of implementation have 
moved beyond gender and show the continuing power of the prison to survive and 
subvert its redefinition. The prison’s essential discipline cannot be masked by 
spacious grounds, attractive architecture and seemingly benevolent programming. 
As Rothman, Cohen and others have consistently demonstrated, prisons are always 
in a state of being transformed, or re-formed, in the hope that an adjustment here, or 
rebuilding there, will provide the solution to the intractable problem of why prisons 
do not work. Prisons are not places of healing; they are sites of coercion, repression 
and pain. The Canadians were but the latest in a long line of reformers hoping to 
find the grail of penal reform. Their failure to do so cannot be blamed on an 
imperfect implementation of their plan, or entirely, on those responsible for its 
flawed implementation, or on the women themselves. The lesson we should derive 
from what has happened in Canada is that the Task Force’s venture is simply 
another footnote in the history of trying to repair what is fundamentally irreparable. 
The Task Force’s failure was inevitable because the basic premise of imprisonment, 
that you can coerce people into being good, by depriving them of their liberty and 
imposing change upon them, is fatally flawed.
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... to persuade the Canadian government to ... appoint its own Royal Commission on the 
Status of Women. The resultant Commission led directly to the appointment of an 
eponymous minister in 1971.
3 Expanding upon the methodology
a Site visits
In 1996 I visited Nova Institution for Women (Nova Scotia), Etablissement Joliette 
(Quebec), Grand Valley Institution for Women (Ontario), Edmonton Institution for 
Women (Alberta), the Okimaw Ohci Healing Lodge (Saskatchewan), the Prison for 
Women (Ontario), Burnaby Correctional Centre for Women (British Columbia), the 
Provincial Correctional Centre (Sackville, Nova Scotia), Maison Tanguay (Quebec) and 
the Minnesota Correctional Facility-Shakopee (Minnesota). In 1998 I revisited the first 
six of the prisons already listed, but more time was spent at the three I had by then 
decided to examine more closely -  Edmonton, Nova and the Healing Lodge. I also 
visited Springhill Institution (New Brunswick), where a unit for maximum security 
federally sentenced women had been opened following the withdrawal of all such women 
from the new prisons, and the Regional Psychiatric Centre, in Saskatoon (Saskatchewan). 
In 2000 I again returned to the Healing Lodge, the only one of the new prisons I visited 
three times.
3b Ensuring confidentiality
During the course of the fieldwork I conducted 32 semi-structured taped interviews with 
members of the Task Force, civil servants, representatives from the voluntary sector, 
academics, civil servants and prison wardens. Additionally, I interviewed some who 
preferred not to be taped, making brief notes during each unrecorded interview and 
expanding upon these considerably when completing my field notes each day. All 
interviewees were given verbal assurances regarding confidentiality and the subsequent 
transcriptions were later coded to ensure this. Those reluctant to be taped were entirely 
prison staff and the principal reason cited was their concern about confidentiality. This 
was largely understandable, as some had been interviewed in connection with events that 
had taken place at their own prisons and the consequent publicity had been widespread.
A few, despite having no knowledge of me beyond the fact that I had been granted access 
to the prisons by CSC, made a point of seeking me out because they wanted their views 
to be heard, albeit anonymously. Some prison staff agreed to speak to me in the company 
of others, leaving me with the feeling that this was a protective strategy, ensuring a 
collective responsibility for what was said. It should also be clarified that this reluctance 
to be taped became more marked the longer the prisons were open and subject to public 
scrutiny and criticism. But the fact that I returned to the prisons seemed to suggest to 
some staff that I had not previously ‘rocked the boat’ and those who recognised me were 
more forthcoming than they had previously been.
The taped interviews generally lasted about an hour and were most frequently conducted 
in the interviewee’s home or office. On one occasion two interviewees participated in an 
interview and, as it happened, this was conducted -  at their request -  during a restaurant 
meal. As the surrounding tables filled, and the noise level increased, the recording was 
later increasingly difficult to transcribe, because their voices were similar and they tended 
to interrupt each other in an effort to give their view of particular events. On another 
occasion I unexpectedly met someone whom I had wanted to meet, but had not contacted 
because I could not afford to travel to where she lived. She was conducting her own 
research at one of the prisons I was visiting and this serendipitous meeting led to another 
noisy interview in a local bar. With the exception of these two interviews, most of the 
tapes took some four hours to transcribe and were often a good ten A4 pages in length. 
While each interview need not necessarily have been transcribed in such detail, I found it 
helpful to be able to review all that was said, as details which initially appeared incidental
4sometimes assumed a new importance. The complete transcripts also indicated where I 
had been sidetracked by the flow of a conversation and needed to pursue angles more 
vigorously. This meant that some interviewees were later asked to expand upon certain 
points, either in a further face-to-face interview, by telephone or by letter. At no stage 
did I use a computer ‘package’ for any of the analysis, with the inevitable consequence 
being that examining them all the interviews took a considerable time.
Arranging all the interviews -  indeed, the whole field-work timetable -  was a protracted 
affair. When I first embarked upon the research I spent months prior to departure writing 
to individuals, first to ascertain that they would meet me and then to arrange a specific 
date. Few were linked to e-mail, so my letters were posted -  and replies awaited, 
sometimes for many weeks. The telephone became the back-up and this often meant 
waiting until late at night so that I could speak to people on the west coast after they had 
returned from work. The timetable for my first field visit, which lasted seven weeks, 
took some months to finalise. It was also hopelessly optimistic, in terms of how much 
could be achieved each day, as I had underestimated the difficulties posed by the 
geographic scale of Canada. I failed to incorporate any ‘rest’ periods into the schedule 
and spent all of the first seven weeks of fieldwork in the prisons, travelling or 
interviewing. By the time I reached the Healing Lodge, which was the last of the prisons 
scheduled for a longer visit, I was tired, having unnecessarily driven from Calgary, when 
it would have been wiser to fly part of the way, had I known. The daily journey to the 
prison itself was initially demanding. I had been sent a hand-drawn map which, in effect, 
suggested that I follow the telegraph poles along what turned out to be an unsealed, 
largely single-tracked road. Upon arrival at the Lodge I was disconcerted by its very 
different operating style, compared with those prisons I had earlier visited, and felt 
doubly aware of my outsider status because of the prison’s cultural dimension. This 
combination of tiredness and uncertainty led to my leaving the Healing Lodge a day 
earlier than planned; I had reached an impasse, but felt too foolish to explain fully. In 
subsequent trips to Canada I, unsurprisingly, knew better what to expect and planned 
accordingly. An added bonus was that many more interviewees could be reached via e- 
mail and, as the Wardens were by then known to me, I could also arrange visits by 
telephone.
5Those listed so far were not, of course, the only interviewees. A particularly important 
part of the research centred on being able to talk with federally sentenced women. 
Understandably, I could not pre-arrange any of this and, as indicated in the body of the 
thesis, I was heavily reliant on the goodwill of staff whenever I wanted time alone with 
women. Generally, this was not a problem and all of the prisons allowed me to move 
relatively freely, as long as I carried a dyster.1 None of the conversations with the 
women were recorded. I initially assumed that I would not be allowed to take a machine 
out to the women’s houses, an assumption which I never chose to test and which might 
have been wrong. It would have been helpful to have had the women’s comments in 
more detail, but I also wanted to retain a degree of informality, so instead relied on my 
field notes for general views. The Healing Lodge was the only one of the new prisons 
which did not allow me to visit women, by myself, in their living lodges; I had to be 
accompanied by a member of staff. As this made confidentiality impossible I relied on 
informal meetings with women in the main Lodge itself. Three of the prisons took care 
to ensure that I was introduced to the women through the formal mechanism of the 
Inmate Committee. At one of these prisons I was intensively questioned by the Chair of 
the Committee, who emphasised that my visit was yet another intrusion into their lives. 
Once she had made that clear, she then spent the following days ensuring that I met 
specific women and that I heard as many views as possible. Another aspect of meeting 
the women was that I met several twice, but in different prisons. Some had been 
transferred from the Prison for Women to one of the new prisons and a few had 
transferred from a new prison to the equally new Healing Lodge. Hearing their different 
experiences was invaluable, as they were in a position to compare developments and 
contrast them with what they had been led to expect.
The question of confidentiality remained a vexed one throughout, but more specifically at 
the writing-up stage. The perspectives offered by some of the participants were at times 
highly personal and, by this, I also mean highly identifiable. It was possible to use some 
of the information they provided in a general way when I was formulating questions for 
future interviews. Indeed, it was helpful to know of the antagonisms which existed 
during the life of the Task Force so that I could skirt around some issues, whilst not 
altogether avoiding them. However, the main difficulty resided in the fact that a number
1 The term ‘dyster’ is explained in the Introduction.
6of the respondents were civil servants or correctional officials, and their livelihood could 
be affected by any indiscretion on my part. Part of the function of being a public official 
is the acceptance of a degree of public accountability and in these interviews individuals 
were being questioned about policies they had helped draft and implement, in their 
capacity as public officials. Yet they were also being asked to respond to criticisms of the 
project which had been levelled by others, and repeated by myself. At various stages in 
each interview they could have resorted to an ‘official’ response and refused to engage in 
any debate, yet none attempted to deflect questions. I am not suggesting that 
confidentiality was an over-riding concern for these officials -  and the very fact that their 
particular branch of the civil service had granted me research access implied that the 
subject matter was open to debate and scrutiny. But permission to speak does not absolve 
an official of responsibility for what he or she might say and these interviewees were 
dependent upon my discretion. I am not suggesting that any were foolishly outspoken; 
many strongly defended their positions, but were also prepared to acknowledge some 
failures in planning and implementation. Perhaps I was the one with undue concerns 
about any risks they took, being aware of how officials in the prison service in England 
and Wales had sometimes been pilloried for their (occasional) frankness.
Representatives from the voluntary sector also expected anonymity, but were more 
accustomed to criticising policies and developments (for which they had no 
implementation responsibilities), because that was one of the aspects of their job. Using 
quotations in the thesis was consequently problematic because I had to ensure that an 
informed reader would not be able to identify an interviewee. On a number of occasions 
I chose to use information derived from interviews (which had been corroborated by 
other interviews and separate documentation) as a paraphrased background to the story I 
was developing. I also decided against specifying just how many individual civil 
servants or Task Force members, for example, were interviewed, so that the identifiable 
field could not be narrowed. Two of the interviewees subsequently agreed to provide 
named quotes, as is apparent in the text.
Problems of confidentiality were not confined to interviews, taped or otherwise. Gaining 
access to the Task Force records was a pivotal moment during the research, but led to my 
facing further difficulties, because a number of the papers were confidential. I might 
read what had happened, but could not necessarily quote from the documents and to use
7them injudiciously could have had repercussions for those who granted me access. This 
left me with a dilemma, because some of the papers confirmed versions of events which I 
had been hearing about during interviews, but could not be cited as verifiable references. 
Fortunately, some documentation was available from non-governmental sources and, 
ultimately, there were very few points I had to ignore, and none that were fundamental to 
the accuracy of the thesis.
What I am trying to convey is that there was a network of information providers, almost 
all of whom knew each other. I found myself in the midst of this network, trying to act 
discretely and responsibly, but also becoming the repository of confidences which I had 
not expected to receive. It was very evident that participation in the Task Force had 
sometimes been a painful experience, to the extent that some of my interviewees did not 
want to read what I eventually wrote because they did not want to relive those days. For 
prison staff the situation was somewhat different, because they were still involved in the 
enterprise and some had been greatly affected by events at the new prisons. Maintaining 
the anonymity of all these sources was a constant preoccupation during the writing of this 
thesis.
c Structure o f CSC during the Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women
Solicitor General
Task Force 
c o m p r i s e d  o f
Working GroupSteering Committee
Commissioner of Corrections
Senior Deputy Commissioner
Deputy Commissioners (5)
responsible fo r  the correctional regions
A t l a n t i c
Q u e b e c
O n t a r i o
P r a i r i e
P a c i f i c
8NB A Deputy Commissioner for Women was first appointed in 1996, bringing 
the possible number of Deputy Commissioners to six. (The present incumbent is also 
responsible for a region.)
4 The victimised offender?
A major theme of this thesis has been the way in which federally sentenced women were 
characterised as victims, as much as victimisers, and the way in which this outcome was 
heavily determined by the Task Force’s understanding of Canada’s colonial engagement 
with its Aboriginal nations. I have detailed how the Task Force’s failure to be 
prescriptive about providing accommodation for women seen to be ‘difficult to manage’ 
within the prison system was intimately linked to its reluctance to label such women. I 
have also shown that the Task Force, in accepting its Aboriginal members’ construction 
of the Aboriginal female offender as the victim of her history and social environment, did 
not then choose to view other federally sentenced women differently. In other words, the 
Task Force did not establish a hierarchy of victimhood, let alone one based on ethnicity; 
all federally sentenced women were seen in the context of a socio-economic background 
from which the great majority emerged.
This willingness to see the wider picture did not emerge simply because of the 
conjunction of those particular people on the Task Force. During the eighties there was 
an emerging body of academic work focusing on victims and how they were 
characterised. There was a growing recognition that victims, in the criminal justice 
arena, were not necessarily only those who had suffered at the hands of offenders and this 
was nowhere more apparent than in the area of domestic violence. Women who killed 
their abusers were slowly being re-assessed as women who might sometimes have 
reacted to prolonged provocation; in short, they themselves had been victimised prior to 
their offence. Pizzey (1974) was one of the first to highlight the extent of domestic 
violence in the United Kingdom and in North America there was a parallel recognition of 
a hitherto hidden problem. In Canada Boyle et al (1985; cited in Ratushny, 1997) 
suggested that, in dealing with women who kill in self-defence, ‘the law ... should 
require the court to examine the facts from the perspective of the accused’. Ratushny 
later led the Self-Defence Review of ‘cases of women convicted of homicide which 
occurred in the context of an abusive relationship’. This Review was a government
9response to the ground-breaking 1990 case of Lavallee2, wherein ‘the Court recognised 
that the experiences, background and circumstances o f the accused should be taken into 
account in determining whether she actually believed she was at risk of serious bodily 
harm or death and had to use force to preserve herself, and the reasonableness of her 
beliefs’ (Ratushny, 1997: 16, emphasis added). While this might not seem immediately 
relevant, particularly as the Lavallee decision was reached by the Supreme Court of 
Canada a month after the Task Force published Creating Choices, it is cited here as 
evidence of changing attitudes towards women. Such changes had been energetically 
pursued in many spheres, largely by feminists, during the preceding decade and would 
have been familiar to all on the Task Force. Additionally, as Westervelt (1998: 14, 
emphasis added) shows, the ‘victimisation defence strategy refers to the use of social 
victimisation as a means of explaining why an actor should be justified or a wrongful act 
excused, and therefore why responsibility should be absolved’. Westervelt demonstrates 
that such a defence may be used equally well by males but, in the context of this 
Canadian venture, the interpretation o f ‘social victimisation’ may be expanded to 
incorporate those very issues which came to preoccupy the Working Group of the Task 
Force. Specifically, the federally sentenced women’s: socio-economic position; history 
of physical and sexual abuse, and addiction; and, in the case of Aboriginal women, their 
inherited experience of colonialism, manifest in dysfunctional families and communities.
The Task Force embraced this wider explanation of victimisation, whilst not absolving 
federally sentenced women of responsibility for their actions, and subsequently found it 
almost impossible to regard federally sentenced women solely as victimisers. Their 
reluctance to label came to be seen as a failure of the Task Force because it eventually 
allowed CSC to devise its own solution when some women did not cope with -  or appear 
to fit -  the new model prisons. While this may be true, until now there has been no 
coherent explanation of why the Task Force chose to emphasise, to such a degree, the 
social inequities faced by federally sentenced women, rather than their offending 
histories. It is important for the historical record to explain the very real dilemmas the 
Task Force faced in addressing Canada’s colonial record and the impact that this had on 
their decision-making.
2 R. v. Lavallee (1990) 1 S.C.R. 852
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However, there is a wider explanation for CSC’s ability to subvert the report’s intentions, 
and that resides in the language of Creating Choices itself. The terminology used by the 
Task Force in its final document relied heavily on a feminist-influenced (or ‘woman- 
centred’) language of reform. In offering the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) a 
philosophical document written in this manner, the Task Force allowed the language of 
feminism to be incorporated into the official discourse of reform, precisely because 
Creating Choices could only be implemented by the authority legally mandated to 
administer federal prisons -  which was CSC. Creating Choices was the official rationale 
for what was to eventuate.
I suggest that this was largely an unwitting action by the Task Force. During many 
months of often painful negotiation with each other the Working Group had agreed a 
terminology which was widely accepted, and understood, by other feminists and 
members were therefore confident that the report’s meaning could not be misconstrued. 
What the Working Group, and Task Force as a whole, failed to anticipate sufficiently was 
the possibility that those responsible for implementation might be subjected to external, 
political pressures they could not withstand, leaving the report’s feminist language 
vulnerable to re-interpretation by those unsympathetic to its intent. I have already 
suggested that a greater familiarity with the literature of prison reform might have alerted 
Task Force members to the possibility that their work would be used to legitimate the use 
of imprisonment itself, rather than simply to provide a more benign prison. As Carlen 
(2002b: 222) suggests, ‘the power to punish by imprisonment is not static and its 
legitimacy has to be constantly renewed’. One of the means of doing so is the 
incorporation of reforming discourse (what Carlen calls ‘common-sense ideologies’) into 
the official discourse -  and, for this to happen, reformers need to be engaged in debate 
with correctional authorities. Such debates do not necessarily have to be conducted 
within the constraints of formal alliances. They can be by means of reports drafted by 
campaigning groups (see The Wedderburn Report, 2000), or by means of reports from 
officials, such as those of the Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales. The 
language of apparent reform used by correctional authorities may be taken from many 
sources. When such organisations actively encourage an exchange of views (as happened 
when the Women’s Policy Group of HM Prison Service solicited the views of various 
voluntary groups, prior to publishing The Government’s Strategy fo r  Women Offenders; 
Consultation Report, Home Office, 2001), then subsequently quote from submissions in
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their reports, this gives every appearance of the rhetoric having been absorbed. This is 
not necessarily the case, because the intentions behind the original language are not 
always observed, yet the words remain in the public domain, adding legitimacy to official 
discourse because they have been gathered from non-governmental sources.
When organisations, such as CAEFS in Canada, decide to collaborate with the 
correctional authorities -  because they have reached the point where constructive 
criticism no longer seems sufficient, as ‘the prison’ is so patently seen to be unsafe and 
failing -  they do so with considerable reservations. Largely, these centre on the risk of 
their being incorporated into the business of imprisonment, when their real function is 
that of astringent critic. As has been apparent in this thesis, CAEFS’ members felt that 
they had reached the point where their options were foreclosed. And although their 
reservations were apparent during the work of the Task Force, CAEFS’ representatives 
became, to a certain extent, caught by the momentum of what they were undertaking. 
They dared hope that this particular project would be the exception to those littering the 
wayside of penal reform. I have already discussed the lessons readily available to them 
by virtue of what had happened in North America once women’s reformatories began to 
be established (see also Freedman, 1981; Strange, 1983; Rafter, 1992; Hannah-Moffat, 
2001). Zedner (1991), in chronicling Victorian attitudes to women’s criminality in 
England, offers rich parallels with those same North America reformatories and present- 
day attitudes to offending women, particularly in relation to their socio-economic status, 
their mental health and their addictions (then being largely alcohol, rather than alcohol 
and drugs, as now). Female prisoners during the period of Zedner’s study were, even 
then, subjected to closer surveillance than were males, leading to heightened tensions 
and, unsurprisingly, the emergence of a determined few whose ‘discipline ... subjected 
the whole female convict population to increasingly rigid regulation’ (Zedner 1991: 213). 
Zedner’s work would not, of course, have been available for the Task Force, but it is part 
of a body of work highlighting the limits, risks and consequences of reform (see also 
Rothman, 1970 and 1980 ; Cohen, 1985). In the Canadian case the consequences have 
been severe for those women defined as ‘difficult to manage’, in that their level of 
regulation is now infinitely greater than was ever anticipated by the Task Force.
If we return, at this point to Carlen (2002b: 221) we may reflect on her analysis of what 
she terms ‘carceral clawback’, a process which she sees, in one respect, as being
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‘powered by the common-sense ideologies of optimistic campaigners’ and ‘the prisons’ 
continuing need for legitimacy’. The prison can never succeed fully (as this would mean 
its self-destruction), yet it must always be seen to be working towards success, because 
its efforts legitimate its existence. In these terms, the prison’s very failure ensures its 
continuance, as there is never a point reached where reformers feel it is safe for them to 
disengage from attempts to ameliorate the harm inflicted by the prison. Yet failure to 
disengage means that the rationale for the prison -  punishment -  is inconsistently 
examined and is even less likely to become part of a public debate. Despite its manifest 
failings the prison remains bewilderingly and resolutely triumphant as the pivotal means 
of punishing the deviant. As my concluding remarks make clear (see chapter 9) I believe 
that the Task Force, in the understandable wish to close the Prison for Women, lost sight 
of the fundamental fact that prisons exist to punish, and its members began to hope that 
their projected model prisons might actually do good. Creating Choices glossed over the 
reality that prisons are not benign places of rehabilitation and that any doing of good is 
incidental to the prison’s purpose. At this point I depart from Carlen (2002a: 120) when 
she refers to ‘those who might be disheartened by the unexpected turn of events in the 
Canadian federal prisons for women’ (emphasis added). The events in Canada have been 
entirely consonant with other attempts at penal reform, because they demonstrate the 
unfailing ability of the prison to reassert its supremacy over those attempting its reform. 
The present outcome should not have been unexpected.
Yet, while the ever-failing, ever-successful, prison exists as a central expression of 
society’s wish to punish the deviant, reformers cannot avoid engaging in debate. The 
scale and means of engagement, as exemplified by the Task Force on Federally 
Sentenced Women, will always be contentious, especially when it involves the planning 
of new prisons. Reformers have little alternative but to articulate an alternative vision of 
imprisonment, even while working towards its eventual demise, but face the risk that 
their language will be incorporated into -  and will legitimate -  official penal discourse. 
The Canadian reformers accepted that challenge and showed a manifest courage in 
refusing to categorise offending women solely by their offence. They, rather than their 
subsequent critics, acknowledged the reality of the lives of federally sentenced women. 
However, in planning their ‘ideal prison’ (Hannah-Moffat and Shaw, 2000), the Task 
Force also managed to conjure up an ‘ideal’ federally sentenced woman to benefit from 
their new penal environment. In ignoring the women’s inevitable diversity, the Task
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Force also ignored the possibility that the women’s socio-economic background, which 
they had taken such trouble to emphasise, might be the very reason that some of the 
federally sentenced women were so confounded by what awaited them. Those same 
women were then labelled by correctional authorities as ‘difficult to manage’ (in ever- 
increasing numbers) and their hard-won, and brief, status as victims (who had also 
victimised others) seemed increasingly illusory. What this shows is that the good 
intentions of those Canadian reformers, in wishing to.avoid labelling women as violent, 
disruptive offenders, led directly to more federally sentenced women being labelled 
‘difficult to manage’ and to their greater victimisation within the new prisons themselves.
